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Preface
Taking South Africa as an important case study of the challenges of structural 
transformation, this volume offers a new micro- meso level framework and evi-
dence linking country- specific and global dynamics of change, with a focus on 
the current challenges and opportunities faced by middle- income countries. 
Detailed analyses of industry groupings and interests in South Africa reveal the 
complex set of interlocking country- specific factors underlying the patterns of 
structural transformation over three decades—from the 1990s and the first demo-
crat ic election in 1994, up to 2019. The book also shows how new global drivers 
of change—digital industrialization, global value- chain (GVC) consolidation, and 
sustainability management—are reshaping structural transformation dynamics 
across middle- income countries like South Africa. While these new drivers of 
change are disrupting existing industries and interests in some areas, in others 
they are reinforcing existing trends and configurations of power.
By structural transformation, we refer to changes in the structure of the econ-
omy towards activities with the scope for sustained high growth in productivity, 
in particular through cumulative improvements. This has a strong sectoral 
dimension, and specifically recognizes the central importance of industrialization 
to a path of sustained economic growth and catching- up. We draw attention not 
just to the need for change in the broad sectoral composition of the economy, but 
also to the heterogeneity within, and linkages between, sectors. Developments 
such as the ‘industrialization of freshness’, digitalization and technological 
upgrading, and the changing nature of value- chain linkages between activities all 
point to the need for a sophisticated and nuanced approach to sub- sectors and to 
the diversity of activities within sectors.
Structural transformation is being recognized internationally as critical for 
economic development. It figures prominently on the international development 
agenda—such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)—and national pol-
icy debates, especially among low- and middle- income countries. This recogni-
tion is linked to a growing field of academic literature which advances the debates 
on industrialization and industrial policy. Some of these contributions have also 
started to link structural transformation to the major global drivers of change, 
including climate change, digitalization, and the new terms of trade and produc-
tion along GVCs.
A structural transformation approach understands the relationships between 
economic structure and performance in dynamic terms, taking into account sec-
tor- and country- specific conditions, as well as the institutional and political 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 21/07/21, SPi
vi Preface
economy factors that underpin the processes of structural change (or lack 
thereof).
South Africa offers an important case study of a middle- income country which 
has emphasized the importance of structural transformation, in particular 
through its industrial policies. Black economic empowerment policies and com-
petition law have also been important initiatives adopted by the South African 
government, as it seeks to drive the structural transformation of the country and 
address the entrenched industrial structure and its concentration. The outcomes, 
however, have been mixed, as the analyses in the book suggest.
A number of chapters in the volume draw on research undertaken under the 
auspices of the Industrial Development Think Tank (IDTT), based at the University 
of Johannesburg.1 The IDTT is a collaboration between the Department of Trade, 
Industry, and Competition (DTIC),2 the Centre for Competition, Regulation, and 
Economic Development (CCRED) (which also houses the IDTT), and the DST/
NRF South African Research Chair in Industrial Development (SARChI 
Industrial Development).
The book contributes to the new literature on structural transformation and 
the understanding of the challenges it presents in the South African context in 
three main ways.
First, the book aims to engage the academic literature by developing a micro- 
meso level analysis of the specific processes and interdependencies underlying 
countries’ structural transformation. This micro- structural perspective is original 
in its framing of structural transformation in detailed analyses of industry group-
ings and ecosystems, including the interests, sources of economic power, and 
governance. It then links these micro- meso dynamics to the global forces driving 
economic, institutional, and social change.
Second, the book applies this framework to South Africa. The structural trans-
form ation trajectory of South Africa presents a unique country case, given its 
industrial structure, concentration, and highly internationalized economy, as well 
as the objective of black economic empowerment. It is also an important case 
because of the country’s economic and political role on the African continent. 
The South Africa case offers a prism through which to investigate what structural 
transformation means for middle- income countries today, in light of the rapid 
global changes in technologies, competition, and industrial organization.
Third, building on and expanding the analysis of the case of South Africa, the 
book links country- specific and global dynamics, with a focus on the new chal-
lenges and opportunities faced by middle- income countries. In particular, the 
book engages with three major global drivers of change: digital industrialization, 
1 Background working papers to those chapters are available at https://www.competition.org.
za/idtt/.
2 Formerly the Department of Trade and Industry (‘the DTI’).
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GVC integration and consolidation, and environmental and other sustainability 
challenges. The book analyses the ways in which both the domestic and global 
drivers of structural transformation shape—and, in some cases, are shaped by—a 
country’s political settlement and its evolution. By focusing on the political econ-
omy of structural transformation, the book disentangles the specific dynamics 
underlying the South African experience. In so doing, it brings to light the 
broader challenges faced by similar countries in achieving structural trans form-
ation via industrial policies.
Chapter 1, ‘Framing Structural Transformation in South Africa and Beyond’, 
locates the case of South Africa in the wider context of structural transformation 
in middle- income and other developing countries. In this chapter, Antonio 
Andreoni, Pamela Mondliwa, Simon Roberts, and Fiona Tregenna set out a spe-
cific analytical perspective on structural transformation. They argue that struc-
tural transformation is a complex, long- term historical process entailing both 
structural change in the sectoral composition of an economy, as well as broader 
societal changes in the productive organizations, institutions, and political econ-
omy of a country. With a focus on South Africa as a middle- income country, the 
chapter advances a holistic and integrated perspective on the nature and dynam-
ics of structural transformation and highlights a specific set of interlocking crit-
ic al factors and dimensions. These are: the processes of learning and productive 
capabilities development and accumulation; technological changes—digitalization, 
specifically—and their relationship with sustainability; power dynamics along 
GVCs and their relation to inequality; and finally, the political economy of devel-
opment and the role of the state. Over the course of its democratic history, since 
1994, South Africa has not undergone sustained and thoroughgoing structural 
transformation. Despite some areas of partial success, there has been premature 
deindustrialization, lack of sufficient development of the local production system 
alongside weak integration into GVCs, and persistent cross- cutting challenges of 
inclusiveness and sustainability. The authors suggest that the holistic and inte-
grated framework developed here can help in developing a policy approach to 
devising feasible and effective packages of industrial policies for structural 
transformation.
In Chapter  2, ‘Structural Change in South Africa: A Historical Sectoral 
Perspective’, Nimrod Zalk traces how policies and institutions flowing from the 
post- apartheid political settlement gave rise to a range of rents and rent- like 
transfers, which have not been adequately invested to advance structural trans-
form ation. Rather, corporate and industrial restructuring has been associated 
with a ‘high- profit low- investment’ economy and deindustrialization. Low invest-
ment, job losses, and limited black participation in the ‘commanding heights’ of 
the economy from the mid- 1990s spurred the political impetus for a stronger role 
for the state in the 2000s. The chapter argues that the formal introduction of 
industrial policy in 2007 has had some successes and has helped to avert even 
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deeper deindustrialization. However, it has been undermined by unsupportive 
macroeconomic policies and a weak articulation between policies to advance 
black ownership and structural transformation. Rising corruption and mal-
admin is tra tion have further undermined structural transformation. A striking 
pattern of low investment and large- scale job losses in tradable sectors is evident. 
Manufacturing has exhibited limited structural transformation, showing a con-
tinued primacy of capital- intensive chemicals and metals and unsatisfactory 
growth of diversified manufacturing sectors. Zalk reflects on the implications of 
South Africa’s structural transformation experience for other middle- income 
developing countries. These implications include the need to elevate industrial 
policy and structural transformation as an economy- wide imperative rather than 
a ‘microeconomic’ one, and recognize that the failure to structurally transform 
can fuel the conditions for unproductive rent- seeking and corruption to flourish.
Chapters  3 to  7 analyse structural transformation in South Africa through 
industry case studies. Chapter  3, ‘Metals, Machinery, and Mining Equipment 
Industries in South Africa: The Relationship between Power, Governance, and 
Technological Capabilities’, by Antonio Andreoni, Lauralyn Kaziboni, and Simon 
Roberts focuses on the metals, machinery, and mining equipment industries, 
which have been at the heart of South Africa’s industrial ecosystem. Their central 
position is associated with the long- term importance of mining, and with which 
there are extensive demand- and supply- side linkages. This chapter reviews key 
turning points in the development and restructuring of these value chains in 
post- apartheid South Africa, from 1994 to 2019. The overall record is of a basic 
steel industry that has performed better in terms of value added relative to the 
more diversified downstream industries, despite government industrial policy 
targeting more labour- intensive downstream industries. The downstream 
machinery and equipment industry struggled to compete with imports in the 
2000s and 2010s and only partially engaged with digitalization. In explaining 
these developments, the authors critically examine the grand bargains struck by 
the state, with the main company producing basic steel and the use of procure-
ment as a demand- side industrial policy. The chapter also provides micro- level 
evidence of the evolving relationships between mining houses; engineering, pro-
curement, and construction management services companies; and input sup pliers 
along the value chain. Overall, it is argued that the relatively poor performance of 
this industry grouping in South Africa has been due to power asymmetries along 
the value chains, upstream concentration, high levels of fragmentation in the 
domestic ecosystem, the lack of key institutional ingredients, and poor policy 
design. Lessons for resource- endowed middle- income countries are discussed, 
and policy challenges for upgrading and diversification are presented.
Next, the plastic industry is discussed in Chapter 4, ‘Leveraging Linkages for 
Developing Plastic Products: An Assessment of Backward Input Linkages from 
Polymers and Forward Output Linkages to the Automotive Industry’, by Jason Bell, 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 21/07/21, SPi
Preface ix
Lorenza Monaco, and Pamela Mondliwa. The chapter considers the role of 
linkages, lead firm strategies, industrial policies, and value- chain governance in 
the performance of the South African plastic products industry. The chapter 
assesses the extent to which the linkages of the plastic products sub- sector 
backwards with the polymers industry, and forwards to plastic automotive com-
ponents, have influenced the performance of the industry. The forward linkages 
to the automotive industry are assessed through a comparative assessment of 
techno logic al capability accumulation in South Africa with its relatively more 
successful upper- middle- income counterpart, Thailand. The analysis shows that 
vertical integration and horizontal collaborations through clusters, as well as the 
different roles played by multinational corporations and the state, have exerted a 
stronger influence on the accumulation of capabilities in Thailand, compared 
with South Africa. The assessment of backward linkages to polymers shows how 
the linkage development in South Africa has been undermined by market power 
in the upstream polymers industry. This is coupled with a failure of industrial 
policy to support diversified industries such as plastic products, including 
through addressing the challenges related to input prices and supporting the 
accumulation of capabilities.
Chapter  5, ‘Government Policy in Multinational- Dominated Global Value 
Chains: Structural Transformation within the South African Automotive 
Industry’, by Justin Barnes, Anthony Black, and Lorenza Monaco focuses on the 
automotive industry. Through a series of government plans, undeniable success 
has been achieved, especially in terms of its export orientation. The industry uses 
efficient technologies and is integrated into global markets. However, major 
structural weaknesses exist. Export growth has not been accompanied by increas-
ing local content, investment has been modest, and employment creation insig-
nificant. Vehicle and component imports into the domestic market are high and 
the industry runs significant trade deficits. Most core technologies are imported, 
including advanced power trains and electronics. This chapter considers the 
structural impediments to the sector’s development, as well as issues related to 
ownership and power relations between the state and multinational firms. 
Analysing the potential for further localization and the deepening of the supply 
chain, the chapter considers global technology developments, domestic pro duct-
ive capabilities, and power dynamics in the GVC. The chapter argues that state–
business bargaining dynamics have negatively affected this potential. While 
efforts to deepen the supply chain would allow for more sustainable growth, the 
achievement of such goals is impossible without concerted commitment from all 
stakeholders.
In Chapter 6, ‘The Industrialization of Freshness and Structural Transformation 
in South African Fruit Exports’, Christopher Cramer and Shingie Chisoro- Dube 
provide a new perspective on the agricultural value chain. Economists have his-
torically tended to identify industrial processes and technological sophistication 
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with manufacturing, and not with agriculture. This chapter illustrates the sub-
stantial scope to apply sophisticated technologies and industrial processes neces-
sary to shift resources out of low- productivity activities into higher- productivity 
activities, i.e. to generate ‘structural change’, in the production of ‘fresh’ agricul-
tural export production. Leveraging the concept of the ‘in dus tri al iza tion of fresh-
ness’, this chapter uses evidence from South Africa’s fresh- fruit industry to show 
how advances in technology have been a key mechanism through which struc-
tural transformation towards high- value fruit has occurred in the industry. 
Cramer and Chisoro- Dube also show how building capabilities to harness 
techno logic al changes is necessary for increased market access through enabling 
producers to keep up with escalating quality standards; to comply with the 
many—and complex—sanitary and phytosanitary requirements; and to adapt to 
climate change. However, despite evidence of dynamism in fruit production, 
effective structural transformation in the South African fruit industry has been 
limited by widespread underinvestment in infrastructure—ports, rural internet 
capacity, water infrastructure, and technical capacity.
Chapter 7, ‘Sustainability and Green Capital Accumulation: Lessons from the 
South African Wine Value Chain’, highlights how sustainability and green capital 
accumulation go hand in hand. Stefano Ponte argues that these operate on the 
back of a structural logic that allows the extraction of value from producers as 
they attempt to improve their environmental performance. The case study of the 
wine industry in South Africa is, at a superficial level, a success story of economic 
and environmental upgrading and of improved international competitiveness. 
However, Ponte analyses how the growing concentration of the wine industry 
globally has come together with increased bargaining power by retailers and 
international merchants, which is leading to a cascade of squeezed margins 
upstream all the way to grape and wine suppliers. This chapter shows that: (1) 
sustainability is used opportunistically by global ‘lead firms’ for marketing, repu-
tational enhancement, and risk management purposes; (2) South African value- 
chain actors and institutions have invested heavily in portraying the industry and 
individual companies as caring for the environment; and (3) major economic and 
environmental upgrading processes in the South African wine value chain have 
taken place, but have not led to positive economic outcomes for most domestic 
players. Collectively, these lessons suggest a combined process of capital accumu-
lation by lead firms, coupled with a process of supplier squeeze.
The chapters that follow turn to a number of cross- cutting social, institutional, 
and power dynamics that underpin structural transformation. These are central 
to the South African experience, but are also relevant to understanding the chal-
lenges of structural transformation in other middle- income countries. Chapter 8, 
‘Structural Transformation, Economic Power, and Inequality in South Africa’, 
examines how economic power, understood as control over accumulation, has 
influenced the poor progress of structural transformation in South Africa. 
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Sumayya Goga and Pamela Mondliwa argue that this, in turn, has impacted on 
inequality through income and wealth effects. The chapter asserts that the failure 
to diversify and develop downstream capabilities in manufacturing in South 
Africa reflects, among other things, the entrenched advantages of incumbent 
upstream firms, as well as the lack of a policy agenda for transformation that 
incorporates a recognition of the economic power of these upstream firms. The 
inability to change the patterns of accumulation underlies the persistent inequal-
ity in income and wealth. The chapter involves an analysis of interests in the 
South African economy within key industry groupings (specifically the metals 
and plastics value chains), and how these interests have set agendas and shaped 
policy and regulation to set the rules of the game for the benefit of upstream 
firms. Goga and Mondliwa’s analysis shows that economic structure is a source of 
economic power, and that the relative strength of the upstream industries means 
that their interests are better served than those of diversified downstream 
industries.
In Chapter 9, ‘Black Economic Empowerment, Barriers to Entry, and Economic 
Transformation in South Africa’, Thando Vilakazi and Teboho Bosiu discuss the 
key issue of black economic empowerment in relation to structural trans form-
ation. One of the main challenges of South Africa’s democratic project has been 
supporting the effective participation of the previously excluded black majority in 
the economy. The broad- based black economic empowerment (BBBEE) policy, as 
the primary tool employed to drive racial transformation, is assessed and found 
to have had a limited impact, although there has been some progress. The chapter 
considers the link between structural transformation and black economic 
empowerment in three key parts. First, relevant literature is drawn on to build the 
argument that inclusion matters for structural transformation. Second, is an 
examination of the factors that have underpinned the challenges with the imple-
mentation of BBBEE to open up the economy for broader participation, including 
its limited focus on key barriers to entry, and the implications for structural 
transformation in South Africa. Third, the chapter presents a case study based on 
a survey of applicants under the government’s ‘black industrialists scheme’ as a 
critical evolution from, and alternative to, the approach followed with BBBEE, as 
it is able to contribute to both racial and structural transformation of the econ-
omy. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the roles of black economic 
empowerment and the black industrialists scheme, barriers to entry, and struc-
tural transformation of the economy.
Chapter  10, ‘Profitability without Investment: How Financialization 
Undermines Structural Transformation in South Africa’, takes up the issue of 
finance. Antonio Andreoni, Nishal Robb, and Sophie van Huellen argue that sus-
tained investment in productive capabilities and fixed- capital formation is a key 
driver of inclusive and sustainable structural transformation. Both historically 
and compared to other middle- income countries, South Africa has performed 
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poorly in terms of sustaining domestic- productive investments. This failing has 
coexisted with the development of a stock market with the second- highest level of 
capitalization over GDP in the world, and high levels of profitability across sev-
eral economic sectors. This chapter provides new evidence on the specific ways in 
which the financialization of non- financial corporations in South Africa has 
resulted in low investment performances, focusing on two large, publicly listed 
corporations operating across different economic sectors between 2000 and 2019. 
The analysis shows that despite sector heterogeneities, (1) corporations have 
increasingly financed operations, capital expenditure, and distributions to share-
holders with debt; (2) the US dollar- denominated share of this debt has grown 
rapidly, exposing corporations to increased exchange and interest rate risk; and 
(3) distributions to shareholders, driven by dividends rather than share repur-
chases, have risen markedly. The authors attribute these financialization dynam-
ics to the distribution of power in the domestic political economy and the 
subordinate nature of South Africa’s integration with global finance. Driving 
financialization, these two mutually reinforcing factors have undermined the 
translation of profits into domestic investment, reducing its capacity to drive 
structural transformation.
Chapter 11, ‘The Middle- Income Trap and Premature Deindustrialization in 
South Africa’, by Antonio Andreoni and Fiona Tregenna takes an international 
comparative perspective on structural change in South Africa. South Africa has 
been experiencing premature deindustrialization and poor growth over an 
extended period of time. Premature deindustrialization is among the key factors 
locking many middle- income countries in a trap of stagnant growth and thwart-
ing their catching- up with advanced economies. Premature deindustrialization 
shrinks middle- income countries’ opportunities for technological development, 
and also their capacity to add value in GVCs, which reduces their scope for the 
sustained increases in productivity required for catching up. Andreoni and 
Tregenna analyse key structural factors contributing to a ‘middle- income tech-
nology trap’. Throughout the chapter, reference is made to the divergent experi-
ences of three middle- income comparator countries to South Africa: Brazil, 
China, and Malaysia. Building on this framework, the chapter presents new 
econometric evidence of premature deindustrialization in South Africa through 
an international comparative lens. By studying the relationship between coun-
tries’ GDP per capita and their shares of manufacturing in total employment, the 
authors identify the level of GDP per capita and share of manufacturing in total 
employment associated with the ‘turning point’ at which the share of manufactur-
ing levels off and begins to decline. The chapter groups countries into four cat-
egor ies based on their (de)industrialization dynamics, and identifies possible 
premature deindustrializers, among which South Africa is found. South Africa’s 
lack of structural transformation helps to explain its failure to escape the middle- 
income technology trap.
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The issues of technological upgrading, and specifically digitalization, are taken 
up in Chapter  12, ‘Digitalization, Industrialization, and Skills Development: 
Opportunities and Challenges for Middle- Income Countries’, by Antonio 
Andreoni, Justin Barnes, Anthony Black, and Timothy Sturgeon. The world econ-
omy is undergoing a period of structural and technological transformation, 
driven by the increasing digitalization of economic and social life. Digitalization 
is being experienced differentially across the globe, reflecting the different oppor-
tunities it offers as well as the particular challenges countries face in digitalizing 
their economic systems. This chapter looks at the opportunities and challenges of 
digital industrialization through the lens of the South African case. In South 
Africa, digitalization is occurring in an economy that has prematurely de in dus-
trial ized, where the digital capability gap in terms of digital infrastructures and 
skills is wide, and where organizations need significant investments to retrofit 
their existing systems. Despite this, South Africa has islands of excellence in 
which firms are embracing the opportunities provided by digitalization to achieve 
greater efficiency, process innovation, and supply- chain integration. These 
ex amples point to what is possible, while at the same time revealing gaps and 
shortcomings. The potential and shortcomings are evident both across firms (in 
terms of their investment rates), within GVCs (domestic firms, engagement with 
multinationals), and across public institutions and industrial policies. The devel-
opment of digital skills in cross- cutting fields such as data science and software 
engineering, as well as transversal technologies in complementary services, are 
identified as particularly important. The chapter concludes with a discussion of 
the policy implications for South Africa and beyond.
In Chapter  13, ‘Global Value Chains, “In- Out- In” Industrialization, and the 
Global Patterns of Sectoral Value Addition’, Antonio Andreoni, Keun Lee, and 
Sofia Torreggiani focus on the role of GVCs in structural transformation. Since 
the emergence and diffusion of regional and GVCs, production- chain develop-
ment has always played a key role in shaping countries’ structural transformation. 
Over the years, the geographical breadth, length, and depth of these chains has 
changed significantly. Building on the catching- up experience of South Korea and 
China, this chapter investigates the conditions and processes under which today’s 
catching- up economies can benefit from integrating into GVCs. The chapter 
empirically documents how successful catching- up has been associated with an 
‘in- out- in’ industrialization process of GVC integration: where countries first 
‘couple’ by entering GVCs in low value- added segments, then ‘decouple’ by build-
ing domestic supply chains and upgrading existing local capabilities, and finally 
‘recouple’ by performing high value- addition activities in GVCs. The authors also 
assess the extent to which middle- income countries like South Africa have man-
aged to increase their sectoral value addition in this global production settlement 
over the last two decades. The chapter finds that today’s middle- income countries 
have experienced different fortunes at the country and sectoral level when it 
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comes to increasing domestic value addition. The chapter concludes, reflecting on 
possible future scenarios arising in the post- Covid- 19 international context and 
the emergence of potential new industrialization models.
The last two chapters of the book engage with the political economy of struc-
tural transformation and advance a new industrial policy framework and agenda 
for South Africa. Chapter 14, ‘The Political Economy of Structural Transformation: 
Political Settlements and Industrial Policy in South Africa’, examines the evolu-
tion of the political settlement in South Africa. Pamela Mondliwa and Simon 
Roberts argue that this is critical for understanding its structural transformation 
path as well as for the reconfiguration of industrial policy. The success or failure 
of countries to drive structural change is understood in terms of the extent to 
which the political settlement, or governing coalition of interests, supports the 
growth of diversified industrial activities with higher levels of productivity. The 
chapter analyses why and how, despite the developmental agenda of the ruling 
African National Congress (ANC), South Africa has failed to achieve its produc-
tion transformation. According to Mondliwa and Roberts, the political settle-
ment forged around South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy has 
created the conditions for a corporate restructuring of the economy character-
ized by high profitability, despite low investments. This has involved power 
entrenchment in large incumbent organizations and coalitions of rentieristic 
interests, which have undermined necessary industrial policy enforcement. 
Persistently high un employ ment and inequality have fuelled dissatisfaction and 
contestation over the core objectives of a more developmentalist state. Industrial 
policies have also been undermined by the fragmentation of the state, leading to 
misaligned policies.
Finally, Chapter  15, ‘Towards a New Industrial Policy for Structural 
Transformation’, by Antonio Andreoni, Pamela Mondliwa, Simon Roberts, and 
Fiona Tregenna analyses some central challenges and policy implications relating 
to structural transformation in South Africa and in middle- income countries 
more broadly. The South African case provides important insights into the chal-
lenges facing middle- income countries as they attempt to build productive cap-
abil ities to drive their structural transformation. Despite South Africa having 
opened up and integrated with the global economy, liberalizing trade and finan-
cial markets, it has remained stuck in relatively lower- productivity activities with 
weak diversification of exports. There continues to be a strong path dependency 
where markets are structured and shaped by previous investment decisions, state 
interventions, and entrenched rentieristic interests. The authors identify five 
important lessons. First, premature deindustrialization needs to be arrested and 
reversed, including the growth and upgrading of the manufacturing sector. 
Second, the technological changes underway with the digitalization of economic 
activities mean that developing an industrial ecosystem of firms with effective 
links to public institutions is critical. Third, inclusive industrialization depends 
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on achieving structural change and dismantling barriers to entry to allow a new 
system of accumulation to emerge. Fourth, structural transformation depends on 
a country’s political settlement, specifically whether coalitions of interests that 
support the organization of industries for long- term investment in capabilities 
hold sway. Fifth, purposive and coordinated industrial policies are central to 
achieving these goals and improving the country’s productivity and competitive-
ness. These are applied to identify key considerations for industrial strategy in 
South Africa, including confronting concentration and the urgent implications of 
the climate crisis, to ‘build back better’ from the Covid- 19 pandemic.
We hope that this volume will make an important contribution to research and 
policy debates on structural transformation, in South Africa, and in middle- 
income countries and developing countries more widely.
Antonio Andreoni, Pamela Mondliwa, Simon Roberts, and Fiona Tregenna
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This volume offers highly original perspectives on structural transformation in 
South Africa. It provides sophisticated analyses of productive transformation at 
the sectoral level, based on profound understanding of national political economy 
and global technological trends. It is a unique contribution to industrial policy 
making in middle-income countries. 
—Ha-Joon Chang, Reader, University of Cambridge
Can industrial policy achieve structural transformation in a developing country 
in the 21st century? This fascinating volume identifies new and emerging con-
straints in the context of South Africa, including GVCs, automation, digitalisa-
tion and much else—and provides a positive agenda for economic policy in the 
new context. A must-read for policy makers and researchers on development.
—Jayati Ghosh, Professor of Economics, University of 
Massachusetts, Amherst
The policy challenges facing middle-income countries have, for far too long, been 
neglected by the development community, squeezed out by an undue focus on 
countries where extreme poverty is the norm and a misguided faith in attracting 
more foreign investment as a guarantee to catching up. Drawing on the South 
African experience, this volume is a timely contribution to filling the gap. 
Blending heterodox economic analysis with selected sectoral case studies, the dif-
ferent chapters examine the damaging legacy of the Washington Consensus on 
the South African economy and make a clear and convincing case for putting 
industrial policy back at the centre of development strategy, not only to correct 
past failures but to manage the new challenges arising from an increasingly digi-
talized, monopolized and environmentally fragile world. While the South African 
economy takes centre stage in the volume, the analysis and policy recommenda-
tions speak to a wider audience across the developing world. A valuable read.
—Richard Kozul-Wright, Director of the Globalisation and Development 
Strategies Division, United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
This book is a reminder of the unfinished business of building economies that can 
deliver shared prosperity. This is especially so for South Africa, a middle-income 
country that has faced economic stagnation in the decade following the Great 
Recession. In its earlier years, post-apartheid South Africa scored significant 
achievements in extending basic services to the majority of the population and 
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reversing the poor macroeconomic metrics inherited from the apartheid regime. 
But to deliver sustained and inclusive growth, the fundamental structure of the 
economy must be tackled. The deep research presented in this book provides 
decision-makers across various sectors of society with the material to think 
deeply about how the South African economy creates value and the nature of its 
integration in a rapidly evolving global economy.
—Trudi Makhaya, Economic Advisor to the President of South Africa, 
President Cyril Ramaphosa
As we navigate an increasingly uncertain terrain, this book offers a comprehen-
sive and insightful look into the challenges South Africa faces in the quest for 
greater inclusive industrial development. The inclusion of industry experts along-
side in-depth investigations by academics provides a realistic analysis of the cur-
rent landscape with future prospects for transformation. This is an important and 
powerful contribution to steering debates away from rhetoric towards reality.
—Tshilidzi Marwala, Vice Chancellor and Principal of 
the University of Johannesburg 
A highly original and coherent volume blending theories of developmental and 
entrepreneurial state, with impeccably researched deep dives into the South 
African economy and society. A timely mine of new evidence to design policies 
and shape markets towards inclusive and sustainable development.
—Mariana Mazzucato, Professor, UCL Institute for Innovation 
and Public Purpose 
‘Structural Transformation in South Africa is a timely and distinct book for 
researchers and policymakers who are interested in structural transformation of 
developing and emerging economies. Diverse leading scholars present deep ana-
lysis anchored in rich development concepts with a practical application to South 
Africa and linking to the challenges of middle-income countries and global 
dynamics. South Africa presents a particularly riveting case as one of the most 
advanced economies in Africa, with a large confluence of factors shaping its 
industrial policy. The book’s emphasis on new industrial policy geared to struc-
tural transformation within the context of global drivers that shape it, and the 
extensive use of rich empirical data add to its significance.’
—Arkebe Oqubay, Minister and Special Advisor to the 
Prime Minister of Ethiopia
This volume makes a critical contribution to improving our understanding of 
industrial development and structural change in developing countries. Through 
in-depth analyses of key industries and policy issues in South Africa, it develops a 
coherent, ambitious and well-grounded agenda for rethinking industrial policy in 
South Africa and other middle-income countries.
—Imraan Valodia, Professor and Dean, University 
of Witwatersrand, South Africa
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Framing Structural Transformation 
in South Africa and Beyond
Antonio Andreoni, Pamela Mondliwa,  
Simon Roberts, and Fiona Tregenna
1.1 Introduction
Over the course of its democratic history, since 1994, South Africa has struggled 
to sustain an adequate process of structural transformation, to move from sectors 
of low to high productivity and complexity, and to upgrade to higher value- added 
activities within sectors. The structural transformation that has occurred has 
been discontinuous and uneven. Ongoing premature deindustrialization has 
negatively affected the long- term performance and potential of the economy. 
Despite some areas of relative success, overall growth and upgrading in industries 
have been constrained by low levels of investments. Firms have struggled to build 
their productive capabilities, diversify their production activities, and develop 
their domestic supply chains. Given this weakening industrial base, the engage-
ments with global value chains (GVCs) and the emerging technologies of the so- 
called fourth industrial revolution have been limited, and have generally not 
delivered the desired outcomes. The imperatives of greater inclusion and environ-
mental sustainability are additional and major cross- cutting challenges within the 
overall challenge of structural transformation.
Structural transformation is a complex, long- term historical process entailing 
both structural change in the sectoral composition of an economy and broader 
societal changes in the productive organizations, institutions, and political econ-
omy of a country. Industrial development and structural transformation are 
in tim ate ly linked as the industry- led productive transformation of the economy 
has been recognized as a critical driver of inclusive and sustainable structural 
transformation (UNIDO, 2020). Causality runs in both directions, as in dus tri al-
iza tion both drives and is sustained by broader social, institutional, and political 
economy changes. And these changes are crucial for delivering sustainable and 
inclusive outcomes along countries’ development journeys.
Structural transformation—industrialization in particular—figures prom in ent ly 
on the international development agenda; for instance, inclusive and sustainable 
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industrialization features in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs, 2015–30). The shift from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs, 
2000–15) to the SDGs marks an important turn in the development discourse, 
which has reintroduced a more holistic notion of ‘development as structural 
transformation’, beyond the more limited focus on ‘development as poverty 
reduction’ (Andreoni and Chang, 2017). This paradigmatic shift was pushed by 
the transformational experience of successful late industrializers such as South 
Korea, as well as the contribution to poverty reduction of China, in particular, as 
the largest late industrializer.
As a whole, this book examines South Africa as an important case study of the 
range of challenges that structural transformation presents, as well as locating 
South Africa’s experience in an international context. Detailed analyses of indus-
try groupings and interests in the country reveal the complex set of interlocking 
country- specific factors which have hampered structural transformation over 
several decades, but also the emerging productive areas and opportunities for 
structural transformation. Links between country- specific and global dynamics 
of change are identified, with a focus on the challenges and opportunities faced by 
middle- income countries.
In this chapter, a specific analytical perspective on the nature and dynamics of 
structural transformation is advanced, and a set of interlocking critical factors 
and dimensions is identified. Framing the contributions that follow in the subse-
quent chapters of the book, the chapter first engages in a discussion of emerging 
perspectives on structural transformation. Next is an evaluation of the extent to 
which South Africa has succeeded or failed in structural transformation, with a 
focus on particular aspects of industrial performance. This is followed by an 
exposition of the holistic framework and each of its dimensions, and their rele-
vance in each of the chapters.
1.2 Structural Transformation: Emerging Perspectives
Despite the resurgence of interest in structural transformation, contributions 
have focused mainly on the impact of changes in the sectoral composition of the 
economy on increases in cumulative productivity and growth performances. 
Thus, studies have chiefly focused on a specific set of issues, including: structural 
change and productivity dynamics within and across sectors (Rodrik,  2008 
and 2014; McMillan et al., 2014); the role of endowment structures in the ‘new 
structural economics’ and the ‘growth identification and facilitation’ approach 
(Lin,  2011; Lin and Monga,  2011; Lin and Wang,  2020); and the macroeco-
nomic link between structural change and economic growth (Ocampo et al., 
2009). Some studies have attempted to move one step further in explaining 
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factors driving structural change. These have mainly focused on different 
trade- based analyses of diversification in the so- called ‘product space’ (see for 
example Hausmann and Rodrik,  2003; Hausmann et al.,  2007; Hidalgo and 
Hausmann, 2009).
Structural transformation is, however, a much more complex process which 
entails both the recomposition of the economy at the sectoral level and broader 
societal changes in the productive organizations, institutions, and political econ-
omy of a country. From this perspective, only by analysing these context- specific 
micro- dynamics of change and their relationship with the evolving international 
context can the major factors responsible for structural transformation (or the 
lack of it) be fully understood. Embracing this complexity, the holistic framework 
advanced in this volume focuses on four dimensions of structural trans form ation: 
learning processes and capabilities development, technological change, economic 
and power relationships along value chains, and broader political economy 
dynamics.
These dimensions have been identified starting from the recognition of struc-
tural transformation as a historical process in which global and local power 
dynamics constantly shape the economic structure, as it moves along more or less 
productive pathways. The relationships between economic actors along value 
chains and the emergence of different institutional and social configurations are 
therefore an intrinsic part of structural change. They are both drivers and out-
comes of structural transformation. Through these processes, effective employ-
ment creation in formal industrial sectors, and the diversification of the economy 
with a more diffused distribution of organizational power, are key to changing the 
social and political economy dynamics. These, in turn, reinforce transformation 
in the economy.
Sector- specificity and the evolving nature of sectors matter too, in that differ-
ent sectors have different characteristics that are relevant for growth. Several clas-
sical contributions (Prebisch, 1950; Hirschman, 1958; Kaldor, 1966) in particular, 
have regarded the manufacturing sector as having features that accord it a special 
role as an engine of growth. These include dynamic increasing returns to scale; a 
high propensity for learning- by- doing; greater scope for technological and or gan-
iza tion al capabilities development; tradability and hence importance for balance 
of payments; strong growth- pulling intersectoral (especially backward) linkages; 
and its importance as the locale for economy- wide technological progress 
(Tregenna,  2009 and  2013). However, major technological and organizational 
changes—digitalization and the vertical disintegration of industries into GVCs—
have led to a shift in the ‘terrain of the industrial’ (Andreoni, 2020). As a result, 
new activities at the interfaces of agriculture, manufacturing, and services have 
increasingly shown some of the traditional properties associated with manufac-
turing that are critical for structural transformation. Indeed, the application of 
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manufacturing technologies and organizational practices, including the 
 digitalization of production, has meant a blurring of sectoral boundaries, 
 complex evolving industry organizations, and new business models (Cramer and 
Tregenna, 2020). This includes the growing importance of knowledge- intensive 
and production- related business services such as design and post- sale services 
(i.e. servicification), as well as the changing nature of the industrialization of 
 agricultural production.
The state plays a key role in driving and steering this broader economic change 
(Chang and Rowthorn,  1995; Andreoni and Chang,  2019). Governments and 
public institutions create new markets and unlock structural coordination prob-
lems such as interdependent investments in productive assets and direct demand 
expansion. Governments also play a moderating role in contested claims on the 
redistribution of this created value among productive organizations, groups, and 
segments of the society and polity. Finally, by implementing industrial policies, 
governments allocate rents among different constituencies, thus shaping the 
incentive structure of the economy; and by implementing regulatory policies, 
they address competition and the concentration of power in markets.
Contributions in the fields of institutional economics and the political econ-
omy of industrial policy have stressed the political nature of institutions and rec-
ognition that the state is a key player in constructing and shaping the institution 
of the market. The literature on the political economy of development and gov-
ernance, and the political economy of industrial policy, has expanded signifi-
cantly over the last decade in particular.1
Some of these contributions have also started to link structural transformation 
to the major global drivers of change, including climate change, digitalization, 
and the changing terms of trade and production along GVCs. Specifically, going 
back to the original roots of the GVC research agenda and its relationship with 
dependency theory (Evans, 1979; Gereffi, 2018), there has been an increasing rec-
ognition of the pervasive and multidimensional role of organized power in the 
economy, in the local and global context, as well as at the interfaces along value 
chains (Dallas et al., 2019).
Countries that have attained middle- income status, like South Africa, face a 
number of challenges—in particular, linking up into GVCs while linking back 
into their domestic economies, and keeping pace with technological change 
(Andreoni and Tregenna, 2020). These, and developing countries more generally, 
are looking at industrialization and industrial policy as ways of addressing these 
challenges, escaping premature deindustrialization, and changing the structural 
1 On the political economy of development and governance leading examples are Chang,  2011; 
Khan,  2018; Pritchet et al.,  2018; and on political economy of industrial policy: Amsden,  1989; 
Wade, 1990; Chang, 1994; Rodrik, 2004; Stiglitz and Lin, 2013; Mazzucato, 2013; Lee, 2013; Noman 
and Stiglitz, 2016; Chang and Andreoni, 2020; Oqubay et al., 2020.
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and institutional configurations of their economies towards higher- productivity 
activities. Indeed, structural transformation and industrial policy are returning to 
the forefront of national policy debates.
The South African case demonstrates the importance of an in- depth industry 
understanding of productive capabilities and confronting the issues about how to 
generate sustained industrial and technological upgrading. Middle- income coun-
tries are also looking at turning the inclusiveness and sustainability challenges 
into opportunities for broader societal and environmental transformation. The 
aspirations of a rising middle class and the broadening of the economic base have 
the potential to change the political economy of these countries and the function-
ing of their institutions.
1.3 Structural Transformation in Middle- Income  
Countries: The Case of South Africa
1.3.1 South Africa’s Performance Compared to 
Other Middle- Income Economies
South Africa offers an important case study of a middle- income country which 
has, at least in recent years, emphasized the importance of industrial policy in 
driving structural transformation. This is formally recognized in the National 
Industrial Policy Framework (2007) and a series of Industrial Policy Action Plans 
(IPAPs).2 Black economic empowerment (BEE) policies and competition law 
have also been important initiatives adopted by the South African government, as 
they seek to address the entrenched industrial structure and its concentration, as 
well as its racialized character.
While there have been positive developments in specific sectors, overall, the 
industrial structure changed relatively little between 1994 and 2019. Fixed invest-
ment has remained low, and the economy has exhibited features of premature 
deindustrialization—instead of the hoped- for broad- based growth that would 
reverse the legacy of apartheid policies that had focused the economy on a nar-
row industry and mining base. At the same time, following the liberalization of 
trade and capital flows in the 1990s, the South African economy has become 
more open and internationalized. This has been evident in, among other factors, 
the magnitude of capital flows and the patterns of ownership on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE). The stock market has expanded to such an extent that the 
market capitalization in 2019 was equivalent to more than three times the size of 


























Table 1.1 Economic performance of South Africa and other middle- income countries
 Brazil Malaysia South 
Africa




GDP (US$ billion), 2019 2,347 399 430 453 1,251 30,557 24,302
GDP growth, 1994–2019 2.3% 5.0% 2.6% 3.4% 4.7% 5.0% 5.0%
GDP per capita, 2019 (US$) 11,122 12,478 7,346 6,503 14,999 5,297 8,510
Industry value- added growth, 1994–2019 1.2% 4.0% 1.3% 3.1% 5.4% 5.2% 5.2%
Manufacturing, value- added growth, 1994–2019 0.4% 5.3% 2.0% 3.6% 5.3%  
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP), 2019 9.4% 21.5% 11.8% 25.3% 19.0% 18.8% 19.8%
Manufacturing exports (% of merchandise exports), 2018 36.1% 69.5% 46.6% 77.5% 80.9% 65.8% 68.4%
Growth of exports of goods and services, 1994–2019 4.5% 4.7% 2.8% 5.7% 7.3%  
High- tech exports (as % of manuf. exports), 2018 13.0% 52.8% 5.6% 23.3% 2.3% 22.3% 23.5%
Average gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP), 
1994–2018
18.5% 26.7% 18.3% 26.6% 25.6% 27.6% 28.1%
Market capitalization of listed domestic companies  
(as % GDP), 2019
64.5% 110.8% 300.6% 104.7% 24.5% 60.2% 60.2%
Note: Growth rates are all calculated as compound annual average growth rates from data in 2010 constant US$. The gaps in the table are indicators that the World Bank 
does not calculate for MIC and upper- middle income groups.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.
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gross domestic product (GDP) (Table 1.1) even while investment rates in fixed 
capital stock in the economy remained poor.
South Africa’s poor performance overall is evident when compared to its peer 
group of upper- middle income countries (Table  1.1).3 While overall, in upper- 
middle income countries (and the broader MIC group), industry value added led 
GDP growth over the period 1994–2019, in South Africa, industry growth lagged. 
South Africa has not been alone in this; for example, Brazil has recorded a similar 
pattern with industry—and manufacturing as a sub- set of industry—growing 
slower than GDP. Average investment rates have also been very poor in both 
countries. South Africa and Brazil have both had a relatively low share of manu-
factured exports (less than 50 per cent) in total merchandise exports and a very 
low share of high- tech exports within these manufactured exports—less than 10 
per cent in South Africa, compared with Thailand’s 23.3 per cent and Malaysia’s 
52.8 per cent, for example.
The middle- income countries group (as defined by the World Bank, in 2018) 
comprised highly heterogenous economies accounting together for 75 per cent of 
the world’s population, and as much as 62 per cent of the world’s poor. Indeed, 
this group includes countries which managed to graduate to higher classifications 
within the broader MIC group in the 2000s, such as Malaysia and Thailand, as 
well as recent entrants to the middle- income grouping, like Tanzania.
China is a very important country in the middle- income and upper middle- 
income groupings. When China is excluded from the data, South Africa’s per-
form ance is not as far from the averages for the country groupings. Excluding 
China, middle- income countries recorded average GDP growth over the period 
of 3.7 per cent and industry growth of 3.2 per cent, while upper middle- income 
countries recorded rates of 3.1 per cent and 2.6 per cent, still notably better than 
South Africa’s average growth rates of 2.6 per cent and 1.3 per cent. The chal-
lenges South Africa has faced with poor industrial performance, low levels of 
investment, and a lack of diversification and weak exports of more sophisticated 
products is at the lower end, but reflects a number of other countries.
1.3.2 Trends within Manufacturing: A Failure to Diversify
A deeper look into the value- added performance of disaggregated manufacturing 
sub- sectors reveals the overall stronger performance of upstream resource- based 
sub- sectors led by coke and refined petroleum products, with basic chemicals and 
basic iron and steel also performing strongly (Figure 1.1; and see Chapter 2 for a 
3 These countries were selected because they show similar levels of per capita GDP to South Africa 
in the 1990s and 2000s, are medium- sized in terms of population, and have pursued industrialization 
strategies.
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more detailed analysis of trends).4 The resource- based sub- sectors, including 
basic non- ferrous metals (mainly aluminium), grew especially strongly to 2008, 
reflecting the impact of the global commodities boom. There was also strong 
growth in value added in machinery and equipment (analysed in Chapter 3) and 
food products in this period on the back of local demand. The motor vehicle sub- 
sector stands out as growing value added over the twenty- five years as a result of 
sustained support through the Motor Industry Development Programme (MIDP, 
1995–2012) and the Automotive Production and Development Programme 
(APDP, 2013–20). However, local content per vehicle declined in the latter period 
and there are big questions about the strength of local linkages to components 
(see Chapter 5).
Over the period as a whole, the other diversified manufacturing activities in 
aggregate (which accounted for more than 50 per cent of total manufacturing 
4 The data considered for sub- sector performance are from Quantec. It is important to note that 
the Quantec data are not official statistics. They have been compiled including data from Statistics 
South Africa, with some computations by Quantec. This should be borne in mind, and conclusions 






































































Basic iron & steel (4.3%)
Machinery & equip (5.7%)
Motorvehicles & parts (7.2%)
Coke & ref petro prod (9.3%)
Basic chemicals (4.6%)
Other diversied manuf (51.1%)
Basic non-ferrous metals (3.1%)
Figure 1.1 Manufacturing value added, changes in selected sub- sectors
Notes: ‘Other Diversified Manufacturing’ is inclusive of all other manufactured products not separated 
out in the chart.
Figures in parentheses reflect the shares in manufacturing value added in 2019.
Source: Quantec, authors’ calculations.
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value added in 2019) have performed poorly.5 There has essentially been a regres-
sion since the mid- 1990s, away from more diversified and sophisticated manufac-
turing activities. The continued importance of minerals, basic metals, and isolated 
islands of other products, including those in motor vehicles, machinery, and fruit, 
is evident in the map of the product space of South Africa’s exports in 2018 
(Figure 1.3 below).
There have also been important differences between the resource- based sec-
tors, especially from 2009 onwards—reflecting in part the extent to which they 
are vulnerable to international price volatility and local energy prices. Sasol,6 
which has dominated the value added in the coke and refined petroleum prod-
ucts sub- sector, has benefited from being vertically integrated back into coal and 
has obtained natural gas from Mozambique at very low prices (Mondliwa and 
Roberts, 2017). Sasol has also accounted for the majority of value added in the 
basic chemicals sub- sector.7 The division of value added between the refineries 
and basic chemicals sub- sectors has thus been, to a significant extent, influenced 
by Sasol’s internal transfer- pricing decisions between its refinery and chemicals 
businesses. Both basic iron and steel and non- ferrous metals have faced the chal-
lenges of volatile international prices in terms of inputs and outputs, although 
basic iron and steel is better integrated back into its key inputs.
As South Africa is a small open economy, a key question for industrial policy 
has been how to manage the impact of large price swings on the local economy, 
including support for downstream sectors such as fabricated metal products and 
plastic products (reported separately in Table  1.2), which have performed very 
poorly and have seen increased import penetration (see also Chapters 3 and 4). 
The extensive trade liberalization and international integration from the 1990s 
increased imports and exports, with imports being more than one- third of 
domestic demand for total manufactured goods in 2019 (Table  1.2). However, 
some resource- based sub- sectors such as basic chemicals and basic iron and steel 
had lower imports in 2019 than in 1994. The effect of the motor industry policies 
reflected increased exports and lower imports.
Looking at employment data, an absolute decline in employment for manufac-
turing as a whole is evident, as well as for the other diversified manufacturing 
grouping (Table 1.2). There have been average increases of more than 1 per cent 
per annum in only three of the selected sectors—in coke and refined petroleum 
products (which is highly capital- intensive and employs very few people), as well 
5 Note that not this does not mean that all segments within the other diversified category in Figure 
1.1 have performed equally poorly with, for example, consumer goods such as soaps and cosmetics 
growing local production in line with local demand.
6 Sasol is a former state- owned firm that is the largest producer of basic chemicals and one of two 
synthetic fuel producers.
7 Basic chemicals include fertilizer and polymer chemicals, which obtain their feedstock from 
refinery by- products and co- products.
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as plastic products and machinery and equipment, each of which are key sub- 
sectors where diversified capabilities could have been built on more (Table 1.2). 
The decline in employment for the other diversified manufacturing sub- sectors in 
Table 1.2, which accounted for more than 45 per cent of all manufacturing jobs in 
2019, is emblematic of the failure of the economy to transform. In motor vehicles, 
while there has been good performance in terms of value added and trade, the 
failure to deepen and diversify local linkages is reflected in no net employment 
creation in the sub- sector (Chapter 5).
The relationship between manufacturing and services is important for under-
standing the development of industrial capabilities where design, engineering, 
and IT services tend to be highly productive and tradable, and can play a key role 
as a growth driver (McMillan et al., 2014). Notwithstanding the challenges of dis-
aggregating services, in South Africa at an aggregate level, communication, and 
finance and insurance services have recorded particularly high growth in value 
added—above 4 per cent per annum (Table  1.3). However, this has not been 
accompanied by strong employment growth in these sub- sectors. Employment 
growth has occurred in business services, which includes large numbers of jobs in 
areas such as outsourced cleaning and security services, as well as in wholesale 
and retail trade (Tregenna, 2010). In general, the growth of services exports has 
also been biased towards traditional rather than advanced services (Bhorat 
et  al.,  2017). While there has been employment creation in low- wage, low- 
productivity sub- sectors, the question is why this has not been accompanied by 
the growth of the more sophisticated services (and higher- skilled employment 
within them) required for building advanced industrial capabilities and aggregate 
economic growth. (This is explored further in Chapter 12.)
To assess patterns of continuity and change in the set of productive capabilities 
in more detail, disaggregated trade data have been assessed, first as shares in total 
merchandise exports, and then in the more granular main export products dis-
cussed in the following sub- section.8 The clear failure to substantially diversify is 
evident in South Africa’s merchandise exports over time. Perhaps the most strik-
ing feature is the lack of any major change in South Africa’s export profile over 
two decades, following some change in the 1990s with the growth of auto exports. 
Minerals and resource- based industries continued to account for a high propor-
tion of merchandise exports, close to 60 per cent in 2019 (Figure  1.2).9 Along 
with growing exports of motor vehicles, machinery and equipment are also not-
able, growing in importance in the first decade after 1994. All other exports have 
remained with a share of around 25 per cent.
8 The focus here is on merchandise trade. While there are also clearly important services exports, 
such as tourism, these are not well recorded.
9 This includes minerals resource- based industries of wood, paper and pulp, basic chemicals, and 
























Table 1.2 Manufacturing performance: selected sectors
 Total employment Value added GFCF, as % 
value added
Export, as % 
output
Import, as % 
domestic 
demand
Growth Share of total Growth Share of total Average
1994–2019 1994 2019 1994–2019 1994 2019 1994–2019 1994 2019 1994 2019
Coke and refined petroleum products 1.6% 1.1% 1.8% 5.0% 4.4% 9.3% 33% 33% 27% 6% 29%
Basic chemicals 0.3% 1.5% 1.8% 3.0% 3.5% 4.6% 56% 20% 46% 58% 37%
Plastics products 1.2% 2.6% 3.9% 1.5% 3.2% 3.0% 18% 3% 17% 11% 34%
Basic iron and steel −3.3% 5.4% 2.6% 2.3% 3.8% 4.3% 38% 66% 36% 23% 13%
Basic non- ferrous metals −2.1% 1.8% 1.2% 1.7% 3.2% 3.1% 38% 32% 39% 18% 33%
Metal products excluding machinery −0.2% 8.1% 8.6% 1.0% 6.9% 5.6% 10% 5% 14% 16% 32%
Machinery and equipment 1.2% 6.3% 9.6% 2.3% 5.2% 5.7% 10% 13% 46% 77% 92%
Motor vehicles, parts and accessories −0.4% 7.0% 7.1% 3.9% 4.4% 7.2% 17% 10% 49% 50% 46%
Food 0.1% 15.2% 17.5% 2.9% 11.4% 14.8% 25% 8% 11% 11% 13%
Other diversified Manufacturing −0.9% 51.1% 45.8% 0.9% 54.0% 42.5% 22%     
Total manufacturing −0.5% 100% 100% 1.9% 100% 100% 23% 14% 26% 26% 35%
Notes: Employment figures include formal and informal employment. Growth rates are all calculated as compound annual average growth rates.
Source: Quantec, authors’ calculations.
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There have been two competing explanations for South Africa’s trade per form-
ance. First and in line with the analysis above is that the country’s approach to 
trade liberalization reinforced the static comparative advantage in minerals, com-
modities, and other resource- based manufactures, and exports of diversified 
manufactured goods have underperformed (Fine and Rustomjee,  1996; 
Roberts, 2008; Black and Roberts, 2009; Black and Hasson, 2016; Driver, 2019). 
Second is that there has been a positive relationship between trade liberalization 
and export performance of manufactured and particularly non- commodity 
goods (Edwards and Lawrence, 2006 and 2008).
Important differences between these two explanations are due to the grouping 
of industries. Edwards and Lawrence (2006 and  2008) classify industries into 
commodity and non- commodity manufacturing, finding that non- commodity 
manufactured exports showed strong growth in the 1990–2000 period, which 
they attribute to a positive response to trade liberalization. However, this export 
growth is largely due to the auto industry (both motor vehicle and components 
exports) and the target of extensive industrial policy as well as ongoing tariff pro-
tection. The components include catalytic converters, an auto component cat-
egor ized under machinery and equipment, as well as seat leather (classified under 
leather products) (Roberts, 2008; Black and Roberts, 2009; and Chapter 5).
There are at least three other classifications which have been commonly used 
in industrial competitiveness and diversification studies. These are: Pavitt’s classi-
fication (Pavitt,  1984); the OECD classification based on R&D intensity intro-
duced in 1994 (for a review see Galindo- Rueda and Verger, 2016); and, the widely 
Table 1.3 Services sector performance
 Total employment Value added
Growth Share of total Growth Share of total
(1994–2019) 1994 2019 (1994–2019) 1994 2019
Wholesale and retail trade 3.0% 22.1% 26.6% 3.0% 19.7% 20.4%
Catering and accomm. 
services
1.5% 5.6% 4.6% 3.2% 1.6% 1.1%
Transport and storage 4.6% 3.0% 5.3% 1.6% 9.7% 9.3%
Communication −0.5% 2.0% 1.0% 2.9% 1.5% 4.3%
Finance and insurance 1.1% 4.6% 3.4% 7.6% 7.2% 10.1%
Business services 3.5% 15.1% 20.2% 4.5% 18.8% 21.6%
Government, community, 
and personal services
1.4% 47.7% 38.9% 3.6% 41.6% 33.1%
Total services 3.0% 100.0% 100.0% 3.0% 100% 100%
Notes: Employment figures include formal and informal employment. Growth rates are all calculated 
as compound annual average growth rates.
Source: Quantec, authors’ calculations.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 15/07/21, SPi
Antonio Andreoni, Pamela Mondliwa et al. 13
used Lall classification (Lall, 2000; see also UNIDO, 2010 for a discussion of the 
ways in which this classification evolved). As Sanjaya Lall notes (2000: 341) 
‘[j]udgment is inevitably involved in assigning products to categories’. For 
ex ample, Lall’s classification excludes basic chemicals and basic metals (including 
steel) from resource- based manufactures and rather includes them in medium- 
technology exports. In South Africa, these industries are closely linked to mineral 
and resources inputs and, as such, it is clearly more appropriate to group them 
with resource- based industry. Furthermore, over long periods of time the nature 
of activities in categories changes and with that their value and technology con-
tent (Andreoni, 2020). In this book, the analysis involves in- depth industry stud-
ies which take into account the evolving value chain and structure of the sectors.
The South African experience illustrates that diversification, in terms of alter-
ing patterns of comparative advantage, is not a simple outcome of trade liberaliza-
tion. Rather, there is an important role for industrial policy to play in countering 
path dependency (Amsden 1989 and 2001; Chang and Andreoni, 2020). Instead 
of growing diversified industries, as many of its middle- income peers have done, 
South Africa has in fact prematurely deindustrialized (Tregenna, 2016a and 2016b; 
and Chapter 11). The reasons for this are a core consideration of this book.
The poor overall investment rates (evident from the international comparisons 
above) are an important factor, even while the commodities boom, infrastructure 
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Figure 1.2 Merchandise export shares
Note: Minerals and resource- based exports include minerals; wood, pulp, and paper; basic and refined 
chemicals; and basic metals (in order from the bottom to the black in the middle of figure).
Source: Quantec, authors’ calculations.
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the 2000s, which peaked in 2008 at 30 per cent of value added. These rates of 
investment have not been sustained and, within manufacturing, have remained 
heavily skewed towards the capital- intensive industries of coke and refineries, and 
basic chemicals. The investments in the basic chemicals and refined petroleum 
products sectors have been essentially driven by Sasol, whose capital expenditure 
has generally constituted the majority of investments (Chapter 4). High rates of 
investment were recorded by the basic metals sectors in the 1990s, which under-
pinned their growth in output at the time. There has not been any significant sus-
tained growth in investment in downstream and diversified manufacturing.
1.3.3 Lack of Diversification in South African Exports
South Africa’s failure to diversify is evident in both the fact that traditional 
resource- based sectors are mainly responsible for industry output growth in the 
economy, and that higher levels of investment in the manufacturing sector have 
continued in these sectors rather than shifting to diversified manufacturing activ-
ities. Diversification—or the lack of it—can be illustrated in greater detail in the 
so- called ‘product- space’ analysis. South Africa was among the first countries to 
use an early version of this product- space analysis to show its structural trans-
form ation challenges (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2006).
South Africa’s product space did not change substantially between the 
mid- 1990s and 2018 (Bell et al., 2018). It has continued to be dominated by low- 
complexity products, and there has been a failure to form clusters around more 
advanced manufactured products. As Figure 1.3 shows, exports of minerals, stone 
and glass, vegetable and foodstuffs, metal products, and chemical products made 
up most of the export basket (relatively larger dots). Many of the linkages between 
various products have not been exploited. Instead, the more important export 
products appear as isolated points. For example, cars are evident, but not auto 
components (apart from catalytic converters which are classified under centri-
fuges) and there are mining equipment exports, but not a broader clustering of 
machinery and equipment, which has characterized countries such as Malaysia 
and Thailand.
It is important to note that a country’s export basket (represented in the product 
space above) attempts to capture the degree of diversification (or spread) of products 
as well as the clustering in certain types of products (which reflect characteristics 
including the degree of technology complexity). These can be understood as an 
outcome of its unique historical processes of accumulation of productive cap abil-
ities, the extent of structural change, and production transformation.
In the South African case, openness to global trade has amplified major differ-
ences and contrasts within the economy and society more than it has driven 














































Figure 1.3 South Africa’s export basket, 2018
Note: The light grey circles are effectively empty for South Africa, representing product categories in relation to each other based on what countries 
around the world tend to export, but in which South Africa does not have significant exports.
Source: Atlas of Economic Complexity.
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firms with export competitiveness based on historical state support and  favourable 
access to resources, while improvements in living standards for some have coex-
isted with persistently high levels of unemployment and inequality. Similarly, the 
expansion of the financial sector has not gone hand in hand with an expansion of 
productive investments; on the contrary, profitability has been associated with 
rents capture and weak fixed capital formation (see Chapters  2 and  10). The 
unfolding of these contradictions and structural tensions has led to political 
fragmentation and the recent destabilization of the post- apartheid pol it ical 
settlement (Chapter 2).
1.4 Towards a Holistic Framework for Structural  
Transformation
A number of path- dependent processes, structural interdependencies, and ten-
sions form part of the mix of complex and intertwined factors that have acted as 
constraints to structural transformation in South Africa. Responding to the need 
for a more holistic approach to both understanding and advancing structural 
transformation, this section presents a framework that can be applied in the 
analysis of the nature and dynamics of structural transformation in middle- 
income countries more generally. The chapters in the book explore these issues in 
different ways. The concluding chapter then draws together insights from the 
comprehensive case study of South Africa, which could help to inform priorities 
for industrial policy in other middle- income countries.
A holistic framework for structural transformation needs to engage with key 
micro- structural dimensions and meet several related challenges. The four 
dimensions embodied in this framework are: learning processes and capabilities 
development; technological change, and digitalization in particular; economic 
linkages and power relationships along GVCs; and, broader political economy 
dynamics. Each is discussed in more detail below. While the dimensions of the 
framework may be addressed in the chapters at a more implicit level, the chap-
ters that focus explicitly on a particular dimension are mentioned at the end of 
each section.
1.4.1 Learning, Productive Capabilities Development, 
and Accumulation
From a micro- structural perspective, production transformation is about learn-
ing and selective attempts to develop different types of productive, technological, 
organizational, and innovative capabilities (Penrose, 1959; Lall, 2001; Teece, 2006; 
Andreoni, 2014; Chang and Andreoni, 2020; Roberts, 2020a). Firms’ capabilities 
are a combination of the individual and collective competencies that are needed 
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to perform and organize interdependent productive tasks as well as to adapt and 
undertake improvements across different technological and organizational func-
tions. Capable agents and functioning organizations can only operate if they are 
matched by investments in production capacity to attain appropriate scale and 
scope. The capabilities needed to generate, absorb, and manage technological and 
organizational change and those needed to seize new opportunities—i.e. dynamic 
capabilities—differ substantially from those needed to operate existing produc-
tion systems.
Developing and accumulating capabilities in activities in which firms are not 
yet competitive requires effort to learn to use new technologies and acquire new 
tacit knowledge. This can be expensive and time- consuming; the returns from 
these investments are not guaranteed, and they also depend on spillovers and 
linkages from other firms (Lall and Teubal,  1998; Lall,  1992; Khan,  2009; 
Andreoni, 2019; Whitfield et al., 2020). There is not comprehensive knowledge of 
alternative production techniques, and thus finding suitable technology at the 
right price involves cost and risk (Nelson and Winter,  1982; Lall and 
Pietrobelli,  2005). As a result, private firms tend to underinvest in the related 
activities required to accumulate capabilities. The learning element of technolo-
gies is important for adapting the technology to different scales, new input and 
skill conditions, and different product demands. The challenge of ensuring high 
levels of effort by the firm in the process of learning- by- doing is the biggest con-
straint to absorbing new technologies. This is where the important role of the 
state comes into play (Khan, 2009).
These considerations indicate that sub- sectors are internally highly heter ogen-
ous as the factors operate and differ at the level of individual firms and clusters 
within sub- sectors. This is borne out in the micro- industrial development, firm- 
focused, evolutionary, and related bodies of literature (Penrose,  1959; 
Andreoni,  2014; Rosenberg,  1982; Amsden,  1989 and  2001; Dosi et al., 2000; 
Lall, 2001; Teece, 2006; Andreoni and Chang, 2017; Avenyo et al., 2021). Owing 
in part to data limitations, aggregated quantitative analyses do not account for 
important differences, and in some cases provide misleading insights about the 
process of structural transformation. For example, as shown by recent contribu-
tions (Dosi et al., 2020; Tregenna and Andreoni, 2020), the traditional patterns of 
deindustrialization are highly heterogenous across manufacturing sub- sectors, or 
different sectoral groupings defined by technological or other organizational fea-
tures (Pavitt,  1984’s and Lall,  2000’s taxonomies). Thus, it is important to go 
beyond both the broad sub- sectoral analysis and the recognition of the continu-
ing importance of manufacturing, and to start taking account of the more com-
plex dynamics within and between firms.
This makes the case for in- depth industry study, as reflected in Chapters 3 to 7. 
Together, these chapters cover developments in metals and mining machinery, 
manufacture of plastic products, the auto industry, evolving competitiveness in 
fresh fruit production, and the wine industry. The role of the financial sector in 
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South Africa in the context of weak investment in more sophisticated and diversi-
fied economic activities is considered in Chapter 10.
1.4.2 Technological Change and Digitalization in Light 
of Sustainability Challenges
Structural transformation perspectives need to take account of the rapid pace of 
technological change within and beyond the manufacturing sector, and more 
broadly the rise of cross- sectoral challenges and the need for cross- sectoral solu-
tions. Sectoral boundaries are also increasingly redefined by new technologies. 
The terrain of the industrial has been shifting—contracting and expanding—to 
give space to both servicification and agricultural industrialization (Andreoni, 
2020; Cramer and Tregenna, 2020).
Technological change is of course not new. But the development of wide- scale 
digital applications is accelerating the pace of technological change exponentially. 
Further, this change is systemic, pervasive, and includes an integration between 
the digital, physical, and biological domains in ways thus far not seen. These 
developments have been characterized under the broad rubric of the ‘fourth 
industrial revolution’. Clearly, the accelerating pace and impact of technological 
change need to be factored into current thinking and policy prescriptions around 
structural transformation. They also call for more ‘ecosystem’-oriented frameworks 
(Andreoni, 2018) that are capable of taking into account both sector value- chain 
specific dynamics and cross- sectoral technological dynamics.
Structural transformation perspectives often have not engaged sufficiently with 
the relationship between industrialization and climate change, and the need to 
reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in particular. Climate change impacts dif-
ferent groups and sectors differently, but it is one of the most striking cross- 
sectoral challenges of the time. Industrial production has been identified as a key 
source of emissions, with evidence of an inverted- U relationship between in dus-
tri al iza tion and emissions (see, for example, Barca and Bridge (2015); Avenyo and 
Tregenna (2021)). This suggests a possible tension between the dual imperatives 
of industrializing and mitigating climate change. This tension is particularly stark 
for late industrializers, since early industrializers were not constrained by the 
need to simultaneously reduce emissions. In recent years, there has been a grow-
ing body of literature and policy discourse exploring a green industrialization 
path that is compatible with mitigating climate change, and green industrial pol-
icy (see, for instance, Rodrik (2014); Fischer (2016); Altenburg and Rodrik 
(2017); Andreoni and Chang, (2017); Pollin (2020)).10
10 See also Chapter 7 in this volume, which explores issues of sustainability and inequality in the 
context of the South African wine value chain.
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In addition to the industry- focused chapters which consider both the legacy 
impacts of resource- based industrialization as well as the impact of sustainability 
standards (such as in wine), the challenges of the middle- income technology trap 
are considered in detail in Chapter 11, and digitalization is addressed in Chapter 12.
1.4.3 Global Value Chains and Power Dynamics
The structural transformation of developing economies is taking place in the con-
text of the globalization of production, where decisions on the geographical loca-
tion of production are largely determined by lead firms in GVCs. Understanding 
upgrading opportunities from participating in GVCs requires engagement with 
strategies of multinational corporations (MNCs) including those related to out-
sourcing, offshoring, and reshoring. Though participation in GVCs presents 
opportunities for upgrading through international linkages, learning by export-
ing and FDI spillovers such as access to technological knowledge and generating 
learning and innovation activities, this process is not automatic (Gereffi et al., 
2005). The gains from participating in a GVC are dependent on power asym-
metries or the governance structures which determine where and by whom value 
is created and captured (Gereffi and Lee, 2012) and how this enhances or hinders 
capability upgrading.
The skewed power relations within GVCs often imply that the bulk of the value 
is captured by lead firms that can leverage a combination of direct and diffuse 
forms of power transmissions (Dallas et al., 2019). The distribution of value added 
in GVCs is often illustrated by means of the ‘smile’ curve (Durand and 
Milberg,  2020). In this curve, developing economies tend to participate in the 
fabrication levels that are subject to intense international competition, and thus 
have limited possibilities to capture value. This has been further heightened by 
the disproportionate distribution of value capture to intangible assets (held by 
lead firms) rather than physical assets (held by suppliers). With increasing levels 
of competition in the supply levels, lead firms also have reduced incentives to 
support upgrading of local firms. The state has an important role to play in tip-
ping the calculus of the lead firms in one direction instead of the other. Norms of 
fair and reasonable market relationships need to incorporate the balance through 
regulation and building multi- stakeholder consensus on the importance of shared 
longer- term investments (Goga et al., 2020; Mondliwa et al., 2021). This involves 
collective and institutional power relations (Dallas et al., 2019).
Though governance and power in value chains has primarily been studied in 
relation to GVCs, it is important to note that some of the observed dynamics par-
ticularly relating to value distribution and capture are also present in domestic 
value chains (Mondliwa et al., 2020). For example, the competitive dynamics and 
outcomes in one level of the value chain can impact the development of whole 
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sectors through vertical linkages, which can promote or undermine structural 
transformation (Lee et al., 2018; Goga et al., 2020).
The influence of power dynamics in industries and the implications for 
in equal ity is assessed in the South African case in Chapter 8, and the record on 
BEE initiatives is analysed in Chapter 9. Chapter 13 looks specifically at industry 
challenges in linking into GVCs while linking back to develop stronger local pro-
duction capabilities.
1.4.4 Political Economy and the Role of the State
The micro- structuralist approach advanced here places emphasis on the role of 
the state in supporting processes of structural transformation. This is because 
successful structural transformation requires a proactive industrial policy that 
steers and supports learning, productive capabilities, and technological change; 
regulates power dynamics and rewards value creation and innovation; and man-
ages conflicting claims, while disciplining unproductive rent- seeking (Andreoni 
and Chang, 2019; Chang and Andreoni, 2020; Roberts, 2020b). Contributions on 
the political economy of structural transformation have also emphasized how 
states’ capabilities to manage rents, including monitoring and disciplining rent 
recipients to ensure productive investment for growth, are in turn influenced by 
the distribution of power within a society—its broader political settlement 
(Gray, 2018; Khan, 2018).
The political economy of structural transformation is therefore about not only 
understanding how the state can drive and give directionality to the process of 
structural transformation, but also how the state is formed and shaped by emer-
ging interests, conflicting claims, and changes in the distribution of organized 
power. The analysis of this dialectic process linking structural transformation to 
state formation is critical in assessing the effectiveness of industrial policy. 
Research on successful catching- up experiences has shown how state embedded-
ness is critical in designing effective industrial policy and organizing coalitions of 
interests around specific structural transformation targets (Chang and Rowthorn, 
1995; Evans, 1995; Weiss and Hobson, 1995). However, it has also noted cases in 
which unproductive interests have captured the state and limited its capacity to 
drive change through industrial policies (Khan and Jomo, 2000).
Within this perspective, industrial policy is not simply an exercise in address-
ing market failures, or other types of systemic failures. Instead, industrial policy is 
the main policy process through which the state sets the terms of the social con-
tract underpinning structural transformation (Andreoni and Chang, 2019). Seen 
through these lenses, industrial policy and all the related policies shaping cap abil-
ities development, technological change, and value distribution within and across 
productive organizations are central to the study of structural trans form ation. 
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The way in which the state uses industrial policy in combination or in contra pos-
ition to other policies, such as competition policy, is also central. In fact, from this 
political economy perspective, the lack of policy coordination is both the result of 
limited government capabilities, and the fragmentation of interests and power 
distribution across the economy. The study of the state—its internal configuration 
and capabilities, as well as its underpinning political settlement—is therefore a 
key dimension in understanding and driving structural transformation.
The political economy of industrial development cuts across all the chapters 
and these issues are specifically drawn together in Chapter 14.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter, and this volume as a whole, draws on the longstanding literature 
from a broad structuralist perspective on the importance of structural trans form-
ation for economic development and catch- up (Blankenburg et al.,  2008). For 
middle- income countries, this is particularly important for avoiding or escaping a 
middle- income trap, and is a key precondition to sustaining broader structural 
transformation. This points to the ongoing importance of industrialization, and 
indeed of reindustrialization where premature deindustrialization has already 
taken place.
With a focus on the South African economy, the ideas put forward in this chap-
ter advocate for the development of a more holistic approach to structural trans-
formation that is focused on key micro- structural dynamics of change, four of 
which are highlighted in the chapter: (1) learning, productive capabilities develop-
ment and accumulation; (2) technical change, digitalization, and sustainability; (3) 
GVCs and power dynamics; and (4) political economy and the role of the state. 
These are addressed in the chapters that follow through in- depth studies of key 
industries in South Africa, which may also make reference to the inter nation al 
context. Other studies address cross- cutting issues, such as BEE, inequality, finan-
cialization, and sustainability, and how they pertain to industrial development.
Recognizing the importance of structural transformation underscores the key 
role of industrial policy, since structural transformation is not something that 
unfolds automatically (see also Chapter 15). Appropriate state- led interventions 
are needed to unlock and shape a viable industrialization path that countries can 
pursue. For industrial policy to successfully advance structural transformation, it 
needs to be well coordinated with other relevant policy domains. For instance, 
supportive macroeconomic policy is required to ensure adequate domestic 
demand, access to finance, and a competitive exchange rate for manufacturing 
exports. Similarly, there is a need for coordination with competition policy, trade 
policy, innovation and technology policy, and so on. In these regards, the case of 
South Africa provides salient lessons, as are drawn out in subsequent chapters.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 15/07/21, SPi
22 Framing Structural Transformation in South Africa
Industrial policy is critical in enhancing countries’ collective capabilities, 
through transforming sectoral silos into ecosystems of productive organizations 
and effective institutions. This will enable the digitalization dividend to be har-
nessed and the sustainability challenge turned into an opportunity for develop-
ment. The management of rents within markets and along value chains, as well as 
new forms of rents arising from new digital platforms, is critical, including in 
opening up economies and unlocking opportunities for more distributed or gan-
iza tion al power, beyond conservative and rentieristic positions.
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2
Structural Change in South Africa
A Historical Sectoral Perspective
Nimrod Zalk
2.1 Introduction
Structural transformation is central to economic development through mobiliz-
ing fixed investment and shifting people to industries with increasing returns, 
and the associated institutional learning to acquire industrial capabilities that are 
becoming ever more sophisticated. Manufacturing has historically been the pri-
mary site of increasing returns, hence industrialization’s centrality in structural 
transformation (Kaldor,  1967; Thirlwall,  1983; Amsden,  2003; Rodrik,  2012; 
Szirmai et al., 2013). It involves not only the development of capabilities at the 
firm and sectoral level, but supportive economy- wide policies and institutions 
that span the macroeconomic and financial arena, and infrastructure and skills 
(Thirlwall, 2002; Ocampo et al., 2009).
Successful structural transformation involves profound changes to economic 
structure, requiring corresponding institutional development (Gerschenkron, 
1962). This is an iterative process with economic and political–institutional 
structures being shaped over time by the interactions between them (Hirschman, 
1971). The interplay between the two can be understood through a country’s 
evolving political settlement that reflects the accommodations forged among 
powerful political and economic actors around the generation and distribution of 
rents (Khan and Blankenburg, 2009). Political settlements thus often reflect ‘elite 
bargains’ struck between powerful economic and political elites (Di John and 
Putzel, 2009; and Chapter 14). Various rents and rent- like transfers, rather than 
being aberrations, are pervasive in capitalist development. These include rents 
derived from market dominance, natural resources, transfers from real economy 
to financial sector actors, conditional industrial policies to promote the acquisi-
tion of industrial capabilities, and state licensing and procurement instruments. 
Furthermore, various ‘rent- like’ transfers to social constituencies are frequently 
deployed to secure political support and maintain political stability (Khan and 
Jomo, 2000; Storm, 2018).
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What is thus important is the form rents take, the political economy effects of 
the processes—often highly contested—through which they arise, and whether or 
not they are used to finance productive investment in sectors with increasing 
returns. In neoclassical terms, various forms of rents, including returns earned by 
firms in excess of total costs (including financing costs), are generally considered 
wasteful (Tollison, 1982). In contrast, in the classical economic tradition profits, 
regardless of whether they exceed costs, are the primary source for financing 
capital accumulation (Thirlwall, 2002).
Across developing regions, internally generated revenues and reinvested profits 
are the primary source of funding for firm- level investment (UNCTAD, 2016). A 
virtuous ‘profit- investment nexus’—where firms make profitable investments, 
funded through retained earnings, which underpin further investment—is thus 
especially important for industrial growth in these regions. This positive feedback 
mechanism was central to East Asia’s rapid industrialization, with the state inter-
vening to accelerate productive capital accumulation (Akyüz and Gore,  1996). 
High levels of fixed investment which build industrial capabilities in sectors that 
provide increasing returns lead to rising productivity, enhancing export competi-
tiveness and alleviating the balance- of- payments constraint to growth 
(Thirlwall, 2002).
Thus, three empirical regularities characterize developing countries that have 
achieved rapid catch- up with advanced economies: first, a high share of fixed 
investment in gross domestic product (GDP); second, a high share of manufac-
turing in GDP; and third, substantial increases in the level and sophistication of 
their exports (Hausmann et al.,  2005; World Bank,  2008). As reflected in 
Chapter 1 (Table 1.1) South Africa has performed disappointingly relative to peer 
middle- income developing countries (MIDCs) against all three measures.
Section 2.2 of this chapter reviews the patterns of post- apartheid fixed invest-
ment, profitability, value added, and employment. It highlights inadequate invest-
ment in diversified industries, low profitability, a declining share of tradable 
sectors in value added, and dramatic declines in employment. This reflects dein-
dus tri al iza tion, as discussed further in Chapter  11. Fixed investment has been 
particularly low in manufacturing and agriculture, with investment in the capital- 
intensive mining industry growing slightly more than the economy- wide average.
Section 2.3 considers the links between the economic performance and key 
phases of post- apartheid economic policy, including industrial policy. It traces 
how orthodox policies and institutions arising from the post- apartheid political 
settlement accelerated deindustrialization through corporate and industrial restruc-
turing that enabled high corporate profits in some areas of the economy, but not 
the virtuous profit–investment nexus in the tradable sectors which are needed to 
drive sustained growth. It argues that the formal introduction of industrial policy 
reflected a significant policy shift, with some important successes and helped 
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avert even deeper deindustrialization. However, it has been undermined by 
unsupportive macroeconomic policies and state- owned corporations (SOCs), 
and the weak articulation between policies to advance black ownership and struc-
tural transformation. Rising corruption and maladministration has further 
undermined structural transformation, particularly through a deteriorating 
national electricity system.
Section 2.4 concludes that the post- apartheid economy has undergone sub-
stantial structural change but limited structural transformation, with some impli-
cations for other MIDCs.
2.2 Low Levels of Productive Investment, Declining Manufacturing 
Profitability, and Limited Structural Transformation
There have been substantial shifts in the corporate and industrial structure of the 
post- apartheid economy flowing from the political settlement forged during the 
transition from apartheid to democracy.
2.2.1 High Corporate Profitability, Low Fixed Investment, 
and the Shift to Low- Tradability Sectors
At the core of changes in the corporate and industrial structure has been the shift-
ing orientation and investment decisions of the country’s largest financial and 
non- financial firms, many of which are listed (Bosiu et al., 2017b). The un bund-
ling of apartheid- era conglomerates and subsequent corporate reconsolidation 
along more narrowly defined sectoral lines has sustained and often deepened 
concentration, enabling a small number of large firms to cement their domination 
of most sectors (Buthelezi et al., 2019).
Concentration and associated market dominance often go hand in hand with 
high corporate profitability. High returns of listed firms in the 2000s, which had 
increased substantially from the 1990s, have been widely observed by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2011, 2014, and 2016) and World Bank (2011). 
Similarly, UNCTAD (2016) calculates that South African listed firms have recorded 
among the highest levels of profitability on MIDC stock markets in the period 
1995–2014, with the banking sector particularly profitable. However, South Africa’s 
financial system aggregates far lower levels of savings and fixed investment than peer 
MIDCs (Bell et al., 2018; and Chapter 1). Fixed investment has been particularly 
low in two major tradable sectors—agriculture and manufacturing (see Table 2.2)—
with profoundly negative consequences for growth, employment, and exports. This 





































Agriculture, forestry, fishing  
Mining, and quarrying
40.5% 34.8% 36.0% 28.2% 25.9% 33.3%
17.1% 29.6% 39.0% 35.6% 24.7% 28.8%
Manufacturing 12.3% 11.0% 8.6% 3.4% 3.9% 8.0%
 Heavy-industry 11.6% 12.8% 9.8% 0.6% −1.0% 7.0%
 Diversified manufacturing 12.6% 9.9% 7.8% 5.0% 6.9% 8.6%
Electricity, gas, and water 14.6% 15.1% 12.1% 41.2% 37.1% 23.7%
Construction 14.6% 13.4% 19.9% 20.0% 18.0% 17.1%
Wholesale and retail trade 37.7% 38.1% 39.7% 46.3% 44.0% 41.1%
Catering and accommodation 11.8% 11.3% 13.7% 21.6% 19.6% 15.5%
Transport and storage 28.7% 24.6% 41.0% 35.1% 29.9% 31.7%
Communication 48.9% 50.3% 52.7% 35.8% 23.9% 42.6%
Finance and insurance 28.4% 31.6% 39.5% 37.3% 25.6% 32.3%
Business services 40.4% 34.5% 36.9% 33.2% 28.5% 34.9%
Community, social, personal 21.2% 18.9% 21.3% 23.9% 20.8% 21.2%
Notes: Net markup is an industry’s net operating surplus as a percentage of the sum of its intermediate inputs, wages, and capital depreciation (Quantec, n.d.). It factors in 
capital intensity, to an extent, as more capital- intensive industries are likely to have higher levels of depreciation. Heavy-industry comprises: Paper; coke, petroleum and 
nuclear fuel; basic chemicals; other chemicals; other non- metal minerals; basic iron and steel and non- ferrous metal sectors. Diversified manufacturing sectors comprise 
all other manufacturing industries.
It is important to note that the Quantec data are not official statistics. They have been compiled using data from Statistics South Africa, with some computations by 
Quantec, and this should be borne in mind.
Source: Quantec.
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Table 2.2 Gross fixed capital formation, gross value added, and employment, 
1994–2019
 Gross fixed capital 
formation


















2.7% 0.6% 2.1% 1.2% 7.1% −0.9%
Mining and quarrying 11.3% 4.7% 8.3% −0.4% 3.1% −0.9%
Manufacturing 14.3% 2.3% 13.2% 1.8% 9.3% −0.5%
Heavy-industry 7.4% 2.6% 3.9% 2.5% 1.9% −0.7%
Paper and paper 
products
0.8% 2.1% 0.5% 1.7% 0.2% 1.0%
Cake, petroleum 
products, and nuclear 
fuel
1.6% 4.0% 1.0% 4.9% 0.2% 1.5%
Basic chemicals 1.3% 2.4% 0.5% 2.7% 0.2% 0.3%
Other chemical products 0.5% 1.9% 0.8% 3.3% 0.5% 3.2%
Other non- metal 
mineral products
1.1% 1.8% 0.4% −0.2% 0.5% −2.3%
Basic iron and steel 
products, casting of 
metal
1.1% 2.8% 0.4% 2.3% 0.2% −3.2%
Non- ferrous metal 
products
0.9% 2.8% 0.3% 1.6% 0.1% −2.0%
Diversified 
manufacturing
6.8% 1.9% 9.3% 1.5% 7.4% −0.4%
Food, beverages, and 
tobacco
3.1% 1.7% 3.7% 1.4% 1.9% −0.1%
Metal products 0.3% 1.6% 0.7% 1.0% 0.8% −0.2%
Machinery and 
equipment
0.4% 2.8% 0.8% 2.2% 0.9% 1.2%
Motor vehicles, parts 
and accessories
0.6% 2.3% 0.9% 3.8% 0.7% −0.4%
Other diversified 
manufacturing
2.5% 1.9% 3.2% 1.1% 3.1% −0.9%
Electricity, gas, and 
water
11.1% 6.1% 3.8% 0.7% 0.4% 1.0%
Construction 1.9% 7.0% 3.8% 3.8% 5.8% 2.0%
Wholesale and retail 
trade




0.8% 2.0% 0.9% 1.5% 3.4% 1.4%
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of South Africa’s fifty largest listed firms, excluding cross- listed firms operating 
pre dom in ant ly outside South Africa, was equivalent to 162 per cent of GDP in 
2017 (Bosiu et al., 2017b), more than double the upper- MIDC average of 60 per 
cent of GDP.
Relative sectoral profitability is a major factor accounting for patterns and 
changes in fixed investment. Sectors with the highest average profitability from 
1994 to 2019, as measured by net industry markup, were limited tradability ser-
vice sectors, notably communication (43 per cent); wholesale and retail (41 per 
cent); business services (35 per cent); finance and insurance, and transport and 
storage (both 32 per cent); as well as agriculture (33 per cent) (Table 2.1). By con-
trast, average post- apartheid manufacturing profitability was 8 per cent in 2015 
and had fallen to 4 per cent in 2019. Heavy- industry profitability was slightly 
higher than diversified manufacturing during the commodity boom of the 2000s 
but fell sharply thereafter. Yet a sizeable and influential literature asserts that 
South African manufacturing commands high markups, particularly Aghion 
et al. (2008), Faulkner et al. (2013), and Fedderke et al. (2007 and 2018). This is 
routinely cited by multilateral institutions and in South Africa’s overarching eco-
nomic strategy: its National Development Plan. Far more plausible than the 
hypothesis that manufacturing exhibits ‘excessive profitability’ is Rodrik’s (2008: 
669) assessment of ‘the decline in the relative profitability of manufacturing in the 
1990s as the most important contributor to the lack of vitality in that sector’.
Within a context of lacklustre overall investment described in Chapter 1, com-
pound annual growth (CAGR) in gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) increased 
most in the communication (11.5 per cent), construction (7.0 per cent), transport 
and storage (6.7 per cent), and community, social, and personal services (5.9 per 
cent) sectors (Table 2.2). The 6.1 per cent increase in electricity GFCF is overstated 
in that it includes massive cost overruns of two new coal- fired plants incurred by 
state- owned Eskom amid corruption and maladministration (Watermeyer and 
Phillips, 2020), as well as private investment in renewable energy projects.
Transport and storage 16.3% 6.7% 7.9% 2.8% 3.9% 4.5%
Communication 1.6% 11.5% 1.8% 7.3% 0.7% −0.4%
Finance and insurance 3.9% 2.8% 6.4% 4.2% 2.5% 1.0%
Business services 12.9% 2.3% 13.3% 3.4% 15.0% 3.4%
General government 15.2% 4.3% 18.2% 1.9% 12.9% 1.6%
Community, social, 
and personal services
1.7% 5.9% 5.9% 2.6% 16.0% 1.2%
All sectors 100.0% 4.0% 100.0% 2.3% 100.0% 1.4%
Note: Growth rates of Gross Fixed Capital Formation and Gross Value Added have been calculated 
from constant 2010 price series; the shares of sub- sectors in economy totals for GFCF and GVA are 
calculated from current price data for 2019.
Source: Quantec RSA Standardised Industry Indicator Database.
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By contrast, a striking pattern of low investment in agriculture and manufac-
turing is evident (Table  2.2). Agriculture GFCF grew marginally between 1994 
and 2019 (with a CAGR of just 0.6 per cent) and manufacturing by only 2.3 per cent, 
while mining grew by 4.7 per cent. Within manufacturing, the heavy- industry 
grouping recorded GFCF growth of 2.6 per cent and diversified manufacturing 
1.9 per cent. Agricultural investment has been curtailed by low public investment 
(particularly in water infrastructure, and research and development), slow 
progress by the Department of Agriculture in negotiating access to fast- growing 
East Asian markets for horticultural products, and land- tenure uncertainties 
from unresolved contestation over land reform (Cramer and Sender, 2015). Low 
agricultural investment has prevailed in parallel with relatively high profitability, 
as corporate consolidation following the lib er al iza tion of the sector in the 1990s 
enabled a small number of large agroprocessing producers to dominate the 
sector (Bell et al., 2018). Higher mining investment has been constrained pre-
dominantly by protracted contention over levels of black ownership in the sector 
(Jonas, 2019).
As with investment, value added has grown most in the generally more profit-
able service sectors with limited tradability, notably communication (7.3 per 
cent), finance and insurance (4.2 per cent), construction (3.8 per cent), business 
services (3.4 per cent), and wholesale and retail (3.1 per cent). Lacklustre growth 
in all three major tradable sectors has prevailed, well below the economy- wide 
average of 2.3 per cent, namely: agriculture (1.2 per cent), mining (−0.4 per cent), 
and manufacturing (1.8 per cent). The capital- intensive heavy industries (2.5 per 
cent) grew faster than diversified manufacturing (1.5 per cent) sectors.
Large- scale job losses have been recorded in all three major tradable sectors, 
albeit reflective of significant shifts within these sectors. Between 1994 and 2019, 
over one- fifth of the workforce was lost in both mining (−23 per cent) and agri-
culture (−21 per cent), while manufacturing employment fell by 12 per cent. 
However, an under- recognized process influencing recorded manufacturing 
employment has been extensive outsourcing starting in the 1990s. Between 1997 
and 2007, an estimated 300,000 workers, such as security guards and cleaners, 
were statistically ‘transferred’ to business services while they continued to work 
(under different employers) in manufacturing (Tregenna, 2010). This implies that 
job losses in manufacturing may not have been as extensive as reflected in official 
employment statistics. However, changes in employment survey methodology 
make it difficult to estimate the precise impact of outsourcing over the 1994–2019 
period (Kerr and Wittenberg, 2019).
Mining job losses have been mainly due to the long- term decline in labour- 
intensive gold mining, which has not been offset by growth in other minerals 
such as platinum (Ritchken,  2018). Agricultural job losses have taken place in 
field crops and livestock, while, as elaborated in Chapter 6, horticulture has repre-
sented a welcome site of employment and export growth (Chisoro- Dube et al., 
2018; Zalk, 2019).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 15/07/21, SPi
Nimrod Zalk 35
2.2.2 Intra- manufacturing Patterns: Limited Diversification  
and the Continued Dominance of Heavy Industry
As manufacturing’s overall share in GFCF fell to 14 per cent in 2019 in line with 
the sector’s share in the economy, above- average GFCF growth has been recorded 
in coke and petroleum (4.0 per cent), and in basic iron and steel, non- ferrous 
metal products, and machinery and equipment (which each grew GFCF at aver-
age annual rates of 2.8 per cent). Motor vehicles grew at the manufacturing aver-
age of 2.3 per cent.
Value- added growth leading up to the global financial crisis was driven chiefly 
by the chemical and primary metal sectors, and associated strategies of dominant 
firms including increasing internationalization. The coke and refined petroleum, 
and basic chemicals sectors, accounting for 14 per cent of manufacturing value 
added, have been dominated by formerly state- owned Sasol. Sasol benefits from a 
legacy of state support, vertically integrated coal supply, and cheap natural gas 
from Mozambique, as well as monopolistic pricing and market conduct (Bell 
et al., 2018; and Chapter 4). Sasol has internationalized through a secondary listing 
on the NASDAQ and various expansion projects outside South Africa, the largest 
being its Lake Charles Chemicals gas- to- liquids project in Louisiana in the 
USA. However, the combination of vast cost and time overruns constructing the 
Lake Charles plant, combined with low oil prices, has created a debt crisis for 
Sasol (Theunissen,  2020), the resolution of which could have damaging conse-
quences for South African manufacturing.
While basic iron and steel and non- ferrous metals grew significantly above 
average until the crisis, lacklustre growth after 2009 reflected a confluence of 
global steel and aluminium oversupply, weak domestic demand exacerbated by 
low public investment, and low investment in plant maintenance in primary 
steel. Rapid escalation of electricity prices and the unreliability of supply have 
precipitated the closure of many foundries (Rustomjee et al.,  2018). Formerly 
state owned Iscor’s 2001 un bund ling saw its steel operations transferred to trans-
national ArcelorMittal with the contractual right to iron- ore supply on conces-
sional terms from Anglo subsidiary Kumba that had acquired Iscor’s iron- ore 
assets. Concurrently, ArcelorMittal South Africa (AMSA) exerted its monopoly 
power to charge domestic customers import parity prices (Roberts and 
Rustomjee,  2010), as touched on in Chapter  3. Rather than the anticipated 
efficiencies the state naively assumed would flow from foreign ownership, 
AMSA systematically underinvested amid multiple plant failures and es cal at ing 
inefficiencies, extracting as much cash as possible to its global parent (Zalk, 2017). 
These inefficiencies were brutally exposed after world steel prices fell in the 
aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, throwing the South African steel 
industry into deep crisis. As part of Anglo’s restructuring strategy to meet 
shareholder expectations that it become a ‘focused mining group’ it sold off the 
second- largest steel producer to Evraz in 2007, which, like AMSA, failed to invest 
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and extracted cash to help service the debt of the global group (Zalk,  2017; 
Rustomjee et al., 2018).
Three main diversified manufacturing sectors recorded meaningful real value- 
added growth: motor vehicles and parts, food and beverages, and machinery, 
with the remainder collectively little larger in real terms than they were in 1994. 
Chapter 3 highlights how industrial capabilities in machinery were developed to 
service the mining sector. However, substantial industrial capabilities and oppor-
tunities have been lost through Anglo and Rembrandt/Remgro’s disposal of their 
most significant engineering subsidiaries: Dorbyl, Boart Longyear, and Scaw 
Metals over the 2000s (Zalk, 2017). Chapter 4 provides a contrast between South 
Africa and Thailand’s plastics industry, demonstrating how tight integration with 
the latter’s automotive policy has driven a far more dynamic trajectory than in 
South Africa. Chapter 5 highlights how the automotive sector has attracted sub-
stantial foreign investment by assemblers and first- tier original equipment manu-
facturer (OEM) suppliers through South Africa’s flagship sector policy 
programme, but that rising exports have not been accompanied by adequate 
increases in domestic value added on a per vehicle basis.
Food and beverages has been one of the few diversified manufacturing sectors 
where the main firms have domestic market power, dominated by a handful of 
large producers (Chisoro- Dube et al., 2018). It is notable that two major sub- sectors— 
sugar and poultry—were among the few that secured sustained import protection 
amid the general slashing of industrial tariffs during the 1990s. Remgro (previ-
ously Rembrandt), the second- largest business group at the end of the apartheid 
era and co- founder with Anglo of the South Africa Foundation that advocated 
the liberalization of various markets, retained substantial interests in both sectors, 
and food and beverages more generally (Mondliwa et al., 2017). Concentration in 
food and beverages has overlapped with, and mutually reinforced, market 
dominance in the supermarket sector, as large producers have offered terms to 
retailers which cannot be matched by smaller producers (Bosiu et al., 2017a).
Manufacturing job losses have been more pronounced in heavy-industry (−0.7 
per cent (CAGR)) than diversified manufacturing (−0.4 per cent) (Table 2.2). The 
dominant explanation given for poor manufacturing employment performance is 
that inordinate labour- market protections were extended over the 1990s, raising 
unskilled workers’ wages, while weak vocational education has led to a shortage 
of skilled workers and raised their wages (Levinsohn,  2008; Kaplan,  2015a 
and 2015b; Nattrass and Seekings, 2019). While South Africa is clearly not a very 
low- wage manufacturing economy, various indicators cast doubt that its uniquely 
high unemployment is explained pre dom in ant ly by market inflexibility. First, 
nominal international wages in tradable sectors are highly sensitive to exchange 
rate movements. Periods of overvaluation push up relative wage costs in dollar 
terms, even as labour productivity has roughly matched Rand increases in the 
wage bill (Rodrik, 2008; Zalk, 2014).
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Second, there is no obvious relationship between measures of labour- market 
rigidity and unemployment across a range of developing countries. A number of 
other middle- income countries have been ranked with similar levels of labour 
market rigidity as South Africa over the past two decades but have not experi-
enced anywhere near the levels of unemployment that South Africa has.1 Far 
more plausible is that low profitability and correspondingly tepid rates of invest-
ment in diversified manufacturing in general, even while there have been higher 
investment rates in capital- intensive heavy industries, are the primary factors in 
poor manufacturing employment growth. Third, while there are clearly deep 
problems with both South Africa’s education and vocational training system, the 
greatest constraint cited by firms for unutilized capacity and in business confi-
dence surveys is lack of demand. This is in no way to suggest that skills formation 
is irrelevant. Rather, a poorly performing secondary and vocational education 
system has provided, at best, no particular advantage to South African manufac-
turers. Indeed, inadequate skills would likely become a more significant con-
straint with any acceleration of manufacturing growth. Furthermore, Chapter 12 
emphasizes that increasing technological sophistication and digitalization of pro-
duction systems mean that the intensity and complexity of skills required are set 
to rise, both in manufacturing and in progressively more integrated ancillary ser-
vice sectors, such as data mining.
South Africa remains heavily dependent on primary and semi- processed 
mineral exports, accounting for 57 per cent of merchandise exports in 2019, 
while aggregate export growth and diversification have been lacklustre 
(Chapter  1). Import growth and dividend outflows have outstripped export 
growth with the balance- of- payment constraint increasingly financed by short- 
term capital inflows (Strauss,  2017). Agricultural export growth has been 
driven pre dom in ant ly by the horticulture sector, particularly of high- value 
fresh fruit (Chapter 6).
The following section turns to the phases and processes of industrial restruc-
turing that have given rise to the limited post- apartheid structural transformation 
described above.
2.3 Phases and Processes of Industrial Restructuring and Policy
Three phases of post- apartheid industrial restructuring and policy can be identi-
fied, reflecting both significant continuity since the 1990s, particularly with 
respect to macroeconomic policy, as well as important policy shifts.
1 See for example, World Bank measures of labour market rigidity reviewed in Zalk (2017).
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2.3.1 Phase 1: Core Bargains, Liberalization, and Stabilization
South African deindustrialization began in the early 1980s due to an inability to 
develop internationally competitive manufacturing sectors outside of the heavy 
‘mineral- energy- complex’ industries built up under apartheid (Fine and 
Rustomjee, 1996). Profitability of the handful of private conglomerates that dom-
in ated the economy faltered together with private and public investment, amid a 
deepening political and economic crisis (Morris, 1991).
The orthodox orientation of economic policy which has prevailed to a greater 
or lesser degree in the post- apartheid period—with its emphasis on macroeco-
nomic ‘stability’, Anglo- American- style capital markets, and the removal of 
 market distortions—was effected through processes of contestation and accom-
modation during South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy. From 
the late 1980s, dominant conglomerates sought to secure policies that would 
restore profitability and, above all, maximize their freedom to restructure capital 
domestically and abroad (Zalk, 2017). Their central contention was that efficient 
capital allocation and higher fixed investment would best be secured, not by state- 
directed restructuring, but by further deepening Anglo- American- style capital 
markets in which shareholders and lenders overwhelmingly shape capital- 
allocation strategies (South African Foundation,  1996). A multi- pronged effort 
was pursued to legitimate this objective. This included relentless lobbying of 
se nior African National Congress (ANC) leaders and economic policy office- 
bearers (Spicer, 2016), rhetorical and ideological appeals to the benefits of ‘free 
markets’ (South African Foundation, 1996), and the initiation of narrow- based 
black economic empowerment (BEE) asset transfers to politically influential indi-
viduals (Kantor, 1998) in a series of highly leveraged ‘first generation’ BEE deals.
Momentum for a putatively market- led restructuring was bolstered by se lect-
ive appeals to scholarship contending that apartheid industrialization had failed 
due to a range of product and factor market distortions, which incentivized 
capital- intensive investment while disincentivizing the employment of unskilled 
labour (Lipton, 1986; Nattrass,  1989; Holden, 1992; Fallon and de Silva, 1994). 
Overlaid upon this market distortions thesis were various ideological claims, 
inadequately substantiated by empirical evidence. These included that public 
investment crowded out private investment, that macroeconomic stabilization of 
public debt and inflation would raise investment via an ill- defined ‘business con-
fidence’, and that South Africa’s industrial import tariff structure was high relative 
to developing- country peers (Macroeconomic Research Group, 1993; Michie and 
Padayachee, 1998; Weeks, 1999).
The adoption of the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) strat-
egy reflected this confluence of interests, selective reliance on scholarship, and 
ideology. Neither the surge in private investment in export- oriented manufactur-
ing nor the 600,000 jobs predicted by GEAR materialized. The concurrent 
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adoption of legislation strengthening de jure worker protection is often conveyed 
as inconsistent with GEAR’s liberalizing thrust (Nattrass,  1998). However, it is 
doubtful whether GEAR could have been politically feasible without it 
(Jonas,  2019), while extensive outsourcing and casualization have in practice 
weakened de jure worker protections (Tregenna, 2010).
Trade liberalization was intended to induce manufacturers to shift from ‘exces-
sively’ profitable domestic markets to less profitable (but presumably not loss- 
making) export markets. Average manufacturing tariffs were cut from 28 per cent 
in 1990 to 23 per cent in 1994 and 8 per cent by 2004 (Edwards and van de 
Winkel, 2005). These went well beyond the reductions South Africa had commit-
ted to when it joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1993 
(Davies, 2019).
In the absence of any overarching manufacturing strategy, particularly for 
underdeveloped diversified sectors outside heavy-industry, industrial policy was 
relegated to a set of dispersed incentives supposed to assist firms adjust to trade 
liberalization. Only two sector- specific programmes were formalized: the Motor 
Industry Development Programme (MIDP) (Chapter  5) and a Duty Credit 
Certificate Scheme (DCCS) for clothing and textiles. In parallel, and stark contra-
diction with their disavowal of state intervention, private conglomerates secured 
extensive public support for heavy- industry expansions throughout the 1990s, 
supported by tax incentives, co- funding by the Industrial Development 
Corporation (IDC), and cheap electricity (Zalk, 2012 and 2014).
Similarly, the ‘free market’ commitment of large business groups was contra-
dicted by their intense contestation of a revised Competition Act, which suc-
ceeded in circumscribing the competition authorities’ ability to deal with 
anticompetitive conduct and not to tackle the pre- existing market concentration 
directly (Makhaya and Roberts, 2013).
Although the envisaged privatization was only partially implemented, a gen-
eral de- emphasis of public fixed investment prevailed as SOCs were commercial-
ized with a view to selling them to BEE investors. Low public investment meant 
the social infrastructure envisaged by the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP)2 did not meaningfully materialize. This translated into weak 
demand for infrastructure- linked sectors, such as steel and engineering 
(Zalk, 2017). The commercialization of SOCs entrenched existing biases in the 
provision of electricity, rail, and ports in favour of the export of primary and 
semi- processed mineral commodities, rather than diversified manufacturing 
exports (Department of Trade and Industry, 2018a).
From the early 1990s, influential institutional investors secured the long- 
desired unbundling of apartheid- era conglomerate structures, shifting the 
2 The RDP was a socioeconomic programme of the incoming ANC government that envisaged 
large- scale investment to address social and infrastructural backlogs.
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balance of power from founding families to shareholders, with the objective of 
‘unlocking shareholder value’ and paving the way for greater internationalization 
(Malherbe and Segal, 2001; Chabane et al., 2006). Capital- account liberalization 
and offshore listings would, proponents argued, attract foreign direct investment 
and provide access to cheaper international capital to invest domestically 
(Walters and Prinsloo 2002). However, offshore listings by major corporations 
acted as a platform for international expansion rather than raising funds for 
investment in South Africa (Chabane et al., 2006). Most prominent was Anglo’s 
listing on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) in 1999, with two of its biggest 
industrial subsidiaries, South African Breweries (SAB), and paper, pulp, and 
packaging producer, Mondi. Rising demands for Anglo to unlock value for 
shareholders by becoming a focused mining company saw it dispose of its 
remaining industrial subsidiaries, including chemicals producer AECI, bottler 
Bevcon (Mohamed 2020) and its steel and engineering investments (together 
with co- investor Remgro)—with profoundly damaging effects on industrial 
capabilities in the sector.
Rather than attracting long- term foreign direct investment, potentially invest-
able long- term capital has been drained through offshore listings and rising own-
ership by foreign institutional investors. The associated stream of dividend 
outflows has become a substantial part of a persistent current- account deficit 
(Strauss, 2017). Long- term sources of capital have been replaced by more volatile 
short- term portfolio flows into South Africa’s expanding stock, bond, and money 
markets (Hassan 2013). Illegal capital flight is said to have exacerbated the exit of 
long- term capital (Ashman et al., 2011; Ndikumana, 2016) although estimates of 
its extent and magnitude are contested (Östensson, 2018).
In the context of legislation that did not empower the competition authorities 
to deal with the pre- existing monopolistic market structures, the unbundling of 
highly concentrated apartheid- era conglomerates across the economy was followed 
by consolidation of control within industries, in which high levels of profitability 
could generally be secured. Heavy industries including petrochemicals, carbon and 
stainless steel, and aluminium retained their ability to impose monopolistic pri cing 
on downstream customers (Roberts and Zalk, 2004; Zalk, 2017; Rustomjee et al., 
2018). As discussed in Chapter 9, large business groups have often in corp or ated 
BEE partners to help entrench their market dominance, rather than open up 
space in the economy for smaller and black- owned entrants (Bell et al., 2018).
By the end of the 1990s, many ‘first generation’ BEE deals, which served to 
bolster the legitimacy for an overwhelmingly orthodox policy path, collapsed in 
the wake of the 1997/8 Asian financial crisis. A brief period that saw black owner-
ship on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) rise and peak at around 7 per 
cent was rapidly reversed (Mcgregor’s, various years). This prompted the estab-
lishment of a BEE Commission that in 2001 called for BEE to be included in 
le gis la tion rather than left to the discretion of large business groups. The 
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limitations of this ‘stabilization’ phase in the 1990s became increasingly apparent 
as fixed investment fell, unemployment and inequality soared, and BEE ambitions 
remained unrealized.
2.3.2 Phase 2: The Illusion of Progress, the Ostensible Shift to a 
‘Developmental State’, and the Introduction of Industrial Policy
The 2000s saw both continuity of orthodox policy and some significant shifts. 
Two main groupings in and around the ANC challenged the direction of policy, 
but for different fundamental reasons. The first sought a shift to East Asian- style 
intervention to reverse deindustrialization and associated job losses. The second 
grouping wanted the state to reorient its procurement, licensing, and regu la tory 
powers in their favour. The government belatedly recognized that public invest-
ment was essential to crowd in private investment (Presidency, 2006) and public 
investment began to increase, particularly to address a mounting backlog in elec-
tricity supply Concurrently prepare for the country’s hosting of the 2010 World 
Cup. Concurrently BEE became increasingly entrenched in legislation, policy, 
and procurement practices of the state and SOCs.
Meanwhile, corporate restructuring bore fruit as ‘value’ was increasingly dis-
gorged to shareholders through dividends and share buybacks. Based on estimates 
by Wesson (2015), dividends to and repurchases from institutional investors on the 
JSE between 1999 and 2009 were equivalent to 17 per cent of total gross fixed 
formation (GFCF) or 61 per cent of manufacturing GFCF over the corresponding 
period. This is a lower- bound estimate as it excludes firms that form part of two 
of the largest sectoral indices of the JSE: basic materials and financials, as well as 
formerly South African companies listed offshore. Thus, it excludes Anglo’s large- 
scale programme between 2005 and 2008 to repurchase shares from LSE in vest-
ors (Coulson, 2009), which coincided with the destructive unbundling of its steel 
and engineering businesses discussed above. Sizeable transfers also accrued to 
beneficiaries of BEE deals. Based on estimates by Theobald et al. (2015) the net 
value transferred to beneficiaries of BEE deals from the one hundred largest JSE- 
listed firms between 2000 and 2014 was equivalent to 8 per cent of total GFCF 
and 29 per cent of manufacturing GFCF over the same period (Zalk, 2017). Thus, 
very sizeable (and conservatively estimated) flows of potentially investable funds 
have accrued as rents or rent- like transfers to both entrenched and new share-
holders. But these have not translated into levels or patterns of fixed investment 
capable of shifting South Africa onto a structurally transformed growth path.
Despite low investment and exceptionally high unemployment and inequality, 
macroeconomic policy continued to be cast as ‘state of the art’ and declared a 
success in terms of intermediate measures such as lower inflation, fiscal deficits, 
and tariffs. Weak manufacturing performance was attributed to a lack of 
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‘micro eco nom ic reforms’, particularly labour market deregulation, deeper trade 
lib er al iza tion, incomplete privatization, and limited competition (Edwards and 
van de Winkel,  2005; Du Plessis and Smit,  2007). A ‘Microeconomic Reform 
Strategy’ echoed the dogma of irreproachable macroeconomic policy, emphasiz-
ing further microeconomic reforms and an ill- defined shift towards greater 
manufacturing ‘knowledge intensity’. The latter was not, however, accompanied 
by any meaningful sector strategies beyond automotives, and clothing and textiles. 
Over this period, the IDC shifted its emphasis from financing capital- intensive 
mega- projects to BEE ownership transfers that were delinked from new indus-
trial investment capacity (Mondi and Roberts, 2005).
Although the 2000s saw a brief period of improvement in GDP, investment 
and employment, this was driven by an unsustainable confluence of the global 
 commodity boom, a surge in short- term capital inflows, and a domestic 
consumption- led boom underpinned by unsustainable increases in household 
debt (Bell et al., 2018). The disjuncture between industrial and macroeconomic 
policy over this period was manifested most starkly by the failure to act meaning-
fully against prolonged currency overvaluation, which dramatically eroded the 
competitiveness of diversified manufacturing industries (Zalk, 2014). Furthermore, 
rail and port SOCs Transnet and Portnet have favoured bulk primary and semi- 
processed commodity exports over diversified value- added exports. Port unit 
costs are considerably higher than developing- country comparators and exceed 
those of either primary commodity exports or the imports of manufactured 
goods (Ports Regulator, cited in Department of Trade and Industry (2018a: 58)).
The belated adoption by the Mbeki administration (1999–2008) of the ‘devel-
opmental state’ nomenclature in the second half of the 2000s represented more an 
attempt to shore up legitimacy within the ANC than present a serious policy 
alternative (Fine, 2010). However, it was inadequate to stave off the accession of 
Jacob Zuma to the Presidency in 2008, supported by an uneasy coalition of ANC 
factions: one envisaging a shift from orthodox policies, the other eyeing unpro-
ductive accumulation opportunities through the state. On the cusp of this transi-
tion, Cabinet adopted the first formal, overarching, post- apartheid industrial 
policy, the 2007 National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF) (Department of 
Trade and Industry, 2007). The NIPF’s core objective was to guide and facilitate 
government- wide policy aimed at the reversal of deindustrialization and the 
diversification of manufacturing beyond heavy-industry.
2.3.3 Phase 3: Industrial Policy—Formally Embraced, Undermined 
in Practice
The introduction of the NIPF and a series of rolling Industrial Policy Action Plans 
(IPAPs) marked a consequential policy shift. It raised fundamental questions 
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about the appropriateness of orthodox policies in light of weak domestic invest-
ment and manufacturing performance since 1994 and the onset of the global 
financial crisis in 2008. In order to reverse a growth path ‘driven by unsustainable 
increases in credit extension and consumption, not sufficiently underpinned by 
growth in the production sectors of the economy’ (Department of Trade and 
Industry, 2010: 4), it highlighted the need for supportive macroeconomic policy, 
scaled- up industrial financing including via development banks like the IDC, 
the strategic use of trade policy instruments, and the leveraging of public 
procurement.
The automotive sector, supported by the Automotive Production Development 
Programme (APDP) and notwithstanding the weaknesses discussed in Chapter 5, 
has grown to become the leading export sector outside of heavy-industry. The 
Clothing and Textile Competitiveness Programme (CTCP) has helped to stabilize 
the sector after mass job losses during the 1990s, through rapid productivity 
growth and the better integration of manufacturers in retail supply chains. The 
agroprocessing, metals and machinery, film, and business- process industries have 
also been supported. These measures have helped to avert even deeper dein dus-
tri al iza tion. However, notwithstanding formal adoption of the policy by the 
Cabinet in 2007, industrial policy and structural transformation have been 
undermined in practice in three main ways.
First, monetary and fiscal policy have been misaligned with structural trans-
form ation and industrial policy. National Treasury took over five years to imple-
ment Cabinet- mandated regulations enabling the designation of publicly 
procured products for domestic manufacture. No real increase in on- budget 
industrial financing materialized until the 2009/10 financial year (Zalk, 2014) and 
these have subsequently been reversed with the Department of Trade, Industry, 
and Competition’s (DTIC) incentives budget declining by 19 per cent in real 
terms between 2012/13 and 2018/19 (Zalk  2014; Department of Trade and 
Industry, 2018b). Since the introduction of the NIPF, the IDC has raised its levels 
of disbursements. However, its ability to provide long- term concessional funding 
has been constrained by limited access to low- cost funding streams, in the face of 
rising costs of capital (Goga et al., 2019), that have been the lifeblood of successful 
development banks elsewhere in the world (Griffith- Jones and Ocampo, 2018).
Second, discordant objectives for an expanded role for the state and SOCs 
became increasingly manifest, particularly with respect to the exercise of the 
state’s licensing and procurement powers. The DTIC and the Economic 
Development Department (EDD) envisaged an expanded role of the state and 
SOCs to reverse deindustrialization and place it on a more diversified path 
(Economic Development Department, 2011). However, much of government and 
the SOCs placed particular emphasis on BEE ownership transfers with limited 
regard to structural transformation and employment considerations. For instance, 
the 2002 Mining Charter (Republic of South Africa, 2002) required a minimum 
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25 per cent black ownership and to cascade these ownership requirements to 
mining suppliers, often sucking in imports from ‘empowered’ importers 
(Zalk 2014 and 2017; and Chapter 9). Efforts to forge a stronger link between BEE 
and the development of productive capabilities included introducing enterprise 
and skills development elements into a revised Broad- Based Black Economic 
Empowerment (BBBEE) Act (Republic of South Africa, 2014) and a black indus-
trialist programme to support active black ownership in manufacturing 
(Department of Trade and Industry, n.d.; and Chapter 9). However, this effort has 
come up against lobbying for the inclusion of importers rather than manufacturers, 
limited budget, and lack of support from SOCs in procuring from bona fide black 
manufacturers (Vilakazi, 2020; and Chapter 9).
Rising corruption and maladministration under the Zuma administration 
(2009–18) further weakened manufacturing. Many SOCs and government 
departments have not complied with local content requirements (Department of 
Trade and Industry, 2018a). The most conspicuous lost opportunity was the suborn-
ment of SOCs Transnet and Prasa’s rail recapitalization programme to renew their 
ageing freight and passenger rail fleets. Widespread irregularities and corruption 
in contracts to acquire rolling stock, have invariably involved the minimization of 
local content in favour of imports. (Bhorat et al., 2017; Crompton et al., 2017).
Corruption and maladministration have been accompanied by a generalized 
deterioration in the public provision of electricity, rail, and port services. 
Electricity prices increased more than 240 per cent above inflation between 2004 
and 2017 (Statistics South Africa, cited in Department of Trade and Industry 
(2018a: 57)) as Eskom’s debt surged due to massive capital cost overruns and mal-
administration. Periodic electricity supply outages have had an extremely adverse 
impact on manufacturing and mining. State guarantees on Eskom’s debt have 
become so large that they have triggered a sovereign credit rating downgrade to 
sub- investment level, with an associated increase in the cost of debt (South 
African Reserve Bank, 2020).
2.4 Conclusions
This chapter traces how the post- apartheid political settlement and associated 
policies and institutions have been shaped by a confluence of interests, selective 
appeals to scholarship, and ideology. These policies and institutions have given 
rise to a range of rents and rent- like transfers including monopolistic profits as 
well as via BEE deals. However, these rents have not been adequately channelled 
into levels of fixed investment or increasing return sectors capable of shifting the 
economy onto a path of decisive structural transformation. Corporate and indus-
trial restructuring has been associated with a ‘high- profit- low- investment’ 
economy and deepening deindustrialization. Low investment has prevailed, 
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notwithstanding the rapid growth and high profitability of the finance sector, 
with institutional investors the major beneficiaries of these monopoly rents. 
Within a context of low overall fixed investment, capital has shifted away from 
the two major tradable sectors essential for structural trans form ation and job 
creation: agriculture and an increasingly low- profitability manufacturing sector. 
Together with mining, these tradable sectors have experienced large declines in 
employment. Rather, investment has moved predominantly to limited- tradability 
services sectors.
Industrial policy interventions have played an important role in supporting 
growth, competitiveness, and jobs in a number of diversified manufacturing 
sectors, particularly automotives, and clothing and textiles. However, increasingly 
internationalized heavy industries have continued to dominate through their 
weight in manufacturing investment and value added, their ability to impose 
monopolistic pricing for their output on downstream industries, and a continued 
reliance on mining and mineral processing for close to two- thirds of South 
Africa’s merchandise exports. Rather than ‘excessive’ worker protections, 
poor manufacturing employment outcomes are mainly due to low rates 
of  manufacturing investment, with low and declining profitability and 
weak demand.
Low investment, job losses, and limited black participation in the ‘commanding 
heights’ of the economy from the mid- 1990s spurred the political impetus for a 
stronger role for the state during the 2000s and 2010s. In this context the formal 
introduction of industrial policy in 2007 reasserted the centrality of structural 
transformation, supported significant sectoral advances, and helped avert even 
deeper deindustrialization. However, industrial policy has been undermined by the 
disarticulation between the policy objective of structural transformation, 
 subordinated to the domain of ‘microeconomic reforms’ on the one hand, and 
macroeconomic and other economy- wide policies and institutional arrangements 
on the other. Monetary, fiscal, and financial policy as well as policies to advance 
black ownership have generally been disconnected from the economy- wide 
imperative of structural transformation. Strategic SOCs, particularly those providing 
electricity, rail, and port infrastructure as well as technical and vocational educa-
tional and training (TVET) institutions, have at best provided no particular advan-
tage to diversified manufacturing sectors. Rising corruption and maladministration 
have fundamentally weakened these SOCs, increasing costs and further lowering 
efficiencies for diversified manufacturing in particular. The emerging cornerstone 
of industrial policy and structural transformation, under the ‘New Dawn’ of the 
Ramaphosa administration that commenced in 2018, are sector master plans to be 
forged through social compacts between the state, business, and labour (Republic of 
South Africa,  2020). There is a danger that these continue to be relegated to the 
domain of ‘micro eco nom ic reforms’ rather than elevated as an economy- wide 
imperative that enjoys appropriate and coherent support across the state and SOCs.
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Despite its own specificities, the South African case has important similarities 
with and some implications for other MIDCs. These include the need to ensure 
that industrial policy and structural transformation are treated as economy- wide 
rather than ‘microeconomic’ imperatives. This implies that associated policies 
and institutions, including fiscal and monetary policy, are supportive of structural 
transformation. For resource- dependent countries, this includes managing 
resource rents over the commodity cycle: sterilizing and saving commodity wind-
falls during the peak and deploying these savings in a counter- cyclical way when 
the cycle turns downwards. Policy space needs to be preserved to use trade and 
other policy instruments strategically in engagements with global, regional, and 
bilateral trade and investment negotiations. The sequencing and orientation of 
financial- sector policy and regulation should focus on mobilizing finance and 
channelling it to productive investment in increasing return sectors rather than 
uncritical ‘financial deepening’. Taxation and other policies have a role to play in 
encouraging the reinvestment of retained earnings rather than maximizing their 
disgorgement to shareholders. Development banks have a critical role to play and 
require access to concessional sources of funding to help underwrite the lengthy 
and risky process involved in firms acquiring industrial capabilities. Finally, the 
South African experience reflects how the failure to foster meaningful structural 
transformation can help create fertile conditions for unproductive rent- seeking 
and corruption to flourish.
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Metals, Machinery, and Mining Equipment 
Industries in South Africa
The Relationship between Power, Governance, and 
Technological Capabilities
Antonio Andreoni, Lauralyn Kaziboni, and Simon Roberts
3.1 Introduction
The metals, machinery, and mining equipment industries have been at the heart 
of South Africa’s industrial ecosystem for many decades. This is due to the im port­
ance of mining in the country for more than a century and the close demand­ and 
supply­ side linkages with metals and machinery production. These industries 
include basic iron and steel, non­ ferrous metals, fabricated metal products, and a 
diverse array of machinery and equipment manufacturing. The industries are 
characterized by well­ established technological capabilities developed through 
linkages with mining and extensive state support under apartheid. During apart­
heid, there was particularly extensive support for basic metals production.
The industries continue to be crucial to the South African economy for several 
reasons. They make up a very substantial part of manufacturing, accounting in 
2019 for 19 per cent of manufacturing value added and 23 per cent of employ­
ment, with employment mainly in downstream fabricated metals products, and 
machinery and equipment. They also provide intermediate products to other sec­
tors across the economy. The industries are central to the processes of learning and 
technological change, and are critical for convergence between the ICT, and 
machinery and equipment industries in the context of the fourth industrial revolu­
tion (Min et al., 2018). As such, machinery and equipment are ‘root industries’ for 
any strategy that seeks to diversify the domestic economy towards higher value 
adding and more sophisticated activities, while creating jobs (see Chapter 12).
This chapter analyses the restructuring and development of these complex 
value chains in post­ apartheid South Africa, from 1994 to 2019. In section 3.2, 
key turning points in this development are identified, in relation to the initial 
phase of the liberalization of the economy, the growth in demand associated with 
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the global commodities boom in the 2000s, and the period of adjustment from 
2008, after the financial crisis, until 2019. Notwithstanding major changes, the 
overall record is of a basic steel industry that performed better in terms of value 
added relative to the more diversified downstream industries.
Section 3.3 involves a critical examination of the engagement of the post­ 
apartheid state with the main companies producing basic metals—the key inputs 
for downstream manufacturers of metal products. The principal firm was the 
major basic­ steel producer Iscor, which became ArcelorMittal South Africa 
(AMSA). This is followed by a discussion on the use of procurement as a demand­ 
side industrial policy, given the importance of infrastructure and investments by 
state­ owned enterprises and mining companies as buyers of metal products and 
machinery.
In section 3.4 the focus turns to the downstream mining machinery and 
equipment industry. While South Africa has strong production capabilities, 
these have been eroded. The section includes a reflection on the challenges in 
terms of technologies, changing ownership, and governance arrangements in 
production systems, and an examination of the related changes in the domestic 
environment. Conclusions and implications for industrial policy are set out in 
section 3.5.
3.2 Missed Opportunities for Structural Transformation
The metals, machinery, and mining equipment value chains serve a critical role in 
South Africa as a source of employment, output, and high­ value products. In 
2019, the industries accounted for the largest source of formal employment in 
manufacturing, contributing a total of 284,000 direct jobs, of which 228,000 were 
in the machinery and equipment, and fabricated metal products industries. The 
industry’s strong linkages with support industries such as engineering services, 
transport, and logistics generate further employment. While the upstream 
capital­ intensive basic metals industry saw output growth alongside shrinking 
employment, the growth of output in the diversified machinery and equipment 
industry was accompanied by employment growth, highlighting its labour­ 
absorbing characteristics.
3.2.1 Mapping the Metals to Machinery and Equipment Value Chains
The metals, machinery, and equipment value chains are quite complex, with 
backward and forward linkages underpinned by integrated production systems. 
The upstream segment begins with the mining and production of mineral ores, 
including iron ore, chrome, manganese, and other related mining activities that 
feed into both basic ferrous and non­ ferrous production. The basic metals go 
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through various processes of value addition, until being manufactured into 
sophisticated products and components including pumps and valves, material 
handling equipment, mineral processing, and earthmoving equipment (see 
Figure 3.1). These are demanded by mining houses, utility providers (including 
state­ owned companies in energy and transport), and other sectors such as agri­
culture and construction. The mining sector is the largest user of these inputs, 
directly accounting for 24 per cent of domestic demand in 2019 and further 
demand for metals and machinery components (Quantec, 2020), as they are 
embodied in intermediate goods.1
Steel is by far the most important basic metal, followed by aluminium and 
other non­ ferrous metals. Primary steel production is a large­ scale, capital­ and 
energy­ intensive industry, with strong backward linkages to iron ore, coal, and 
electricity, as well as scrap metal (used in mini­ mills for producing long steel 
products). Basic steel is widely traded, notwithstanding substantial transport 
costs, as is aluminium. Cast­ metal products are produced in foundries, melting 
steel and other metals to produce components that are used in a range of 
1 It is important to note that the Quantec data are not official statistics. They have been compiled 
including data from Statistics South Africa, with some computations by Quantec, and this should be 
borne in mind.
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Figure 3.1 Metals to machinery and equipment value chain
Note: The arrows are only illustrative of the main linkages and supplies of, for example, pumps and 
valves are supplied to a range of customer groupings.
Source: Adapted from Rustomjee et al., 2018.
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downstream finished manufactures. The cost and quality of steel, as a key input, is 
a major contributor to the competitiveness of downstream fabrication of a range 
of metal products.
Basic steel production in South Africa has been dominated throughout the 
period by the steel plants of by the formerly state­ owned Iscor, which became 
ArcelorMittal South Africa (AMSA). Acerinox is the major stainless­ steel 
producer, while there were a few very large aluminium smelters. Iscor’s first plant 
came into production in Pretoria in 1934 (Zalk, 2017). Following its privatization 
in 1989, Iscor continued to receive substantial government support in the 1990s and 
was the subject of a major government­ sponsored restructuring strategy resulting 
in its acquisition to become AMSA (Roberts and Rustomjee, 2009; Rustomjee et al., 
2018). Other steel producers then included Highveld Steel and Vanadium, using 
iron ore as the main feedstock, and Scaw Metals, manufacturing from scrap metal. 
Both companies were part of the Anglo American conglomerate until the 2000s. 
Parts of Highveld Steel were taken over by Evraz in 2006, while parts of Scaw were 
acquired by the IDC following the downturn after 2008 (Rustomjee et al., 2018).
Downstream products have strong backward linkages with the upstream steel 
producers and foundries that provide fabricated metal products as key inputs into 
machinery and equipment production. In addition to basic metal products from 
which intermediate components are manufactured, there are a range of cast prod­
ucts made by foundries. These cast components can be manufactured from alloys 
and are important for the automotive industry. The key components sold to the 
industry include a com bin ation of low­ tech, medium­ tech, and high­ tech compo­
nents, illustrating some level of structural transformation.
Despite the importance of the foundry industry at the midstream level as pro­
ducer of cast components, its capabilities were severely eroded after the opening 
up of the economy in 1994. The industry continued to struggle competitively, 
resulting in a dramatic decline in the number of foundries and levels of output, 
particularly between 2008 and 2016, when the number of foundries fell by 38 per 
cent and output declined by 15 per cent (Rustomjee et al., 2018). The weakening 
capabilities are partly explained by the lack of any substantial investment in cap­
ital and technology upgrading in the two decades up to 2020, coupled with 
increasing import competition from Asia and Europe.
In South Africa, the local mining machinery and equipment industry, which is 
the most imprtant downstream segment, is characterized mainly by medium­ 
sized local companies that are highly specialized in specific product segments, 
including underground and surface mining equipment, off­ road specialized 
equipment, mineral processing, and material handling. These firms compete with 
global original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) which have increased their 
share of the South African and Southern African markets. The South African pro­
ducers have innovative and advanced technological capabilities in deep­ level 
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mining, including rock mechanics, shaft sinking, re friger ation, ventilation, 
pumping, and hoisting systems, and drilling and blasting (Fessehaie,  2015; 
Andreoni and Torreggiani, 2020). Some of the domestic manufacturers supplying 
equipment to the mining houses have backward linkages to foundries providing 
metal casting and to suppliers of components such as pumps, valves, and con­
veyor systems, as well as with related services, especially in engineering, and 
product­ system and software design (Phele et al., 2005; Phele and Roberts, 2005).
3.2.2 Competitiveness and Structural Transformation
Structural transformation in the industry requires better performance in diversi­
fied downstream activities, instead of in the upstream, capital­ and energy­ 
intensive basic metals industries. Despite the downstream sector accounting for a 
larger proportion of value added in total manufacturing, the relatively stronger 
growth in value added through the 1994–2008 period was observed in the 
upstream basic metals industries (Table 3.1).
Major investments were made in the basic iron and steel industries in the early 
1990s and in the non­ ferrous metals industry in large aluminium smelters in the 
early 2000s, as reflected in the average rates of investment (Table 3.1). The continu­
ation of support to the main producers underpinned high average growth in value 
added in basic metals industries from 1994 to 2002, alongside major restructuring 
efforts to reduce employment. The upstream industry growth reflected the strength 
of path­ dependency effects in response to liberalization, and how the balance of 
interests in favour of concentrated incumbents influenced policy (Goga et al., 
2020). This path dependency is evident in the capital­ intensive upstream industries 
continuing to attract higher levels of investment through the period as a whole, 
accounting for the great majority of real gross fixed capital investment (in constant 
2010 prices) in the metals and machinery industries overall.
The commodities boom in the 2000s further drove growth in steel value added, 
with an 11.8 per cent compound annual average growth rate in the 2002–8 period. 
The growth in mining activity in other parts of Southern Africa increased demand 
for machinery and equipment in this period and saw average annual growth in 
value added in this industry of 5.7 per cent from 2002 to 2008, even while import 
penetration increased to 67.6 per cent of domestic consumption (Table 3.1). The 
import penetration, especially from China and including in cast metal compo­
nents, eroded capabilities even while overall the industry grew in both output and 
employment. This impact is evident in the decade following the financial crisis, 
when production stagnated, notwithstanding a few areas of excellence in machin­
ery and equipment, which regained competitiveness following investments in 
capabilities (Barnes et al., 2019).
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The downstream industries have not had a major coordinated industrial policy 
programme of support and services, including targeted skills and technology sup­
port through institutions of industrial policy. Instead, there has been an evolving 
mix of ineffective incentives and initiatives. These include investment incentives 
in the 1990s, the bulk of which went to the basic metals producers rather than 
diversified downstream and labour­ absorbing producers (Roberts and Rustomjee, 
2009). There were also technology support measures under the Integrated 
Manufacturing Strategy and the Advanced Manufacturing Technology Strategy 
(Machaka and Roberts,  2003). Cluster developments were championed by the 
South African Capital Equipment Export Council (SACEEC), established in 2000 
Table 3.1 Performance across the metals, machinery, and mining equipment 
industry grouping






























Average value­ added 
growth
1994–2002 3.9% 7.9% 2.7% 2.4%
2002–8 11.8% 3.8% 0.7% 5.7%
2008–19 −3.3% −3.7% 0.1% 0.3%
Employment (in 
thousands)




















1994–2002 −5.4% −3.7% −1.5% −0.2%
2002–8 −0.7% 2.3% 1.8% 3.9%
2008–19 −3.8% −3.8% −1.0% 0.3%
Average investment
(gross fixed capital 
formation  
as % of gross value 
addition)
1994–2001 41.0% 31.6% 9.4% 9.4%
2002–8 37.2% 36.2% 11.2% 10.0%
2009–19 34.1% 43.7% 9.9% 9.4%
Imports as % of 
domestic 
consumption
1994 10.4% 11.7% 13.8% 54.0%
2002 7.7% 22.3% 19.1% 57.4%
2008 25.9% 66.9% 24.5% 67.6%
2019 13.8% 39.9% 24.3% 69.1%
Exports as % of 
domestic  
output
1994 45.1% 29.1% 5.1% 14.2%
2002 35.6% 38.9% 10.0% 22.2%
2008 67.0% 57.2% 12.7% 27.4%
2019 37.2% 42.6% 15.0% 40.4%
Note: The imports and export measures for fabricated metal products are for ‘Other fabricated metal 
products’.
Source: Quantec data and authors’ calculations.
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as a public­ private partnership between the industry and the Department of 
Trade, Industry, and Competition (DTIC), but the emphasis was on driving mar­
ket access through public procurement, export promotion, and marketing initia­
tives, such as international trade fairs.
In fact two separate developments worked against diversifying the industrial 
base. First, substantial engineering capabilities in subsidiaries of the major con­
glomerates, led by Anglo American and including its Dorbyl business, were 
eroded when the conglomerates unbundled and a short­ term asset stripping took 
place (Zalk,  2017; Rustomjee et al.,  2018). Second, the procurement policies, 
including under black economic empowerment (BEE) provisions in the 2000s to 
favour black suppliers, did not measure local value added and led to black entre­
preneurs setting up as local suppliers for multinational producers importing into 
South Africa (Chapter 9).
3.2.3 Trade Performance and the Poor Performance  
of Machinery and Equipment
The opening­ up and international reintegration of the South African economy 
from 1994 saw the basic metals industries (iron and steel, and non­ ferrous met­
als) maintain trade surpluses while the trade deficit in machinery and equipment 
reduced somewhat, as the real exchange rate depreciated in line with the unwind­
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Figure 3.2 Metals, machinery, and equipment trade balances, nominal US$ millions
Source: Trade Map and South African Reserve Bank, accessed in March 2020.
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roughly balanced trade throughout the entire 1994–2019 period, as exports were 
similar to imports.
From 2002, as the commodity boom took hold and international commodity 
prices increased substantially, the trade surplus in basic steel quadrupled. 
However, while robust domestic demand meant that the machinery and equip­
ment industry continued to grow output and employment, under the stronger 
commodity­ supported currency it could not compete with the massive import 
penetration. The currency appreciation made it more attractive for domestic 
demand to be met by relatively cheaper imports. The increase in the trade deficit 
from 2002 to 2008 was equivalent to the domestic value­added of the industry in 
2008, which supported 100,000 direct jobs.
The global financial crisis saw a sharp decline in the output of both basic metals 
and fabricated metals as prices collapsed. While the trade balance in machinery and 
equipment improved somewhat, as imports declined, the hollowing out of cap abil­
ities in the previous period from 2002 to 2008 meant that per form ance continued 
to be weak overall, and value added in 2019 remained lower than ten years earlier.
The failure to maintain and grow from a strong industrial base in machinery 
and equipment is most evident in the declining competitiveness in the Southern 
African region, which accounts for the great majority of South Africa’s exports of 
these products. For example, in Zambia, which has been one of the largest export 
markets for South Africa, market share fell from above 60 per cent in 2002 to 










































































































South Africa RoW SA market share
Figure 3.3 Machinery and equipment imports of selected SADC countries from 
South Africa versus the rest of the world, in US$ billions
Note: Due to lack of data, Angola import values for 2002, 2008, and 2019 are represented by 2004, 
2009, and 2019; and Tanzania import values for 2019 are represented by 2018 import values.
Source: ITC Trade Map (https://www.trademap.org/); authors’ calculations.
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and Zimbabwe, but these are smaller markets. In the largest importer in the 
region, Angola, South Africa’s share of machinery imports is very small, as it is 
too in Tanzania.
South Africa’s poor performance in the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) has been especially concerning as, in 2019, other SADC 
countries collectively accounted for a larger market in terms of mining activity 
than South Africa itself. This suggests the need to urgently build strong regional 
value chains for South Africa to regain the lost ground in machinery and equip­
ment exports.
The lack of structural transformation at the downstream segments represents 
lost opportunities for these industries to move towards higher­ value and rela­
tively complex products. While there have been businesses with existing islands 
of competitiveness, overall, the downstream industries have failed to build on 
these capabilities.
3.3 Steel and Metal Products: Industrial Policies, Power, 
and Governance
To assess how interests have shaped policies to maintain economic power, this 
section involves an examination of the industrial policy, power, and governance 
dynamics along the value chain from steel producers to fabricators of metal prod­
ucts. In particular, the grand bargains struck by government with the steel indus­
try and the implications for the supply of inputs to downstream industries are 
analysed. On the other side, the impact of procurement policies working through 
demand by state­ owned companies for metals and machinery products are 
assessed.
The first democratic government in 1994 adopted a set of policies to support 
the manufacturing industry, including incentives and investment support pro­
grammes.2 In reality, the greater share of these incentives went to the upstream 
basic industries (Mondi and Roberts, 2005; Roberts and Rustomjee, 2009; Black 
and Roberts, 2009). At the same time, the steel industry was facing very low inter­
national steel prices and the challenges of restructuring the local producers, while 
globally there were shifts from national to transnational ownership and 
consolidation.
The government’s strategy for the steel industry in the late 1990s involved a 
grand bargain struck with the main steel producer, where low input costs in terms 
of energy and iron ore were ensured, along with support for investment and for 
2 Investment support programmes included the IDC’s Global Player Fund, a tax holiday pro­
gramme and accelerated depreciation allowance tax incentive scheme under section 37E of the 
Income Tax Act.
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local consolidation. This competitive restructuring upstream was envisaged to be 
the foundation for growing downstream steel­ using industries led by fabricated 
metal products and machinery. These industries were also supported in the later 
period by government preferential procurement policies, which are described 
and evaluated below. Against this background and in the context of the govern­
ment’s approach, a question that needs to be asked is why so little changed in the 
overall structure of the metals and machinery industries. Specifically, how does 
one explain the fact that, on average, upstream capital­ intensive industries con­
tinued to grow more strongly than the downstream industries?
3.3.1 The Big Steel Bargain: Government Support and Conditionalities 
for Upstream Producers
As part of achieving a rapid restructuring of the basic steel industry in the late 
1990s to improve production efficiencies, upgrade plant, rationalize employment 
numbers, and reduce the number of grades manufactured, the government sup­
ported acquisitions of strategic equity stakes by transnational corporations 
(TNCs). The government did this through its ownership in Iscor (held by the 
IDC) and different forms of industrial policy support. The rationale was to ensure 
the local acquisition of international technology, expertise, and capital essential 
for the rapid upgrade of local production.
Under this strategy, Lakshmi Mittal’s LNM (later Mittal Steel) acquired a stake 
in Iscor, following the vertical separation of the steel­ making from the mining 
parts of the business. The separation ensured the supply of iron ore for twenty­ 
five years at cost plus a 3 per cent management fee which, along with cheap energy 
in the form of coal and electricity, meant Iscor’s plants were among the lowest 
cost in the world (Roberts, 2008).
Government support for the Mittal acquisition represented the first ‘grand bar­
gain’ (Rustomjee et al.,  2018) and was linked to a business assistance agreement 
which provided various incentives, including additional shareholding related to 
investment and upgrading steps (Zalk,  2017). Through the agreement, Mittal 
gained sole control of an effective local monopolist in flat steel products in 2003, 
given the additional absorption of Saldanha Steel in 2002 in which Iscor had already 
held a 50 per cent stake. The acquisitions were approved based on the company 
moving to a ‘developmental steel price’ for local customers. However, the nature of 
the developmental steel price was not specified nor agreed with government.
Instead, it fell to competition law to discipline the exercise of market power 
over local downstream customers by Mittal Steel South Africa before it became 
AMSA.3 The competition authorities duly uncovered various cartels in which 
3 There are other producers in long steel products.
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AMSA had been engaging with its competitors, where it had them in long­steel 
products. For instance, the reinforcing bar price­ fixing cartel, which lasted from 
1999 to 2008, led to average prices being over 30 per cent above competitive levels 
(Mondliwa and Das Nair, 2019).
In most flat steel products AMSA faced no local competitor and explicitly 
priced at an import parity level until 2019, calculated as the landed price of 
imported steel, generally to inland customers, including all the imputed transport 
and related costs and a 5 per cent ‘hassle factor’ (Roberts, 2008). This was notwith­
standing around 40 per cent of AMSA’s production being exported, while the local 
import parity­ based prices were around 40–60 per cent above the export prices 
being earned by AMSA for the same products. The high prices directly under­
mined the competitiveness of producers of downstream products using steel as an 
input. In March 2007, The Competition Tribunal found in favour of a complaint by 
two mining companies that this pricing was excessive and a contravention of the 
Competition Act. Two years later, The Competition Appeal Court overturned the 
decision on the grounds that the economic value against which prices needed to be 
evaluated had not properly been considered (Das Nair and Mondliwa, 2017).
Using competition law to address monopoly pricing by a business that had 
received extensive government support ignored direct policy levers which could 
have been used to discipline the conduct of AMSA. Mining licences were a poten­
tial tool as clause 8 of the standard mining licence in South Africa stated that min­
erals and derivative products were to be sold at competitive and non­ discriminatory 
prices (Rustomjee et al.,  2018). This, in effect, would have required factory gate 
prices for downstream steel customers of AMSA (given its production from local 
iron ore) to ensure it did not discriminate between local and export customers.
Conditionalities on investment incentives were a second industrial policy lever. 
In this regard, the upstream capital­ and energy­ intensive basic metals (and basic 
chemicals) industries had received the bulk of the benefits from generous tax 
incentive programmes and development finance, while the downstream industries 
received a fraction of this support (Mondi and Roberts  2005; Black and 
Roberts,  2009; Roberts and Rustomjee,  2009). The upstream firms, however, 
evaded conditionalities. For instance, the 37E tax incentive legally obliged the 
upstream firms to sell steel at non­ discriminatory export­ parity prices to the 
domestic market. This was side­ stepped by Saldanha Steel, which elected to export 
its production in its entirety rather than sell locally (Roberts and Rustomjee, 2009).
The business assistance agreement reached with Mittal on the purchase of its 
initial stake and the commitment to a ‘developmental steel price’ proved not to be 
effective. In addition, after the initial restructuring, Mittal extracted profits from 
the South Africa business while funding acquisitions and investments in devel­
oped countries (Zalk, 2017). This meant that the expected benefits from Mittal’s 
ownership in South Africa were not realized.
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When global steel export prices dropped again to a ten­ year low in 2016, the 
industry, led by AMSA, placed government under pressure to provide support 
once again. To support the upstream industry, government struck a second ‘grand 
bargain’ with AMSA. AMSA committed to adopt a production cost­ based for­
mula for local pricing in exchange for the settlement of unresolved competition­ 
related matters, increased tariff protection, and a policy directive that only South 
African steel be utilized in publicly funded infrastructure projects. The rationale 
for government included the protection of the remaining jobs in the steel indus­
try and the importance of a local steel producer for value chain linkages upstream 
and downstream.4
The agreement favoured AMSA. Steel prices turned upwards in 2016, while 
AMSA’s local monopoly power was further entrenched (as other small domestic 
producers were in or close to bankruptcy) and the agreement was only binding 
until 2022. The settlement of the anticompetitive charges across multiple compe­
tition cases for R1.5 billion (US$115 million) in 2016 was generous relative to the 
likely penalties, especially for the collusion charges. The steelmaker also received 
an additional steel tariff of 10 per cent that effectively increased the steel indus­
try’s safeguard measure to 22 per cent. While the pricing commitment was meant 
to protect local buyers, there is considerable scope for interpretation as to its 
terms (Rustomjee et al.,  2018). Meanwhile, the labour­ absorbing downstream 
industry was not protected by tariffs in the same way as the upstream industry.5
The concentration of employment in a few upstream firms supported the 
lobby ing efforts by large steel companies, despite the much higher number of jobs 
in the relatively disorganized downstream industries. Tackling these inherent 
power dynamics is central to structural transformation.
3.3.2 The Effects of Poorly Enforced Public Procurement Policy
Public procurement is a significant source of demand in most economies and 
can be a key lever for industrial development. In South Africa procurement by 
state­ owned companies is very important for the metals and machinery industry. 
Procurement policies can thus be effective industrial policy instruments for sup­
porting local industry development, innovation, and technological upgrading 
(Edler and Georghiou,  2007; Georghiou et al.,  2014; Lember et al.,  2014; 
Tiryakioğlu and Yülek, 2015).
4 See the DTIC presentation to the joint portfolio committees on trade and industry and 
 economic development on 23 August 2016: https://www.thedti.gov.za/parliament/2016/Steel_
Industry_Interventions.pdf.
5 There is a lack of tariff support for the downstream industries, with 90 per cent of capital equip­
ment duty­ free (Rustomjee et al., 2018).
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South Africa has leveraged public procurement, including by state­ owned 
enterprises, through the designation of sectors and products for local content 
under the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act (PPPFA) of 2000 and 
the Competitive Supplier Development Programme. This followed the earlier 
National Industrial Participation Programme in 1995. Under the PPPFA the 
Department of Trade, Industry, and Competition is enabled to designate certain 
sectors whereby tenders will only be awarded to locally manufactured products 
with a prescribed minimum threshold of local content. The PPPFA also has BEE 
objectives to support businesses owned and controlled by black South Africans 
(Chapter  9). In 2007, the Department of Public Enterprises introduced the 
Competitive Supplier Development Programme (CSDP) to specifically support 
the development of local industrial capabilities.6 While these different policy 
instruments were meant to complement each other, evidence suggests that their 
enforcement was weak (Mohamed and Roberts,  2008; Crompton et al.,  2016). 
Instead of realizing the intended outcomes, weak enforcement also enabled sig­
nificant rent extraction. A striking example was state­ owned enterprise Transnet’s 
procurement of 1,064 locomotives and its infamous outcomes.
3.3.2.1 The Case of Transnet: A Cautionary Tale
Transnet was supposed to be implementing the CSDP approach when it started to 
plan a major procurement of locomotives for its freight business in 2012. In July 
2012, it issued a tender for 1,064 locomotives for its general freight business div­
ision, both electric and diesel. The procurement was required to comply with the 
earlier stated PPPFA’s local content requirements, with thresholds of 55 per cent 
local content for diesel and 60 per cent for electric locomotives.
In 2014 Transnet placed the very large order for the 1,064 locomotives with 
four companies: Bombardier Transportation South Africa, China South Rail 
Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Company (CSR), General Electric South Africa 
Technologies, and China North Rail Rolling Stock South Africa (Pty) Ltd (CNR).7 
All four had BEE partners. The two Chinese firms, which subsequently merged, 
secured permission to build a relatively large number of locomotives outside of 
South Africa for an initial period. However, while Transnet had developed an 
ambitious three­ phased approach for localization, by the end of 2019 there was 
limited evidence of investments being made in South African manufacturing, 
while costs had escalated substantially.
Widespread issues of corruption and non­ compliance were subsequently 
uncovered and subject to scrutiny at the Zondo Commission of Inquiry into State 
6 The Competitive Supplier Development Programme (CSDP) provided for SOEs to design supply 
and demand side measures with government for OEM suppliers to develop localized first­ and 
second­ tier suppliers, so building the domestic supply chain. The CSDP was coordinated by the 
Department of Public Enterprises (Crompton et al., 2016).
7 The order was for R50 billion (around US$5 billion at the time).
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Capture, which started in the middle of 2018 and was due to wrap up in early 
2021. In January 2018, Transnet made attempts to remedy instances of non­ 
compliance in agreements with the Bombardier and General Electric suppliers, 
while in December 2019 Transnet launched a court case to declare the contracts 
with the Chinese suppliers as being unlawful and set aside.8
Through this procurement, the foreign OEMs held the potential to develop 
industrial capabilities and improve manufacturing suppliers in South Africa, as 
the procurement terms required supplier development initiatives that would 
encourage technology transfer, skill transfer, and improved quality standards 
(Crompton et al., 2016). However, in addition to the concerns about corruption, 
the incentives for OEMs to invest to establish South Africa as a platform and 
innovation hub were also undermined by Transnet Engineering’s own ambition 
to become an OEM. This placed Transnet in a conflicted position as it was both 
customer and competitor. (Mondliwa and Das Nair, 2019)
The procurement process was fraught with problems that reflect the under­
lying challenges in developing effective industrial policy (Crompton and 
Kaziboni, 2020). Public procurement involving such large sums requires a num­
ber of institutional conditions to be in place, which were largely lacking in South 
Africa. These include a lack of clear guidelines, weak verification and enforce­
ment processes, insufficient coordination between the relevant government 
departments, and capacity constraints at the governing department (Rustomjee 
et al., 2018). The ongoing changes to procurement rules, to the BEE codes,9 and to 
incentive procedures greatly increased the risks and uncertainty for investment, 
while making it easier to capture rents through the procedures being bypassed. 
And the verification of local content requires a competent and well­ resourced 
verification agent to conduct verification checks at various points in the process. 
If non­ compliance at any stage is detected there needs to be a functional enforce­
ment agency with the necessary policies and procedures to address it.
3.4 Mining Machinery and Equipment: Technological Capabilities, 
Power Asymmetries, and the Missing Ecosystem Ingredients
The mining machinery and equipment segment is the most significant part of the 
machinery and equipment industry in South Africa, and includes niches of 
techno logic al excellence. The downstream industry has established capabilities 
thanks to the backward linkages from mining to local producer, and lateral 
8 https://www.news24.com/fin24/companies/industrial/transnet­ wants­ court­ to­ clear­ r54bn­ 
unlawful­ contract­ for­ 1064­ locomotives­ 20,191,217. As of September 2020, the extensive allegations 
relating to corruption and state capture including relating to this contract were still under inquiry.
9 These were last revised in 2017; see Chapter 9 for more on this.
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migration of capabilities of generic technologies used in other sectors such as 
construction, agriculture, and general manufacturing (Walker and Minnitt, 2006; 
Dolo et al., 2018).
By drawing on extensive firm­ level research, this section examines the 
impact of technology changes, notably digitalization, and the relationships with 
the governance of production systems. In particular, engineering, procurement, 
and construction management (EPCM) companies which provide full package 
solutions to mining companies have grown in importance while the larger 
South African engineering businesses have been divested from the industrial 
conglomerates (Jourdan,  2014). These changes have coincided with increased 
international consolidation in the industry and the growing importance of large 
multinational enterprises in the Southern African markets. As the developments 
in the global industry affect companies in all countries, some governments have 
supported their domestic companies to capture domestic value addition, technology 
spillovers, and the employment dividend. Considered against selected international 
examples, it is clear that in South Africa there are a number of missing ingredients, 
coupled with poor policy design.
3.4.1 Technological Capabilities and the Digitalization of Mines
The technological changes with the digitalization of production, design, and 
coordination along supply chains (see Chapter  12) have had major impacts on 
machinery and equipment for the mining industry. The developments encompass 
advanced capabilities in design, additive manufacturing, and rapid prototyping 
and sensor technologies for predictive maintenance and conditional monitoring. 
These technological advancements potentially open the way for more effective 
supply­ chain integration, process efficiencies, and collective upgrading for both 
larger and smaller firms. The lead mining machinery and equipment firms in 
South Africa have developed advanced capabilities, improving supply­ chain inte­
gration and upgrading, to offer customized solutions to enhance the performance 
for the end users, that is, the mines.
In mineral processing equipment the customization often depends on the 
en vir on ments and mineral being mined. This means that, when coupled with the 
analysis of data on performance in different settings (including through machine 
learning), additive manufacturing can drastically reduce the time to upgrade 
machinery for specific requirements. For example, one company managed to 
reduce the time for customization from six to eight weeks to not more than three 
days (Kaziboni et al., 2019).
Digitalization extends beyond product design, testing, and customization to 
integrating sensors across businesses, allowing remote monitoring and real­ time 
data collection. Together with cloud computing, big­ data analytics and machine 
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learning have made predictive maintenance of these machines and consumables 
possible, allowing for the rate of wear and tear to be tracked (Barnes et al., 2019). 
Thanks to these innovations, mining companies can prevent unplanned down­
time and reduce operating costs, while lead firms can pre­ determine consumable 
requirements by customers, thereby reducing stock­ holding and manufacturing 
waste. This is especially valuable as after­ market services and components repre­
sent the most profitable segment of the value chain (Fessehaie, 2015). Realizing 
the benefits requires connectivity and bandwidth at reasonable cost; personnel 
with specific skills such as data analysts, scientists, and artisans with IT cap abil­
ities; and an appropriate policy environment governing data. South Africa faces 
challenges in each of these (Chapter 12).
While lead firms have developed integrated supply­ chain systems and struc­
tures, smaller firms are lagging. Smaller manufacturers of mineral process equip­
ment are still in the early stages of integrating their supply chain and their 
challenges are seldom about the implementation of advanced applications, but 
more around basic elements of internal systems and processes related to ordering, 
standardized quoting, and stock­ taking applications. Optimizing linkages between 
firms requires an integration of systems that allows access to information and 
data across firms within a single ecosystem to support capability upgrading. This 
shows that capabilities are not limited to technologies and skills, but also include 
internal systems, structures, routines, and working practices.
An example of the potential benefits from digitalization across a lead firm and 
its suppliers and customers is the case of Multotec, an international OEM of 
South African origin that engineers minerals processing machinery. Multotec has 
built its capabilities based on customized solutions for mines in South Africa 
(Gostner et al., 2005). Working with customers and suppliers it has demonstrated 
how an internationally integrated firm can be an important source of demand­ 
driven innovation back to components manufacturers. Its suppliers have become 
globally competitive (and certified) to service both the lead firm and other clients 
(Kaziboni et al.,  2019). Such experience is, however, not common and it has 
required the company to build internal technical training and testing facilities 
which would not be viable for smaller businesses to develop.
Power asymmetries and fragmentation in the South African mining equipment 
value chain have further limited the opportunities for collaboration and techno­
logic al upgrading (Rustomjee et al., 2018). The discussion turns to these implications.
3.4.2 Power Asymmetries: Global Consolidation and 
Domestic Fragmentation
Similar to other advanced manufacturing industries, the 2000s and 2010s saw 
significant consolidation in the machinery and equipment industry. Already in 
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2009, the six global leading companies accounted for one­ quarter of total world 
production of these mining technologies. In the decade 2010–20, intense M&A 
activity drove consolidation along global value chains, and across the main indus­
try segments, with signs of new competitive pressure coming from China globally 
in segments such as yellow metal vehicles (Andreoni and Torreggiani,  2020). 
Chinese producers also increased their penetration into Southern African mar­
kets, including in areas such as castings (components of machines).
Against this backdrop, mining machinery and equipment firms in South Africa 
have remained largely fragmented, while major multinational OEMs such as 
Sandvik, Epiroc, Caterpillar, and Komatsu continued to consolidate their market 
shares and leverage their global supply chain to provide mining houses with 
highly competitive solutions. In 2018, for example, in the underground equip­
ment segment, Sandvik and Epiroc together held around 70 per cent of the local 
market (Smeiman,  2018), especially for certain mineral commodities; their 
regional presence in Southern Africa has been equally significant. The multi­
nation al OEMs have some fabrication and assembly in South Africa, but mining 
machines are mainly produced abroad: in Europe and the USA for high­ end 
products, and in India and China for lower­ end equipment, including over 
ground vehicles and basic mineral processing technologies, and components such 
as valves. Some local engineering companies manufacture components under 
licence for OEMs.
The power of the OEMs allows them to directly deal with mining houses, pro­
viding machines, customized financial packages, and after­ sale services. In con­
trast, the relationship between small and medium­ size South African OEM 
companies and mining houses is often intermediated by specialized engineering 
contractors under EPCM (engineering, procurement, and construction manage­
ment) or so­ called EPC (engineering, procurement, and construction) arrange­
ments—with the main difference related to the allocation of cost risks. These 
specialized engineering companies are very powerful as they are responsible for 
making procurement decisions for the mining houses, as part of their design of 
the overall mining solution. Being excluded from their sourcing strategies means 
being excluded from the main source of demand in this market (Andreoni and 
Torreggiani, 2020).
There are a number of more established South African OEMs and local sup­
pliers with high local content and export capabilities, which have both direct and 
mediated relationships with mining houses and junior mines (notable examples 
are AARD for underground equipment, Bell Equipment for surface equipment, 
and Kwatani and Multotec for mineral processing) (Andreoni and Torreggiani, 
2020). They have a regional and international footprint in terms of markets, as 
well as strong supply­ chain linkages with several tiers of components producers 
along the domestic metal value chain. They have also made domestic investments 
in new digital technologies and, in some cases, have managed to upgrade their 
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domestic suppliers. Unfortunately, these are also the companies whose supply of 
metals is negatively impacted by the market power in supplier industries, dis­
cussed in section 3.3.
Within this ecosystem, with the exception of the very few leading South 
African OEMs, in the 2000s smaller and less well­ established mining equipment 
companies operating as OEMs, or component suppliers and assembly, were 
located in fragmented production systems and became increasingly uncompeti­
tive. Several key factors explain this (Andreoni and Torreggiani,  2020): limited 
cooperation between project houses and suppliers, particularly towards smaller 
equipment suppliers that could not supply at scale; the balance of power along the 
supply chains from metals inputs to machinery producers, often resulting in fre­
quent and sudden price increases imposed on equipment manufacturers; insuffi­
cient financial resources on the part of local manufacturers to invest in formal 
R&D activities compared to large international OEMs; the unavailability or cost 
of local components which presented challenges in meeting local content require­
ments; and severe skills shortages in the sector and inadequate training provision.
The objectives of BEE and localization for the sector have presented several 
challenges. The Broad­ Based Black Socio­ Economic Empowerment Charter for 
the South African Mining and Minerals Industry, known as the Mining Charter, 
was introduced in 2004, with subsequent amendments and revisions to the tar­
gets. Its core objectives included building links between mining companies and 
suppliers, and supporting local capabilities and skills. The Mining Charter intro­
duced a scorecard system for mining right holders which, as of 2018, had the fol­
lowing six criteria: (1) ownership participation by historically disadvantaged 
persons; (2) employment equity, promoting fair treatment and equal op por tun­
ities in the workplace; (3) human resources development and capacity building 
for employees and local communities; (4) procurement and enterprise develop­
ment aimed at locally empowered businesses; (5) mine community development; 
and (6) housing and living conditions for mine employees. While targets can be 
met within a transition period, the non­ compliance with any one of the above 
obligations can lead to the withdrawal (or the suspension) of the mining permit. 
The ‘procurement, suppliers and enterprise development’ requirement alone 
accounted for 40 per cent of the 2018 scorecard. The 2018 revision tightened the 
requirements for local content and established conditions on domestic sourcing 
of capital equipment, consumables, and services (80 per cent with preferential 
conditions), as well as a minimum of 70 per cent of total R&D budget to be spent 
on South Africa­ based R&D entities.
The promotion of local sourcing in the Charter, along with a number of other 
government and industry­ led initiatives to support increased domestic value 
addition and boost R&D activities, have been undermined by the exploitation of 
loopholes. The provisions have to a large extent been met by intermediaries who 
may be sourcing imported products (possibly assembled in South Africa) 
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(Rustomjee et al., 2018). In addition, the tariff schedule that the South African 
government negotiated for equipment and components used in mining op er­
ations tended to protect a number of key industrial components for domestic 
OEMs raising their local costs (such as tyres and some steel components). In 
doing so, trade policy undermined the cost­ competitiveness of the local machin­
ery and equipment manufacturers. By comparison, final products, such as assem­
bled machinery and equipment, were generally given access to the domestic 
market at zero or very low tariffs.
There is also a lack of appropriate skills in the sector. Skills development has 
been largely managed through the relevant Sector Education and Training 
Authority (SETA), that is, the Manufacturing, Engineering, and Related Services 
Authority (MERSETA), and, more specifically, the Metal Chamber of MERSETA. It 
is responsible for quantifying occupational shortages, identifying skill gaps, deter­
mining skills priorities, and developing an appropriate educational offer for spe­
cific clusters of industries. However, as discussed in Chapter  12, institutional 
challenges in delivering appropriate skills, especially in the digital space, remain.
3.4.3 Missing Ingredients: Comparative International Insights  
for Better Ecosystem Development
Important insights into the key missing ingredients are provided by comparisons 
with other countries which have successfully supported machinery equipment 
clusters. These include Chile and Australia, where South African companies are 
also active, as well as Finland. The comparative assessments help to evaluate alter­
native policies and institutional forms used to support local content, effective 
trade policy, and R&D efforts (Steuart, 2019; Andreoni and Torreggiani, 2020).
In terms of procurement and local content, by ensuring commitments on the 
part of buyers, supply industries have been incentivized to make the investments 
required to upgrade capabilities. Australia’s local­ content policies have been 
defined at the national as well as the state level. This has enabled strong growth in 
the country’s Mining Equipment, Technology, and Services (METS) industry. The 
overarching principle guiding the framework has been to offer ‘full, fair and rea­
sonable’ access to employment and tendering opportunities to Australian firms 
and individuals (World Bank, 2015). The emphasis has been on equitable oppor­
tunity, and on monitoring and reporting, which means that procurers are eff ect­
ive ly held accountable. This has been supported by funds for suppliers to work 
with project developers to identify supply opportunities for ‘capable and competi­
tive’ Australian firms, especially SMEs. Finland has an even more hands­ on 
approach to local content under its green­ mining objectives. It requires foreign 
companies to establish affiliates in Finland and access to funding from public sec­
tor bodies is conditional on firms being registered in Finland. There are detailed 
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requirements on firms including domestic value addition, technology transfer, 
and local R&D spending. This is also a preferential price premium for local sup­
pliers (OECD, 2017).
Local procurement priorities have mostly required an aligned and strategic 
trade policy. In Australia, for example, there were arrangements under the 
Enhanced Project By­ Law Scheme (EPBS) from 2002 to 2016 for duty­ free 
importation of eligible goods identified as strategic and not produced in Australia. 
In a quid pro quo, these concessions were, however, contingent on the project 
houses developing and implementing approved Australia Industry Participation 
plans. This contrasts with South Africa, where, despite advanced technological 
capabilities, trade policy has not protected final products, such as assembled 
machinery and equipment.
R&D tax incentives have been widespread across all countries, with some hav­
ing targeted incentives linked to the upgrading of suppliers. In Chile, for instance, 
the economic development agency (CORFO) has granted incentives to large com­
panies participating in supplier development. In the Antofogasta region this has 
supported a collaborative effort across the stakeholders in the ecosystem, includ­
ing ten large mines and two regional universities, the establishment of an industry 
association, a vendor qualification system, and a supplier database. By 2015 this 
vendor model was being used by twenty purchasing companies in mining, oil, and 
gas industries, and accounted for over 2,500 suppliers (World Bank,  2015). The 
model has evolved to a hybrid incentive and procurement scheme with mining 
companies and potential suppliers who could form a collaborative cluster to work 
on solutions together with local universities and public institutions.
In building R&D­ rich ecosystems, intermediate technology and business ser­
vices are the capabilities ‘glue’. Local ‘intermediate technology institutions’ are 
essential for this glue to stick. These include institutional arrangements inter­
facing with universities, engineering and design services businesses, and hybrids 
supporting advanced manufacturing. In Australia a whole range of encourage­
ment activities were offered for the evolution of collaborative institutional 
arrangements, such as through accelerators, hackathons, challenge platforms, and 
cluster programmes. These supported the establishment and growth of a network 
of public­ private technology intermediate institutions in the ecosystem.
3.4.3.1 South Africa’s Attempts to Address the Constraints
In the context of R&D and skills, as part of the Mining Phakisa initiative launched 
in 2015, the Mandela Mining Precinct was established in Johannesburg as a cen­
tral hub for industry­ specific R&D initiatives, alongside the promotion of the 
Mining Equipment Manufacturers of South Africa (MEMSA) association in 
2016. MEMSA is an industry cluster body supporting the absorption and diffu­
sion of technologies and collaborations across local OEMs and their sup pliers 
and promises to impact on the fragmentation of the local industry.
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With the establishment of the Mandela Mining Precinct, South Africa started 
equipping the industry with an important institutional solution to some of the 
binding constraints noted above in terms of technological innovation and 
upgrading. An intermediate technology institute like the Precinct can support 
companies in achieving appropriate functional, technical, and per form ance 
specifications, by innovating on several technologies and solutions offered by 
local OEMs. It may also provide support in the standardization process, making 
sure local OEMs develop solutions to capture the value of post­ sale services. 
The extent to which these initial steps in the right direction are going to be 
effective in South Africa will depend on their sustained support, and the adoption 
of a full package of aligned measures cutting across the Mining Charter and 
relevant institutions.
3.5 Conclusions and Opportunities for Industrial Policy in the 
Metals and Mining Machinery and Equipment Industries
The metals, machinery, and equipment industries are at the heart of South Africa’s 
industrial economy. The performance in these industries over the 1994 to 2019 
period has demonstrated the challenges facing the country in redirecting the path 
of structural transformation and points to the key reasons why it has largely failed 
to overcome these challenges. As the ‘big steel’ case highlights, the entrenched 
power of the upstream firms continued to drive the agenda and shape the overall 
development of the industries. Downstream in the value chain, as is evident in 
the mining machinery and equipment industry, there was extensive international 
integration, in terms of ownership, technology, and trade. However, this was 
accompanied by increasing import penetration, persistent industry fragmenta­
tion, and ineffective and poorly coordinated policy and institutional support.
The industry record underlines the importance of understanding how and 
through what mechanisms power is exercised. A significant proportion of the 
support directed at strengthening the metals, machinery, and equipment value 
chain has benefited the capital­ intensive upstream businesses, despite the poten­
tial to build on downstream capabilities and the opportunities which digitaliza­
tion has presented. Additionally, the absence of a cohesive downstream industry 
able to lobby for government support has undermined the industry­ level cluster 
efforts aimed at bolstering the industry. Lead firms can play a critical role in 
learning and building capabilities across their supplier networks. The lead 
upstream firms (in basic metals) have been instead largely oriented to protecting 
rents, particularly in the context of the challenges posed by international volatility 
(Rustomjee et al.,  2018). Conditionalities needed to be strongly enforced along 
with moves to ensure cost­ based mining inputs to steel­ making and the removal 
of tariff protection.
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At the same time, some lead firms in machinery and equipment have managed 
to sustain capabilities thanks to efforts to continuously invest in infrastructure, 
skills, and technology, including adopting digitalization. However, these have 
represented islands of capabilities rather than anchoring wider clusters of com­
petitive capabilities. After 2008, the South African domestic market for machin­
ery and equipment also started to shrink with the end of the commodities boom, 
while import penetration continued to be high despite various local content and 
procurement policies.
There was clearly a lack of an overarching strategy in this period that would 
locate procurement policies within the wider ecosystem as well as appropriate 
policies to increase domestic value addition, technology development, and 
upgrading (Andreoni and Torreggiani, 2020). This would require overcoming the 
fragmentation of policies being pursued by different departments and targeting 
the policies based on a thorough assessment of the products and services in order 
to impact on quantity, quality, and price competitiveness parameters. Monitoring 
compliance is also clearly important. Exports became increasingly significant for 
the companies that managed to sustain themselves through the prolonged slump. 
Export performance should have been incorporated into the targets in order to 
impact on the production decisions of the international and domestic OEMs 
affected by local content requirements. The international OEMs should also have 
been able to ‘link back’ local suppliers into their exclusive supply chains, thus 
‘powering’ the local company.
Tariffs need to be consistent with the assessment of the local supply­ chain 
capabilities and specific product segments for which domestic producers have 
a chance to be competitive internationally. This assessment should start from 
the analysis of the additionality of the current tariff, that is, the identification 
of the real beneficiaries of tariffs along the extended metal, mining equipment 
value chain. Trade policy should prioritize those intermediate and final 
 product segments in which existing companies have already developed dis­
tinctive cap abil ities and are close to the international price competitiveness 
benchmark.
Rebuilding overarching institutions of industrial development is a central 
means to integrating fragmented initiatives and building a strong coalition for the 
downstream industries. The Mandela Mining Precinct has the potential to be ele­
vated to a specialized intermediate technology institute focusing on the op por­
tun ities offered by the mega trends in global mining, addressing the challenge of 
scaling up national OEMs and their suppliers, and promoting collaboration 
across domestic players, including collaborative challenge­ driven efforts for 
diversification. As discussed in section 3.4, effective engagement with digitaliza­
tion is essential, including building the specialized digital skills base. The institute 
can provide this combined technology and skills development functions, focusing 
on the targeted training of task forces of specialized technicians and engineers in 
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collaboration with universities and technical and vocational education and training 
(TVET) colleges.
Capturing the opportunities offered by the global technology and industry 
megatrends is conditional on increasing the scaling­ up capability of the domestic 
OEMs and suppliers. This includes the lateral migration of capabilities in pro­
cesses common to machinery and equipment across different applications such as 
food processing. These scaling­ up challenges can be addressed by providing 
dedicated technology services as well as providing companies with access to 
quasi­ public good technologies such as data systems, testing facilities, and pilot 
lines for virtual design and prototyping of mining solutions, complemented by 
the fi nan cing and skills for investing in capabilities.
While policy instrument design and governance frameworks are critical, the 
effective implementation and enforcement of any industrial policy will depend on 
the extent to which the policy is able to promote the emergence of a new coalition 
of productive interests, or offer the existing powerful groups alternative and more 
productive ways to operate in the economy. This is the ultimate ‘feasibility’ test for 
the policy.
References
Andreoni, A. and S. Torreggiani (2020). ‘Mining equipment industry in South Africa: 
global context, industrial ecosystem and pathways for feasible sectoral reforms.’ 
CCRED Working Paper 3/2020. Johannesburg: CCRED.
Barnes, J., A.  Black, and S.  Roberts (2019). ‘Towards a digital industrial policy for 
South Africa: a review of the issues.’ Industrial Development Think Tank.
Black, A. and S. Roberts (2009). ‘The evolution and impact of industrial and competi­
tion policies.’ In J. Aron, B. Kahn, and G. Kingdon (eds), South African Economic 
Policy under Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Crompton, R., J. Fessehaie, L. Kaziboni, and T. Zengeni (2016). ‘Railway locomotives 
and Transnet: a case study.’ Johannesburg: The Centre for Competition, Regulation 
and Economic Development.
Crompton, R. and L.  Kaziboni (2020). ‘Lost opportunities? Barriers to entry and 
Transnet’s procurement of 1064 locomotives.’ In T. Vilakazi, S. Goga, and S. Roberts 
(eds), Opening the Economy: Barriers to Entry and Competition. Cape Town: 
HSRC Press.
Das Nair, R. and P. Mondliwa (2017). ‘Excessive pricing under the spotlight: what is a 
competitive price?’ In J. Klaaren, S. Roberts, and I. Valodia (eds), Competition Law 
and Economic Regulation: Addressing Market Power in Southern Africa. 
Johannesburg: Wits University Press.
Dolo, S., M. Odendaal, and G. Togo (2018). ‘South Africa: Horizontal linkages­build­
ing expertise by overcoming country­specific constraints (Case Study).’ IGC 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 15/07/21, SPi
76 Metals, Machinery, and Mining Equipment Industries
Guidance for Governments: Leveraging Local Content Decisions for Sustainable 
Development. Winnipeg: IISD.
Edler, J. and L. Georghiou (2007). ‘Public procurement and innovation—resurrecting 
the demand side.’ Research Policy 36(7): 949–63.
Fessehaie, J. (2015). ‘South Africa’s upstream industries to mining: import substitu­
tion opportunities and impact of regulatory frameworks.’ Background Paper for the 
Mining Phakisa.
Georghiou, L., J. Edler, E. Uyarra, and J. Yeow (2014). ‘Policy instruments for public 
procurement of innovation: choice, design and assessment.’ Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change 86: 1–12.
Goga, S., P. Mondliwa, and S. Roberts (2020). ‘Economic power and regulation: the 
political economy of metals, machinery and equipment industries in South Africa.’ 
In E. Webster, D. Francis, and I. Valodia (eds), Inequality Studies from the Global 
South, 75–98. London: Routledge.
Gostner, K., S.  Roberts, A.  Clark, and I.  Iliev (2005). ‘Resource­based technology 
innovation in South Africa.’ Employment Growth and Development Initiative 
Working Paper, October 2005. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council.
Jourdan, P. (2014). ‘The optimisation of the developmental impact of South Africa’s min­
eral assets for building a democratic developmental state.’ Mineral Economics 26(3): 
107–26. Https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s13563­013­0037­1.pdf.
Kaplan, D. (2011). ‘South African mining equipment and related services: growth, 
constraints and policy.’ Making the Most of Commodities Programme (MMCP), 
Volume MMCP Discussion Paper 5.
Kaziboni, L., M. Nkhonjera, and S. Roberts (2019). ‘Machinery, equipment and elec­
tronic control systems: leading reindustrialisation in Southern Africa.’ Digital 
Industrial Policy Framework Issues Paper 1, CCRED. Johannesburg: University of 
Johannesburg.
Lember, V., R. Kattel, and T. Kalvet (2014). ‘Public procurement and innovation: the­
ory and practice.’ In V. Lember, R. Kattel, and T. Kalvet (eds), Public Procurement, 
Innovation and Policy, 13–34. Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer.
Machaka, J. and S. Roberts (2003). ‘The DTI’s new “integrated manufacturing strat­
egy”: comparative industrial performance, linkages and technology.’ South African 
Journal of Economics 71(4): 679–704.
Min, Y. K., S. G. Lee, and Y. Aoshima (2018). ‘A comparative study on industrial spill­
over effects among Korea, China, the USA, Germany and Japan.’ Industrial 
Management & Data Systems 119(3): 454–72.
Mohamed, G. and S.  Roberts (2008). ‘Weak  links in the BEE chain? Procurement, 
skills and employment equity in the metals and engineering industries.’ Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies 26(1): 27–50.
Mondi, L. and S. Roberts (2005). ‘The role of development finance for industry in a 
restructuring economy: a critical reflection on the Industrial Development 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 15/07/21, SPi
Antonio Andreoni, Lauralyn Kaziboni, and Simon Roberts 77
Corporation of South Africa.’ Presented at Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies 
Annual Forum, Johannesburg, 30 November – 1 December 2005.
Mondliwa, P. and R. das Nair (2019). ‘Overcharge estimates in the South African rein­
forcing bar cartel.’ In J. Klaaren, S. Roberts, and I. Valodia (eds), Competition and 
Regulation for Inclusive Growth in Southern Africa. Johannesburg: Wits Press.
OECD (2017). The Next Production Revolution. Paris: OECD.
Phele, T. and S. Roberts (2005). ‘The impact of the minerals sector on industrial com­
petitiveness: linkages and the development of capabilities in the capital equipment 
industry in South Africa.’ Mimeo, presented at Globelics Conference, Pretoria, 2005.
Phele, T., S.  Roberts, and I.  Steuart (2005). ‘Industrial strategy and local economic 
development: the case of the foundry industry in Ekurhuleni Metro.’ South African 
Journal of Economic and Management Sciences 8(4): 448–64.
Roberts, S. (2008). ‘Assessing excessive pricing: the case of flat steel in South Africa.’ 
Journal of Competition Law and Economics 4(3): 871–91.
Roberts, S. (2020). ‘Assessing the record of competition law enforcement in opening 
up the economy.’ In T. Vilakazi, S. Goga, and S. Roberts (eds), Opening the Economy: 
Barriers to Entry and Competition. Cape Town: HSRC Press.
Roberts, S. and Z. Rustomjee (2009). ‘Industrial policy under democracy: apartheid’s 
grown­up infant industries?’ Iscor and Sasol. Transformation 71: 50–75.
Rustomjee, Z., L. Kaziboni, and I. Steuart (2018). ‘Structural transformation along met­
als, machinery and equipment value chain—developing capabilities in the metals 
and machinery segments.’ CCRED Working Paper 7/2018. Johannesburg: CCRED.
Smeiman, M. (2018). ‘Opportunities in mining industrialisation. phase one: a high­
level business case to focus industrial development.’ Mining Industrialisation 
Business Case presented at the Department of Trade and Industry in May 2018.
Steuart, I. (2019). ‘A critical review of international cluster and other sector­support 
initiatives in the mining equipment & machinery sector.’ The Industrial 
Development Think Tank (IDTT).
Tiryakioğlu, M. and M.  A.  Yülek (2015). ‘Development­based public procurement 
policies: a selective survey of literature, cross­country policy experience and the 
Turkish experience.’ The European Journal of Social Science Research 28(3): 344–59.
Walker, M. I. and R. C. A. Minnitt (2006). ‘Understanding the dynamics and competi­
tiveness of the South African minerals inputs cluster.’ Resources Policy 31(1): 12–26.
World Bank (2015). ‘A practical guide to increasing mining local procurement in 
West Africa.’ World Bank, KAISER EDPI, and Australian Government.
Zalk, N. (2017). ‘The things we lost in the fire: the political economy of post­apartheid 
restructuring of the South African steel and engineering sectors.’ Unpublished PhD 
Thesis, Department of Economics, School of Oriental and African Studies, 
University of London.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 15/07/21, SPi
Jason Bell, Lorenza Monaco, and Pamela Mondliwa, Leveraging Plastics Linkages for Diversification: An Assessment of 
Backward Linkages from Polymers and Forward Linkages to the Automotive Industry In: Structural Transformation in South 
Africa: The Challenges of Inclusive Industrial Development in a Middle- Income Country. Edited by: Antonio Andreoni, 
Pamela Mondliwa, Simon Roberts, and Fiona Tregenna, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2021.  
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192894311.003.0004
4
Leveraging Plastics Linkages for 
Diversification
An Assessment of Backward Linkages from Polymers  
and Forward Linkages to the Automotive Industry
Jason Bell, Lorenza Monaco, and Pamela Mondliwa
4.1 Introduction
At the core of structural transformation is the diversification of an economy, 
generally based on linkages to support cumulative productivity increases. In the 
early 1990s, South Africa’s industrial core was made up of a set of sectors spanning 
mining, energy, and various heavy industries. The strong input- output linkages 
between them, but weaker linkages with other manufacturing sectors, resulted in 
an economic structure that has been identified as the minerals and energy 
complex (MEC) (Fine and Rustomjee,  1996). An assessment of South Africa’s 
structural transformation over the post- apartheid period from 1994 to 2019 
necessarily entails an evaluation of the extent to which the economy has 
diversified away from the MEC core and towards more diversified downstream 
industries within the MEC.
This chapter analyses the development of the downstream plastic products 
industry, which has strong backward linkages to the upstream, petroleum 
industry for its main material inputs. At the same time, plastic products are a 
diverse set of manufactured goods for final and intermediate use and, as such, the 
sub- sector has strong forward linkages to the rest of manufacturing, with 54 per 
cent of output consumed by the range of manufacturing sub- sectors in 2019. 
While the upstream petrochemicals activities and some downstream 
manufacturing activities that consume plastic products, such as the automotive 
industry, have grown throughout the 1994–2019 period, plastic products have 
recorded poorer performance (Chapter 1). The plastic products sub- sector grew 
between 1994 and 2002, but declined thereafter, with weak performance in terms 
of output, value added, and investment, as with other diversified manufacturing 
activities (Mondliwa and Roberts, 2019).
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This raises two important questions. The first is why the growth of those indus-
tries requiring plastic components, such as automotive, has not acted as a demand 
pull. This question is analysed through a comparative assessment of the South 
African and Thai plastic automotive component industries. The focus is on how 
the two countries have attempted to foster technological upgrading and produc-
tion capability accumulation by leveraging linkages to the automotive industry. 
While both South Africa and Thailand have embarked on targeted industrial pol-
icy to grow their automotive industries, very different results in terms of upgrad-
ing in the linked components industries have been observed, and Thailand is 
currently significantly more competitive (on South Africa, see Chapter 5).
The second is why the growth of the upstream polymer industry—in part due 
to South Africa’s cost advantages in the production of basic petrochemical 
inputs—has not supported growth of plastic products. This is assessed through an 
analysis of the vertical relationships between the upstream polymer industry 
dominated by Sasol, and downstream plastic producers. The analysis focuses on 
the extent to which pricing decisions by the lead firm and policy (including 
regulatory decisions) in the upstream polymer industry have had an impact on 
the growth path of the downstream industry.
Overall, the chapter considers the role of policies, lead firm strategies, and 
governance in facilitating technological upgrading and the accumulation of 
productive capabilities necessary for the formation of linkages.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the 
dynamics of structural transformation through linkages by reflecting on existing 
literature. Section 4.3 provides an overview of the structural change patterns in 
the linked petroleum, basic chemicals, and plastic industries. Through a 
comparison of South Africa and Thailand, section 4.4 assesses technological and 
production capability accumulation in plastic automotive components with a 
focus on the importance of the linkage to the automotive industry. Section 4.5 
presents an analysis of the backward input linkages to the polymer industry with 
a focus on the lead firm, Sasol. Concluding remarks are made in section 4.6.
4.2 Structural Transformation through Exploiting Forward 
and Backward Linkages
The premise of growth through linkages stems from the early contributions by 
Hirschman (1958), which demonstrated the significance of backward linkages to 
input producers and forward linkages to markets for intermediate products in 
supporting structural change and productivity growth necessary for economic 
development. Linkages create multiplier effects, such that support for final goods 
producers can increase the range of components or inputs produced, broadening 
the industrial base and attracting the entry of further final goods producers in an 
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economy (Baldwin and Venables, 2015). Country comparisons have shown that 
those countries that have strong production linkages with both domestic and 
foreign suppliers have been more successful in changing the structure of their 
economies and achieving economic development (Haraguchi and Rezonja, 2015).
In resource- rich countries like South Africa, backward and forward production 
linkages from the resource industries provide an important and often unrealized 
potential for industrial development (Morris et al., 2012) and thus for structural 
change. This is because successful economic development is essentially an 
incremental unfolding of linkages between related economic activities. This pro-
cess is supported by an accumulation of capabilities including technological 
upgrading (Tregenna, 2012).
Many plastic products are intermediate components, which rely on linkages 
with input suppliers and with downstream industries. Literature on value chain 
governance shows how corporate power exercised by large and lead firms shapes 
the distribution of profits and risks in an industry, and how this alters the 
upgrading prospects of firms in developed and developing economies that are 
included in (or excluded from) the supply chain (Gereffi and Lee,  2016). Lead 
firms play a crucial role by defining the terms of participation in value chains, by 
incorporating or excluding actors, and by determining how, when, where, and 
by whom value is added (Gereffi and Lee, 2016).
While much attention has been paid to governance within global value chains 
(GVCs), a number of similar dynamics are also present in domestic value chains. 
First, firms with market power can exploit the downstream businesses reliant on 
the products as inputs through charging high prices, and can also leverage this 
power to undermine downstream rivals (Goga et al., 2020; Mondliwa et al., 2021). 
Distortions in input markets have been found to explain productivity differences 
within value chains and in the competitiveness of sectors (Acemoglu et al., 2007; 
Jones, 2013). Second, market power often translates into political power, whereby 
dominant firms can influence policy and regulation in their favour (Zingales, 2017; 
Goga et al.,  2020). Third, firms also share knowledge and practices vertically 
through the supply chain, and large and lead firms often drive this process (as 
discussed in the Thai case in section 4.4). In this regard, the strategies of large and 
lead firms, as well as their capabilities, can have an impact on the propensity for 
positive linkage development along value chains.
While the GVC approach brings out elements of learning from geographically 
dispersed and vertically fragmented production networks (Gereffi et al.,  2005), 
clustering analytical frameworks emphasize the importance of co- location and 
the creation of dynamic linkages for achieving increased competitiveness, as well 
as the upgrading of firms (Porter,  2000). These clusters can include firms in 
vertical or horizontal relationships. The emphasis is on collaboration among 
different stakeholders to take advantage of interdependencies in the production 
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process (Götz and Jankowska, 2017). In particular, small firms in horizontal clus-
ters are supposedly able to overcome some of the major constraints they usually 
face: lack of specialized skills, difficult access to technology, inputs, markets, tele-
communication, credit, and external services (Giuliani et al., 2005). Participation 
in a cluster allows for collective benefits (positive externalities) for firms engaging 
in similar activities. These include, for example, the pooling of skilled labour and 
facilities, including testing and research facilities for design and product develop-
ment. In the analysis here, value chains are used to capture the vertical relationships, 
and clusters are used to capture the horizontal relationships between firms.
Technological ‘learning’ and developing production capabilities are areas in 
which collective action by government and firms play an important role. 
International experience in the development of local industrial clusters or 
upgrading within value chains demonstrates the importance of the public sector 
in creating appropriate institutions and an enabling policy environment (see, for 
example, Best, 2001; Lema et al., 2018). In this regard, industrial policy is critical. 
Industrial policies can play an important role in developing linkages either 
through solving market failures, developing supportive institutions, or engaging 
in the process of discovery. When effectively coordinated, industrial policy 
incentives can promote both the breadth of linkages (the proportion of inputs 
sourced locally or outputs processed locally) and the depth of linkages (the extent 
of their domestic value added) (Morris et al., 2012).
4.3 Structural Change Dynamics within the Chemicals  
and Plastic Products Industry Grouping
The chemicals and plastic products industry grouping has been an important 
part of South Africa’s industrial core throughout the twenty- five- year period 
under review (1994–2019). In 2019, the industry grouping accounted for 
24 per cent of manufacturing value added (up from 16 per cent in 1994), 18 
per cent of manufacturing exports (up from 16 per cent in 1994), and 13 per 
cent of manufacturing employment (up from 7 per cent in 1994). The broader 
chemicals and plastic products grouping is made up of a range of value chains. 
These include a wide range of activities, from resource extraction (crude oil, 
coal, and natural gas) and refining, to various levels of basic  chemicals pro-
cessing to produce industrial and consumer products, including plastic prod-
ucts. This chapter focuses on only one of these value chains—the petrochemical 
co- products to polymers (one of the many basic chemicals), to plastic products 
and the linked automotive assembly industry.
Plastic products are an important area of focus: they have been identified as 
having high potential for pulling along growth and are thus important for 
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cumulative productivity increases (Tregenna,  2012); they are relatively more 
labour- absorbing (Table 4.1), which is a priority for South Africa’s industrial policy; 
and, constituting mostly intermediate products, they are central in diversified 
manufacturing through their extensive forward linkages (Figure 4.1).
The petrochemical value chain in South Africa is characterized by highly con-
centrated upstream manufacture of polymer chemicals, closely linked with the 
processing of petroleum products, and lower levels of concentration in the down-
stream manufacture of plastic products. There are only two polymer producers in 
Table 4.1 Performance of the chemicals and plastic products sub- sectors









Value added R’bn) 
(% share of total 
manufacture)
1994 10 8 12 8
(4.4%) (3.5%) (4.9%) (3.2%)
2019 35 17 26 11





1994 18 26 37 44
(1.1%) (1.5%) (2.1%) (2.6%)
2019 27 28 83 59
(1.8%) (1.8%) (5.5%) (3.9%)
Avg. valued- added 
growth
1994–2002 6.9% 6.5% 6.5% 5.6%
2002–8 4.6% 2.6% 6.3% −1.1%
2008–19 3.8% 0.8% −0.6% 0.1%
Avg. employment 
growth
1994–2002 −4.4% −1.1% 0.7% 3.4%
2002–8 17.4% 2.1% 8.8% 0.0%
2008–19 −1.9% 0.5% 2.3% 0.5%
Avg. investment 
(gross fixed capital 
formation, % of 
gross value added)
1994–2002 35.5% 57.3% 15.9% 17.3%
2002–8 36.5% 64.7% 15.0% 20.4%
2008–19 30.0% 52.7% 13.1% 17.9%
Imports as % of 
domestic demand
1994 5.6% 57.6% 32.5% 11.4%
2002 7.1% 24.3% 21.3% 11.2%
2008 20.4% 36.2% 27.1% 19.8%
2019 29.4% 37.4% 25.2% 33.7%
Exports as % of 
domestic output
1994 33.4% 20.5% 5.8% 2.6%
2002 21.5% 17.8% 8.1% 4.4%
2008 13.6% 36.0% 11.7% 9.4%
2019 27.1% 46.1% 20.5% 16.6%
Notes:
1. It is important to note that the Quantec data are not official statistics. They have been compiled 
including data from Statistics South Africa, with some computations by Quantec, and this should be 
borne in mind.
2. Value figures are in ZAR millions (constant 2010 prices).
3. Growth is calculated as compound average growth rates.
4. Employment numbers include informal jobs.
Source: Quantec, authors’ calculations.
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South Africa—the formerly state- owned Sasol, with a 60 per cent share of the 
commonly used polypropylene input, and Safripol, with the remaining 40 per 
cent. Sasol’s power comes from it holding a monopoly position in important 
monomers such as propylene which are chemical co- products from refining and 
are used in the production of polymers.
In contrast, the manufacture of plastic products is characterized by relatively 
low- scale economies with many of the producers being small and medium- sized 
firms. Plastic production itself is diversified, with products differentiated by the 
sectors into which they form inputs, such as motor vehicles, building materials, 
electrical products, and packaging (Figure 4.1).
Over the twenty- five- year period under review (1994 to 2019), the upstream 
coke and refined petroleum products and basic chemicals sub- sectors recorded 
strong overall performance in terms of value- added growth, supported by rela-
tively high levels of investment (Table 4.1). By comparison, the plastic products 
sub- sector performed well in the earlier part of this period with average annual 
growth in value- added of 5.6 per cent between 1994 and 2002, and employment 
growth of 3.4 per cent. However, the plastic products sub- sector lagged other 
industries in the value chain thereafter. There have been relatively low levels of 
investment in plastic production, as gross fixed capital formation averaged 
around 17 per cent to 20 per cent of value added.
South Africa’s trade liberalization appears to have benefited the upstream basic 
chemicals sub- sector, with improved competitiveness in both domestic and 
Coal 
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Natural gas Petrochemical components
Fuel Fuel wholesale
Fuel 




























Figure 4.1 The petrochemical value chain
Source: Adapted from Mondliwa et al. (2020).
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export markets.1 However, after the period from 1994 to 2002, import penetra-
tion in the plastics sub- sector increased substantially, from 11.2 per cent in 2002 
to 33.4 per cent in 2019, reflecting a loss in competitiveness in the domestic mar-
ket, although exports also increased somewhat to 16.6 per cent of domestic out-
put over the same period (Table 4.1).
Why then, despite South Africa’s initial success in plastic production in 
1994–2002 and cost competitiveness in the upstream polymer inputs, has the 
industry performed so poorly over time? The liberalization of protection had 
been assumed to improve the capabilities of the downstream industries, through 
international integration and the industry support measures provided. However, 
as analysed below, the linkage development has been weak and industrial policy 
interventions not been well coordinated.
Within the plastic products industry, there has also been a failure to move 
towards the more complex product segments such as components for automotive, 
electronics, and medical products. The industry has continued to be dominated by 
the less tradable packaging segment, which continued to account for more than 
half of the sub- sector’s output, signifying poor diversification (Beare et al., 2014; 
Bell et al., 2018). Though packaging is the largest segment in most countries (for 
example, around 40 per cent in the EU), the share in South Africa is particularly 
high. This matters for understanding capabilities and competitiveness of plastic 
production as packaging is relatively less traded and, as such, benefits from some 
protection from import competition.
While the industry’s import penetration increased over the period, the overall 
picture masks important trends within the sub- sector. Import penetration 
appears to have increased most in the more sophisticated automotive components, 
medical, and sports and leisure segments, at over 70 per cent in 2013 
(Mondliwa,  2018). And, instead of plastic product exports becoming more 
diverse over time, they have become more concentrated in lower- value segments 
(Beare et al., 2014).
The rest of the chapter assesses the developments in more detail: first, by 
conducting a comparative analysis of technological upgrading in the plastic 
automotive components segment in Thailand and South Africa in section 4.4; 
and, second, by assessing how market power, governance dynamics along the 
value chain, and industrial policy have supported or undermined development 
along linkages between upstream polymers and downstream plastic products, in 
section 4.5.
Plastic automotive components represent an important segment due to their 
relative complexity and potential for upgrading through forward linkages. In 
addition, the policy framework that supports the automotive sector was meant to 
1 The increased import penetration in coke and refined petroleum is a result higher imports of fuel 
blending components to meet clean fuels specifications.
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support upgrading in linked industries and the framework did support increased 
output and South African exports of assembled vehicles implying growing 
demand for components.
4.4 Leveraging Forward Linkages to the Automotive Sector: 
A Comparative Analysis of Plastic Automotive Components 
in South Africa and Thailand
Thailand presents a successful case study of fostering linkages between the 
automotive industry and the development of plastic and other automotive com-
ponents (Black et al., 2018; Monaco et al., 2019). Leveraging this linkage, the Thai 
plastic automotive components segment has experienced high growth rates 
relative to South Africa. For example, between 2001 and 2018, Thailand grew 
exports of motor vehicle bumpers and their parts, such as fittings, at a compound 
average growth rate of 16 per cent, while South Africa’s exports grew by a more 
modest 2 per cent.2
This linkage has supported the diversification of plastic production in Thailand 
with the plastic automotive component segment increasing its contribution to 
total plastic production volumes to 8 per cent in 2018. South Africa compares 
poorly in this area, with the plastic automotive component segment accounting 
for only 4 per cent of total production, with the majority of production focused 
on packaging and less sophisticated plastic product segments. In terms of the 
number of firms, 16 per cent of the 5,000 Thai plastic products firms manufacture 
automotive components (Monaco et al.,  2019), compared to a much smaller 
share of the 1,800 South African firms.
While Thailand’s proximity to the developed ASEAN regional market demand 
has allowed it to achieve scale economies and is an important contributor to its 
success (Monaco et al.,  2019), this has not been the only success factor. The 
automotive component industry has built robust technological capabilities 
through strong collaborations—both vertically through the value chain and 
horizontally through clusters (Monaco et al.,  2019). In addition, the state and 
industry associations have played an important role in both facilitating inter- firm 
collaborations and coordinating policy incentives for development of the 
component industry (Monaco et al., 2019). These factors have allowed Thailand 
to leverage participation in the automotive GVC to grow plastic and other 
automotive component production. The focus is on understanding the drivers of 
success and failure in leveraging these linkages.
2 South Africa also focuses more on the actual bumpers rather than the more sophisticated fittings, 
suggesting relatively weaker capabilities.
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The comparison comprises two main parts. First, the accumulation of 
technological capabilities in both Thailand and South Africa’s plastic automotive 
component manufacturers are compared. This includes a discussion of the role 
played by firm collaborations in horizontal clusters, and the role played by vertical 
integration through the value chain in supporting capability upgrading.
Second, the factors that have supported the formation of the horizontal and 
vertical collaborations and technological upgrading more generally are discussed. 
This includes a discussion of how targeted automotive industrial policies have 
been leveraged to develop automotive components, the role of the state in the 
coordination of policies for capability upgrading, and the interactions between 
the state and the multinational original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) that 
govern automotive value chains.
4.4.1 Technological Capabilities and Competitiveness
As many plastic products are of intermediate goods, demand linkages to 
industries that require these as inputs are important.3 Among the potential 
benefits of participation in the automotive GVC are the opportunities to meet 
increased domestic demand and the upgrading of technological and other 
capabilities of the supply chain (Gereffi, 2019). Technological capabilities are also 
important factors for countries to upgrade within GVCs and for linking back into 
the domestic economy.
4.4.1.1 The State of Technology Infrastructure
The technology divide is the overwhelming difference in competitiveness between 
South African and Thai firms. Since the 1980s, Thai firms have made significant 
improvements in both production and operational management techniques 
(Monaco et al.,  2019). Overall, the Thai firms were operating with up- to- date 
technology infrastructure (e.g. machines, moulds). Thai plastic auto component 
suppliers have gradually introduced robotics and other technologies linked to the 
fourth industrial revolution, such as the internet of things (Monaco et al., 2019). 
The Thai firms also demonstrated the capacity to innovate, due in part to 
investment in research and development, and testing and prototyping facilities, 
all supported by synergies between the plastic industry and government centres 
such as the Plastics Institute of Thailand (PITH).
Evidence from the South African plastic automotive component suppliers tells 
a starkly different story. In terms of technology infrastructure, there are 
differences among the local subsidiaries of multinational corporations (MNCs), 
3 This section builds on fieldwork conducted in Thailand for the IDTT during October 2018 (see 
Monaco et al., 2019).
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local small and medium- sized firms, and large domestic firms. Local subsidiaries 
of MNCs tended to have newer machines, their own tool rooms, and were already 
using technologies linked to the fourth industrial revolution, with some degree of 
technology adaptation taking place in the domestic production facilities (Bell 
et al., 2019). However, strategies for technological upgrading are developed in the 
home countries and most research and development occurs in the MNCs’ 
headquarters abroad. The large domestic firms were also relatively up to date in 
terms of technology used, had their own tool rooms, and some degree of R&D 
that was mainly focused on adaptation. In contrast, the small and medium- sized 
firms (SMEs) had little engagement with technology changes, the firms tended 
not to have tool rooms, and had no formal R&D activity (Bell et al.,  2019). 
Regarding age of machinery, South African firms had machines with an average 
age of around eighteen years which is old compared to the norm of replacing 
machinery after seven to ten years of use (Bell et al., 2019).
The analysis of technology infrastructure also considered the origins of the 
machinery used by firms, where European moulding machines are reported to 
have better precision, an important quality for more complex plastic products. 
South African firms appear to be shifting towards the use of Chinese machines, as 
they are relatively cheaper. In 1994, 60 per cent of imports of moulding machinery 
were from Europe, while in 2018 the bulk of moulding machines (55 per cent) 
were coming from China (Bell et al., 2019), with the change largely driven by cost 
differences. South African firms also have a far lower propensity to invest in R&D, 
opting for short- term solutions to problems rather than investing time and 
resources into building strong R&D capabilities as the Thai firms do 
(Garisch, 2016). Financial constraints are cited as the main reason for the reluc-
tance to upgrade their technological infrastructure. This is largely because the 
local South African firms, particularly the SMEs, are trapped in a vicious circle of 
low margins (partly from the polymer input prices), low levels of investment in 
up- to- date technology, and poor competitiveness (Mondliwa, 2018).
4.4.1.2 Technological Capabilities Can Be Achieved through 
Vertical and Horizontal Collaborations
One way in which downstream plastic product manufacturers can realize 
improvements in technological capabilities and R&D capacity is through an 
acquisition or joint venture with an innovative firm. In Thailand, the increasing 
adoption of technology has been facilitated through vertical collaborations 
between Thai component manufacturers and MNCs, in particular Japanese 
OEMs (Monaco et al.,  2019). Partnerships between the OEMs and local firms 
have improved management and production techniques through continuous 
human resource development, employee training and education in new 
technologies, connection with external markets, and through the attention paid 
to improving efficiency in the manufacturing process. Similarly, collaboration in 
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R&D, testing, and prototyping facilities has been crucial for improving and 
maintaining quality and standards, as well as allowing Thai firms to become 
leaders in innovation. This means that Thai firms are significantly more 
competitive in the auto components export market (Monaco et al., 2019).
The successful vertical collaborations between local and foreign- owned firms 
in Thailand have been complemented by horizontal collaborations in the form of 
clusters. The potential for a cluster to jointly develop technological capabilities is 
strongly connected to the quality and strength of linkages developed. As such, 
the development of industrial clusters has been considered crucial for the devel-
opment of industries, such as the automotive industry, where the components are 
heavy and bulky, and just- in- time manufacturing is necessary to improve com-
petitiveness (Kuroiwa et al., 2017). The locating of firms in clusters together with 
organizations that support innovation can promote the ‘interactive learning’ pro-
cess, which in turn provides an opportunity for local firms to upgrade their capa-
bilities (Malmberg and Maskell, 2006). The Thai state’s cluster programmes have 
been designed to attract increasingly larger amounts of FDI and facilitate techno-
logical upgrading within the automotive industry by positioning large OEMs 
within a close geographical proximity to small and medium- sized component 
manufacturers. Automobile and auto parts producers have been encouraged to 
locate their operations in Bangkok and the surrounding central area (Techakanont 
and Charoenporn,  2011). Combined with the involvement of Japanese capital, 
this has fostered the strong growth in technological capabilities in these sectors.
In contrast, there has been limited collaboration for ‘learning’ and building 
capabilities in the plastic products and automotive industries in South Africa. 
Some success was observed in the Durban Automotive Cluster where there is a 
vertical cluster championed by Toyota and which includes various players in the 
value chain (Black et al.,  2018). The success is limited, however, as spinoffs in 
other provinces such as Gauteng and the Eastern Cape have not been as effective.
Linkages between private and public investments in R&D and innovation have 
also been more successful in Thailand, where they have been coordinated by the 
PITH. In South Africa, the plastic products sector has a limited number of 
laboratories conducting R&D and testing of locally produced products for exports 
(IPAP, 2018). A partnership between Plastics SA and the Council for Scientific 
and Industrial Research (CSIR) was formed to encourage innovation and the use 
of new technologies in the plastic industry in 2018. However, the project is 
focused more on the recycling of polymers and bio plastic inputs.4 While these 
are important for sustainability, there is still insufficient focus on innovation 
related to the final plastic products.
4 https://www.crown.co.za/environment/7533- plastics- sa- overcoming- challenges- with- collaboration- 
and- innovation.
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4.4.2 The Role of Industrial Policy and Governance by OEMs
The analysis above points to the important role played by vertical and horizontal 
collaboration in building technological capabilities in Thailand. This section 
discusses the role of policy interventions in the automotive industry, the 
importance of policy coordination, and the governance role of multinational 
OEMs in facilitating these collaborations in Thailand and South Africa.
4.4.2.1 Thailand
In terms of policies, both South Africa and Thailand have been through iterations 
of industrial policy targeted at developing automotive industries, including the 
linked automotive components. The Thai Automotive Masterplan has offered sev-
eral incentives that have facilitated an influx of foreign investment from global 
multinational assemblers who set up large- scale production facilities in the coun-
try. The establishment of a world- class domestic automotive components industry 
was in part due to the local content policy that was part of the Masterplan. Though 
the local content policy was initially opposed by the larger Japanese assemblers, 
negotiations involving the state, the assemblers, and component manufacturers led 
to its adoption. Lobbying by the industry associations representing domestic auto-
motive components manufacturers played an important role in influencing the 
policy decisions (Poapongsakorn and Tangkitvanich, 2001).
A number of complementary incentives and policies have aided in the execu-
tion of the Thai Masterplan. These include the development of infrastructure in 
the form of special economic zones and industrial parks, education and training 
in firms, and the provision of finance for the purchase of up- to- date technologies. 
The Thai state has coordinated many of these incentives through various cluster 
initiatives that have linked locally owned Thai auto component manufacturers 
with large, multinational auto assemblers.
This suggests that the political economy dynamics in the Thai economy have 
significantly enabled the success of the Thai auto component sector. Specifically, 
the Thai state and the various associations and institutions in the automotive 
industry have complemented the presence of a strong regional market to realize 
the success of the Thai Masterplan (Monaco et al., 2019).
The governance role of MNCs and the ability of the state to shape their orienta-
tion have also been critical for developing plastic and other automotive compo-
nents. At the global level, the significant size and power of large multinational 
automotive assemblers affects multiple levels within the supply chain and the 
broader institutional setting in which the industry operates. Owing to their domi-
nant positions, these large multinational assemblers can affect investment 
(Monaco et al., 2019). This determines both the rate and success of the develop-
ment of the national supply chain, particularly in the context of techno logic al 
upgrading.
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Similarly, these large and dominant assemblers can influence the policy space 
in which the state operates. The bargaining dynamics between the state and large 
multinationals are crucial for understanding supply- chain development (Monaco 
et al., 2019). Owing to a number of institutional arrangements and the formation 
of a strong coalition between the state and the multinational companies, Thailand 
has been able to grow its auto component sector around its automotive sector. 
The attraction of FDI has therefore been a key part of Thailand’s success, acting as 
a catalyst for knowledge diffusion and the local capability building (Techakanont 
and Terdudomtham, 2004). Many of Thailand’s SMEs that make up the bulk of its 
component manufactures have been developed as part of joint ventures with 
Japanese OEMs (Monaco et al., 2019).
4.4.2.2 South Africa
In South Africa, the political economy dynamics and their effect on the auto 
components sector have been very different.
South Africa’s policy frameworks for developing a globally competitive auto 
industry took the form of the Motor Industry Development Programme (MIDP), 
which ran from 1995 to 2012, and the subsequent Automotive Production 
Development Programme (APDP), from 2012 to 2020. Neither the MIDP nor the 
APDP achieved the expected development of the local industry with South 
Africa’s production of assembled automobiles only accounting for 0.65 per cent of 
the global market. The levels of local content in the domestic automotive industry 
have remained low (Chapter 5). The rebate mechanism, which allowed the OEMs 
to increase imports of components as long as exports were also increasing, has 
been the chief policy weakness, as it has undermined the increasing of local 
content (Black et al., 2018). For example, in 2016, as much as 60 per cent of the 
components used in production in South African plants were imported. Other 
factors contributing to this are low domestic and regional demand of assembled 
automobiles in the domestic industry.
The political economy dynamics in South Africa have not been supportive of 
the development of the automotive industry, especially automotive components. 
The South African state has failed both to realize its developmental agenda and to 
reconcile it with the interests of the global assemblers. While the state has 
assumed an interventionist role in the auto industry, this has meant that the 
MNCs have been in a strong bargaining position with the state for incentives, 
given their hegemonic positions in the local supply chain (Black et al., 2018). The 
South African automotive components industries have been reliant on the 
strategies of the multinational assemblers.
The experience in South Africa has led to the Auto Masterplan 2035, launched 
in 2020, which was largely inspired by the Thai version. Under this framework, 
the state is seeking to achieve local- content levels of 60 per cent across all 
assembled vehicles as well as doubling employment levels in the sector and 
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increasing its competitiveness. It is too soon to comment on the success of the 
strategy.
With regards to the development of automotive components, poor coordination 
among different government departments responsible for executing policy 
incentives in the 1994–2019 period has further undermined this development. 
The National Industrial Policy Framework (2007) and the iterative Industrial 
Policy Action Plans (IPAPs, 2010–19) have sought to leverage linkages to the 
growing automotive industry to develop plastic automotive components. 
However, the political economy dynamics have not been supportive of this. For 
example, the local compounding industry, which produces automotive polymer 
grades was undermined by polymer pricing (discussed further below). An 
analysis of the cost competitiveness of the local industry showed that while the 
conversion cost and additive costs were comparable with global compounders, 
the local firms were paying 30 per cent more for polypropylene, which accounted 
for 80 per cent of the raw material cost (Mondliwa, 2018). The result is that, over 
time, the compounding level of the value chain lost competitiveness and firms 
largely exited the market. This meant the automotive plastic converters have had 
to switch to imported automotive grade polymers, which has obviously reduced 
the local content of the plastic components and, in turn, the incentive for assemblers 
to source locally.
The funding and incentive programmes have also reinforced South Africa’s 
sub- sectoral composition rather than targeting the sub- sectors that the country 
was seeking to develop, such as automotive components (Beare et al., 2014).
4.5 Leveraging Backward Linkages to Polymers
To assess how interests have supported or undermined development along 
linkages between upstream polymers and downstream plastic products, this 
section examines industrial policy, market power, and governance dynamics 
along the value chain in South Africa.
4.5.1 The Role of Industrial Policy in Supporting Linkages 
and Structural Transformation
Structural change requires industrial policy to support the development of 
capabilities in new activities rather than allocating resources in line with the 
existing economic structure. For successful structural change within the plastic 
products value chain, industrial policy has an important role to play to support 
the more diversified plastic products industry including higher value added and 
more sophisticated goods, such as automotive components. Despite the 
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prioritization of the plastic products industry, from 2007, by the Department of 
Trade, Industry, and Competition (DTIC), incentives have continued to 
disproportionately flow towards the upstream basic chemicals production—
suggesting that the distribution of power within the economy does not support 
diversification. The section considers the distribution of industrial incentives 
between 1994 and 2007 (the year that the National Industrial Policy Framework 
was launched), and then in the period between 2007 and 2019.
In the 1994–2007 period, while there was no overarching industrial policy, a 
range of industrial policy support measures such as development finance and 
export incentives were made available to firms. These included loans extended by 
the Industrial Development Corporation, the General Export Incentive Scheme 
running from 1994 to 1997, and various tax incentives for investment. These 
measures were disproportionately awarded to the upstream firms, including Sasol. 
For example, Sasol received the lion’s share of financing provided to the chemicals 
and plastic products industry grouping (Mondi and Roberts, 2005; and Gumede 
et al.,  2011). Sasol was already internationally competitive by 1994 and able to 
finance further investments from its profits (Bell et al., 2019). This bias towards 
upstream producers continued in the 2000s, as Sasol alone received 22 per cent of 
the entire Strategic Investment Programme (SIP) incentive programme (Mondliwa 
and Roberts, 2019). Other beneficiaries were upstream basic steel industries. Very 
few plastic products firms benefited from these incentives. This distribution of 
incentives reinforced the economic structure rather supporting diversification.
Though the plastic products industry was prioritized in the post- 2007 period, 
this did not result in substantial support for the industry. Instead, in terms of 
incentives and initiatives, most support continued to be biased towards 
upstream firms. Where the industry has benefited from government incentives, 
these have tended to go towards larger firms, primarily in the packaging industry 
(Beare et al., 2014; IPAP,  2016). This means that industrial policy has not 
 supported diversification within the plastic products industry, but has instead 
reinforced the existing structure.
It was only in 2019, that the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) devel-
oped a targeted scheme for the downstream plastic production industry. Though 
this is an important development, finance alone is not the silver bullet for chang-
ing industry performance. Other factors and conditions need to be in place, 
including competitively priced inputs and the ability to source appropriate 
technology, such as machinery and moulds. Clusters initiatives are an important 
part of collective action to address common challenges relating to skills and 
capabilities. In 2016, a cluster programme was developed by the DTIC for this 
purpose and firms in the plastic products industry applied for cluster develop-
ment support. However, the programme was shelved due to lack of funding.
While the DTIC has developed ‘sector strategies’, the success of these strategies 
depends on the coordination of interventions among the different departments 
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overseeing the different areas, such as technology and skills development 
(Mondliwa, 2018). As a result of poor cross- department coordination, many of 
the interventions identified in the sector strategies have not been implemented.
4.5.2 Industrial Policy, Economic Regulation, and 
Implications for Market Power
Diversification in the plastic products value chain has not only been undermined 
by poor support for the development of capabilities in downstream plastic 
production. The significant support provided to Sasol, accompanied with weak or 
no conditionalities, has further entrenched the firm’s market power and 
undermined the bargaining power of downstream firms.
A product of the planning legacy of apartheid, Sasol is the dominant petro-
chemicals producer in South Africa, including of monomers and polymers. 
Acknowledging the implications of Sasol’s dominant position for price ne go ti-
ations with downstream industries, the apartheid government placed a number of 
conditions on the provision of state support and a favourable regulatory regime for 
liquid fuels. One condition required Sasol to sell intermediate chemical inputs, 
including polymers, at export parity levels (as determined to be the competitive 
level), and to support the growth of the downstream industries in other ways, such 
as through advice and technical support (Roberts and Rustomjee,  2009). But, 
instead of continuing the stance of applying strong conditionalities, in the post- 
apartheid period decisions taken by regulators and policymakers have been char-
acterized by weak reciprocal mechanisms, or none at all. Sasol changed its pricing 
around 2002 once it became evident that it was not going to be held to commit-
ments. As discussed below, this coincides with a decline in the performance of the 
downstream plastic products sector (Figure 4.2).
Two features of the post- apartheid policy regime stand out. First, the approach 
to fuel regulation from 2003 onwards has assumed away Sasol’s vertical integration 
and the potential leveraging of market power from one product market to 
another. Price regulation applies only to fuel, and the chemical co- products that 
arise in fuel production are not regulated. This creates opportunities to extract 
monopoly prices in the unregulated product markets. At the same time, the 
upstream petrochemical activities have continued to benefit from a range of 
inherited advantages and regulations. These advantages filter through to the 
chemical co- products, such as monomers, which are priced at fuel alternative- 
value.5 The generous fuel regulation means that downstream industries pay 
higher prices for co- products and by- products (Mondliwa et al., 2020).
5 The imputed return to the product, if it were converted into fuel components, even while there 
are limits to the extent to which this could be done in practice.
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Second is that there has been limited enforcement of conditionalities. For 
example, Sasol holds mineral rights to coal, which is used as an input for syn-
thetic fuel production. The standard coal licence contains a condition that pre-
cludes price discrimination between domestic and export markets for coal and 
products beneficiated from coal. However, this condition has never been enforced 
for chemical products that are beneficiated from coal by Sasol. Another example 
is the condition placed on Sasol’s release from repaying windfall gains from past 
regulation. Here, Sasol has committed to support and develop the downstream 
activities of the petrochemical value chain (Mondliwa and Roberts, 2019). However, 
rather than building strategic vertical partnerships with its customers for the devel-
opment of new products, Sasol has instead taken a corporate social responsibility 
approach to the ‘support for growth and competitiveness of the downstream 
sector’ by establishing an incubator, which the government co- funded (Mondliwa 
and Roberts, 2019).
The state has therefore not succeeded in re- orienting Sasol’s strategies to support 
downstream industry development. Sasol on the other hand has leveraged its mar-
ket position to maximize its profits. The internationalization of the firm through its 
listing on the New York Stock Exchange in 2003, has also meant that these profits 
are increasingly distributed outside of the country as dividends (Chapter 10).
4.5.3 Input Linkages and Value Chain Governance: Pricing Power
Sasol has leveraged its market position to influence distribution of value in the 



















































































Figure 4.2 Turning point in the performance of the plastic products industry
Source: Authors’ calculations using Quantec data.
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level of the value chain has allowed it to influence pricing outcomes in polymer 
production. Sasol is both the monopoly supplier of monomers (the input in the 
production of polymers) and the competitor to Safripol (the only other producer 
of polymers) in the supply of polymers. Sasol has been able to influence Safripol’s 
pricing strategies in two ways. First, by limiting access to monomers, it has 
restrained Safripol’s ability to expand and compete more aggressively with Sasol 
(Mondliwa et al., 2021). This has been done by adopting a pricing structure that 
resulted in higher prices as volumes increase. Collusion has also played a part, as 
Sasol and Safripol entered into a coordinated arrangement, which had the impact 
of indirectly fixing the polymer prices in the country based on Sasol’s position as 
the monopoly monomer supplier.
Second, Sasol placed a condition on the ‘gas to liquids’ technology licence to 
PetroSA, precluding the state- owned firm from selling chemical co- products in 
the domestic market for the first twenty years of the licence agreement. This has 
effectively removed a potential competitor from the market, further entrenching 
Sasol’s market power.
The impact of polymer pricing strategies on the performance of the plastic 
products industry can be observed in relation to the response to Sasol’s change in 
pricing strategy in 2002/3. Between 1994 and 2002, when polymer prices con-
tinued to be priced at the required export parity levels as part of the historical 
conditions for state support, the plastic products industry performed reasonably 
well, with output growth in line with other diversified manufacturing production 
up until 2002 (Figure 4.2). However, 2002—when Sasol changed its pricing strat-
egy from export parity to import parity—marked a turning point. It was then that 
the performance of the downstream plastic products industry started to lag that 
of other diversified manufacturing industries, with a marked decline in competi-
tiveness and import penetration increasing, to reach 34 per cent by 2019 
(Figure 4.1).
Input pricing is important for the wider development of capabilities, as the 
investments to build production and technological capabilities—necessary for 
becoming internationally competitive—are undermined by the input price effect 
on margins and profitability of downstream businesses. In plastic production in 
particular, the pricing of polymers is crucial for cost competitiveness, as polymers 
account for 50 to 70 per cent of variable production costs (Machaka and 
Roberts, 2003; Dobreva, 2006; Beare et al., 2014; Mondliwa, 2018). Though the 
pricing of the input may not be the only factor that led to the decline in 
competitiveness of industry, it is certainly an important one given that polymer 
inputs make up the largest component of variable cost.
Input linkages are not only important for input cost competitiveness: certain 
aspects of the innovation of plastic production require collaboration with polymer 
producers who are able to adapt the performance of polymers to specific design 
requirements. Since the days when Sasol was required to provide technical 
support to the downstream plastic industry there has been far less collaboration. 
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In order for industrial policy to succeed in driving development through linkages, 
it is important that it grapples with the vertical relationships in value chains, 
including the power distribution. This allows the policymaker to design policies 
that can tip the scales for large and lead firms like Sasol to work with downstream 
industries to develop capabilities and competitiveness.
4.6 Conclusions
At the core of structural transformation is diversification of an economy, generally 
based on linkages to support cumulative productivity increases. In the case of 
South African plastic products, this crucial development has been undermined 
by market power in the upstream petrochemicals industry, meaning high input 
prices, which are critical for the competitiveness of the industry as well as for 
building capabilities. The price pressures on an intermediary input product 
(polymers), have resulted in smaller margins, meaning that firms are unable to 
reinvest in up- to- date equipment and research and design, all of which are critical 
for building productive capabilities. These firms may find themselves in a vicious 
circle of competitiveness with low margins, low investment, and little development 
of capabilities.
With regards to the comparative analysis of Thailand and South Africa’s 
automotive plastic components, the chapter highlights how, despite South Africa 
and Thailand both having policy frameworks to support automotive value chains, 
these have led to very different outcomes. This speaks to the importance of the 
design of industrial policy as well as the political economy dynamics that can 
support or undermine such policies. However, state policies alone do not provide 
a full explanation for either Thailand’s relative success, nor South Africa’s relative 
failure. The factors that explain the different trajectories include: the combination 
of vertical with horizontal integration in the form of participation in GVCs and 
the clustering effects which differed in the two countries; the presence of a larger 
and growing regional market for Thailand; and, a different role played by MNCs—
Japanese firms in the case of Thailand. From a policy perspective, better coordi-
nation and more focused policy objectives also appear to have played an 
important role in Thailand’s accumulation of technological capabilities and the 
development of deeper intersectoral linkages.
The complex and sometimes contradictory political economy dynamics in 
South Africa have been an important contributing factor in undermining the 
development of linkages. As the discussion has shown, in the period up to 2006, 
policy continued to support the upstream firms such as basic chemicals, with the 
lion’s share of government incentives being channelled to these industries. Since 
2007 onwards, industrial policy instruments have been deployed to target the plas-
tic products industry and attempted to link the plastic automotive components to 
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the automotive industry. However, poor coordination among multiple govern-
ment departments and agencies has further weakened these initiatives.
The opportunity for ‘linking back’ into the domestic economy from automotive 
GVC participation has been further undermined by poor collaboration between 
firms, weak relationships with institutions that could support capabilities 
development, and conflicts within the value chain.
The chapter emphasizes the importance of understanding the performance of 
the plastic industry within the broader sectoral value chain. In the analysis of 
push dynamics from backward industries, it is shown that competitive outcomes 
at one level of the value chain can impact on the development of sectoral value 
chains. This happens through vertical linkages, which have the potential to 
promote or undermine structural transformation (see also Lee et al., 2018; 
Mondliwa et al., 2021). And crucially, as Zingales (2017) notes, the market power 
of firms translates easily into political power, which allows dominant firms to 
influence regulations and policy in their favour.
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Government Policy in Multinational- 
Dominated Global Value Chains
Structural Transformation within the South African 
Automotive Industry
Justin Barnes, Anthony Black, and Lorenza Monaco
5.1 Introduction
The automotive industry has been regarded as one of South Africa’s key industrial 
sub- sectors and attracted considerable state support.1 Through a series of 
development plans, evolving from import protection during the apartheid era to 
progressive liberalization with the Motor Industry Development Programme 
(MIDP, 1995) and the Automotive Production and Development Programme 
(APDP, 2013), the industry was extensively restructured and became increasingly 
globally integrated. In the process, there was organizational and technological 
upgrading. However, the growth in finished vehicle exports was not accompanied 
by increasing local content, investment levels were modest by global automotive 
industry standards, and most capabilities resided within large multinational 
firms. These multinational corporations (MNCs), by and large, conducted 
research, design, and vehicle development in their home countries, and not in 
South Africa. Imports of vehicles and parts increased and the industry generally 
ran significant annual trade deficits. As a result, despite its important role in the 
South African manufacturing sector, spillovers have been modest and the indus-
try has not developed into a competitive global hub.
This chapter reflects on constraints to localization. It does so by looking not 
only at structural impediments that hamper the process, but also at ownership 
and power relations between state and business, and at the distribution of power 
along the value chain. In particular, the question of bargaining between state 
1 The chapter draws on a rich set of data available thanks to the direct involvement of two of the 
authors in the formulation of previous and current auto plans, including the 2035 South African 
Automotive Masterplan. The authors would also like to acknowledge helpful comments by Tim 
Sturgeon and an anonymous referee.
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institutions and multinational carmakers is a key dynamic. It also analyses the 
potential for further deepening the automotive value chain in South Africa, con-
sidering the availability of resources, manufacturing infrastructure, and pro duct-
ive capabilities.
Section 5.2 of the chapter locates the South African industry in its inter nation al 
context. It then goes on in section 5.3 to trace the development of the domestic 
industry since 1960. The related questions of scale of production and structural 
change are examined in section 5.4. The development of the automotive industry 
has been driven by policy that has been the subject of intense state–business bar-
gaining. This is the subject of section 5.5. The rest of the chapter is then focused 
on the supply chain. Section 5.6 considers the impact of growing foreign owner-
ship and other factors on supply- chain development. In section 5.7 prospects for 
increased localization are assessed. Section 5.8 concludes.
5.2 The South African Automotive Industry in an 
International Context
The automotive industry is one of the world’s largest manufacturing industries 
and has frequently been identified as emblematic of national industrialization. As 
such it has been the recipient of extensive state attention and support. Given the 
size and visibility of the sector, this is not altogether surprising and governments 
all over the world have tried to promote their domestic automotive industries in 
various ways.
In developing countries, these support measures initially included high tariffs 
on imported vehicles tied to local- content requirements. Indeed, the automotive 
industry was an important pillar in import substitution programmes, especially 
in larger countries (Humphrey et al., 1998). From the 1980s, again echoing global 
trends, support moved to the promotion of exports and was accompanied by 
trade liberalization. Direct investment support and a wide range of other incen-
tives for local production were also put in place and countries (and regions within 
countries) competed fiercely to attract major plants, mainly to the advantage of 
investing multinational firms (Pavlinek, 2016). These pressures were enough to 
foment several waves of foreign direct investment, beginning early in the twenti-
eth century when Ford and General Motors made dozens of investments across 
the globe, carrying through to a new surge in the 1990s as most large auto pro-
ducers sought to build vehicles in large emerging markets (Sturgeon and 
Florida,  2004). Indeed, the rapid development of the industry in many global 
locations such as Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, and Thailand was driven by foreign 
investment, while the role of domestic first- tier suppliers declined (Barnes and 
Kaplinsky, 2000).
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Many countries embarked on even more specific industrial policies. These 
included efforts to rationalize production by reducing the proliferation of makes 
and models being domestically assembled. The objective was generally to achieve 
economies of scale in order to encourage a deepening of the domestic supply 
chain. There were also policies to promote indigenous firms, often at great cost, as 
in the case of the Proton and Perodua projects in Malaysia. In other countries, 
such as in central Europe, Turkey, and Brazil, efforts were made to incentivize 
investments in R&D, with generally weak results. Automotive policies have fun-
damentally shaped the development of national industries, and policy instru-
ments have often been highly contested.
In considering the effectiveness of state intervention, three patterns can be 
identified. The first are cases where an effective developmental state was able to 
harness domestic firms to gradually develop a globally competitive industry (e.g. 
South Korea). The second are cases where domestic rent- seeking dynamics dom-
in ated (e.g. Egypt).2 The third are cases such as South Africa, where policy was 
driven by the interests of multinational corporations, potentially resulting in an 
adverse mode of incorporation into global markets (Black et al., 2020). In these 
latter cases governments had certain objectives—mainly GDP contribution, 
employment growth, technology transfer, and the generation of foreign exchange. 
But industry stakeholders—primarily the major multinational corporations 
(MNCs)—play a vocal and frequently influential role in the development of pol-
icy, tightly framed by their direct commercial interests, and to both good and bad 
effect. Major MNCs were therefore of specific and growing importance. A key 
issue was the interaction between the developmental ambitions of government 
and the strategies of major firms, whose decisions were based on optimizing their 
global position in an increasingly competitive world market.3
The bargaining power of governments is dependent on the size and dynamism 
of the domestic (or regional) market and on the capacity of the government 
bureaucracy to engage with MNCs. China, due to its huge market, obviously had 
exceptional leverage in this respect and was able to insist that MNCs raise local 
content, form joint ventures with domestic firms, and transfer technology to 
these firms. India and Brazil similarly were able to negotiate investments that 
aligned with state development priorities. Most other developing countries, 
including South Africa with its small local market, were in a far weaker bargain-
ing position.
Industry outcomes in individual country contexts consequently depend in 
large part on what multinationals do. On the upside this could include developing 
the national industry as a major production hub within their global (or regional) 
2 See for example Black et al. (2020).
3 For examples in different country contexts, see Doner (1991 and  2009); Miozzo (2000); and 
Pavlinek (2016).
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networks, investing heavily in the supply chain, and even undertaking R&D. The 
downside would be more limited investment in basic assembly processes that 
meet minimum domestic policy requirements with limited investment in the 
supply chain. In some circumstances, local brands that are (at least initially) heav-
ily dependent on foreign technologies might also emerge, probably with govern-
ment support. But this was not the case in South Africa and MNCs became 
increasingly dominant in the component supply chain as well, reflecting a global 
trend (Sturgeon and Lester, 2004).
5.3 The Development of the South African Auto 
Industry since 1960
The early development of the South African auto industry was fundamentally 
shaped by protection. High tariffs were placed on finished vehicles, which, when 
combined with a rapidly growing market, attracted significant MNC investment, 
frequently in the form of joint ventures with local firms. These operations were 
very small in international terms and had correspondingly high unit costs. 
Production was aimed solely at the domestic market (Black, 2009).
The first in a series of local- content programmes was introduced in 1961. In 
later phases, the local- content requirement (on a mass basis) was raised to 66 per 
cent. By late 1986, there were seven assemblers producing over twenty basic 
model variants for a market of only 172,000 passenger cars. Low volumes meant 
that the industry was uncompetitive. Exports were minimal but there had been 
substantial development of a domestic supply base (Black, 1994; Duncan, 1997).
The Phase VI local- content programme, introduced in 1989, marked a signifi-
cant change in direction by allowing exports to count as local content. Many 
component suppliers and all the vehicle assemblers instituted significant export 
drives. The level of protection on built- up vehicles, however, remained prohibi-
tive with nominal protection of 115 per cent (100 per cent ad valorem plus 15 per 
cent surcharge). However, the Phase VI programme came in for increasingly 
heavy criticism from the component- producer federation, the National 
Association of Automotive Component and Allied Manufacturers (NAACAM), 
which was concerned about rising import competition (Black, 1994).
The advent of democracy in 1994 fundamentally shifted the automotive policy 
terrain in South Africa, culminating in the introduction of the MIDP in 1995. 
The MIDP abolished local- content requirements and introduced a tariff phase 
down at a steeper rate than required by the terms of South Africa’s offer to the 
GATT. It also entrenched the principle of import–export complementation that 
had been initiated in Phase VI. Import–export complementation enabled assem-
blers to use import credits to source components at close to international prices—
provided they exported either vehicles or automotive components. Declining 
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nominal protection on finished vehicles was therefore largely compensated for by 
reduced protection for components, again as a result of strong pressure by vehicle 
producers, all of which were either foreign- owned or with licence agreements 
with MNCs.
The MIDP was devised as a form of a WTO Trade Related Investment Measure 
(TRIM), with very particular industrial policy objectives. With the proliferation 
of makes and models being produced in low volumes in South Africa, component 
firms had in turn been required to produce at volumes below minimum efficient 
scale. This rendered them largely uncompetitive, especially in supply- chain seg-
ments requiring high- cost and model- specific tooling and machinery, a feature 
that is pronounced in the automotive industry (Sturgeon et al.,  2008). A key 
objective of the MIDP was, therefore, to increase the volume and scale of produc-
tion through a greater level of specialization in terms of both vehicle models and 
components. This could be achieved by exports of locally produced, high- volume 
vehicles and automotive components that could earn import credits to be used to 
import either additional models for sale in the domestic market, or components 
required in vehicle assembly.
Until the early 1990s, high protection resulted in very low numbers of 
 vehicle imports. With the liberalization that followed the introduction of the 
MIDP, total imports of vehicles and components grew rapidly. Nominal tariffs 
on light ve hicles and automotive components were phased down gradually to 
25 per cent in the case of vehicles and 20 per cent for components. These tariff 
reductions could not, on their own, explain the rapid increase in automotive 
imports. A key factor was that the MIDP enabled firms to rebate import duties 
by exporting.
Vehicle producers were happy to accept reductions in vehicle tariffs from very 
high levels but initially registered growing concerns about proposed reductions 
below 40 per cent. However, as they derived a growing proportion of their rev-
enue from the importation of vehicles, much of their strategic behaviour shifted 
to optimizing their duty position. This was reflected in their firm- level strategies 
as well as interventions to influence government to ensure that the import credits 
they earned from exporting were only phased down very slowly. From 1996 to 
2011, the average level of duty paid by vehicle manufacturers was only 0.6 per 
cent of the total value of their imports of vehicles and components over 
this period.
The growth of automotive exports was one of the most striking features of the 
development of the automotive industry under the MIDP. Its incentive structure 
strongly favoured exports. But the very strong supply response to changes in the 
policy regime is also partly attributable to the changing nature of the automotive 
industry value chain. From 1994 there was a process of investment or reinvestment 
by MNCs with all seven light- vehicle producers rapidly becoming 100 per cent 
foreign- owned. In addition to the benefits of exporting, one of the factors driving 
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the takeover of domestically owned plants by licensors was the need to upgrade 
the South African plants in the face of growing competition. To achieve scale, 
exports were essential and this required the control that comes with wholly 
owned plants.
The MNCs were able to rapidly facilitate exports either from their own South 
African operations or from South African- based suppliers to their international 
operations. This enabled them to expand their exports and offset import duties 
on vehicles and auto parts. While trade and industrial policy provided significant 
support, especially for exports, substantial improvements in productivity were 
also evident. However, South Africa still lagged countries such as Thailand in 
terms of manufacturing costs (Barnes et al.,  2017). Part of the competitiveness 
deficit can be accounted for by the relatively low availability of skills in South 
Africa, which is reflected in high skills premiums for technicians, artisans, profes-
sionals, and managers (Barnes et al., 2017).
A highly contested issue in the development of the automotive sector both in 
South Africa and other developing countries was the level of local content in 
domestically assembled vehicles. The South African government was keen to pro-
mote greater depth of supply- chain development by securing investment in first- 
and second- tier suppliers; this was one of the stated objectives of the APDP, 
which replaced the MIDP in 2013. As has been illustrated, the bargaining power 
of the MNCs ensured that it remained relatively easy to import vehicles and auto 
parts into the South African market while offsetting almost all duties (Barnes et al., 
2017). Indeed, this did not help the established domestic component manufactur-
ers and allow for deepening of the local supply chain. The aim of the 2035 South 
African Automotive Masterplan (SAAM), launched in 2019, was to build on the 
foundations established by the APDP, while simultaneously correcting its distor-
tions and perceived development limitations. It set an ambitious objective of 60 
per cent local content by 2035, which was a substantial increase on the level of 
only 38.7 per cent achieved in 2015 (Barnes et al., 2016).
Apart from a market and production growth boom in 2005–6, there was only a 
modest increase in investment in vehicle manufacturing. The expansion in invest-
ment in the component sector was also modest due to weak domestic demand 
and the lack of supply- chain competitiveness relative to other investment loca-
tions (Barnes et al.,  2017). This was despite South Africa’s automotive policy 
offering significant investment incentives in the form of the Automotive 
Investment Scheme (AIS).
The conversion of the MIDP to the APDP in 2013 heralded a significant change 
in government policy, with its explicit export support reoriented to production 
support, irrespective of market focus. This was embodied in the move to a Volume 
Assembly Allowance (VAA) for vehicle producers and a Production Incentive 
(PI) for vehicle producers and component manufacturers. The import credits that 
had been earned by exporting (under the MIDP) were, in terms of the APDP, 
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based on value added. The policy ‘paradox’ of rewarding local production with 
import rebates was therefore extended to 2020.
As indicated in Table 5.1, the share of exports in light vehicle production was 
high and tended to increase since the inception of the APDP. In respect of stra-
tegic choices, it would appear as if several carmakers identified the opportunity to 
increase their finished vehicle export programmes under the APDP as an alterna-
tive to deepening their local content. This appears to have been driven by inter-
nation al export opportunities, the ease of exporting relative to the arduous task of 
growing local supplier capabilities and competitiveness levels, and the ability of 
vehicle producers to inflate the level of rebates earned through the Volume 
Assembly Allowance (VAA). As the VAA is based on the sales value of finished 
vehicle production, as opposed to local value addition, carmakers can earn sub-
stantial rebates by exporting higher- value vehicles comprising predominantly 
imported components.
5.4 The Scale of Production and Structural Change
Overall, the targeted industrial policies in the auto industry yielded mixed results. 
The sector undoubtedly achieved improved industrial performance. From 1994 to 
2014 it was the second- fastest growing manufacturing sub- sector in South Africa, 
although it slumped subsequently in response to a weakening economy (Bell 
et al., 2018: 7). Technological upgrading at vehicle assemblers and some first- tier 
automotive component manufacturers, higher volumes and a ra tion al iza tion of 
products and platforms enabled significant improvements in productivity and 
rapidly rising exports. However, important structural weaknesses remained.
Table 5.1 South African production profile for major vehicle categories (2011–17)
Product Market 2011 2013 2015 2017
Passenger vehicles Domestic 124,736 113,364 112,566 100,354
Export 187,529 151,893 228,459 230,957
Total 312,265 265,257 341,025 331,311
Export% 60.1% 57.3% 67.0% 69.7%
Light commercial 
vehicles
Domestic 108,704 127,188 140,310 136,438
Export 84,125 121,345 102,664 105,862
Total 192,829 248,533 242,974 242,300




Domestic 26,656 30,924 30,535 26,293
Export 803 1,206 1,124 991
Total 27,459 32,130 31,659 27,284
Export% 2.9% 3.8% 3.6% 3.6%
Source: Adapted from Barnes et al. (2016): 32; AIEC (2018).
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Undoubtedly, the growth in exports was strongly incentivized by the import–
export rebate mechanisms designed as part of the MIDP; and continued with 
vehicle exports under the APDP. At the same time, the generous concessions on 
import duties granted to exporting firms reinforced a balance of power in favour 
of vehicle producers in relation to suppliers. Overall, the growing power of MNC 
lead firms, together with the increasing foreign ownership of first- tier suppliers 
operating within global contractual arrangements, blocked the deepening of the 
domestic value chain in South Africa. Local content either remained stable or 
tended to decline, with a concomitant contraction among second- and third- tier 
suppliers. The successful transition to export orientation produced a much more 
technologically sophisticated industry, while quality and productivity also 
improved significantly. Although the sub- sector continued to be highly sub sid-
ized, its structure did become more robust, more competitive, and more oriented 
to global markets.
The issue of the scale of production is, however, fundamental. The automotive 
industry remains highly scale intensive. In such industries, tariff protection in 
small domestic markets is likely to lead to the establishment of plants operating at 
below minimum efficient scale. Small- scale assembly raises costs and adds little 
value. Low- volume vehicle plants mean that in the absence of heavy protection, 
investment in component production is uneconomic beyond a very low level of 
local content. In a market with high effective rates of protection for vehicle assem-
bly, it is economic for producers to build a wide range of models even in low vol-
umes, to be able to supply a full model range to the domestic market. However, 
the implications for the component sector are highly adverse. The cost premium 
incurred by component makers for producing a wide range of products at low 
volume is considerable. Suppliers are, therefore, severely disadvantaged by the 
decision of assemblers to increase product variety. Given that automotive compo-
nents comprise the heart of value addition within the industry, this imposes a 
binding constraint on industry development.
Essentially, what was sought in South Africa with the introduction of the 
MIDP was a shift from completely knocked down (CKD) assembly,4 as was typ ic-
al ly characteristic of vehicle production in protected developing country markets, 
through a ‘transition stage’ to ‘full manufacturing’ (Black, 2009). This transition is 
depicted in Table 5.2. CKD assembly involves relatively light investments but pro-
duction costs are usually quite high, especially if a high level of localization is 
stipulated by government policy. Product variety makes traditional automation 
impractical. High local- content requirements would necessarily require much 
higher investment levels and would tend to encourage rationalization. In a pro-
tected market, the cost of tooling up for new models and domestic content also 
4 CKD assembly typically involves the assembly of imported ‘kits’ of components.
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encourages assemblers to skip the introduction of new models. As a result, in 
many protected, emerging economy markets, models have continued in produc-
tion long after they have been phased out in advanced country markets. In the 
CKD assembly stage, quality is also likely to be below inter nation al standards.
In the transition and full manufacturing stages (Table 5.2), where exports may 
become substantial, both quality standards and the number of derivatives offered 
need to be in line with international practice.5 Production volumes per model 
also increase in the transition stage and under full manufacturing would approach 
world scale. Because firms are exporting, they would need access to components 
at world prices, so despite higher volumes in the transition stage, local- content 
levels may not increase. In the full manufacturing stage, much higher volumes 
would normally be attained, encouraging vehicle makers to localize components 
on an economic basis.
The South African automotive industry made considerable progress in achiev-
ing a reasonable level of scale with current average model volumes in the region 
of 65,000 units per annum, representing a huge improvement on levels well below 
10,000 units at the advent of the MIDP, but below the 150,000 units that represent 
5 The term ‘derivative’ refers to the different permutations within a ‘basic model’. Examples include 
engine size and body (e.g. saloon or hatchback) configurations.
Table 5.2 Stages in the development of vehicle production in South Africa
Criteria CKD assembly Transition Full manufacturing






Low; import of CKD 
packs
Medium High
Model line up Many models One or two One or two
Derivatives Limited to reduce costs Full range to supply 
export market
Full range to supply 
export market
Local content Generally low but may 
be quite high due to local 
content requirements
Moderate based 
primarily on cost 
factors
Medium to high
Quality Below source plant Equal to source 
plant
Equal to source plant
Production cost High Medium; penalties 
incurred by high 
logistics costs
Low
Domestic design Local adaptations None None—may do 
global R&D in niche 
areas
Source: Black (2009: 491).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 15/07/21, SPi
Justin Barnes, Anthony Black, and Lorenza Monaco 109
fully integrated plants in large markets. Most vehicle producers could now be 
classified as having reached the ‘full manufacturing stage’ indicated in Table 5.2.6 
However, higher model volumes in the assembly sector were not accompanied by 
higher local content, despite evidence that the component industry did signifi-
cantly improve its operational performance (Barnes and Black, 2014).
Considered as a whole, the supply chain remained underdeveloped and heavily 
reliant on imports. Overall, the desired process of productive transformation was 
not completed. Without major structural weaknesses being overcome and the 
balance of power moderated, the ambitious targets of the SAAM would always be 
difficult to meet.
5.5 Policy, Incentives, and State–Business Bargaining
The transformation of the South African auto industry from protection during 
apartheid to the post- apartheid globalization era can only be understood if 
embedded within the political economic context in which it occurred. Indeed, its 
most recent configuration can be interpreted as the outcome of specific policy 
choices, the product of international competitive pressure, and a balance of power 
between state institutions, MNCs, domestic firms, and organized labour. Such 
balance of power, and the institutional setting that accompanied it, are a direct 
product of the country’s historical trajectory.
Overall, South Africa’s industrial development path was highly conditioned by 
its apartheid legacy, and the way the globalization of its economy was negotiated 
also depended on this inheritance. The auto industry, in this sense, followed a 
rather peculiar path. First, it benefited from significant financial support received 
in the form of incentives—which other industrial sectors were not granted. 
Second, its development was also influenced by global integration being delayed 
by the pre- 1994 sanctions period, although the eventual integration into inter-
nation al markets was quite rapid. Finally, the sector, being one of the most glo-
balized, was also one of the most exposed to the demands of multinational firms, 
and to power bargaining dynamics between local institutions and foreign firms. 
Overall, both state–business bargaining and changing ownership strongly affected 
the policy space in the industry.
Since the end of apartheid, and of the white nationalist project that found its 
expression in the protection of infant industries, including the automotive indus-
try (Duncan, 1997), the South African state was caught between forces pushing in 
different directions. On one side, the need to transform the socio- political- 
economic structure in a democratic sense called for a developmental project 
6 The exceptions are Nissan and Isuzu, which have so far failed to secure major export programmes 
that would enable them to achieve large volumes per model.
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addressing the basic needs of a long- neglected majority population. On the other, 
the wish to catch up with the rest of the world, to compensate for ‘wasted’ time, 
resulted in an attempt to accelerate global integration. This directly affected the 
direction taken by the industrialization process, and the bargaining relationship 
between the state and multinational firms.
Tangri and Southall (2008) highlight how the coexistence of contrasting goals 
generated a tension that was often difficult to manage. In this sense, post- 1994 
ANC governments all clumsily steered between the declared aims of pursuing 
economic equity and redistributing wealth, while also advocating actions target-
ing rapid economic growth by attracting corporate investment. Hamann, 
Khagram, and Rohan (2008) show how the apparent attempt to establish a form 
of ‘collaborative governance’ between state and business paradoxically entailed an 
active intervention of the state to limit its own powers. In their view, any move to 
regulate firm behaviour was constrained by the simultaneous need to operate 
within a framework that also worked in the firms’ interests. In practice, what lay 
behind the negotiation of a governance space was always the condition for busi-
ness to keep a hegemonic position. This was particularly evident in the auto 
industry, where global companies not only asserted their voice in relation to 
investment and productive strategies, but also defended their dominant role 
within the supply chain (Barnes et al., 2017).
The tensions had parallels to the Slovakian case described by Pavlinek (2016). 
In the development of the South African auto sector, the state played a crucial 
role in accommodating the strategic needs of foreign capital, to a point where the 
industry became overwhelmingly dependent on the directions taken by global 
investors (Hamann, Khagram, and Rohan,  2008). Analysing an FDI- driven, 
export- oriented strategy comparable to the one pursued by the South African 
auto industry in the post- apartheid era, Pavlinek (2016) warns against the dynam-
ics typical of a ‘dependent market economy’, where the state actively sets the rules 
of the game to attract investors, but eventually sees its bargaining power signifi-
cantly reduced. In this regard, while broadly compensating for the lack of domes-
tic capital, strategies relying on foreign capital as a primary vehicle to promote 
national competitiveness and industrial restructuring end up limiting the domes-
tic policy space. At a sectoral level, such strategies will be successful only if the 
shape taken by the targeted industry is in line with the investment strategies of 
the hosted MNCs. Overall, while possibly conducive to faster integration and 
more efficient restructuring, such policies can also be less sustainable as they are 
usually reliant on state incentives and can lead to patterns of uneven develop-
ment. For example, as in the South African case, they can lead to the progressive 
erosion of local capabilities, whereby ‘export- oriented foreign- owned factories 
often assemble high- tech, high quality goods with a relatively high value- added 
from components that are either imported or produced locally by other foreign 
firms’ (Pavlinek,  2016: 575). The outcome of such strategies can be rapid 
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industrial growth, but with the possible downside of truncated supply chains, 
control by foreign firms and reduced state bargaining power.
In the South African auto industry, the will of the government to compensate 
for delayed industrial development, and the consequent attempt to accommodate 
foreign companies to attract investment and technology, was reflected in the 
incentive mechanisms and in the generous concessions made to increasingly 
dominant MNC lead firms. As a result, the industry today is strongly influ-
enced by the strategic direction set by the multinational assemblers, whose 
lobbying power weighs heavily on policy decisions (Masondo,  2018). In this 
sense, it is only by re- balancing the governance mechanisms of the supply 
chain that the conditions for a more sustainable structural transformation will 
be put in place.
Weak economic growth in South Africa and the resultant negligible growth in 
the domestic market further weakened the bargaining power of government in 
dealing with multinational firms. These firms were quick to point to a multitude 
of real constraints and difficulties which made it easier for them to extract further 
concessions from government.
5.6 Changing Ownership and Supply- Chain Development
In South Africa, these state–business bargaining dynamics limited the develop-
ment of the supply chain. While foreign investment promoted industrial upgrad-
ing and international integration, local ownership and capabilities simultaneously 
declined (Barnes et al., 2017).
It became increasingly important for local firms to have links to global net-
works as a way of facilitating access to international markets. In South Africa, and 
indeed in other emerging markets, foreign- owned assemblers increasingly pre-
ferred to source components from joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries 
of their global suppliers rather than from domestically owned firms. The result 
for many South African firms was that they either needed to seek out an inter-
nation al partner or face the prospect of being confined to the aftermarket (Barnes 
and Kaplinsky, 2000).
With growing foreign ownership, the main conduits for technological upgrad-
ing were through transfers from foreign sources rather than an increase in 
domestic R&D.  Domestic firms, under pressure to upgrade their technological 
and production capacities, turned to foreign sources through the establishment of 
joint ventures, for example. There was plenty of evidence that when local firms 
have come under the control of transnationals, existing R&D establishments are 
downsized or shut down (Lorentzen and Barnes, 2004; Black, 2011). It does not 
necessarily follow, however, that these firms downgrade technologically. This is 
because the shutting down of formal R&D facilities can be accompanied by the 
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introduction of new specialized product and process technologies from their 
global networks that bring the firms closer to the world frontier.
Multinational vehicle producers have actively sought out component suppliers 
that are able to export and to supply components which meet the exacting stand-
ards of their own increasingly export oriented assembly operations. These MNC 
lead firms have therefore played a major role as conduits between domestic com-
ponent firms and the international market by arranging export contracts for com-
ponent suppliers by facilitating access to their global networks, brokering new 
investment, bringing in new technology, and accelerating the transfer of industry 
best practices in production organization to their suppliers.
There is no doubt that foreign ownership, as opposed to licensing arrange-
ments, has in many cases been critical for vehicle producers to obtain major 
export contracts but the question is more complicated for component producers. 
A number of foreign- owned suppliers have established facilities in South Africa 
with the sole purpose of supplying component subsystems to domestic assem-
blers. A striking difference between foreign- owned and domestically owned firms 
has been that the former import a significantly larger share of their inputs. The 
main explanation is that many foreign component firms are ‘systems integrators’, 
supplying entire sub- assemblies to the vehicle manufacturer. This is more of an 
assembly than a manufacturing activity. Foreign firms are also clearly less embed-
ded in the domestic economy although this may change over time as firms 
develop domestic linkages (Black, 2011).
As a consequence of such processes, the South African automotive value chain 
was now underdeveloped relative to leading international competitors. This is 
indicated schematically in Figure  5.1, which illustrates the large share of value 
addition by assemblers and first- tier suppliers in South Africa, with this essen-
tially a function of the hollowing out of the second and third tiers of the supply 
chain. Overall levels of local content are low and have been declining with a 
strong rise in component imports. Table 5.3 indicates the extent of this trend over 
the period of the APDP. While South Africa increased the value of its vehicle 
assembly activities significantly over the period, the increase in vehicle assembly 
was accompanied by a R54.8 billion (US$ 2.2 billion) surge in automotive compo-
nent imports, largely nullifying the assembly gains made.
As indicated in Table 5.4, component exports have expanded rapidly. From a 
low base of R3.3 billion (US$909 million) in 1995, component exports increased 
to R23 billion (US$3.6 billion) in 2005 and R53.7 (US$3.7 billion) by 2019. A key 
objective of the import- export complementation scheme under the MIDP was to 
assist component suppliers to generate higher volumes, which would make them 
more efficient, and able to compete in the domestic market against imports. A 
linked objective was that reduced production costs would have the added benefit 
of providing lower- cost inputs into the assembly industry. The objective of higher 
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component volumes has certainly been achieved at least in the sense that export 
development has usually been accompanied by higher volumes and specializa-
tion. Many component producers have also rationalized their product lines.
However, the nature of the component industry’s export expansion also raises 
concerns. Firstly, the bulk of exports has consisted of catalytic converters. This 
export growth was certainly affected by the high subsidies the sector received as a 
result of the platinum group metals used in their production. In this sense, large 
export contracts were arranged by vehicle producers seeking to offset import 
duties on parts (and vehicle) imports through the rebate mechanism. So instead 
of promoting exports of parts in order to achieve economies of scale in the com-
ponents which they were purchasing for their own assembly operations, the car-
makers in many cases preferred to establish large- scale component export 
programmes of products, such as catalytic converters. These were for the most 
part disconnected from their own assembly operations. Another sub- sector that 
emerged in the early days of the MIDP was automotive leather, which in 1995 
accounted for 30.7 per cent of component exports. This labour- intensive sector 
eventually went into decline with supply contracts being moved to central Europe, 
and two factories relocating to Lesotho. Such shifts were influenced by decreasing 
policy support to materials- based export- oriented sectors under the APDP and 
lower labour costs in neighbouring countries (i.e. Lesotho). Overall, the expan-
sion of component exports was accompanied by a very low level of integration 
into the domestic industry, both in terms of supply to domestically assembled 
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Figure 5.1 Value addition breakdown of global and South African automotive 
supply chains
Source: Barnes (2014).
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5.7 The Prospects for Localization and Transformation  
in the Supply Chain
Given the structure of the South African automotive industry, attempts to secure 
sustainable industry growth need to be linked to two main challenges: increasing 
the level of localization, and developing the lower tiers of the auto supply chain. 
Indeed, this will also require strong intervention to re- balance governance assets 
and the balance of power between big and small players, multinational lead firms 
and component suppliers, and foreign and local firms. At the same time, any 
strategy to raise local content and develop local suppliers will also have to be con-
nected to initiatives aimed at developing local ownership and increasing black 
participation in the industry.
The localization challenge is particularly pressing. At only 39.2 per cent local 
content in South African assembled vehicles in 2017, the ability of the South 
African automotive industry to realize its growth potential is being severely com-
promised. As a second- tier automotive producer, the domestic automotive 
Table 5.3 Assembled vehicles
Year Local content (Rbn) Imported content (Rbn) Local content (%)
2012 35.2 40.1 46.6
2013 37.9 54.6 40.9
2014 47.1 66.4 41.5
2015 52.9 83.8 38.7
2016 58.1 97.1 37.4
2017 61.2 94.9 39.2
Sources: SARS; NAAMSA.
Table 5.4 Major component export categories, 1995–2019 (R million)
 1995 2005 2015 2019 % 2019 total
Total 3,316 23,000 49,641 53,667  
Catalytic converters 389 9,935 20,326 20,359 37.9
Engine parts 102 1,000 3,941 4,345 8.1
Tyres 213 1,183 2,193 2,619 4.9
Engines 9 781 1,448 1,904 3.5
Radiators and parts 66 220 1,190 1,536 2.9
Transmission shafts/cranks 55 553 1,060 1,152 2.1
Automotive tooling 153 332 1,459 943 1.8
Other 2,329 8,996 18,024 20,806 38.8
Source: AIEC (various years).
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industry has the potential to grow its local content to at least 60 per cent. This is 
based on the recognition that core drivetrain, powertrain, safety, and telematics 
technology is unlikely to be domestically sourced soon, but that there is substan-
tial opportunity to increase local content in South African vehicles—as evidenced 
through the experiences of other second- tier automotive economies, such as 
Turkey, Thailand, and Brazil.
However, localization is a multidimensional challenge requiring a multifaceted 
response. At the most basic level it is associated with improving South Africa’s 
factor cost profile (overheads, labour, and materials costs), along with the econo-
my’s ability to ensure technology and skills availability ahead of industry demand. 
Research completed for the South African Automotive Masterplan in 2016 
emphasized the debilitating impact of exorbitant government- administered ser-
vice price increases (such as electricity, rail, and port handling) on the operating 
costs of firms (Barnes et al., 2016).
As firms have shifted their business models to accommodate these increasing 
costs, domestic content has been lost, along with associated technologies and 
skills. Reversing this trend requires the stabilization of government- administered 
service costs, and the development of technology and associated skills.
Additional key elements relate to the creation of targeted specialization within 
the automotive value chain, and the potential to strategically link South Africa’s 
materials base with automotive opportunities. Dealing with specialization first: 
unless firms can secure economies of scale within the domestic automotive indus-
try, they are unlikely to be sufficiently competitive to deepen their value addition. 
Key then is identifying opportunities to secure improved economies of scale in 
the context of South Africa’s comparatively small production volumes. This is 
partly a policy issue, but it also requires industry coordination and programmatic 
interventions. The South African automotive industry, working in partnership 
with national government, has established the Automotive Supply Chain 
Competitiveness Initiative (ASCCI) as the vehicle for identifying and responding 
to localization opportunities, and it is important that the industry and govern-
ment collaborate on specific agreed- upon opportunities.
The objective of increasing local content is deeply intertwined with the chal-
lenge of promoting the transformation of the industry. This is part of a broader 
government ambition to strengthen local ownership of the country’s productive 
assets, and to promote the participation of black industrialists in the development 
of national industry. The transformation of the sector is consequently included as 
a priority for firms looking to continue securing government support, and to 
access available incentives.
The idea of economic transformation, aimed at expanding the role of black 
ownership and control of the economy, has been part of the post- apartheid pol it-
ical project from the outset. The aim of achieving black economic empowerment 
(BEE) has informed numerous government programmes since 1994. However, 
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the BEE policies of the first ten years of the post- apartheid era were, at best, con-
sidered ineffective, leading to only cosmetic adjustments of pre- 1994 inequalities 
and economic imbalances. Early BEE policies were also strongly criticized, for 
resulting in the formation of a black industrial elite, without concretely address-
ing South Africa’s much deeper structural disparities. Makgetla (2004), for 
ex ample, highlights how economic restructuring post- 1994 created very limited 
opportunities for black entrepreneurs, while the extreme concentration of owner-
ship remaining largely unchanged (see also Freund, 2007).
The perception of limited policy reach (Ponte et al., 2007) led the South African 
state to reconsider the first package of BEE policies, in favour of an enlarged set of 
conditions for transformation. The 2000s thus saw the introduction of a ‘broad- 
based black economic empowerment’ (BBBEE) formula, which went beyond 
 simple corporate ownership. The widened package entailed a long list of criteria, 
seen as crucial indicators of deeper transformation. These included ownership, 
management representation, employment equity, skills development, preferential 
procurement, enterprise development, and corporate social investment (Ponte 
et al., 2007; and Chapter 9). The objective was to promote more inclusive trans-
form ation, and to target a larger pool of potential beneficiaries. However, despite 
the revision of the original agenda, and the ambition to extend its reach, the 
implementation of BBBEE policies remains limited, and the transformation of 
South African industry remains slow.
In this regard, several weaknesses have been identified. Ponte and colleagues 
(2007) warned against the managerialization of the BEE agenda, which progres-
sively shifted towards technical compliance, moving away from its initial focus on 
redistribution. Ultimately, such processes also transferred responsibilities from 
the state to the firms; with firms competing to tick boxes on their scorecards to 
win incentives. Despite critiques of its implementation and limited achievements, 
the idea of BEE remains crucial for the transformation of South Africa’s post- 
apartheid industrial landscape. However, progress will not be achieved only by 
setting the right policy targets, but necessarily through the joint efforts of all the 
stakeholders involved in developing the industry.
Many initiatives have emerged, but the coordination between them needs to be 
significantly improved. Presently, all major stakeholders operating in the industry 
are exploring localization opportunities and have transformation programmes in 
place. The National Association of Automobile Manufacturers of South Africa 
(NAAMSA) has established a R6 billion (US$414 million) transformation fund 
(Engineering News, 6 November 2019). NAACAM is actively engaged in ‘best 
practice education’ via a black supplier development programme that is run 
jointly with the Automotive Supply Chain Competitiveness Initiative (ASCCI). 
NAACAM is also providing legal assistance to its members to assist in achieving 
compliance with the BBBEE scorecard. ASCCI endeavoured to target interven-
tions aimed at building supplier capabilities, driving localization, and developing 
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strategic insights into future opportunities for the value chain. All of these 
 elem ents have transformation objectives. In Gauteng, the Automotive Industry 
Development Centre (AIDC) is promoting Automotive Incubation Centres 
linked to individual vehicle producers (the most advanced project being at Ford) 
and is also running a supplier development programme. In KwaZulu–Natal, the 
Durban Automotive Cluster (DAC) has tested a supplier development model 
based on the formation of joint- ventures between established component manu-
facturers and emerging black suppliers.
While a number of initiatives are in place, they face several difficulties. These 
are mainly related to the financial feasibility of identified localization op por tun-
ities and to technical barriers to localization (such as volumes, technology, global 
supply agreements, and the cost of testing). In addition, the uneven leverage of 
different stakeholders, pursuing diverse business strategies, does not facilitate the 
process, and further complicates the development of a common development 
strategy.
5.8 Conclusion
The South African automotive industry has undeniably achieved significant 
structural transformation since the end of apartheid. It has consolidated its 
manu fac tur ing capacity, improved its productivity, increased exports, and 
upgraded its position in global value chains. However, this internationalization 
has not been accompanied by strong supplier development. Increasing foreign 
ownership, deteriorating local operating conditions (especially in respect of gov-
ernment administered services), and an unfavourable state–business bargaining 
relationship, have affected the development of the industry, leading to a supply 
chain heavily concentrated around MNC lead firms and first- tier suppliers, them-
selves mainly multinational firms. In the process, the second and third tiers of the 
automotive supply chain have declined.
Localization, transformation, and supply- chain development still emerge as 
key priorities for the future of the South African auto industry. In this regard, the 
2035 Masterplan sets ambitious targets that could potentially be achieved, but 
that will also certainly require a significant effort on behalf of all stakeholders.
Supply- chain development will require major support for skills develop-
ment and the technological advancement of local firms. In relation to black 
supplier development, ownership transactions, encouraging outsourcing to 
smaller suppliers and the establishment of joint- venture projects are all options 
worthy of further exploration. Another key requirement for the realization of 
the SAAM’s objectives will be the recovery of the South African economy and 
the creation of a more favourable environment for both foreign and domestic 
investment.
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6
The Industrialization of Freshness and 
Structural Transformation in South African 
Fruit Exports
Christopher Cramer and Shingie Chisoro- Dube
6.1 Introduction
Clear evidence of the potential for stronger growth of the South African fruit 
industry, coupled with robust growth in global demand, makes it a central focus 
for any high- value agriculture- led growth strategy. In 2018, global fruit exports 
amounted to US$92 billion, up from US$73 billion in 2013 (a 26 per cent growth 
in value terms) (ITC Trade Map,  2019). Over the same period, South Africa’s 
share in global fresh- fruit exports averaged 3 per cent, although the country 
commands higher shares in narrow product lines. For example, South Africa is 
the second- largest exporter of citrus after Spain, accounting for 10 per cent of 
global exports in 2018 (ITC Trade Map, 2019).
Although the spread of Covid- 19 has disrupted many industries worldwide, 
exports of fruit have continued to grow amidst the crisis, accelerating the long- 
term growth trend.1 In particular, the demand for citrus has boomed during the 
pandemic because of the fruit’s high Vitamin C content. While global volumes of 
citrus imports between March and May 2020 (at the peak of the covid- 19 pandemic) 
were not consistently higher than the previous season, their value averaged 13 
per cent higher in the same period, compared to March to May 2019 (ITC Trade 
Map, 2020). South Africa has taken advantage of the Covid- 19- related expansion 
in demand, increasing the volume and value of fruit exports. In value terms, 
South Africa’s exports earned 114 per cent and 118 per cent more in March and 
April 2020 respectively, compared to the same months in 2019.2
1 https://www.freshplaza.com/article/9216935/overview- global- lemon- market/; https://www.
freshplaza.com/article/9220910/overview- global- stone- fruit- market/; https://www.freshplaza.com/
article/9233712/overview- global- cherry- market/; https://www.freshplaza.com/article/9235863/overview- 
global- orange- market/.
2 See ITC Trade Map, 2020; these are nominal values and the increase is partly due to the partly due 
to the depreciation of the Rand during this period. Also https://www.freshplaza.com/article/9209810/
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The South African fruit industry has a high potential not only to ease the 
balance- of- payments constraint on growth, but also through high levels of labour 
demand to help address the high level of unemployment, particularly in rural 
areas (Cramer and Sender, 2015). However, to underpin sustainable growth of the 
fruit sub- sector, the industry (with policy support) needs to adapt to major 
advances in technology in what can be termed the ‘industrialization of freshness’ 
(Cramer and Sender,  2019). The industrialization of freshness hinges on fruit 
producers’ ability to improve the quality of fruit and product shelf life through 
research and technology development. The goal to produce high- quality fruit for 
export markets is driving key technological changes—from inputs, production, 
packing, and storage, to marketing and distribution. Constant technology 
upgrading across these processes is critical for market access and developing 
timely, flexible, and speedy supply chains (Chisoro- Dube et al., 2019). Advances 
in technology have been a key mechanism through which structural 
transformation (a shift to higher productivity economic activity) towards higher- 
value crops has occurred in agriculture.
Despite evidence of dynamism in fruit production, effective structural trans-
form ation in the South African fruit industry has been constrained by widespread 
underinvestment in technical capacity and key infrastructure including water, tele-
com mu ni ca tions, and ports. The high levels of congestion and delays at South 
Africa’s main ports, thanks to machinery breakdowns caused by ageing and worn 
out infrastructure, have hampered port operations and increased costs for fruit 
exporters. Similarly, the historical underinvestment in water resources and in ad-
equate maintenance of water infrastructure, especially in rural areas, have caused 
water shortages in agriculture, forcing the industry to be conservative with new 
plantings. While growers have adopted on- farm production technologies to 
respond to the impacts of droughts and growing susceptibility of crops to pest and 
diseases imposed by climate change, poor internet and cell- phone connectivity in 
rural areas (exacerbated by low levels of investment in broadband penetration) has 
limited the use of such technologies. In addition to the infrastructure challenges, 
limited technical capacity and know- how at the quarantine laboratories of the 
Department of Agriculture, Land Reform, and Rural Development for clearing 
exotic pests and diseases makes the process of importing new varieties cumber-
some, and delays commercial production.
The results from sector- wide interviews for this research suggest an underlying 
tension that has been constraining the deepening of structural transformation in 
fruit production in South Africa. The government’s priority with regards to fruit 
(and agriculture more broadly) has been more focused on transformation in the 
increased- global- demand- for- citrus- bodes- well- for- the- 2020- export- season/; https://www.freshplaza.
com/article/9225032/overview- global- blueberry- market/; https://www.freshplaza.com/art icle/9216133/
south- african- 2020- export- season- shows- strong- increase- in- global- citrus- demand/.
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racial demographics of ownership in the industry. Through its black economic 
empowerment (BEE) policy, it has prioritized the participation of small and 
medium- sized black- farmer businesses (see Chapter 9). The industry’s priority on 
the other hand, has been around quality, growth, and increased market access. 
This entrenched standoff has created an investment vacuum in key infrastructure 
and technical capacity within the industry, limiting overall growth.
In this chapter, evidence from South Africa’s fruit industry is used to illustrate 
how advances in technology and industrial processes have driven a shift towards 
high- value crops and the accessing of high- value export markets in developed 
countries. The chapter also highlights the constraints on greater structural 
transformation in the sector. For although South Africa is an established exporter 
of fresh fruit, the country’s performance lags behind key competitors. Indeed, 
South Africa has not been able to match the growth rates in fruit exports achieved 
by countries such as Mexico, Chile, and Peru.
The chapter draws largely on insights from interviews with some fifty industry 
stakeholders and government officials in different fruit- growing regions for a 
number of research projects conducted between 2017 and 2020.3 The first project 
in 2017 formed part of a broader research programme on regional industrialization 
commissioned by the Department of Trade, Industry, and Competition (the 
DTIC) and coordinated by Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS).4 Eleven 
firms in the fruit industry were interviewed. The second project (2018–19) 
formed part of a series of studies on the challenges of industrialization in South 
Africa undertaken by the Industrial Development Think Tank (IDTT) housed in 
the Centre for Competition, Regulation, and Economic Development (CCRED) 
in partnership with the South African Research Chairs Initiative (SARChI) in 
Industrial Development at the University of Johannesburg. The IDTT project 
interviewed twelve firms in the fruit industry. CCRED also hosted a Dialogue on 
Industry 4.0 and the fruit sector, held on 22 October 2018. The third project 
(2019–20) was on innovation and inclusive industrialization in agriculture and 
agroprocessing and was funded by the UK Economic and Social Research 
Council’s (ESRC) Global Challenges Research Fund. This two- year collaboration 
between researchers from the University of Edinburgh, the University of 
Johannesburg, and the Economic and Social Research Foundation, Tanzania, had 
by late 2020 amassed interviews with over thirty firms in the fruit industry in 
South Africa.
3 Chisoro- Dube et al. (2018a); Chisoro- Dube et al. (2018b); Chisoro- Dube et al. (2019); and 
Innovation & Inclusive Industrialisation in Agro- Processing Project available on https://iiap.info/.
4 Trade & Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS) is an independent, non- profit, economic research 
institution established in 1996 to support economic policy development. TIPS undertakes quantitative 
and qualitative research, project management, dialogue facilitation, capacity building, and knowledge 
sharing. Its areas of focus are: trade and industrial policy, sustainable growth, and inequality and 
economic inclusion.
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Section 6.2 sets out a conceptual framework for understanding structural 
transformation in agriculture. Section 6.3 describes the performance of South 
Africa’s fruit industry in global markets and how South Africa has fallen behind 
competitor producers. Section 6.4 shows how South Africa’s fruit industry is 
leveraging research and technology to produce high- quality fruit for export 
markets, showing in detail how fresh- fruit exporting has become increasingly 
industrial, while also embodying the process of ‘servicification’. Section 6.5 
discusses the infrastructural and technical capacity constraints limiting effective 
structural transformation of the South African fruit industry. Section 6.6 
concludes and pulls together some of the key policy weaknesses and implications 
touched on in sections 6.3 and 6.5.
6.2 Structural Transformation in Agriculture; and Power 
and Upgrading in Global Value Chains
The process of structural change entails a shift of resources (capital and labour) 
from less productive to more productive sectors, either through upgrading within 
a sector or across sectors (Storm,  2015); and it involves integrating into the 
international economy through trade and technology relationships (Lall,  2004; 
Khan and Blankenburg, 2009; Hausman et al., 2014).
Economists have historically tended to associate industrial processes with 
manu fac tur ing and not with agriculture (Kuznets, 1973; Syrquin, 1988; Samaniego 
and Sun, 2016; Mijiyawa, 2017). Hence, the process of economic development is 
often simplified to refer to a shift of resources out of low- productivity agricultural 
activities into higher- productivity manufacturing activities and urban services, 
with manufacturing viewed as distinct from agriculture. But the boundaries 
between agriculture and manufacturing, and processed and unprocessed agricul-
tural products, are becoming less distinct. This is partly as a result of agriculture 
employing more sophisticated technology and transforming the structure of pro-
duction (Page, 2014; Cramer and Sender, 2015).
A shift to higher- productivity economic activity entails building industrial 
capabilities. The term ‘industrial’ in Young’s (1928) definition captures the extent 
to which certain kinds of productive activity are characterized by an increasingly 
intricate nexus of specialized undertakings that has inserted itself between the 
producer of raw materials and the consumer of the final product. This definition 
places more emphasis on the forms of industrial organization at play and what 
Young termed the ‘roundabout’ nature of production, than on whether or not 
production takes place in factories (Cramer et al., 2018). Industrial capabilities, 
on the other hand, entail the accumulation of knowledge and skills both at an 
individual and organizational level. While developing such capabilities requires 
education and formally acquired skills, of equal importance are capabilities 
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associated with the problem- solving knowledge embodied within organizations. 
These capabilities include production technologies, marketing, labour relations, 
and ‘dynamic capabilities’ of search and learning (Cimoli et al., 2009). Similarly, at 
the level of national late development, Amsden (2001) emphasizes the role of 
learning in building technological capabilities, which she classifies into 
production capabilities, project execution capabilities (investment capabilities), 
and innovation capabilities.
Structural change in agriculture entails building exactly these kinds of capability, 
and developing the intricacy and ‘roundaboutness’ of the nexus of production in 
moving to higher- value agricultural production—improving yields, ensuring a 
reliably consistent supply of higher- quality products, perfecting ripeness at the 
point of consumption, improving the shelf life of the product and logistics 
coordination, and related undertakings that together may be called the ‘industri-
alization of freshness’ (Cramer and Sender, 2019). This requires that agriculture 
systems become more capital intensive, more productive, and better integrated 
with other sectors of the economy through markets (FAO, 2017).
It is important therefore to appreciate the close linkages between manufacturing 
and ‘unprocessed’ agriculture, even as the distinctions between them fade. The 
manufacturing sector remains a key source of technology- driven productivity 
growth, innovation, and learning for the agricultural sector, as manufacturing 
activities easily lend themselves to mechanization and processing (relative to other 
economic activities) (Andreoni and Chang, 2016). Developments in manufacturing 
industries and their dynamic linkages are key in producing agricultural machinery 
and equipment, agrochemicals, and mechanized warehousing—all necessary for 
developing the agricultural sector.
Structural change in agriculture has important implications for industrializa-
tion. Internationally, there have been several successful experiences of sustained 
economic growth and structural change that have been centred on agriculture 
(Cramer and Sender, 2015). This is evident in countries such as Mexico, Chile, 
Peru, and Brazil. Yet South Africa has not been able to match the growth rates 
achieved in agricultural exports in these countries. Part of the difficulty in achiev-
ing greater structural transformation in agriculture relates to the widespread 
underinvestment in infrastructure—ports, water, and telecommunications, and 
technical capacity.
Alongside the domestic challenges of underinvestment in key infrastructure 
and technical capacity, the nature of fresh- fruit production as an export- oriented 
industry means that access to developed- country markets becomes increasingly 
dependent on the ability to integrate into the global commodity chains of core or 
lead firms based in high- income countries (Gereffi, 1994; Gereffi and Fernandez- 
Stark, 2011; Gereffi and Lee, 2016; Dallas et al., 2018). In these global value chains 
(GVCs), participation of firms from low- income countries is not governed just by 
national trade and other policies but also by the strategic decisions of the core 
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firms in the value chains (Nolan et al., 2008). The role played by powerful ‘lead’ 
firms in coordinating production activities and shaping the distribution of profits 
and risk within an industry is central to understanding governance structures in 
global industries (Gereffi and Lee, 2012). Lead firms in GVCs control production 
through setting and enforcing product and process parameters including 
standards and protocols that must be met by other players operating in the value 
chain. This includes controlling decisions about what to produce, how to produce, 
and how much to produce (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002; Gereffi and Fernandez- 
Stark, 2011).
Thus, these ‘systems integrators’ (Nolan et al., 2008) are at the apex of extended 
value chains and they actively select the suppliers most able to meet strict require-
ments that are the condition of their participation in the ‘systems integrators’ sup-
ply chains. These firms interact in the deepest, most intimate fashion with the 
major segments of the value chain, both upstream and downstream, exerting 
intense pressure across the whole supply chain to minimize costs and stimulate 
technical progress (Nolan et al., 2008).
6.3 Performance of South Africa’s Fruit  
Industry in Global Markets
South Africa’s exports of fresh fruit grew at an annual compound rate of 6 per 
cent between 2013 and 2018, in value terms (Figure 6.1).5 The growth in exports 
has been coupled with a corresponding increase in direct jobs in fruit farming, 
with an estimated 241,676 jobs in 2018,6 up from 179,948 jobs in 2015,7 with 
many more in related activities.
Nonetheless, South Africa lags behind key competitors such as Chile, Mexico, 
and Peru. This is especially the case for high- value and fast- growing fruits, such 
as avocados and berries (Figures 6.2 and 6.3). In volume terms, between 2013 and 
2018, South Africa’s exports of avocados grew at a compound annual growth rate 
(CAGR) of 8 per cent, compared to 26 per cent in Peru and  14 per cent in Mexico. 
Similarly, in the same period, South Africa’s exports of berries in volume terms 
grew at 6 per cent compared to 68 per cent in Peru (although from a low base) 
and 8 per cent in Mexico.
South Africa’s export fruit bowl is relatively concentrated relative to competitor 
countries. Citrus, grapes, and apples and pears together account for 91 per cent of 
total South African fruit exports, in both value and volume terms, and these are 
5 ITC Trade Map,  2019 HS Codes for fruits used are 0810, 0803, 0805, 0804, 0806, 0808, 0809, 
0807, 0813.
6 https://fruitsa.co.za/wp- content/uploads/2019/09/A5- Fruit- SA- Stats- Booklet_2018.pdf.
7 CCRED (2018) Policy Brief: ‘Structural transformation to grow high- value exports and jobs: the 
case of fruit.’
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relatively large- volume, lower- value fruits. Competitors such as Chile and Peru 
have far more diversified export baskets with a wider range and proportion of 
higher- value fruits such as avocados, berries, cherries, guavas, and mangoes. 
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Figure 6.1 Value of fruit exports from South Africa and competitors, 2001–18























































South Africa Chile Peru Mexico
Figure 6.2 Volume of avocado exports from South Africa and competitors
Source: ITC Trade Map, 2019.
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the value of Chile’s fruit exports is much higher than that of South Africa’s 
fruit exports. Similarly, although Peru has much lower volumes of fruit exports 
than South Africa, it is fast approaching the equivalent of South Africa’s export 
values (Figure 6.1).
However, some diversification has been under way: South Africa is shifting 
production to high- value and globally in- demand fruits within fruit varieties. For 
example, within the citrus category, South Africa is shifting from oranges to higher- 
value fruit varieties such as clementines and mandarins, and lemons and limes, 
which are among South Africa’s fastest- growing exports. Between 2013 and 2018, 
South Africa’s exports of lemons and limes grew at a CAGR of 12 per cent in volume 
terms. However, this is still slower growth than in key competitors: in volume terms, 
Chile expanded exports of lemons and limes at a CAGR of 22 per cent, and Peru 
at a CAGR of 26 per cent (although they are both from lower bases than South 
Africa) (Figure 6.5). And in the same period, while South Africa’s exports of clem-
entines and mandarins grew at a CAGR of 14 per cent in volume terms, Chile 
recorded a higher export growth rate of 23 per cent (Figure 6.4).
In addition to diversifying the fruit export basket, South Africa needs to diver-
sify its export markets. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom account for 
34.6 per cent of South Africa’s total fruit exports in value terms (Figure  6.6). 
However, between 2013 and 2018, the growth of South Africa’s volume of exports 
to the European Union grew at an annual compound rate of less than 2 per cent. 
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Figure 6.3 Volume of berries exports from South Africa and competitors
Source: ITC Trade Map, 2019.
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where most of the future growth is likely to come from. Yet South Africa has not 
done well in opening up access to these markets.
Currently, only a few fruits from South Africa are being exported into China. 
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Figure 6.5 Volume of exports from South Africa and competitors: lemons and limes

























































South Africa Chile Peru Mexico
Figure 6.4 Volume of exports from South Africa and competitors: clementines and 
mandarins
Source: ITC Trade Map, 2019.
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can be protracted. For example, it took eighteen years for South Africa’s apples to 
gain access into China. Sanitary and phytosanitary issues have been a key reason 
for the slow and limited access. This was mainly due to the government’s apparent 
limited technical and diplomatic expertise and agility. It did not capitalize on 
industry research and information to negotiate market access and to demonstrate to 
potential trading partners that South African fruits do not pose a risk of diseases 
and pestilence to importing countries (Cramer and Sender, 2015; Chisoro- Dube 
et al., 2019). Discussions have been under way for pears and avocados, supposedly 
the next in line. The trend seems to have been negotiating one fruit at a time, with 
protocols approved for citrus in 2004, table grapes in 2007, and apples in 2014. 
Even negotiations to amend existing protocols to change shipment methods are 
slow. For example, in 2015 the South African citrus industry asked China for 
specialized reefer (break bulk) vessel shipments to be allowed in terms of 
the  2004 protocol. After years of negotiating the technical details, the first 
break- bulk vessel with citrus left South African shores only in May 2019 
(Chisoro- Dube et al., 2019).
The share in value of South Africa’s fruit exports to China and Hong Kong has 
shown substantial growth, from 3.4 per cent in 2001 to almost 12 per cent in 
2018. However, of the total value of fruit exports from South Africa to China and 
Hong Kong, citrus fruit has accounted for 85 per cent. With South Africa’s exports 
to China concentrated on citrus, maximizing market access into such fast- growing 
































































































Figure 6.6 South Africa’s fruit export markets: 2001 and 2018
Source: ITC Trade Map, 2019.
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6.4 Leveraging Research and Technology for the Production 
of High- Value Fruit and Access to Export Markets
The expansion of South Africa’s fruit industry has been underpinned by research, 
innovation, and technological developments.8 Growing customer demands and 
complex sanitary and phytosanitary standards in different markets require quality 
improvements and regulatory compliance at each level of the value chain. And the 
effects of climate change on fruit production complicate the ability of producers 
to meet these requirements. In a highly competitive global market, structured 
through relationships in GVCs, it is exactly these pressures that drive responses at 
firm and government levels that accelerate the industrialization of freshness.
Firms are innovating, learning, and adopting technological solutions to meet 
escalating requirements. Learning is a dynamic process; a solution at one level of 
the chain necessitates changes at other levels. For example, while biotechnology is 
key to responding to climate change threats, it is also at the heart of addressing 
issues of fruit quality through the development of genetically improved varieties 
necessary for complying with phytosanitary standards.
Major developments in research and technology in South Africa’s fruit indus-
try have been in the areas of biotechnology and on- farm production technolo-
gies. These include irrigation and precision farming methods, disease and pest 
management, and post- harvest production technologies such as digital platforms 
and the internet of things for sorting, grading, and cold storage. These new 
technologies are transforming the structure of fruit production, offering scope for 
greater productivity through improved yields, speed, shelf life and quality, and 
transparency and traceability along the value chain.
The growing complexity of fruit production and exporting also means that 
financing requirements are increasingly complex and often involve the need for 
long- term or ‘patient’ finance before returns are reaped (for example, on 
investments in R&D). And the increasingly intricate, roundabout character of 
fruit exporting also means that there are evolving requirements for public 
investment in key infrastructure and technical capacity that the evidence suggests 
have not adequately been met (see below, section 6.5). The rest of this section 
illustrates some of these knowledge- intensive industrial processes at play in the 
production of export- quality fruit.
6.4.1 Biotechnology
Upstream in the value chain, the impacts of climate change, weather variability, 
and diseases and pathogens have driven investments in advanced breeding 
8 Section 6.4 draws from interviews discussed in the introductory section.
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technologies for growing varieties that are adaptable to local climate conditions, 
with improved resistance to diseases and pests such as insects, weeds, and 
pathogens. Advances in biotechnology also ensure that new varieties can be bred 
according to specific characteristics such as taste, visual appearance, shelf life, 
seasonality, yield, climatic resilience, and soil- type suitability. These advances 
may also affect labour requirements. New varieties enable growers to meet 
changing international preferences, and extend the growing seasons which 
supports year- round supply to different markets.
Integrating advanced genetic seed material into South African fruit production 
draws firms in South Africa into the domain of leading global firms. The berry 
industry provides a good example. The industry currently imports its main varieties 
from the USA (developed at the universities of Florida and Georgia) and Australia 
(from Costco Wholesale). These are the Costa and Driscoll, OZblu and Mountain 
Blue Orchards (MBO) cultivar range. These imported varieties are owned by three 
leading producers: Haygrove, United Exports, and BerryWorld. These producers 
have the breeding licences to produce new plants and seedlings from the parent 
plant, and they have contracts with the universities and Costco to disseminate the 
tree seedlings. Improved berry varieties have higher yields and are sweeter than 
old varieties. They fetch higher prices and perform better on export markets. 
Given their shorter shelf life, the older varieties are transported via air, while the 
new stronger varieties are transported via (cheaper) shipping containers as they 
can endure longer sea- freight transit times.
Similarly, variety management and development companies in the citrus and 
deciduous fruit industries import new varieties from around the world and com-
mercialize plant breeders’ new varieties both in South Africa and internationally. 
To secure the profitability of investments in breeding new varieties, which can 
take up to ten to sixteen years, intellectual property management companies 
ensure that plant breeders earn royalties and commissions for every plant sold in 
nurseries.
The technological ability of the local industry to develop or import improved 
varieties has an important impact on the structure and governance of the value 
chain. The development of new varieties, tightly managed by intellectual property 
rights, is becoming the organizing principle of the fruit value chain. Owners of 
protected varieties can exercise significant power in dictating to farmers the terms 
and conditions of production, volumes, marketing, and exports. This means that 
owners of protected varieties can control the entire fruit value chain of a specific 
variety—from production to marketing—enabling them to capture value through 
royalties and commissions.
For example, the citrus industry is moving towards more protected varieties 
for niche markets in order to control and earn higher prices through restrictions 
on production, which avoid market flooding. The market trend has been to move 
away from oranges and navels towards easy- peeling naartjies (mandarins) for 
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which global demand is growing. These include branded mandarin varieties 
called ClemenGold and Tango, which are protected varieties. The plant breeder 
and the intellectual property management company decide on the allocation 
of  hectares for planting protected varieties. For instance, they can stipulate 
that only up to 1,000 hectares of the variety can be planted in a specific 
 growing season and once the plantings reach that number they can no longer 
sell the variety.
6.4.2 On- Farm Production Technologies
The increasing effects of variable rainfall and more frequent drought conditions 
mean that farmers need to augment plantings of improved varieties that are 
adaptable to local conditions, coupled with new irrigation and pest control 
technologies. This is critical for producing the right size and quality of fruit 
demanded in export markets.
For example, the Eastern Cape region—the second- largest citrus- producing 
region in South Africa (after Limpopo) and accounting for 26 per cent of the total 
88,569 hectares under production in 2019—has experienced two prolonged 
droughts, in 2015/16 and 2019/20. In particular, Citrus production in the Gamtoos 
Valley area in the Eastern Cape, along with other agricultural production activities 
(such as chicory, avocados, strawberries and blueberries, vegetables, dairy, and 
herbs) relies entirely on the Kouga Dam for irrigation water. The dam supplies 59.9 
million cubic metres of water to farmers, with each farmer having a standard water 
allocation of 8,000 cubic metres per annum per scheduled hectare (Gamtoos 
Irrigation Board, 2019). However, the dam’s reduced water levels caused by the long 
droughts have led to water restrictions being imposed by the irrigation board and 
the Department of Water and Sanitation. In January 2018, with the Kouga Dam at 
only 9.75 per cent capacity, growers were allocated a 20 per cent water quota for 
the 2017/18 season. This meant that farmers could only draw 1,600 cubic metres of 
their normal annual water allocation of 8,000 cubic metres per scheduled hectare. 
In late 2018, there was good rainfall, which increased the dam- water level to 55 
per cent and farmers were permitted to draw 85 per cent of their annual water 
allocation for the 2019/20 water year. However, in 2020, the dam’s water level 
dropped again to below 7 per cent and growers were allocated a 20 per cent water 
quota, forcing growers to remove some of the newly planted citrus trees and to 
not plant new seedlings (Gamtoos Irrigation Board, 2019).
The pressure from the recent droughts in South Africa is forcing growers to 
adopt irrigation and precision- farming technologies to maintain and improve 
production. Firms have been adopting the use of low- flow micro and drip 
irrigation technologies, which are programmed and operated through mobile 
phones. These fertigation systems allow crops to be irrigated and fertilized at the 
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same time and monitor the nutritional needs of a tree. These kinds of adaptation 
point to increasingly roundabout processes in agriculture, as it is organized through 
an intricate nexus of inputs, technologies, and organizational requirements. It is 
also clearly shaped by the related process of ‘servicification’ (see Lanz and 
Maurer, 2015) by which a rising share of value of non- service output is accounted 
for by service- type activities.
Alongside the water- security challenges imposed by worsening climatic 
conditions, the growing susceptibility of crops to pest and diseases is driving 
the fruit industry to expand research and technical services. These are critical 
for compliance with phytosanitary standards in export markets, which are the 
biggest constraint for fresh- fruit exports. The compliance process requires the 
industry to conduct research and provide specific technical and scientific 
information to satisfy importing countries that there are no risks of any pests 
and diseases. This research information is a critical tool for governments 
to  negotiate trade agreements with other countries or market it to potential 
trading partners.
A number of players in the South African fruit industry are engaging in 
research activities. Part of the Citrus Growers’ Association (CGA), Citrus 
Research International (CRI) conducts industry research and technical services 
with funding primarily from the association’s levy on exported citrus. CRI has 
spent a significant and increasing amount of its annual income levy on research 
and technical services: 57 per cent of its total annual income levy of R91 million 
in 2019/20, compared to 53 per cent in 2018/19 (CGA,  2019 and 2020). CRI’s 
research on diseases and integrated pest management has focused largely on false 
coddling moth, citrus black spot, and fruit flies, which have presented key 
market- access challenges for citrus fruit products. To fund the growing demand 
for research driven by the increasing requirements of export markets, the Minister 
of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development approved the Citrus 
Growers’ Association’s application to increase the citrus export levy by more than 
100% from 74 cents per every 15kg carton exported for 2020 to R1.64 for 2021 
(CGA, 2020).9 Additional public funding to the citrus industry includes an 
extension of the Sector Innovation Fund from the Department of Science and 
Technology, in the form of the Research for Citrus Exports programme and the 
Post- Harvest Innovation Programme. The Post- Harvest Innovation Programme 
is a public- private partnership between the Department of Science and 
Technology and the Fresh Produce Exporters Forum. The South African Berries 
Association, established in 2011, has also invested in research for the government 
to use in trade negotiations. That research has concentrated on insects and fungi 
that affect blueberries, including viruses and bacteria.
9 www.cga.co.za (2021).
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6.4.3 Post- harvest Production Technologies: Automated Sorting 
and Grading Equipment, and Cold Storage
The need to reduce defects and increase the quality and speed of fruit sorting to 
meet growing consumer demands is driving key technological improvements. 
Access to new sorting technologies that are more accurate than hand- grading 
enables producers to improve productivity and to achieve consistency in the 
supply of high- quality, defect- free fruit to consumers. Consistency in the quality 
of supply is also critical for compliance with sanitary and phytosanitary standards 
for market access. Investing in new sorting technologies, to raise the proportion 
of higher valued fruit exported, is central to firms’ prospects for upgrading within 
fruit value chains.
Leading fresh- fruit exporters have computerized their entire systems in 
packhouses. Packhouses are installed with optical graders and sizers, which use a 
camera system that grades the fruit into different grades and classes.10 These 
technologies are imported from leading manufacturers in France, the Netherlands, 
and New Zealand; South Africa has limited research, technical, and engineering 
skills to develop new sorting technology locally.
Another important determinant of success in the fruit industry is a firm’s 
ability to install sophisticated cold- chain technologies that ensure a longer 
product shelf life. The adoption of these technologies has provided greater access 
to geographically dispersed and distant markets. This has been particularly 
important for delicate fruits, such as berries, that have a short shelf life and for 
which the slightest reduction in turnaround times will increase profits 
significantly (Wyman, 2018).
6.4.4 Digital Innovations for Improving Market Access
Competitive success in global agricultural trade turns on the capacity to produce 
and export a reliable supply of high- quality output that meets demanding sanitary 
and phytosanitary standard requirements. One dimension of this is that the need 
for improved processes of capturing, storing, and sharing information for 
compliance purposes has driven the adoption of innovative digital platforms in 
the fruit industry. One South African example is an electronic data- sharing 
platform for growers for issuing export phytosanitary certification.11
10 https://www.tru- cape.com/tru- news/new- technologies- keep- tru- cape- and- its- packhouses- in- 
the- lead/; https://www.tru- cape.com/tru- news/new- grabouw- sorting- line- and- packhouse- uses- the- latest- 
 global- tech- available/.
11 https://www.citrusresourcewarehouse.org.za/home/document- home/news- articles/south- 
african- fruit- journal- safj/sa- fruit- journal- 2016/3748- sa- fruit- journal- aug- sept- 2016- cga- phytclean- 
update/file.
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To complement and realize the benefits of the industry initiative to move to 
electronic certification and data- sharing systems, individual firms, particularly 
large producers, are implementing electronic data interchange (EDI) systems 
within their supply chains to integrate information in the packhouse and cold- 
chain facilities. This technology allows for the seamless monitoring of supply- 
chain processes as the system syncs the information from the packhouse and 
cold- storage facility and then produces comprehensive reports and documenta-
tion. Tablet devices installed with apps that use cloud storage are used to conduct 
audits and inspections on the farms that are necessary to acquire accreditation in 
export markets. Nonetheless, however sophisticated their own operations may be, 
firms in rural areas often run up against the wall of poor connectivity; this is 
addressed in section 6.5 below.
6.5 Constraints on Effective Structural Transformation  
in South Africa’s Fruit Industry
Despite evidence of dynamism in fruit production, effective structural 
transformation in the South African fruit industry has been limited by widespread 
underinvestment in ports, water, and telecommunications infrastructure, and 
technical capacity.
6.5.1 Congestion and Delays at Ports
High levels of congestion and delays at South Africa’s main ports have continued 
to pose one of the biggest challenges in the industry.12 Machinery breakdowns 
caused by ageing and worn- out infrastructure frustrate operations at the ports. 
The additional pressures during the Covid- 19 pandemic put further strain on 
maintenance and exposed the failure of spreaders, straddles, and mobile cranes.13 
Port congestion and delays have been particularly acute during peak seasons of 
major export products such as citrus. The process of moving fresh produce 
through South Africa’s main ports can take seven to eight weeks, drastically 
reducing the shelf life of perishable goods (Chisoro- Dube et al.,  2019). Fruit 
exporters have also lost money in unplanned expenditure on additional plug- ins 
for vessels that were delayed at the ports.14
12 https://www.freshplaza.com/article/9123535/crisis- at- south- africa- s- harbours- affecting- citrus- 
exports/; https://www.freshplaza.com/article/9239660/tru- cape- searches- for- solutions- to- cape- town- 
 port- crisis/.
13 https://www.freshplaza.com/article/9232871/productivity- at- all- south- africa- s- port- terminals- 
 currently- well- below- norm/.
14 https://www.freshplaza.com/article/9123535/crisis- at- south- africa- s- harbours- affecting- 
 citrus- exports/.
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The causes of congestion have included institutional snags, port capacity, and 
the build- up of traffic from trucks carrying containers into and out of the ports. 
Although government and industry stakeholders have acknowledged the urgency 
of addressing congestion issues at the ports, the crisis has continued to worsen.15 
For example, in December 2019 the Department of Economic Development and 
Tourism, and Transnet in the Western Cape, established a task team to address a 
shortage of cranes, traffic bottlenecks, and sluggish logistics communications in 
the supply chain at the port of Cape Town, but the challenges persisted into 2020.
6.5.2 Ageing and Poorly Maintained Water Infrastructure
Similar to the challenges of ageing and worn- out infrastructure at the ports has 
been the historical underinvestment in water resources and the inadequate 
maintenance of water infrastructure. The average age of water infrastructure is 
thirty- nine years and there has been a poor maintenance record (Amis et al., 
2017). Backlogs in investments and maintenance of water infrastructure are 
 especially serious in rural parts of the country. The consequences have been 
 particularly acute during drought periods.16
Insufficient funding from the fiscus for the Department of Water and Sanitation, 
which is the custodian of water resources and responsible for coordinating 
 investments in water infrastructure, has constrained the ability of government to 
deliver infrastructure timeously. It has been estimated that South Africa requires at 
least R1.4 billion investments per annum (approximately US$85 million per 
annum)17 to maintain the current water infrastructure (Amis et al., 2017).
Water management in South Africa has also been characterized by a significant 
lack of capacity among water professionals, many of whom have migrated to the 
private sector in search of better working conditions. Inadequate engineering 
skills in the country have exacerbated the problem (Amis, Zinyengere, and 
Cassim,  2017). South Africa’s engineering industry ranked forty- ninth out of 
ninety- nine countries in the Global Engineering Capability Index in 2020; its 
infrastructure ranking was fortieth, behind countries including Uruguay, Chile, 
Greece, and Latvia; and its digital infrastructure ranking was even lower, at 
fifty- fourth.18
The backlog in infrastructure maintenance at the Kouga Dam in the Eastern 
Cape is one example of the effects of poor infrastructure. The Gamtoos Irrigation 
15 https://www.freshplaza.com/article/9239660/tru- cape- searches- for- solutions- to- cape- 
 town- port- crisis/.
16 https://www.cbn.co.za/news/manufacturing/financing- of- water- infrastructure- takes- centre- 
 stage- in- south- africa/.
17 This is based on the exchange rate as of 21 October 2020 accessed at https://www.xe.com/.
18 For safety standards, South Africa ranked seventy- seventh: http://reports.raeng.org.uk/global- 
engineering- capability- review/appendix- 1/.
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Board manages and distributes water from Kouga Dam and the provincial 
Department of Water and Sanitation is responsible for maintaining the dam and 
water infrastructure, such as the water canal system and dam wall. However, 
the department has not done any maintenance on the water infrastructure since 
the mid- 1990s. While the Gamtoos Irrigation Board stepped in to carry out some 
maintenance functions, it could not afford the high levels of investment required 
to adequately address the backlog. This means that there will have to be more 
investment on the part of government and more effective intervention at the 
technical level.
6.5.3 Inadequate Telecommunications Infrastructure
The use of irrigation and precision- farming technologies to respond to the 
impacts of droughts and the growing susceptibility of crops to pest and diseases 
imposed by climate change requires stable internet access and cell- phone 
connectivity. Yet in many rural areas there is poor internet and cell- phone 
connectivity. The problems have been exacerbated by South Africa’s low levels of 
broadband penetration and limited access to fixed and mobile infrastructure. The 
high cost of investments required to roll out fixed and mobile infrastructure, 
particularly in rural areas, and of leasing space on existing infrastructure sites, 
has limited broadband penetration.
Fixed services in rural areas are vital for providing high speeds and high 
volumes of data at a lower cost (Hawthorne et al., 2016; Robb and Paelo, 2020). 
Historically, Telkom was the fixed- line monopolist in South Africa until 
government’s decision, reflected in the 1995/6 White Paper, to adopt managed 
liberalization in the telecommunications sector. As part of this process, Telkom 
was partially privatized and was entrusted to facilitate universal broadband 
rollout. However, Telkom used its control of upstream infrastructure to frustrate 
downstream rivals and limit competition in the sector (Hawthorne et al., 2016; 
Robb and Paelo, 2020).
Organizations like the Perishable Produce Export Control Board (PPECB), 
which conducts audits for export markets and accreditations, have struggled in 
this context of limited connectivity. Organizations carrying out this kind of 
activity cannot afford downtime in connectivity because inspections need to be 
conducted timeously.
6.5.4 Insufficient Technical Capacity
The cumbersome process of importing seed varieties into the country and the 
long quarantine periods depend on various factors such as the ability of exporting 
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countries to comply with South Africa’s import requirements and the 
phytosanitary risk that varieties pose to the South African industry. Countries 
such as Spain and Chile have fast- tracked their systems for pathogen testing by 
accepting products tested in internationally certified laboratories, thus stealing a 
march on countries like South Africa, which as well as not accepting varieties 
tested abroad have not invested sufficiently in lab equipment or quarantine 
facility skills.
Limited technical capacity and know- how at the quarantine laboratories of the 
Department of Agriculture Land Reform and Rural Development for clearing 
exotic pests and diseases slows the process and leads to delayed commercial 
production. Plants can die in quarantine, with a high financial impact on the 
importer. Also, when varieties are not tested and released fast enough, there is 
limited time to discover whether they work in South African agroclimatic 
conditions and then to register the variety for plant breeders’ rights, which protect 
the variety when it becomes commercially viable.
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, detail has been provided on the ways in which production for 
export of fresh fruit in South Africa embodies the characteristics of the industrial: 
fruit production is increasingly sophisticated and complex, it is organizationally 
and materially ‘roundabout’, and an increasingly intricate technical nexus is 
inserted between the genetic plant stock origins of fresh fruit (themselves the 
focus of high- tech research and development) and the point of consumption. The 
knowledge- intensive, productivity- enhancing processes involved in exporting 
fresh fruit are precisely those that economists have long identified as central to 
structural transformation. But the chapter has also shown how the scope and 
shape of structural transformation within fruit—and broader agricultural—
production are shaped by a number of complex factors: national ecosystems of 
infrastructure and knowledge production capable of generating dynamic 
increasing returns (Best, 2018; Oqubay and Lin, 2020), agroclimatic conditions 
and climate change, the dynamics and power relations within GVCs, and domes-
tic politics and policy.
Not only does South Africa have considerable potential for further structural 
change through fruit production and export, structural change that can contribute 
to foreign exchange earnings and employment, but also it is clear that South 
Africa’s competitiveness in fruits requires greater prioritization and more 
coordinated policy attention by government. For although there has been 
impressive expansion in some fruits, overall South African fruit exports have 
failed to keep pace with other leading exporters, such as those in Latin America. 
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And South Africa has lost the technical lead it had earlier established in key areas 
like cold- storage facilities. Individual South African firms, and some industry 
association bodies, have invested and worked to develop capabilities and 
institutions to support improvements in efficiency and quality. But underlying 
much of the relative failure of South African fruit production overall has been the 
weakness of government policy. The evidence from the fruit sector suggests that 
the government, distracted by the political framing of a transformation agenda, 
has undermined fruit exports and weakened the dynamic of structural change. It 
has done this by underinvesting in port facilities, rural internet capacity, and water 
infrastructure, as well as in engineering capabilities, technical capacity, and trade 
negotiation. It has also failed to build the kind of patient, long- term development 
finance that has been critical to many other experiences of agrostructural change.
Developments in South Africa’s fruit sector have important implications for 
other African countries in terms of development and industrialization within 
agriculture. South Africa’s fruit story shows that industrialization and structural 
transformation are not limited to manufacturing but extend to many ‘primary’ 
agricultural products. Agriculture is still the mainstay of the majority of African 
economies with few manufacturing activities. There are therefore important 
lessons to be drawn from South Africa’s fruit- production experiences for how 
other African countries might leverage agriculture for economic growth. Such 
growth is dependent on building industrial capabilities to harness technological 
changes necessary to produce high- quality fruit for high- value export markets. 
And the evidence, in South Africa as elsewhere, is that this requires concerted, 
targeted state support.
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7
Sustainability and Green Capital 
Accumulation
Lessons from the South African Wine Value Chain
Stefano Ponte
7.1 Introduction
In the past two decades or so, ‘green capitalism’, ‘green growth’, the ‘green economy’, 
and the ‘circular economy’ have become popular constructs in view of addressing 
climate change and other pressing environmental crises (popular books include 
Lovins et al.,  2007; Esty and Winston, 2009; Friedman, 2009; McDonough and 
Braungart,  2010; Schwab,  2017). Considerations of sustainability and resilience 
have also been widely referred to in the context of the impact of the Covid- 19 
pandemic and recovery from it. Essentially, these concepts have been employed 
to argue that the capitalist mode of production can be leveraged to solve the 
pressing environmental issues that arise from its very logic. We are told that new 
business models, innovation, and technological progress can save the environment 
and still facilitate capital accumulation and everlasting growth. In other words, 
we are led to believe that green capitalism contains the seed of salvation.
Of course, some of the technologies and models have the potential to address 
pressing environmental challenges—but they almost always address the mani fest-
ations rather than the roots of problems, and often focus on individual models 
and production technologies without exploring the systemic and structural elements 
in which they are embedded. In other words, while green capital accumulation 
strategies that optimize production and resource use are helping to lower the rela-
tive energy and material intensity of production, they do not address the overall 
ecological limits to growth because they are based on a logic of continuous expan-
sion (Kovel, 2007; Newell and Paterson, 2010; Higgs, 2014). To restate in slightly 
different terms, these relate to technological and organizational fixes which do 
not address the overall structural change required (Coe and Yeung, 2015).
One approach that has been often used to implementing these fixes is for lead 
firms in global value chains to place new environmental demands on their 
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suppliers, which come with requests for more information on supplier cost structures 
and operations (Ponte, 2019). In supplier jurisdictions where regulatory monitor-
ing is poor or difficult, this can lead to pro forma compliance with buyer demands 
and certifications, while further limiting the actual impact on environmental sus-
tain abil ity. When profit margins decrease for suppliers (negatively affecting their 
economic sustainability), these demands can also have negative rebounding 
effects on social sustainability—for example, driving suppliers to cut labour costs 
or worsen work conditions to recoup the extra environmental costs.
This chapter highlights how sustainability and green capital accumulation go 
hand in hand—through the analysis of economic and environmental upgrading 
in the wine value chain in South Africa. These processes of accumulation are built 
on a structural logic that extracts value upstream from producers as they attempt 
to improve their environmental performance, and that leaves upstream actors 
with little leverage on how to (re)capture the ‘environmental value’ that they 
themselves create. The South African wine industry is widely viewed as a 
successful example of value chain upgrading, one that changed over the 1990s 
and 2000s from producing mainly bulk wine of low quality to delivering demand- 
driven wine styles in the basic quality segment of the industry and higher quality 
wines in new niches (Ponte and Ewert, 2007; Ponte and Ewert, 2009).1 In both 
quality segments, upgrading has included offering certified Fairtrade, organic, 
and biodynamic wines, and some degree of improvement in environmental 
practices. Yet domestic producers’ economic returns have been squeezed, while 
marketers and retailers in importing countries reap the benefits of economic and 
environmental upgrading.
The rest of this chapter discusses first the general trend of how capital 
accumulation has taken place along value chains on the basis of addressing (or 
pretending to address) environmental sustainability concerns. The chapter then 
moves on to the analysis of different aspects of economic and environmental 
upgrading in the wine value chain originating in South Africa and ending in the 
UK, in the context of recent dynamics that characterize the global wine value 
chain. Upgrading is examined through three kinds of processes: first, product, 
process, volume, and/or variety—including their environmental aspects; second, 
changing and/or adding functions; and, third, transferring capabilities between 
chains. In the next section, the actual economic and environmental outcomes of 
upgrading are discussed, with specific focus on producers. The chapter concludes 
with a reflection on what the case study of wine says about structural 
transformation in South Africa more generally.
1 http://www.sawis.co.za.
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7.2 Sustainability and Capital Accumulation in Global 
Value Chains
As competitive advantage becomes denationalized and increasingly shaped by the 
functioning of global value chains, new winners and losers arise within and across 
nations (Baldwin, 2016; Milanovic, 2016). In South Africa, inequality has often 
been examined in relation to the agenda of black economic empowerment (BEE) 
(Southall, 2007; Khagram and Rohan, 2008; Tangri and Southall, 2008; Mebratie 
and Bedi,  2013; Bowman,  2019; Bracking,  2019; Hamann et al., 2020; and 
Chapter 9) and research on production, economic development, and sustainability 
has paid particular attention to the specific consequences for disadvantaged groups. 
In this context, discussions on the sustainability of production are discussions 
that focus on power relations, inequality, and social, environmental, and climate 
justice.
Yet, in its current manifestation, ‘sustainable development’ (including much of 
the construction of the UN Sustainable Development Goals) has been stripped of 
its justice elements and has become ‘all but synonymous with “sustained economic 
growth” ’ (Dale et al., 2016). It has embedded unfettered and apolitical technological 
optimism and ‘sustainability consumerism’. Green capitalism is going hand in 
hand with green and/or blue ‘grabbing’ that is operated through the exploitation 
of land and water resources (Benjaminsen and Bryceson,  2012; Fairhead et al., 
2012; Hill, 2017), a contemporary instance of accumulation by dispossession 
(Harvey,  2004). As capitalism metamorphoses into green capitalism, it comes 
along with its financial imperatives, its (im)moralities and its values, in South 
Africa and beyond (Bracking,  2012; Sullivan,  2013; Dempsey,  2016; Asiyanbi, 
2017; Ouma et al., 2018).
Global value chain (GVC) analysis has provided important insights into how 
sustainability and capital accumulation interact. It does this by examining the 
power relations that underpin the governance of discrete ‘value chains’ that are 
explicitly governed by one or more groups of ‘lead firms’ (such as retailers or 
branded food processors) (Gereffi, 1994). Two dimensions of GVC analysis are 
especially relevant for the purposes of this chapter. A first dimension concerns 
various forms of GVC governance (Cattaneo, Gereffi, and Staritz, 2010; Gereffi, 
1994; Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon, 2005; Gibbon and Ponte, 2005; Milberg 
and Winkler, 2013; Ponte and Gibbon, 2005; Ponte, 2014) and the different kinds 
of power that shape them. This literature underscores the role played by powerful 
corporations, especially those that exert ‘buyer power’ by placing large orders in 
their value chains (e.g. Gereffi et al., 2005) and how lead firms in GVCs are lever-
aging sustainability to extract more information from suppliers, strengthen power 
relations to their advantage, and find new venues of value creation and capture 
(Ponte, 2019).
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A second dimension, often coupled with reflections on economic development, 
refers to GVC upgrading—the paths for value chain actors to add value and 
extract more rent, eventually moving up the value chain to more sophisticated 
and skill- intensive operations (Gereffi, 1999; Humphrey et al., 2004; Gereffi, 2014). 
Much of this literature has highlighted paths for actors to ‘move up the value 
chain’ for economic gain—identifying the sources of capabilities that facilitate 
access to new markets (Giuliani et al., 2005; Morrison et al., 2008) and/or how 
knowledge and information flow within value chains between lead firms and 
their suppliers (Gereffi,  1999). The research agenda on upgrading has recently 
moved from the examination of its economic and social aspects to the 
consideration of environmental concerns as well—and thus to the processes that 
can improve or minimize the environmental impact of GVC operations, including 
production, processing, distribution, consumption, and disposal or recycling (De 
Marchi et al., 2013; Krishnan, 2017).
Elsewhere (Ponte, 2019), it has been shown that the management of sus tain abil-
ity concerns has become a key element of both governance and upgrading in 
GVCs. Geographically, production is moving to locations that can meet basic 
sustainability specifications in large volumes and at low cost. Organizationally, 
multi- stakeholder initiatives on sustainability are playing a key role in redefining 
the minimum accepted standards for products. And, the need to verify sus tain-
abil ity compliance has led to the adoption of new technologies of measurement, 
verification, and trust (Busch, 2011; Freidberg, 2013; Freidberg, 2014; Fouilleux 
and Loconto, 2017). It has also been argued (Ponte, 2019) that the ‘business case’ 
for sustainability has by and large been solved: lead firms in global value chains 
not only extract sustainability value from their suppliers, especially those based in 
the global South, but they can also benefit from internal cost savings, supplier 
squeezing, reputation enhancements, and improved market capitalization. As the 
value of goods increasingly depends more on their intangible properties (includ-
ing those related to the environment) than on their functional or economic value, 
sustainability management becomes a central function of corporate strategy—
filtering through companies’ organization, marketing, operations, and logistics.
Producers in the global South, including in South Africa, have undergone 
impressive upgrading trajectories. Yet they have achieved limited economic gains 
(Ponte, 2019). They are offering increasingly sophisticated sustainability features, 
often to simply keep participating in GVCs as buyers place increasing demands 
on them. This often leads to lower margins for producers unless productivity 
gains can more than compensate for higher costs. When producers do manage to 
receive higher prices, it is usually in the context of much larger gains that buyers 
obtain in the same GVC. The value created by producers through economic- cum- 
environmental upgrading is mostly captured by buyers. At the same time, 
consumers can enjoy a wide variety of special and/or ‘sustainable’ products that 
deliver a feel- good factor.
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In other words, lead firms are using sustainability to appropriate surplus value 
from other GVC actors—often small producers based in the global South (Starosta, 
2010; Quentin and Campling, 2018). This sustainability- driven supplier squeeze 
(Ponte, 2019) is yet another manifestation of a larger process of value extraction 
from suppliers that has been observed in many GVCs (Milberg and Winkler, 
2013), which can lead to the adverse incorporation of suppliers (Gibbon and 
Ponte, 2005; Phillips, 2011) and to immiserizing growth (Kaplinsky, 2005).
7.3 Economic and Environmental Upgrading in the  
South African Wine Value Chain
In GVC analysis, the general term upgrading has been used to highlight paths for 
actors to ‘move up the value chain’ for economic gain. There are two broad 
orientations within this literature. A first orientation seeks to identify the sources 
of capabilities that facilitate access to new markets. Some argue that ‘horizontal’ 
flows are key, including locational and interactive knowledge built in clusters 
(Giuliani et al., 2005; Morrison et al., 2008). Others focus on ‘vertical’ relations 
and how knowledge and information flow within value chains between lead 
firms and their suppliers (Gereffi, 1999). But integrative efforts assessing which 
paths and aspects of upgrading originate from combinations of socio- spatial 
dynamics and ‘learning from global buyers’ have also been developed (Giuliani 
et al., 2005; Murphy, 2007; Gereffi and Lee, 2016; De Marchi et al., 2017).
A second orientation, the one taken in this chapter, is concerned with the 
nature of upgrading and its trajectories, often based on four kinds of economic 
upgrading (Humphrey and Schmitz,  2002,  2004, and  2006): (1) product 
upgrading: moving into more sophisticated products with increased unit value; 
(2) process upgrading: achieving a more efficient transformation of inputs into 
outputs through the reorganization of productive activities; (3) functional 
upgrading: acquiring new functions (or abandoning old ones) that increase the 
skill content of activities; and (4) inter- chain upgrading: applying competences 
acquired in one function of a chain and using them in a different sector/chain.
GVC scholars initially highlighted the importance of a ‘high road’ trajectory to 
upgrading (from process to product to functional upgrading) eventually leading 
to performing functions in a value chain that have more skill and knowledge 
content (Gereffi, 1999). Others have argued that a specific trajectory should not 
be an end in itself, and that attention should also be paid to what conditions can 
improve the position of disadvantaged actors along GVCs (e.g. smallholder 
producers, developing country processors, women entrepreneurs) and more 
generally achieve a ‘better deal’ for developing country- based operators (Tokatli, 
2012; Glückler and Panitz, 2016a). This includes examining in detail the complex 
upgrading and downgrading trajectories that are emerging (Gibbon,  2001; 
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Gibbon and Ponte, 2005; Tokatli, 2007; Ponte and Ewert, 2009; Cattaneo et al., 
2010; Mitchell and Coles, 2011; Tokatli,  2012; Hansen et al.,  2014; Ponte et al., 
2014; Blažek, 2015; Bernhardt and Pollak, 2016; Gereffi and Lee, 2016; Glückler 
and Panitz,  2016b). Recent efforts in GVC scholarship have attempted to go 
beyond the discussion of economic upgrading to also examine social upgrading 
trajectories and the interactions between the two (Barrientos et al., 2010; Gereffi 
and Lee,  2012; Barrientos and Visser,  2013; Coe and Hess,  2013; Milberg and 
Winkler, 2013; Rossi, 2013; Pegler, 2015; Bernhardt and Pollak, 2016; Gereffi and 
Lee, 2016).
The research agenda on upgrading in GVCs is also finally moving to the consid-
eration of its environmental aspects (Lister et al.,  2015; Poulsen et al.,  2016). 
Environmental upgrading in the literature is seen as ‘a process by which actors 
modify or alter production systems and practices that result in positive (or reduce 
negative) environmental outcomes’ (Krishnan, 2017: 117; emphasis in the original). 
This emerging literature has usefully distinguished between different drivers of 
environmental upgrading, and between upgrading as a process vis- à- vis upgrad-
ing as an outcome (Krishnan, 2017), an effort that continues in this chapter.
7.3.1 The Global Wine Value Chain: The Global Context 
and Overall Trends
The global wine value chain has perhaps the most complex and sophisticated 
quality infrastructure in the agrofood industry. It has been going through a major 
process of restructuring in the past few decades—where the application, 
challenge, and re- interpretation of different ideas and representations of quality 
and sustainability have been contested and redefined in the context of the 
emergence of large multinational companies (Anderson, 2004) and an increasing 
level of concentration in the marketing of wine.
Recent trends in the geography of wine production, trade and consumption, as 
well as changes in the quality composition of supply and demand, have been well 
documented (Anderson  2004; Unwin  2005; Anderson and Nelgen  2011; 
Hira 2013; Gilinsky et al. 2015). These included, in the last decades of the twentieth 
century, a dramatic fall in production volumes and per capita consumption in trad-
ition al (so- called ‘Old World’) wine- making and wine- consuming countries, such 
as Portugal, Spain, France, and Italy; this was partly compensated by growing 
production and exports in ‘New World’ producing countries (Argentina, Chile, 
South Africa, New Zealand, Australia, and the USA) and by increasing consump-
tion in the UK, the USA, and in some Asian countries. Table 7.1 shows the ranking 
of the top wine- producing and wine- consuming countries from 2010 to 2018. 
The top five producing countries by volume (Italy, France, Spain, the USA, and 
Argentina) in 2018 accounted for 64 per cent of global supplies. The top five 
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consuming countries (USA, France, Italy, Germany, and China) accounted for 49 
per cent of global demand (see Table 7.2).
The years 2002–7 marked a period of major growth in wine consumption. This 
was accompanied by a spurred interest in firms applying environmental 
management systems as part of a multiplication of wine offerings and the search 
for new differentiation strategies (Atkin et al., 2012; Gilinsky et al., 2015). As the 
global financial crisis hit in 2008, the wine industry suffered a dramatic downturn 
with global consumption starting to decline. This led to downward pressure on 
prices and margins, and a drop in the introduction of new wine brands and 
offerings, at least in the USA.2 By the second half of the 2010s, however, the trend 
had reversed, and the industry’s volume of consumption was back to the levels of 
the mid- 2000s.3
Growing concentration led to the top four global wine merchant groups 
controlling almost 10 per cent of the global market in 2006, a figure that had 
decreased only marginally by 2012 (see Table 7.3). It is worth noting that the same 
top three groups, all US- based, rank at the top in both periods. In 2012, the 
fourth- placed company (based in Australia) was a spin- off of the wine division of 
Fosters into an independent company in 2011. This suggests that there has been 
little change in the top rankings overall. Wine retail, which was traditionally the 
domain of small specialist shops, is now in the hands of supermarket chains, 
especially in northern Europe, the UK, and the USA, but increasingly in southern 
Europe as well. Although there are fears of homogenization of styles and offerings 
in the wine market, this is still an industry that produces a phenomenal array of 
different products, which are sold under a combination of brand names, grape 
variety, sustainability certifications, and/or indications of origin (Ponte, 2009).
Many of the main wine companies, both globally and in South Africa, are to 
different degrees vertically integrated—they may also produce wine and may own 
a number of flagship estates for grape production. The general tendency, however, 
has been for these conglomerates to concentrate more on value- chain functions 
that require less capital investment, and to find an appropriate equilibrium 
between own production (usually for top- quality wines) and purchasing from 
external suppliers (Ponte and Ewert, 2009).
In relation to sustainability issues, organic certification (and Fairtrade for 
social issues) has been the early mover in wine, as in many other agrofood GVCs. 
Although the cultivation of organic grapes for winemaking is still a minor 
proportion of total production, it has been growing rapidly and has reached 5 per 
cent of the total area under production in Spain, the leading country in this field 
(Gilinsky et al., 2015: 42). Organic grape cultivation has also grown dramatically 
in New World producing countries, where producers have fewer restrictions on 
2 http://www.oiv.int/en/databases- and- statistics/statistics.
























Table 7.1 Top ten wine- producing countries (2010–18)
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Rank 
(2018)


















1 Italy 48.5 18.4% 42.8 16.0% 45.6 17.7% 54 18.7% 44.2 16.3% 50 18.2% 50.9 18.9% 42.5 17.1% 54.8 18.8%
2 France 44.4 16.8% 50.8 19.0% 41.5 16.1% 42.1 14.6% 46.5 17.2% 47 17.2% 45.3 16.8% 36.3 14.6% 48.6 16.6%
3 Spain 35.4 13.4% 33.4 12.5% 31.1 12.1% 45.3 15.7% 39.5 14.6% 37.7 13.8% 39.7 14.7% 32.5 13.1% 44.4 15.2%
4 USA 20.9 7.9% 19.1 7.1% 21.7 8.4% 23.6 8.2% 23.1 8.5% 21.7 7.9% 23.7 8.8% 23.3 9.4% 23.9 8.2%
5 Argentina 16.3 6.2% 15.5 5.8% 11.8 4.6% 15 5.2% 15.2 5.6% 13.4 4.9% 9.4 3.5% 11.8 4.7% 14.5 5.0%
Top 5 165.5 62.7% 161.6 60.3% 151.7 58.8% 180 62.3% 168.5 62.2% 169.8 62.0% 169 62.6% 146.4 58.8% 186.2 63.8%
6 Chile 8.8 3.3% 10.5 3.9% 12.6 4.9% 12.8 4.4% 9.9 3.7% 12.9 4.7% 10.1 3.7% 9.5 3.8% 12.9 4.4%
7 Australia 11.4 4.3% 11.2 4.2% 12.3 4.8% 12.3 4.3% 11.9 4.4% 11.9 4.3% 13.1 4.9% 13.7 5.5% 12.9 4.4%
8 Germany   9.1 3.4% 9 3.5% 8.4 2.9% 9.2 3.4% 8.8 3.2% 9 3.3% 7.5 3.0% 10.3 3.5%
9 South Africa 9.3 3.5% 9.7 3.6% 10.6 4.1% 11 3.8% 11.5 4.2 11.2 4.1% 10.5 3.9% 10.8 4.3% 9.5 3.3%
10 China 13 4.9% 13.2 4.9% 13.8 5.3% 11.1 3.8% 13.5 5.0% 13.3 4.9% 13.2 4.9% 11.6 4.7% 9.1 3.1%
 Russia 7.6 2.9%                 
Top 10 215.6 81.7% 215.3 80.3% 210 81.4% 235.6 81.5% 224.5 82.8% 227.9 83.2% 224.9 83.3% 199.5 80.1% 240.9 82.5%
 World 264 268 258 289 271 274 270 249 292
























Table 7.2  Top ten wine- consuming countries (2010–18)
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Rank 
(2018)


















1 USA 27.6 11.5% 28.4 11.7% 30 12.3% 30.2 12.5% 30.6 12.7% 30.9 12.7% 31.7 13.0% 32.6 13.3% 33.0 13.4%
2 France 29.3 12.2% 28.3 11.7% 28 11.5% 27.8 11.5% 27.5 11.4% 27.3 11.2% 27.1 11.1% 27.0 11.0% 26.8 10.9%
3 Italy 24.6 10.2% 23 9.5% 21.6 8.9% 20.8 8.6% 19.5 8.1% 21.4 8.8% 22.4 9.2% 22.6 9.2% 22.4 9.1%
4 Germany 20.2 8.4% 19.7 8.1% 20.3 8.3% 20.4 8.4% 20.3 8.4% 20.5 8.4% 20.2 8.3% 19.7 8.0% 20.0 8.1%
5 China 15.1 6.3% 16.3 6.7% 17.1 7.0% 16.5 6.8% 17.4 7.2% 18.1 7.4% 19.2 7.9% 19.3 7.8% 17.6 7.2%
Top 5  116.8 48.5% 115.7 47.8% 117 48.0% 115.7 47.8% 115.3 47.8% 118.2 48.6% 120.6 49.4% 121.2 49.3% 119.8 48.7%
6 UK 12.9 5.4% 12.8 5.3% 12.8 5.2% 12.7 5.2% 12.6 5.2% 12.7 5.2% 12.9 5.3% 12.7 5.2% 12.4 5.0%
7 Russia 12 5.0% 12.2 5.0& 11.3 4.6% 10.4 4.3% 11.1 4.6% 10.8 4.4% 10.5 4.3% 11.1 4.5% 11.9 4.8%
8 Spain 10.9 4.5% 10 4.1% 9.9 4.1% 9.8 4.0% 9.8 1.0% 9.8 1.1% 9.9 4.1% 10.5 4.3% 10.5 4.3%
9 Argentina 9.7 4.0% 9.8 4.0% 10.1 4.1% 10.4 4.3% 9.9 4.1% 10.3 4.2% 9.4 3.9% 8.9 3.6% 8.4 3.4%
10 Australia 5.3 2.2% 5.3 2.2% 5.4 2.2% 5.4 2.2% 5.4 2.2% 5.5 2.3% 5.4 2.2% 5.9 2.4% 6.0 2.4%
Top 10  167.6 69.5% 165.8 68.5% 166.5 68.2% 164.4 67.9% 164.1 68.1% 167.3 68.8% 168.7 69.1% 170.3 69.2% 169.0 68.7%
 World 241  242  244  242  241  243  244  246  246  
Source: OIV—Statistical report on world vitiviniculture (2010–19).
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viticulture and wine- making practices. Biodynamic production, whether certified 
or not, is also spreading worldwide, but remains a small niche. In France and 
Italy, small vineyards in traditional wine- producing regions, such as Bordeaux 
and Chianti, also make claims of ‘reasonable’ viticultural practices or the production 
of ‘natural wines’ based on the characterization that traditional local techniques 
are similar to those used in organic production.
New World producing countries have spurred a number of broad sustainability 
initiatives (Borsellino et al.,  2016). Programmes for carbon- footprint minimiza-
tion are also starting to be considered in the wine industry (Flint et al.,  2016). 
Most of the current wine sustainability programmes and certifications focus on 
environmental issues, rather than social concerns. Exceptions are Fairtrade and 
some South Africa- specific initiatives—such as the Wine and Agricultural Ethical 
Trade Association (WIETA) and other projects attempting to address black eco-
nomic empowerment issues in the wine industry (Du Toit et al., 2008).
7.3.2 The South African Wine Industry
What are the implications of this sustainability focus for economic and environ-
mental upgrading in the South African wine industry? In order to answer this 
question, upgrading is broken down into three broad categories: first, improving 
product, process, volume, and/or variety; second, changing and/or adding functions; 
and third, transferring capabilities between chains (see details in Ponte,  2007; 
Ponte and Ewert, 2007; Ponte, 2009; Ponte and Ewert, 2009).
Table 7.3  World’s top wine marketers
Rank Company Headquarters World share (%)
2006    
1 Constellation Brands USA 3.9
2 E&J Gallo Winery USA 2.7
3 The Wine Group USA 1.6
4 Foster’s Wine Estates Australia 1.5
Top 4   9.7
2012    
1 E&J Gallo Winery USA 2.7
2 Constellation Brands USA 2.2
3 The Wine Group USA 1.6
4 Treasury Wine Estates Australia 1.8
Top 4   8.3
Sources: Own elaboration of data from Marketline.com (for 2012) and Impact 37(11–12), June 1 and 
15, 2007, p. 6 (for 2006).
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7.3.2.1 Upgrading through Improving Product, Process, Volume,  
and/or Variety—Including Environmental Aspects
Substantial upgrading took place in the South African wine industry in the broad 
category of improving product, process, volume, and/or variety. Environmental 
sustainability has been an important element of this (see Table 7.4). Throughout 
much of the twentieth century, the wine industry in South Africa was centred 
around cooperative wine cellars, which were responsible for a large proportion of 
total wine production. They supplied bulk wine of low quality and their farmers 
were dependent on cheap black labour. Although some upgrading had taken 
place before the formal ending of apartheid in 1994, the industry has upgraded 
substantially since. This was most evident in the 1990s, followed by a less steep 
curve in the 2000s (Ponte and Ewert, 2007 and 2009).4
Environmental issues have also played a role in the upgrading trajectories of 
the wine value chain in South Africa. These initiatives can be observed in two 
categories. The first category includes global, codified and standardized best 
practices that are embedded in sustainability certifications that include 
environmental content, such as the BRC Global Standard- Food and/or the IFS- 
Food standard. The popularity of general environmental management standards, 
such as ISO 14001 certification, is also on the rise (in 2005, only a handful of 
cellars held this certification). And exports of organic or biodynamic certified 
wines have also grown, albeit from a small base.5
7.3.2.2 Upgrading through Changing and Adding Functions
The case study of wine in South Africa suggests two key features on upgrading 
through changing and/or adding functions (see Table 7.4). First, wine producers- 
wholesalers have shed off upstream functions linked to grape and wine 
production. Where complete outsourcing has not been possible, value- chain 
operators across the board have tried to move from hands- on management 
systems (requiring close supervision) to more hands- off systems, with the 
exception of top- quality wines. Most small and medium- scale wineries rely to 
some degree on own- grape growing and always make their own wine. All 
marketers, by definition, do not grow grapes or make their own wine—they rely 
on contracted wineries (often producer cooperatives). But even the largest and 
historically most important producer- wholesalers have been moving away from 
grape growing on their own farms and in some cases even winemaking—thus 
becoming pure marketers (Ponte and Ewert,  2009). Large cooperatives (or ex- 
cooperatives) do not have outsourcing options because their members are grape 
growers. As a result, they are increasingly holding stock (and facing higher risks) 
4 http://www.sawis.co.za. 5 http://www.sawis.co.za.
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Table 7.4 Overview of economic and environmental upgrading trajectories in the 
South African wine industry
Improving product, process, volume, and/or variety
Aspect of upgrading General trend in South African wine industry
overall intrinsic quality improved
proportion of bottled exports  
vs bulk exports
increased, but then stagnated in the 2000s
proportion of natural vs rebate/
distilling wine production
more or less the same
noble variety proportion increased
top quality wines number and visibility increased
proportion of wine certified  
under Wine of Origin Scheme
increased
product consistency improved
economies of scale increased (mainly in coops)
economies of scope improved
managerial systems improved
viticultural practices improved
wine- making practices improved
marketing, advertising, provision  
of promotional support
improving, but still a relatively weak point
sustainability certifications increasing sales of organic and biodynamic wines
biodiversity preservation BWI initiative promoted conservation efforts, but 
current status is unclear
environmental management large proportion of operators meet IPW scheme 
standards
Changing and/or adding functions
Location of functional upgrading/
downgrading
General trend in South African wine industry
in South Africa cellars and producer- wholesalers moving away or 
reducing their engagement in grape- growing
marketers moving away from winemaking
cooperatives becoming more engaged in marketing 
and branding through joint ventures
product innovation increasingly done by European/
US marketers and agents
in Europe South African producer- wholesalers and marketers 
divesting from own agencies in the UK and Europe, 
or entering in joint ventures
Brand ownership by South African actors decreasing
Inter- chain capability transfer
tourism industry mutually beneficial interactions and joint capability 
building
environmental sustainability leveraged to build brand recognition and sales
Source: Author’s own analysis; adapted and updated from Ponte (2007), Ponte and Ewert (2009), and 
Ponte (2019).
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on behalf of other actors downstream in the value chain. This is a classic vertical 
specialization process, common in many GVCs, that in the wine sector entails 
many private cellars and producer- wholesalers moving away from, or reducing 
their engagement in, grape growing. Some of the most successful producer- 
wholesalers have largely abandoned even winemaking, thus divesting from holding 
fixed capital and becoming pure marketers (Ponte, 2007 and 2009).
Second, the few South African producer- wholesalers and marketers used to 
have their own agencies in the UK and Europe. They have now divested from 
them or have entered in joint- ventures with Europe- based branders and market-
ers. Many of the most successful brands of South African wine in the UK are 
owned or co- owned by overseas companies. These are processes of functional 
downgrading from a point of view of South African producers—yet, they have 
yielded positive results in terms of successfully selling their stock before the next 
harvest comes in (what operators call ‘moving volume’). Conversely, many 
co opera tives and ex- cooperatives have become more engaged in direct marketing 
and branding through joint ventures. This is an example of functional upgrading 
on their part.
UK agents and marketers have also upgraded functionally. Under pressure 
from shorter lead times, they had to increase their control over logistics—with 
some importers selling to retailers with delivery executed at the warehouse in the 
UK instead of ‘free- on- board’ on the ship in Cape Town as in the past. As retailers 
are seeing themselves increasingly as shelf- space providers, the replenishment 
function now falls upon UK agents. Much product innovation, new packaging, 
and new presentations and styles are also generated by these agents/marketers. 
This does not mean that upstream learning is not taking place. Up to the early 
1990s, quality in South African wine was ‘producer- generated’, whereas now 
cellars and South African marketers are able to interpret consumer market 
changes and react to downstream requests much more quickly and efficiently.
7.3.2.3 Upgrading through Transferring Capabilities between Chains
Wine tourism is a well- developed industry in the Western Cape, the major wine- 
producing region in South Africa, with a number of organized wine routes. Cape 
Town is part of the Great Capitals of Wine network. A good proportion of cellars 
are open to the public and have tasting facilities. Many have restaurants and some 
have hotels on- site. Scenic beauty and many flagship properties displaying Cape 
Dutch architecture (and some interesting contemporary architecture as well) add 
flavour to the ‘Cape wine experience’. A large share of the revenue accruing from 
wine tourism comes from food sales and accommodation—the volume of wine 
sales at the cellar- door is not significant in absolute terms—with the exception of 
some flagship estates such as Vergelegen, Boschendal, or some Constantia- based 
cellars and farms.6 Branding and marketing capabilities are used for promoting 
6 http://www.wosa.co.za/Wine- Tourism.
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both wine sales and broader tourism- related income. Cellar and property visits 
tend to improve wine sales beyond the tasting room, and visibility in retail can 
bring tourists to a property as well. While for the major producer- wholesalers 
wine sales are far more significant than wine tourism income, their flagship 
properties with wine- tasting rooms, restaurants, and/or hotels continue to be 
important elements of their overall brand offering. South Africa is considered a 
sophisticated player in the global tourism industry, and can offer excellent value 
for money—benefiting the wine industry as well (Bruwer,  2003; Ferreira and 
Hunter, 2017).
7.4 Discussion: The Economic and Environmental Outcomes 
of Upgrading
As has been examined elsewhere (Ponte,  2019), governance in the wine GVC 
underwent a major transformation between 1960–90 and 1990–2018. It moved 
from a multipolar structure where producers, international merchants, and 
retailers exerted limited power on each other, to an increasingly unipolar one 
with retailers at the helm. These transformations in the wine GVC have led to a 
series of new demands placed on merchants and producers in South Africa, 
especially in the low- end quality segment, and the pressure to deliver wines at 
scale at different quality points. Within South Africa, in terms of governance, 
what has emerged is a value chain where the main drivers are producer–
wholesalers and marketers, although their power over other actors in the South 
African segment of the value chain is limited by their own need to deliver volume 
and quality to importers and retailers in importing countries.
Producer- wholesalers and marketers are reshaping the functional division of 
labour within the wine value chain in South Africa, with inventory being pushed 
upstream (in terms of volume and duration) all the way to cooperatives and other 
wine producers. At the same time, large South African producer–wholesalers 
have moved away from branding and marketing operations in Europe to 
concentrate on value- chain functions within the country. Although this is a 
downgrading trajectory from a traditional GVC perspective, it has been important 
in terms of securing volume of purchases from other, previously competing, 
international merchants (Ponte and Ewert, 2009).
While sustainability demands from international marketers and retailers have 
been relatively limited so far, South African operators and regulators placed 
strategic importance in proactively profiling sustainability to secure elements of 
additional competitive advantage in a crowded global supply field. This led to a 
number of actions and initiatives to deliver environmental content, including 
most wine producers meeting the (relatively low) sustainability standards of the 
Integrated Production of Wine (IPW) scheme.
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A superficial reading of these trends would suggest a successful upgrading 
story for South Africa’s wine industry: delivery of demand- driven wine styles; 
volume and consistency have allowed the industry to grow in the basic quality 
segment of the industry, while the proliferation of higher quality wines has 
opened new niches. In both quality segments, South Africa has also increased its 
offering of certified Fairtrade, organic and biodynamic wines; wine producers are 
now able to comply with an increasingly demanding package of specifications 
expected as a given; this has in turn stimulated a further process of upgrading in 
the form of improved vineyard operations, wine- cellar innovation, better man ager-
ial and environmental practices, and more systematized quality management.
However, the economic outcomes for South African wine producers and grape 
growers remain problematic, as the margins for improvement have now decreased 
in many areas. The extras (e.g. promotional support, certifications, sustainability) 
that the industry delivers to obtain or even just maintain a listing with major 
retailers are becoming more complex and costly. Margins remain extremely low 
in the retail markets of the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands, and the industry 
has a limited presence in the more lucrative US market (Ponte, 2007 and 2009). 
According to a 2005 study of all South African wineries with a revenue of less 
than R25 million (approximately US$4 million), 36 per cent were making a loss, 
and of those with a revenue of R25–90 million (US$4–14 million), 25 per cent 
were making a loss. The average profit in small wineries was reported at R13 
(US$2) per 9- litre case, against R20 (US$3.1) in Australia. Fast- forward to 2016, 
and the picture has become even worse, with returns to investment dropping to 
less than 1 per cent. VinPro data indicate that only 13 per cent of the 3,300 pro-
ducers operate at sustainable income levels, 44 per cent are operating at break- 
even, and 40 per cent are making a loss.
The implication of these findings is that South African grape and wine 
producers have made substantial strides in terms of processes of economic and 
environmental upgrading. But this has not translated into positive economic 
outcomes in the aggregate. This suggests that while suppliers are delivering more 
content to buyers (including marketable environmental sustainability features), 
they are facing profitability challenges. At the same time, consumers—both in 
South Africa and in importing countries—can enjoy a variety of wine qualities at 
competitive prices, including those delivering sustainability features.
Comprehensive evaluations of the environmental outcomes of these upgrading 
processes and related sustainability initiatives in South Africa are not available. 
However, it is probably safe to assume that there have been some positive impacts 
in terms of biodiversity conservation, decreasing agrochemical application (when 
farms convert to organic or biodynamic), and better environmental stewardship 
of the land and water resources. At the same time, grape growing is a mono- crop 
cultivation method that when applied to previously natural areas destroys rather 
than enhances biodiversity (McEwan and Bek, 2009).
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In sum, the case study of the South African wine value chain suggests that: first, 
sustainability is used opportunistically by global ‘lead firms’ for marketing, reputa-
tional enhancement, and risk management purposes; second, South African value- 
chain actors and institutions have invested heavily in portraying the industry and 
individual companies as caring for the environment, and painted this portrait 
along with scenic and natural beauty of the winelands in this country; although 
the wine GVC is becoming more unipolar and driven by retailers, South African 
suppliers have driven environmental sustainability proactively in view of high-
lighting the unique features that can provide some form of competitive advantage; 
and third, major economic and environmental upgrading processes in the South 
African wine value chain took place, but did not lead to positive economic out-
comes for most domestic players, and to environmental outcomes that are likely to 
have been limited. Collectively, these lessons suggest a combined process of capital 
accumulation by lead firms, coupled with a process of supplier squeeze.
7.5 Conclusion
The case study of the wine industry in South Africa is, at a superficial level, a 
global value chain story of economic and environmental upgrading and of 
improved international competitiveness. This has included the lead firms and key 
institutions driving environmental sustainability as part of consumer positioning 
of South African wines in the global market. However, the growing concentration 
of the wine industry globally has come together with increased bargaining power 
by retailers and international merchants, which is leading to a cascade of squeezed 
margins upstream all the way to grape and wine suppliers and their workers. In 
other words, lead firms in the global wine industry are using sustainability 
opportunistically to shape a structurally unfavourable functional division of 
labour along the value chain. This is happening as the South African industry is 
carrying out all sorts of upgrading processes, including those related to 
environmental management and certification, while diverting attention from the 
fundamental changes required in the Cape peninsula—one of the most unequal 
areas in the world and one of those most at risk from the climate crisis.
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Structural Transformation, Economic 
Power, and Inequality in South Africa
Sumayya Goga and Pamela Mondliwa
8.1 Introduction
South Africa is the most unequal country in the world, of those on which 
comparable data are collected (World Bank, 2018; Chatterjee et al., 2020; Webster 
et al.,  2020: 8). Wealth is even more concentrated than income. In 2017, the 
richest 10 per cent in South Africa held 86 per cent of the total wealth (the top 1 
per cent held 55 per cent), while the poorest 60 per cent held a mere 7 per cent of 
total wealth.1 These levels of inequality pose challenges for South Africa’s ability 
to effect structural transformation and achieve economic development and 
growth. Inequality has been shown to have a negative effect on both medium- 
term growth rates (Cingano, 2014) and the duration of growth spells (Berg and 
Ostry,  2017). This is because inequality adds to weak aggregate demand and 
makes politics vulnerable to elite capture, economic entrenchment, clientelism, 
and populism—all of which divert attention and economic resources away from 
the capability accumulation required for structural change and growth (Doner 
and Schneider, 2016).
This chapter contributes to the literature on the role that structural  transformation 
can play in reducing inequality (other recent contributions include Doner and 
Schneider, 2016; Hartman et al., 2017; Baymul and Sen, 2019; Bhorat et al., 2020; 
Goga et al., 2020). Though much of the literature focuses on the implications of 
sectoral transitioning from agriculture to manufacturing and services for inequal-
ity, increasing attention is being paid to the implications for inequality of sectoral 
deepening and diversification within manufacturing—the focus of this chapter. 
Here, it is argued that the economic power of large and lead firms plays an influ-
ential role in reproducing the economic structure, which undermines the reduc-
tion of inequality. In this context economic power can be understood as control 
over accumulation. Within an economy, economic power is usually distributed in 
line with the prevailing economic structure (Behuria et al.,  2017). This implies 
1 https://wid.world/country/south- africa/.
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that interests linked to activities that dominate a country’s economic structure are 
able to influence policy and regulation in their favour as they are regarded as 
important for investment and growth (Goga et al., 2020).2
To shed more light on how the observed outcomes of inequality have been 
reproduced over time, building on Goga et al. (2020), the chapter undertakes an 
analysis of the role of economic power in shaping the patterns of structural 
transformation in South Africa. The analysis of economic power draws on 
insights from political settlements literature on the distribution of power in 
societies and how it can be leveraged to shape outcomes (Khan,  2010, 2018b, 
and 2018a; Behuria et al., 2017; Gray, 2018). This is complemented with insights 
from competition literature, which explains how market power (as a form of 
 economic power) can be used to shape patterns of structural transformation and 
the distribution of surplus from consumers to producers (see for example Doyle 
and Stiglitz, 2014; Khan and Vaheesan, 2017; Ennis et al., 2019; Mondliwa et al., 
2021). The analysis focuses on how interests in the economy have set agendas and 
shaped markets, policy, and regulation to maintain economic power in the hands 
of powerful actors linked to economic structure, to the detriment of structural 
transformation.
To illustrate how economic power reinforces outcomes in terms of economic 
structure and inequality, two case studies on two industry groupings in South 
Africa are analysed over the period 1994 to 2019—metals, machinery, and 
equipment; and chemicals- to- plastics. The metals, machinery, and equipment, 
and chemicals- to- plastics industry groupings are good locations from which to 
understand the poor outcomes in the South African economy (Chapter 1). The 
basic chemicals and basic metals sub- sectors accounted for 25 per cent of 
manufacturing output and 47 per cent of manufacturing exports in 1994, with 
policy in the post- democratic period seeking to leverage the relatively strong 
productive base in these industries for developing downstream labour- absorbing 
industries through strong local value chains. Upstream basic metals and basic 
chemicals industries are considered strategically important for industrialization 
since they are producers of key inputs into a number of downstream industries, 
including metal products and machinery, and plastics.
In section  8.2, the relationships between structural transformation, 
 inequality, and economic power are explored. Section 8.3 briefly sketches out 
structural transformation outcomes in South Africa’s post- apartheid period 
and gives an overview of selected industries. Section 8.4 analyses these outcomes 
using a political settlement analysis, drawing on experiences in the metals, 
machinery, and equipment and chemicals- to- plastics industry groupings in 
2 These interests are also regarded as an important source of tax contributions and financing 
elections.
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South Africa. In section 8.5, the implications of the lack of structural change 
for inequality are explored.
8.2 Inequality, Structural Transformation, and Economic Power
8.2.1 Inequality and Structural Transformation
Economists’ understanding of the relationship between structural transformation, 
growth, and inequality has evolved over time. Initially, it was understood that for 
developing countries the relationship between inequality and growth can be 
represented by an inverse- U curve, whereby economic growth initially leads to 
increasing levels of inequality as populations transition from agriculture (charac-
terized as low productivity) to higher productivity sectors (Kuznets, 1955). But, 
as countries develop by changing the structure of their economies, larger portions 
of their populations move from agriculture into other sectors of the economy and 
their skills bases expand, incomes increase, and  inequality falls. Kuznets’s thesis 
has since been challenged in part due to changes in the industrialization trajec-
tories of developing countries. There has been increasing incidence of countries 
deindustrializing prior to achieving high- income status (meaning that potential 
higher- income jobs are not created). Here the implication is that inequality con-
tinues to increase rather than decrease over time. Dynamics within sectors have 
also changed. For instance, not all activities in agriculture are low- productivity, 
while services activities are highly heterogenous.
The nature of structural change clearly matters and the manufacturing sector 
continues to be important for reducing inequality by absorbing more labour in 
jobs that are more productive, better paid, and offer better labour conditions. 
Manufacturing- driven structural transformation has been found to decrease 
inequality, regardless of the stage of structural transformation the country is in, 
while the outcomes are more nuanced for services- driven structural change 
(Baymul and Sen, 2020). Certainly, in many East Asian countries, the shift from 
agriculture to manufacturing was accompanied by reductions in inequality, thus 
not conforming to the inverted- U curve. For developing countries, services- 
driven structural change increases inequality (Baymul and Sen, 2020).
Furthermore, manufacturing has a pulling effect on other sectors, stimulating 
demand for more primary goods as well as services. Its strong linkages with other 
sectors impact on employment creation in other sectors due to indirect effects 
(UNIDO,  2013).3 Both the direct and indirect employment effects suggest 
3 Lavopa and Szirmai (2012) suggest that every job created in manufacturing is associated with two 
or three jobs created outside of manufacturing (UNIDO, 2013).
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reductions in inequality. Furthermore, there are multiplier effects associated with 
net increases in income received by workers in jobs created directly or indirectly 
through investment in manufacturing, which also serve to reduce inequality. 
However, there is heterogeneity within manufacturing and downstream 
diversified industries such as plastics, and machinery and equipment, have 
relatively higher employment multipliers (Tregenna, 2012).
There are also other spillover effects associated with an increase in 
manufacturing. Investment in research and development improves the prospects 
for innovation and technology transfers. Where this does occur, there are 
knowledge spillovers and productivity growth in other sectors as well 
(Weiss, 2013). There are thus multiple benefits associated with the stimulation of 
manufacturing activities: positive effects on job creation and production in 
manufacturing and related sectors, increases in overall demand associated with 
increased employment and incomes, and spillover effects related to productivity 
and technology in other sectors.
Inequality outcomes are also increasingly being linked to inequality of 
opportunities (Doyle and Stiglitz, 2014). In South Africa, this has two dimensions. 
First, the high barriers to entry and expansion limit the opportunities for entrants 
and smaller firms to successfully enter and grow businesses (Vilakazi et al., 2020). 
The second dimension is linked to opportunities for education and access to 
other basic services, which is not discussed further here. In terms of barriers to 
economic participation, the falling competitiveness of downstream industries as a 
result of strategic conduct of upstream incumbent firms (among other factors) 
means reduced employment opportunities for those at the bottom to earn an 
income. When there is a lack of competition and ineffective mechanisms to 
manage rents, inequality is reinforced and entrenched because barriers maintain 
the patterns of ownership of productive assets and control of rents in society, and 
therefore the distribution of income and wealth to the wealthy few (including 
through dividends and capital gains), while limiting opportunities for others 
(Khan and Vaheesan,  2017; Ennis et al.,  2019). Opening up the economy and 
changing its structure is critical to deal with entrenched inequities.
In highly unequal societies the distinct power dynamics and political economy 
means insiders enjoy greater power and outsiders have less recourse for checking 
that power (Doner and Schneider,  2016). This dynamic is likely to keep 
reproducing itself unless changes are made to the mechanisms that drive it. One 
of these mechanisms is economic power, the impact of economic power on 
structural transformation is discussed in more detail below.
8.2.2 Structural Transformation and Economic Power
While there are competing ideas about how to move developing economies onto 
the path of structural transformation, the political economy of transformation is 
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increasingly being recognized as important for understanding the process. This is 
because the political context and underlying power dynamics shape performance 
(Chapter 14). Those with economic power can use it to influence outcomes, even 
though institutions (‘rules of the game’) to transform the economy may exist. The 
role of power in explaining the effectiveness of particular institutional 
arrangements is thus key. It goes beyond coercive power in which one actor uses 
incentives or sanctions to directly compel another actor to act according to their 
wishes (Dahl,  1957), to more subtle exertions of power, such as covert power, 
which can be agenda- setting (Dallas et al., 2019).
The evolution and performance of economies are impacted by how institutions 
are influenced by powerful groups, both formally and informally (Di John and 
Putzel,  2009; Khan,  2010). If powerful groups are not satisfied with the 
distribution of resources through the current institutional structure, they will 
seek ways to change the structure (Khan, 2010), that is, to shape agendas, policy, 
and laws. In developing countries, informal mechanisms are often used to modify 
the operation of formal institutions and influence the allocation of resources 
(Khan,  2010). So understanding how economic development happens in a 
particular context requires an analysis of both a country’s formal institutions and 
of how powerful interests shape these institutions and agendas in order to 
influence outcomes. It is possible to analyse who benefits from institutions and 
who may lose out and, therefore, will seek to block or influence institutional 
changes that promote development.
Institutions or policies create benefits for firms, but the configuration of power 
across different types of organizations (firms, and formal and informal groups in 
society) influences both the institutions that emerge and how these are implemented 
(Khan, 2018b). For instance, if a policy is developed to benefit downstream firms in 
a particular value chain, the ability of these firms to capture the benefits depends on 
the configuration of power in the value chain. Organizations constantly mobilize to 
change rules, reflecting ongoing changes in their relative power, and in turn, their 
activities further impact on their future position.
A distribution of organizational power becomes a ‘political settlement’ if it 
reproduces itself over time. This is defined as the combination of power and 
institutions that are mutually compatible and sustainable in terms of economic 
and political viability (Khan,  2010). A particular political settlement implies a 
balance between the expectations of different organizations based on their 
assessment of their relative power and what they are getting through the political 
and economic process.
A political settlement analysis allows an understanding of how agency is 
exercised—how interests are pursued in an economy by powerful groups. It 
allows an unpacking of development outcomes by analysing the interaction 
between powerful groups and the institutions that these groups seek to influence. 
This means that the strategies of various powerful groups in the face of 
institutional rules for transformation can be analysed. More generally, it enables 
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an understanding of the nature of economic change (or the slow pace of it) in 
developing- country contexts like South Africa, resulting from incentives that can 
be shaped in different ways by ideas, formal and informal institutions, and the 
distribution of power.
Examining the interaction of agency and institutions through a political 
settlement analysis makes it possible to think more creatively about how elite 
incentives can be restructured for the purposes of transformation, rather than 
focusing on how to ‘fix’ institutions. This is important because transformation 
in  developing countries tends to be successful when institutions are effective 
in changing behaviour. This is usually possible when outcomes are aligned with 
the interests of the powerful or are in the interests of those which can enforce 
these outcomes, given the distribution of power (Khan, 2018a). Focusing on the 
strategies of powerful groups allows for an exploration of how and why they 
intervene, how they assert agency, and how institutions fare in the face of the actions 
of the powerful. This, in turn, allows for better interventions for transformation 
that engage with the reality of the power balance in specific contexts, and with an 
awareness of the need to incentivize the powerful for the purposes of transformation 
while taking care that institutions are not captured by them.
Whether a particular political settlement persists depends on the ‘holding 
power’ of different actors, where ‘holding power’ is understood to be the capability 
of an individual or group to engage in and survive conflicts. Holding power is 
determined by the economic strength of organizations as well as the networks 
they are able to organize and mobilize (Khan,  2018c), that is, the historically 
rooted capacities of different groups to organize. There are four main sources of 
holding power: economic structure, ideology, violence rights (the threat or use of 
violence), and rents (Khan, 2018c; Behuria et al., 2017). Determining the holding 
power of different groups requires an understanding of economic structures and 
how rents are distributed between different groups, and the interplay between 
these and other factors, including ideology and the appropriation of violence 
rights (Behuria et al., 2017). Different sources of holding power are analysed in 
the political settlement analysis of the two industry groupings in section 8.4.
In the South African context, Goga et al (2020)  analysed and found economic 
structure, rents, and ideology have to be influential in shaping outcomes (Goga et al., 
2020). The case studies are analysed through these three sources of holding power.
8.3 Structural Transformation, Inequality, and the 
Internationalization of Key Industries in Post- apartheid 
South Africa
South Africa has not experienced the type of structural change that would 
facilitate accumulation by the poor to reduce inequality, as observed in the late 
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industrializers in East Asia. South Africa underwent a process of industrialization 
that started in the inter- war period until the mid- twentieth century, a process 
which created a particularly concentrated and exclusive economic structure 
(Freund,  2018). Though manufacturing is generally inequality- reducing, the 
structure of manufacturing determines the distribution of the gains (Baymul and 
Sen, 2019). In South Africa, where there is significant concentration in capital- 
intensive industries linked to minerals, this has translated into the gains from 
industrialization accruing to a small group of equity owners and employed 
citizens. From the 1980s, the country started deindustrializing, with employment 
losses across manufacturing. (See Chapter  11 for an analysis of South Africa’s 
experience of premature deindustrialization.) Within manufacturing, there has 
been a decline in light and medium manufacturing, which are relatively more 
labour- absorbing, representing a structural regression (Bell et al.,  2018; and 
Chapter 1). This has been accompanied by a dramatic rise in low- wage service 
employment.
The structural change dynamics observed in South Africa have exacerbated 
inequality in two ways. First, premature sectoral transitioning from manufactur-
ing to services has been dominated by low- value services. A higher share of 
services is associated with increasing inequality in all income groups (Baymul 
and Sen,  2019). Second, there has been weak sectoral deepening towards 
higher value- added and productivity- inducing activities, particularly in 
manufacturing.
Sectoral deepening in South Africa has, in part, been undermined by the 
concentration of the economy in capital- intensive and minerals- based industries. 
Though industrial concentrations are important for taking advantage of 
economies of scale to achieve international competitiveness, it is important that, 
where these concentrations are fostered by the government, there are 
conditionalities to limit extractive rent- seeking and to promote reinvestment in 
capabilities and wider gains for the economy (Amsden and Singh,  1994; 
Khan 2010; Mondliwa and Roberts, 2018; Goga et al., 2020). South Africa has a 
poor record of enforcing conditionalities on state support (Mondliwa,  2018). 
Instead, there has been an overreliance on competition law and international 
competition to address the market power of domestic firms (Bell et al., 2018). For 
instance, while significant capabilities were developed in the upstream metals and 
chemicals sectors during apartheid through the creation of large firms, the 
government has failed to manage rents associated with these firms for the benefit 
of downstream, more labour- intensive manufacturing industries.
The reason for this is that large and dominant firms use their economic power 
to lobby for policies and regulations in their favour. This means that the economic 
power that arises from monopoly positions readily translates into the capture of 
political power that reinforces those positions (Zingales,  2017; Mondliwa and 
Roberts, 2018).
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In South Africa, the liberalization from the 1990s benefited those firms and 
industries that had established capabilities at the point of opening up, largely in 
the industries in the upstream minerals-energy complex (Black and Hasson, 
2016; Bell et al.,  2018). These industries are typically capital intensive, which 
meant that the gains from exports tended to flow to a small group of existing 
equity owners and the employed. Within manufacturing, the small grouping of 
basic heavy industries in South Africa consisting of refineries, basic chemicals, 
and basic metals accounted for 19 per cent of manufacturing output and 44 
per cent of manufacturing exports in 1994.4 Given the levels of concentration in 
these sectors, this was effectively due to just a handful of companies. Subsequently, 
aside from non- ferrous metals, these industries have all grown more rapidly than 
manufacturing as a whole and, recorded high average rates of investment. Other 
diversified manufacturing sectors, including the downstream activities of 
manufacture of plastic and metal products generally performed more poorly than 
the average, with the notable exception of motor vehicles (Tregenna, 2012; Black 
et al., 2016; and Chapter 5).
The trade liberalization that started in the 1990s led to the expected increases 
in import penetration for most sectors (see also Roberts,  2000; Black and 
Roberts, 2009). Yet, in the upstream industries of basic chemicals, basic metals, 
and basic ferrous metals, the relative importance of imports in meeting domestic 
demand was actually lower in 2019 than in 1994 (see Chapters 3 and 4). Import 
penetration increased substantially for downstream plastic products, metal 
products and other diversified manufacturing. Machinery and equipment already 
had very high rates of import penetration in 1994, which increased further while 
exports also grew substantially.
The apartheid state’s industrialization strategy had focused on heavy industry 
with linkages into mining and energy. Steel was a key pillar and, as a result, the basic 
metals industries received favourable electricity tariffs, logistics support, and 
investments aimed at promoting competitiveness. Machinery and structural 
steel were key intermediate capital inputs to mining. The main state- owned steel 
business Iscor was privatized in 1989 as an effective monopolist of flat steel prod-
ucts and the single- largest producer of long products. The development of the 
sector up to 1994 was thus a reflection of the priorities and power of the apartheid 
state (Chapter 3).
A second important pillar of the apartheid industrial strategy was 
petrochemicals, which was centred around Sasol, the state- owned producer of 
liquid fuels from coal and later natural gas. Sasol also produced fertilizer and 
explosives, key inputs to agriculture and mining, respectively, and a range of other 
intermediate industrial chemical inputs, including monomers and polymers for 
plastic products manufacture. Sasol was privatized in 1979.
4 The rest of this section draws from Mondliwa et al. ( 2021).
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In the 2000s, Iscor and Sasol both internationalized, though in quite different 
ways. Iscor was acquired by a major multinational (in 2001) and became part of 
the ArcelorMittal group (Zalk,  2017), becoming Arcelor Mittal South Africa 
(AMSA). Sasol outwardly internationalized with a dual listing in New York (in 
2003), a major US investment (in 2014), as well as other investments and 
acquisitions. In contrast with Iscor, which was vertically separated around the 
time that it was privatized, Sasol has maintained and even increased its vertical 
integration upstream into its feedstocks. This involves substantial ownership of its 
own coal mines and the rights to gas from Mozambique, along with the pipeline 
infrastructure for it to be transported to Secunda in Mpumalanga, the location of 
its second- largest extraction refinery. It has also been able to acquire key chemical 
businesses from its competitors, including African Explosives and Chemical 
Industries (“AECI”)’s polymer business, though acquisitions in the fuel industry 
have been blocked by the competition authorities.
The significance of these industries in the South African economy meant that 
they continued to receive a disproportionate share of government incentives 
post- apartheid. The basic metals and basic chemicals sectors continued to receive 
substantial support in the 1990s, including development finance, as part of the 
firms’ steps to improve production efficiencies and be internationally competitive 
in liberalized markets (Roberts and Rustomjee,  2009; Zalk,  2017; Rustomjee 
et  al.,  2018). Other forms of support included generous tax allowances and 
favourable electricity prices (Goga et al., 2020). Iscor continued to dominate the 
upstream steel industry, together with Highveld Steel and Scaw Metals (which 
manufactured thick steel plate and structural steel products), both owned by 
Anglo American. Iscor and the Anglo American companies also had joint 
shareholdings in a number of related companies in the sector, reflecting the 
historically close integration of the state with big business.
8.4 Unpacking the Role Played by Lead Firms in Structural 
Transformation Outcomes through a Political Settlement Analysis
This section involves an analysis of the political settlement dynamics that have 
undermined the type of structural transformation of the South African economy 
that would serve to reduce inequality. This is done through two case studies: one 
focusing on the metals, machinery, and equipment grouping, and the other on 
the chemicals and plastics industry grouping. The outcomes from various 
perspectives are considered, as well as the various strategies used by the upstream 
firms to maintain power. These include how the upstream industries have 
extracted support in order to maintain the structure, and how upstream firms 
have captured rents and influenced rent management. The analysis shows that 
decisions and non- decisions have been heavily influenced by dominant business 
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groupings for their benefit. Ideologies have shaped the overarching economic 
policies that have been pursued post- apartheid, including the unbundling and 
privatization of key conglomerates, while economic power has impacted on rent 
management. A central part of the analysis is that due to the fragmented nature of 
policymaking in South Africa, interests can lobby different parts of the state (see 
Chapters 1 and 2).
In both industries, the power players include the firms at the different levels of 
the value chain, various government departments, and government agencies such 
as development funding institutions, regulators, and labour unions. In the 
chemicals and plastics industry group, Sasol is the upstream firm, while in the 
metals, machinery and equipment grouping, the upstream firms are AMSA, Scaw 
Metals and Highveld. The downstream firms are plastic product convertors, and 
metal fabricators and machinery and equipment firms.
8.4.1 The South African Metals, Machinery,  
and Equipment Industry
As in many other developing economies, the steel industry in South Africa has 
been given special status due to the important linkages to the rest of manufacturing 
production. As such, it has been supported by the state with the end goal of 
developing the competitive downstream steel fabrication industry through 
competitively priced intermediary input steel (see Chapter  3 for a detailed 
description of the support). This has meant that every time the industry has been 
in trouble, the state has come to its rescue, even at the cost of developing the 
downstream industry that would contribute more effectively to reducing inequality.
Two critical policy decisions in the post- apartheid period, accompanied by 
weak conditionalities, illustrate the continued state support. First, when the steel 
business was unbundled in the early 2000s from the iron ore mining business, a 
deal was struck for iron ore to be sold to the steel business at cost plus 3 per cent. 
The pricing effectively created rents for the steel firm. In exchange, the government 
sought to negotiate a developmental price for steel to downstream local users, but 
these negotiations were never completed. Providing cheap steel to downstream 
industries was meant to bolster local manufacturing capability on the basis of the 
competitive advantage inherent in local mineral resources. Government entered 
into protracted negotiations on developmental steel prices with AMSA, but the 
pricing standoff dragged on for years, with the government unable to use any 
policy levers to steer AMSA into contributing to long- term development.5 AMSA 
in fact increased the domestic prices of steel to full import- parity levels, which 
5 https://trudimakhaya.co.za/arcelormittal- settlement- is- new- and- tricky- territory- for- competition- 
authorities/.
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were as much as 50–100 per cent above the prices it received for roughly half of its 
production, which was exported. This was despite its plants being in the lowest 
quartile of all plants in the world in terms of production costs at the time 
(Roberts,  2008; Robinson,  2016; and Chapter  3). AMSA therefore abused its 
access to cheap supply of iron ore by fixing import- parity prices for steel and did 
not show any regard for government’s objective of making cheaper steel available 
to downstream industries to help build South Africa’s manufacturing base.
The importance that was placed on the steel industry meant that it had the ear 
of government, and as a result the iron ore price deal was included in contracts. 
These rents were meant to be passed on to downstream steel users, but downstream 
steel users are more fragmented and less organized, and in the negotiations their 
interests were represented by government. Given that the government is an arena 
for contestations between interests, the more organized groups are more likely to 
succeed, and in this case, developmental steel price negotiations which were 
meant to benefit the downstream were never concluded. Furthermore, AMSA 
negotiated high- wage agreements for workers, thus ‘co- opting labour’, and these 
wage agreements were forced on already embattled downstream industry players—
the prescribed minimum wage in the steel industry is at least 35 per cent higher 
that South Africa’s second- most expensive industry.6
The second critical policy decision followed the global recession of 2009, when 
there was once more a crisis in the global steel industry.7 At the behest of the steel 
producers, the government intervened in the industry, bailing out Scaw in 2012 
and giving support to AMSA in 2016. Government agreed to a basket of support 
for AMSA, including tariffs of 10 per cent (which effectively increased to 22 per 
cent when safeguard measures are included) for a period of three years on all 
imports of hot rolled steel. The 10 per cent customs duty effectively increased the 
cost of steel for the downstream fabricating industry, making their products less 
competitive and resulting in an increase in imports of finished products 
(Rustomjee et al., 2018).
It has been argued that the tariff and safeguard support allowed AMSA to use 
the downstream industry as a buffer to protect its old ineffective steel mills, since 
the tariffs reduced the pressure on AMSA to upgrade its steel plants to be more 
effective.8 In return, AMSA agreed that it would cease import- parity pricing 
and pay a settlement amount to settle a number of competition cases against it. 
Downstream firms expressed reservation about whether the government 
would be able to match AMSA’s power during the detailed technical and financial 
negotiations around the price- basket, particularly as the rationale and detailed 
calculations behind the selection of the basket were not clear (Rustomjee et al., 2018). 
6 https://www.cbn.co.za/opinion/mittal- vs- the- downstream- steel- industry- war/.
7 Global steel export prices dropped to ten- year lows between 2012 and 2016.
8 https://www.cbn.co.za/opinion/mittal- vs- the- downstream- steel- industry- war/.
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AMSA and the government communicated that the pricing principles would be 
 determined by the weighted average of countries South Africa competes with but 
would exclude China and Russia. The exclusion of China—the world’s largest steel 
producer—from the equation, was also questioned by stakeholders.9 Given the 
past record in terms of monitoring and enforcing conditionalities, the settlement 
raises concerns about government’s ability to ensure the implementation of the 
agreed pricing structure to benefit downstream steel using industries.
The policy decisions to support the upstream industry, and AMSA in particular, 
shed light on the distribution of power in the value chain. Before the support was 
given, AMSA was alleged to have been charging excessive prices (Rustomjee et al., 
2018); the cartel cases showed that the steel producers including AMSA were 
 governing the value chain to maximize value capture at steel production level. In 
addition, AMSA was not producing much of the grades of steel required by 
downstream industries. There are also relatively fewer jobs in steel production 
than in the beneficiation of steel by downstream industries. South Africa’s 
industrial policy priorities suggest that the decisions taken by policymakers 
should have prioritized the downstream industries.
In addition to influencing policy decisions, firms are able to use other strategies 
to capture value. Extraction of rents by AMSA was evident from the outflows of 
funds from AMSA to its shareholders, even in the face of rising inefficiencies. 
This included substantial payments related to the Business Assistance Agreement 
(BAA) in 2003 and 2004 (which exclude BAA remuneration received in the form 
of Iscor shares), dividend outflows, and fees remitted to the parent company for 
‘corporate services’ from 2008 and ‘research and development’ from 2009. In 
total, between 2001 and 2015 the recorded flow of funds out of AMSA to its 
shareholders amounted to R21.8 billion (or US$1.3 billion),10 of which 63 per 
cent accrued to the ArcelorMittal global group (Zalk, 2017).
AMSA has also attempted to vertically integrate backwards by proposing a 
black economic empowerment (BEE) deal with Imperial Crown Trading (ICT) 
for mineral rights at the Sishen mine, after AMSA’s mineral rights at the Sishen 
mine expired in 2009.11 The deal would give it access to 21.4 per cent of South 
Africa’s iron ore reserves. This is an example of how BEE, which was intended to 
redistribute wealth, has been leveraged to further entrench incumbent firm 
 positions (see Chapter 9). The National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa 
(NUMSA) opposed the transaction, arguing that ICT was co- opted by AMSA in 
9 https://www.cbn.co.za/opinion/mittal- vs- the- downstream- steel- industry- war/.
10 Rand amount converted to US dollars using exchange rate as at 28 October 2020 (R1 equivalent 
to $0.061).
11 Kumba (the firm that owns the iron ore level of former SOE Iscor) and ArcelorMittal SA were 
co- owners of the mineral rights at the Sishen mine, holding 78.6 per cent and 21.4 per cent, respectively. 
Linked to these rights, Kumba supplied AMSA with iron ore at cost plus 3 per cent from the Sishen 
mine. Kumba cancelled the 2001 contract to supply cheap iron ore when AMSA failed to re- apply for the 
mining rights with the introduction of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act.
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order to shore up its dominant position, and that the two companies ‘colluded 
with each other and abused their financial muscle and political contacts to obtain 
mineral rights’.12 ICT was linked to the Gupta family, a key player in the so- called 
state capture process during the Zuma presidency, for which investigations are 
on- going. After a protracted legal battle, the rights were eventually awarded 
to Kumba.
The issues around pricing of steel to downstream users, outflow of funds from 
AMSA to the Arcelor Mittal global group, and AMSA’s attempt to capture the iron 
ore rights all show how AMSA has used its power to influence rent management 
and capture rents in the metals, machinery, and equipment value chain.
The economic power of the steel industry is in part derived from the market 
power of the steel firms. AMSA has held a dominant position in flat steel and the 
long steel market is oligopolistic. There have been a series of cases that have been 
brought to the competition authorities relating to the unilateral exertion of 
market power by AMSA. These include cases relating to AMSA’s pricing to local 
customers at import- parity levels while charging substantially lower prices to 
export customers, as described above. In one case, a customer complained that 
AMSA abused its dominance by charging excessive prices at import parity for flat 
steel, even though a very large proportion of total production was exported and 
there were low input prices. The case was lost on appeal, with the Competition 
Appeal Court deciding that the economic value (competitive benchmark prices) 
needed to reflect a ‘long- run competitive equilibrium’. This has been interpreted 
as a price necessary to reward capital investment as if made by a greenfield entrant 
and not considering benefits from historical state support (Roberts,  2008; Das 
Nair and Mondliwa, 2017).
The case highlights the implications of the state adopting a static neoclassical 
microeconomic framework that is biased towards allocative efficiency, and which 
effectively assumes that competition will arise in the absence of constraints. Such 
a framework does not consider the intrinsic concentration given scale economies, 
the incremental nature of capability building, and the role of historical state 
support to underpin the large investments required, which also means 
entrenching firms’ dominant positions. In these conditions, real competition is 
not promoted through the instruments of competition law enforcement.
8.4.2 The South African Chemicals and Plastics Industry
The petrochemical value chain involves functions ranging from resource extrac-
tion (crude oil, coal, and natural gas) and refining through various levels of 
chemicals processing to produce industrial and consumer products (see 
12 https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/arcelormittal- bee- deal- a- looting- scheme—numsa.
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Chapter 4). This discussion focuses on how the lead firm in the industry grouping 
can leverage its economic power to influence rent management and maintain the 
status quo in terms of value capture in the value chain. There is also an 
examination of how state support, and regulation and energy policy have shaped 
the power relations in the industry, as well as the implications for the sectoral 
deepening that is a necessary component in reducing inequality.
In many of the industries that Sasol has been operating in, it holds monopoly 
or near monopoly positions. However, Sasol’s dominant market position has been 
further entrenched by various policy and regulatory decisions with weak 
conditionalities that undermine the productive use of rents which would have 
wider benefits for the economy.
First, South Africa’s petrochemical complex was established around Sasol 
through a succession of policy levers and regulation, beginning under the 
apartheid state (Rustomjee,  2012; Mondliwa and Roberts,  2014; Mondliwa and 
Roberts,  2019; Mondliwa et al.,  2020). Various conditionalities on the support 
were put in place, including a requirement to price chemical intermediate inputs 
to downstream industries at export- parity levels to support the development of 
the downstream industry (Mondliwa and Roberts, 2019). These conditionalities 
were honoured until about 2003, when Sasol was ‘effectively’ released from prior 
obligations on state support by the termination of the main mechanism for 
support, the Main Supply Agreement (Mondliwa and Roberts,  2014). This 
decision ignored the fact that state support had entrenched Sasol’s market 
position, thus skewing power dynamics in its favour relative to its customers.
Between 1994 and 2019, various arms of government have taken policy and 
regulatory decisions that have facilitated the firm’s further vertical integration 
and  entrenched market power. Analyses of the negotiations of important deals 
and regulatory outcomes in this period point to a balance of power that tips in 
Sasol’s favour (for detailed descriptions of the main deals see Mondliwa and 
Roberts, 2017 and 2019). With regards to regulation, South Africa’s approach to 
fuel regulation has assumed away the fact that Sasol produces multiple products 
and that it can leverage market power across different product markets. Fuel 
regulation has continued to disproportionately advantage Sasol, as the Windfall 
Tax Task Team found (2007). This advantage has also filtered through to chemical 
co- products, as prices are linked to fuel prices. Although this has followed 
international norms, the generous price regulation has meant that downstream 
industries have paid higher prices for co- products and by- products, thus 
undermining their competitiveness (Mondliwa and Roberts, 2019). The regulated 
fuel price formula has also largely remained unchanged, and still contains notional 
transport costs from the coast to Sasol’s plants in the inland region (Mondliwa 
and Roberts, 2019). This is effectively a transfer from consumers to Sasol.
The state has also taken decisions that have further entrenched Sasol’s market 
power in chemical markets by supporting its vertical integration into natural gas. 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 15/07/21, SPi
Sumayya Goga and Pamela Mondliwa 179
A deal struck with Sasol and the South African and Mozambican governments in 
2001 resulted in Sasol becoming the monopoly supplier of natural gas in South 
Africa.13 This has two implications. First, an alternative firm could have used the 
gas to produce goods that could compete with Sasol, giving downstream firms an 
alternative supplier and thus improving their bargaining power. Second, the 
regulation of gas prices has been to Sasol’s advantage: it has focused on pricing to 
external customers, while the bulk of the gas was converted into fuel (which was 
regulated) and chemical products (which were not regulated), so the customers 
have not received the benefits of the cheap gas (Mondliwa and Roberts, 2019).
The combined effect of these decisions has entrenched Sasol’s market position, 
bestowing on it market power. In turn, the exertion of this market power has 
shaped the strategies of other value chain participants, including decisions for 
expansion or technological upgrading (Mondliwa et al.,  2020) and its pricing 
strategies in particular have undermined the development of downstream 
industries (see Chapter 4).
Sasol’s vertical integration has allowed it to leverage market power at specific 
points of the value chain to determine the terms of participation of other firms. 
For example, in polymers, Sasol has been both the monopoly supplier of the input 
and the competitor to Safripol in the supply of polypropylene.14 Sasol was able to 
restrain Safripol’s ability to expand and colluded with it in the pricing of 
polypropylene to downstream plastic producers (Mondliwa and Roberts, 2019). 
The two firms negotiated a supply agreement whereby the price of the propylene 
input supplied by Sasol was dependent on the price of polypropylene charged by 
the two producers. This had the impact of indirectly fixing the polypropylene 
prices in the country and resulted in prices above competitive levels for the 
downstream plastic products industry. This has allowed Sasol to control value 
capture in the value chain, skewed towards upstream activities, and resulted in a 
vicious cycle of low margins, and limited investment in capability upgrading for 
the downstream plastics industry, thus undermining competitiveness (Chapter 4).
The main mechanism for countering market power in South Africa has been 
competition law and import competition. In terms of competition law, the 
excessive pricing case against Sasol in 2014 succeeded at the Competition 
Tribunal but the decision was overturned by the Competition Appeal Court in 
2015. The Appeal Court found that the Competition Tribunal had not allowed a 
sufficient return on capital. Fortunately, the South African Competition 
Amendment Act of 2018 (section 8(3)) includes changes to the tests for excessive 
pricing, including that structural characteristics of the market can now be taken 
13 The deal facilitated the construction of a pipeline from Mozambique to Sasol’s plants in South 
Africa, access to gas from the Pande Temane fields, and low prices.
14 Safripol (with approximately 20 per cent market share) is a polypropylene producer that com-
petes with Sasol (with approximately 80 per cent market share) and relies on Sasol for propylene 
inputs. Sasol holds a 94 per cent market share in propylene. Market shares are based on capacity.
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into account along with past or current advantages such as state support. Both the 
SCI and the AMSA case discussed above may have had different outcomes if they 
had been assessed through the new framing. The amendments also allow for the 
Minister of Trade, Industry, and Competition to make regulations regarding the 
calculation and determination of an excessive price.
8.5 Structural Transformation, Economic Power, and Inequality: 
Insights from a Micro and Meso Analysis
The chapter has examined at the industry level how power relations within and 
across manufacturing matter for reducing inequality. The move towards higher 
productivity and high value- added sub- sectors within manufacturing would 
allow for broad increases in income, which would reduce income inequality. In 
the South African context, positive structural transformation would mean a move 
away from minerals- related sub- sectors towards more diversified and labour- 
absorbing industries with enhanced employment creation, learning, and skill 
acquisition. The comparative industry assessment has highlighted how in South 
Africa, inequality has instead been reinforced by the lack of such transformation 
in key industry groupings.
8.5.1 Structural Transformation Means More Businesses and Jobs, 
and a Reduction in Inequality
Historically, structural transformation and sectoral deepening within manufacturing 
have led to increased employment and wages, creating the conditions for more 
equitable income distribution. A more diversified economy means that there 
are greater opportunities for people to accumulate, including through better 
 participation of smaller firms and higher prospects of earning an income from 
employment. Evidence shows that the manufacturing sector has the highest 
indirect employment multiplier and downstream industries have relatively higher 
employment multipliers (Tregenna, 2012).
Historically South African industry has largely been resource- based, and this 
has not changed in the post- apartheid period, with little evidence of growth in 
broader manufacturing capabilities. The economy has displayed high levels of 
concentration, and instances of entry of new and dynamic businesses to rival 
established incumbents have been scant (Vilakazi et al., 2020). Furthermore, the 
shift of the economy towards sectors that employ more skilled workers and the 
tertiary sector (Bhorat et al.,  2020) has impacted negatively on inequality 
 outcomes. Skilled workers have attracted a high salary premium while the  tertiary 
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sector has a large vertical pay differential, with the majority of the jobs being 
low- paying (Mondliwa and Roberts, 2018; Bhorat et al., 2020).
At a macro level, large firms have been relatively more successful in shaping 
the policy agenda, as is evident in the overarching economic policies adopted. 
This has largely been done by their influencing the ideology that has underpinned 
economic policymaking. For instance, it was argued that the market- leaning 
policies that were implemented when apartheid ended would serve as a 
counterbalancing force to the apartheid government’s support for large- scale 
capital- intensive industries and the history of poor productivity (Joffe et al., 1995; 
Hanival and Hirsch, 1998; Ponte et al., 2007). In particular, the expectation was 
that internationalization and the reduction of tariffs would spur the development 
of non- traditional manufactured exports—as with increased competition and a 
more international orientation, transnational corporations (TNCs) would 
invest and upgrade technology, thus improving the competitiveness of domestic 
industries. Even though the high levels of concentration in the economy were 
identified as a potential challenge for diversification, it was expected that both 
import competition and competition law would constrain market power (Joffe 
et al., 1995). However, competition law itself was shaped by the market ideologies 
of the time,15 and in retrospect, it has become clear that the market policies 
adopted primarily served the existing participants in the economy. Despite the 
low growth of the economy and investment levels, profit levels have been sustained 
(OECD, 2013).
The outcomes described in the two industry studies, consistent with economy- 
wide reviews (Bell et al., 2018; Driver, 2019), demonstrate the ineffectiveness of 
market liberalization for engaging with the power of entrenched dominant firms. 
In both the metals, machinery, and equipment, and the chemicals to plastics 
industry groupings, the economic power of the lead firms contributed to the slow 
pace of sectoral deepening. This is evident in three ways. First, the lead firms in 
these value chains have been able to leverage market power to increase input 
prices for the downstream industries. The higher input prices effectively transfer 
value to the upstream levels where the gains are shared by a smaller group. The 
higher prices are detrimental for the competitiveness of the downstream indus-
tries, which can lead to poorer performance and a decline in employment. This 
has direct implications for inequality both in terms of incomes from wages and 
wealth creation from returns to equity. The abuse of this market power can also 
lead to a direct transfer from the poor to the rich. While some degree of market 
15 The 1995 draft paper on competition advised that competition policy should not be used to 
break up the conglomerates as a means of advancing black economic interests, with the implication 
being that BEE and the unbundling of conglomerates should be pursued separately (Michie and 
Padayachee, 1997). This decision and the subsequent design of the BEE system has been unsuccessful 
in promoting independent black- owned businesses and has not resulted in meaningful empowerment 
(Ponte et al., 2007).
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concentration is desirable for investment and innovation purposes, market power 
is often associated with poor outcomes if left unchecked.
Despite its dominance in steel production, AMSA has improved neither invest-
ments, nor the range or quality of its products, while it has priced steel at import 
parity despite significant steel exports. The unfavourable pricing of steel, and lack 
of investment to improve the quality and range of products has meant that 
downstream businesses have not benefited from the government’s support of 
the upstream. The internationalization and financialization of both Sasol and 
AMSA has also meant that much of the value created by domestic rents have 
been transferred out of the economy. Both Sasol and AMSA increased dividends 
payouts on internationalization (see Zalk (2017) for details on AMSA, and 
Chapter 10 for details on Sasol).
The second way in which the economic power of the lead firms has contributed 
to the slow pace of sectoral deepening is that the current economic structure 
bestows economic power on upstream firms that have been deemed ‘too big to 
fail’ in some instances. This is particularly the case in the metals, machinery, and 
equipment value chain, where AMSA has continued to extract rents from the state, 
including import tariffs. The support rendered to AMSA has come at the expense 
of the downstream industries, which have been identified as being critical for more 
inclusive development. The importance that has been placed on the steel industry 
in the prevailing structure has undermined the interests of the downstream firms, 
which are also relatively less organized to push effectively for their interests.
Third, conditionalities are critical for ensuring that rents created by state sup-
port are productive and that there are wider benefits for the economy. In both the 
value chains analysed, the conditionalities have either been weak or poorly enforced, 
making rents created susceptible to being extractive rather than productive. The 
case studies have further revealed that the state acts more as an arena where conflicts 
for value capture take place rather than a power player in itself. The interests of 
the lead firms have triumphed in part due to the good organization at these levels, 
while downstream firms have been relatively less organized and the economically 
excluded have relied on the government to represent their interests.
The structural regression in these value chains in South Africa has had negative 
implications for business and employment creation, and therefore inequality 
outcomes. In both value chains, there has been significant potential for 
employment growth within the more dynamic and robust downstream industries, 
including the potential for entrants to develop and thrive—which would support 
the reduction of both income and wealth inequality. Roberts and Nkhonjera 
(2019) estimated that there is potential for direct employment growth of 65,000 
jobs and another 325,00016 jobs in related activities due to multiplier effects, by 
16 This is significant, given that total manufacturing employment was 1.5 million in 2018 (the base 
year for the estimation).
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increasing local machinery production by more than 50 per cent in order to 
regain the market share that South Africa was enjoying in the regional market in 
around 2010. Similarly, in plastics, Beare and colleagues (2014) estimated that the 
plastics industry had the potential to create another 20,000 direct jobs in South 
Africa. These are sizeable figures in an economy which has failed to create signifi-
cant numbers of jobs. However, generating more jobs would require significant 
government support for existing and new firms in these downstream industries. 
Apart from incomes for new workers, the wealth creation for new and expanded 
businesses and the wider consumption effects would all contribute to a reduction 
in inequality.
8.5.2 The Role of the Politics behind Policies and Institutions
South Africa has developed a significant base upon which industrialization could 
have been better effected, leading to a reduction in inequality. Why this has not 
happened is indeed the question. While there have been some policies and 
interventions to support new and more dynamic businesses, these have had little 
effect on the structure of the economy and the dominance of incumbent firms. 
Looking at the role of political economy, and more specifically, the role of political 
settlements in keeping the status quo and the impact of this on the ability to 
accumulate and therefore on inequality, goes some way to answering it.
As the case studies show, the economic power of dominant firms like AMSA 
and Sasol has allowed, these firms to reinforce their dominant positions through 
lobbying policies and regulations in their favour. Sectoral deepening within the 
metals, machinery and equipment, and chemicals- to- plastics value chains 
policies that support capability development and technology upgrading at the 
downstream level, and power dynamics that support diversification of the value 
chain. The case studies have shown how economic power within these value chains 
has been leveraged to influence the kinds of policies that have been adopted, 
which businesses have received support, and what kinds of support, and rent 
management and the capturing of rents.
There has been insufficient engagement in South Africa about how to reorient 
large businesses that dominate the economy for the purposes of more inclusive 
growth. In particular, insufficient attention has been given to the underlying 
power dynamics and how they have influenced and continue to influence 
outcomes in the economy. Instruments like competition law have had muted 
impacts, particularly for dealing with abuse of dominance by large incumbent firms 
(Roberts, 2020). In part this has been due to the design of the competition law, 
which was itself an outcome of negotiations between large businesses, government, 
and labour. Focusing simply on competition law does not deal with the ability of 
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large firms to lobby agencies of government to shape regulations in their favour; 
nor does it address market failures in access to finance. Re- industrialization of the 
economy would require an engagement with these dynamics, in order to analyse 
how outcomes have been and continue to be influenced.
Strategies for better inclusion would be more effective if the need for 
appropriate design of policies and institutions across different political settlements 
is better understood. Policy and institutions should be designed and implemented 
so that conditions that would hurt firms if they fail to deliver results can be 
credibly enforced. One way to do this is for policy to promise sufficient ex- post 
rents to give a high return for risky investments (Khan, 2018a). Furthermore, as 
Khan (2018a) further observes, policy prescripts should be realistic in tackling 
value chains individually: countries like South Africa do not have the political 
and institutional capacity to support development across a broad range of sectors 
at once, as this would require disciplining ex ante policy rents to a broad range of 
businesses in various sectors.
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9.1 Introduction
Economic growth requires structural transformation of the economy, and 
growing the manufacturing sector in particular (Tregenna, 2008; McMillan and 
Rodrik, 2011; Felipe et al., 2012). As set out in the introductory chapters of this 
volume, for South Africa this means diversifying investments and economic 
activity away from upstream capital- intensive industries to value- added and 
labour- absorptive downstream industries, which have the potential to increase 
employment and productivity (Tregenna, 2008; Hartman et al., 2017; Baymul and 
Sen,  2018). Rivalry from local or foreign rivals can lead to dynamic gains in 
productivity and investments in improved capabilities, which are also associated 
with structural transformation (McMillan and Rodrik, 2011). However, the evidence 
in South Africa is that rivalry is restricted by high barriers to entry in key economic 
sectors. These are especially high for black- owned firms (Vilakazi et al., 2020).
The chapter develops the insight that racial transformation and addressing 
barriers to entry (generally, and for black South Africans in particular) are critical 
for structural transformation of the economy. It does this in three key parts. First, 
in section 9.2, the chapter sets the scene by drawing on the literature to show that 
economic inclusion and rivalry, and racial transformation of the economy, are 
critical for structural transformation to be achieved in South Africa. Second, in 
section 9.3, the evolution of South Africa’s black economic empowerment (BEE) 
policy is assessed in terms of how it has been implemented and the challenges it 
has faced. This includes the shift to broad- based black economic empowerment 
(BBBEE).
Third, in section  9.4 the chapter presents a case study of the South African 
government’s black industrialists scheme (BIS) as an important development and 
alternative to the approach adopted with BBBEE. The BIS is an industrial policy 
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tool focused on targeted funding and non- financial support of ‘black industrialists’ 
(BIs) involved in value- adding manufacturing activities. Although it is relatively 
soon after its implementation in 2016, evidence from a survey of applicants to the 
programme demonstrates its strong potential for enhancing both the structural 
and racial transformation of the economy. The scheme’s design and intended 
focus is specifically on fostering competitive black- owned companies in the 
manufacturing sector.
9.2 Setting the Scene: Why Inclusion and Black Economic 
Empowerment Matter for Structural Transformation
Drawing from the existing literature this section sets out the ways in which rivalry 
and inclusion are important parts of the process of structural transformation, 
with specific reference to South Africa. The key point is that the inclusion of black 
people is critical for structural transformation to take place.
9.2.1 Rivalry and Inclusion Matter for Structural Transformation
The competitive process can drive economic efficiency and higher productivity. 
Rivalry between businesses is important as it enlists firms to intensify effort 
and create new products and business models to improve their own offering, and 
ensures a sharper focus on businesses finding ways of deriving productive and 
dynamic efficiencies (Roberts,  2010). While markets are inherently imperfect, 
forms of competitive discipline arising from the threat of entry, regulations, or 
exposure to foreign competition and international export markets can ensure that 
firms retain the economic incentive to improve their competitiveness, even in 
concentrated industries (Amsden,  1989; Singh,  2002; Roberts,  2010; McMillan 
and Rodrik, 2011). The gains from competition are therefore dynamic and linked 
to investments in capabilities, technological upgrading, and shifts to the produc-
tion of more complex products.
In South Africa, however, investment and growth in productivity have been 
hampered by high levels of concentration and barriers to entry (Vilakazi et al., 
2020). In some cases, the exercise of market power upstream, which is reinforced 
by government policies that effectively protect incumbency, can mean that com-
petition and investment in adjacent markets are stifled (Mondliwa and Roberts, 
2019). In addition, international competition and openness have not served to 
stimulate rivalry and discipline the market power of large local businesses, and 
the economy remains highly concentrated (see Bell et al., 2018; Bell and Goga, 
2020; Goga et al.,  2020). Notwithstanding the enforcement of competition law, 
there is a growing evidence base that shows that substantial barriers to the entry 
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and growth of rivals remain, which prevent them from effectively contesting the 
market and undermining the economic rents being earned by incumbents 
(Vilakazi et al., 2020).
While large firms are important for realizing economies of scale and scope and 
making necessary investments for upgrading, they need rivals to spur them on to 
do so. A lack of an optimal degree of competition to discipline market power 
enhances inequality, in that concentration forms the basis of rents, wealth, and 
the returns from ownership of assets and resources for the rich in societies (Baker 
and Salop,  2015; Ennis et al.,  2019). Barriers to entry and market power are 
therefore directly and indirectly linked with inequality (Chapter 8).
The implications are that improving productivity and competition requires a 
strong role for industrial policies that are aligned with effective BEE policies. Such 
policies are important to stimulate the entry of new rivals at sufficient scale and 
with capabilities to contest markets with established rivals, as part of driving 
structural transformation of the economy. Equity and efficiency do not necessarily 
pull in opposite directions, as had come to be understood from classic welfare 
economics (Atkinson, 2015: 246). Here, rather, it is suggested that the objectives 
of increasing participation and rivalry, while promoting productive growth and 
structural transformation, can go hand in hand. Indeed, rivalry from different 
sources is a key component in driving improvements in productivity and driving 
structural change.
Moreover, inequality undermines social cohesion (Atkinson, 2015). In South 
Africa, this is especially the case given that inequality in wealth and income 
occurs along racial lines—more than 90 per cent of the population are black (Stats 
SA, 2020), but ownership of economic assets and wealth is skewed heavily towards 
white South Africans (Chatterjee et al.,  2020). Furthermore, recent evidence 
shows that while barriers to entry are high in general, they are especially high for 
black businesspeople. This serves to reinforce the lack of dynamism in the 
economy and the high levels of economic concentration and control by leading 
white- owned firms (Vilakazi et al., 2020; Vilakazi and Ponte, 2020; Bosiu et al., 
2020). As such, the political economy of inclusion and affirmative action in South 
Africa is inseparable from economic policymaking and market outcomes.
9.2.2 Racial Transformation of the Economy Is Necessary 
for Structural Transformation
The emphasis on racial transformation as part of economic policymaking in 
South Africa is similar to the context of affirmative action and indigenization 
policies in other countries addressing a colonial legacy, such as Malaysia. In fact, 
it is not that different from many policies in other countries that are designed to 
improve the economic position of marginalized groups, including South Africa’s 
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apartheid- era policies for the empowerment of Afrikaners in the mid- 1900s 
(Terreblanche,  2002; Gqubule,  2006; MacDonald,  2006; Von Holdt,  2019). 
Experiences with affirmative action, in particular, are well documented in the 
literature (see, for example, Gqubule, 2006; Lee, 2015). These are not canvassed in 
this chapter, except to note that in Malaysia, affirmative action policies contributed 
to the economic upliftment of the marginalized majority Bumiputera population, 
particularly in the education sector. However, as in South Africa, there remain 
concerns about rent- seeking, fronting, and lack of transformation in the ownership 
of wealth (Lee,  2015). This is not surprising as economic policies to achieve 
empowerment of economically marginalized groups are necessarily deeply 
politicized.
Economic exclusion and its social consequences and drivers speak to the 
sustainability and stability of a country’s political settlement (Gqubule,  2006; 
Lee, 2015; Khan, 2017; and Chapter 14). As such, in the South African context for 
structural transformation of the economy to be sustained it will depend on the 
ability to ensure that the pattern of growth and diversification of the economy is 
inclusive in terms of its racial dynamics. At the simplest level, opening up markets 
for new and/or black- owned firms and forging a black capitalist elite has been 
critical for sustaining and stabilizing the political settlement (Hirsch,  2005; 
MacDonald,  2006; Von Holdt,  2019; Mondliwa and Roberts,  2020). It can also 
lead to potentially better economic outcomes arising from more economic 
dynamism and contestation (Vilakazi et al.,  2020)—both of which can have a 
positive impact on structural transformation. In addition, the path of structural 
change needs to enable large- scale inclusion of the black majority through 
emphasis on more diversified industries and the steering of investments in the 
economy towards labour- absorptive sectors, which also tend to have lower 
barriers to entry.
This brief overview of the interlinkages between inclusion, racial trans form-
ation, and structural transformation shows that policies focused on each of these 
areas are closely related and mutually reinforcing. Building on this framework, 
the following section analyses the challenges with the approach taken with 
BBBEE, and provides insights into its inability, to- date, to address specific barriers 
to entry and expansion.
9.3 The Evolution and Challenges of Black Economic 
Empowerment and Fostering Meaningful Black  
Participation in the Economy: An Overview
Black economic empowerment (BEE) was defined by the South African 
 government in 2003 as ‘an integrated and coherent socioeconomic process that 
directly contributes to the economic transformation of South Africa and brings 
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about significant increases in the number of black people who manage, own and 
control the country’s economy, as well as significant decreases in income inequali-
ties’ (DTI, 2003).1 At the heart of BEE philosophy was an ambition to foster an 
economy in which black South Africans, who had been previously marginalized 
by apartheid government policies from long before the 1990s (Terreblanche, 2002), 
were able to participate ‘meaningfully’ in all aspects of economic life, including as 
owners of capital.
BEE policy became one part of a wider nexus of policies to drive socioeconomic 
transformation in terms of land ownership, public procurement, employment 
conditions, and skills and training (DTI,  2003). Of all these, BEE policy was 
undoubtedly important for driving racial transformation of the economy—not 
least because it targeted widespread changes in ownership within existing, largely 
white- owned businesses. Other policies, such as those relating to skills develop-
ment, were arguably less direct in terms of their symbolic and political impact.
As such, expectations of BEE were high and there has been extensive scrutiny 
of its outcomes. A rich body of literature, which is only selectively drawn on here, 
has reviewed BEE and the government’s incremental policy shifts over time 
towards a more ‘broad- based’ conception of empowerment (BEECom,  2001; 
Hirsch,  2005; Gqubule,  2006; Freund,  2007; Ponte et al.,  2007; Southall,  2007; 
Hamann et al., 2008; Tangri and Southall, 2008; Sartorius and Botha, 2008; Patel 
and Graham, 2012; Mebratie and Bedi, 2013; Bracking, 2019; and Mondliwa and 
Roberts, 2020).
9.3.1 1994–2003: No Mandatory Compliance
Despite the widespread recognition among ruling, political, and business elites 
that black inclusion needed to be achieved as part of the settlement reached 
leading up to and after the democratic transition in 1994, there was surprisingly 
little specificity in policy about how this would be done (Hirsch, 2005). Various 
large businesses took the lead from as early as 1993 in structuring partnerships 
with black businesspeople, some connected with the ruling party, to sell equity 
stakes in established white businesses to consortia of black businesses and 
businesspeople. A notable transaction was by Sanlam, one of the largest 
conglomerate insurance and financial services groups, which sold 10 per cent of 
Metropolitan Life to a black- owned consortium called Methold, which was later 
renamed as New Africa Investments Limited (Gqubule,  2006). Many similar 
initiatives were concluded in the 1990s. These became known as ‘BEE deals’, 
1 In the BBBEE Act of 2013, black people are defined as Africans, Coloureds, and Indians who are 
citizens of South Africa by birth or descent; or who became citizens by naturalization in different 
defined parameters.
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which denoted the transactions through which BEE firms and consortia would 
acquire stakes in existing firms as BEE partners.
The manner in which this process evolved in the 1990s revealed a number of 
fundamental issues that would require government attention. First, it was obvious 
that white businesses were offloading many non- core business assets to black 
empowerment partners, in highly leveraged empowerment transactions. This put 
the consortia into extremely indebted positions and exposed them to volatility in 
economic conditions in sectors such as mining, which meant that their returns 
from the deals were neither stable nor significant (Ponte et al., 2007; Southall, 2007; 
Tangri and Southall,  2008; Patel and Graham,  2012). In addition, the overseas 
listings of some of the major conglomerate groups meant pressure from overseas 
shareholders to focus on more clearly identified areas of ‘core business’ (Chabane 
et al., 2006; Ponte et al., 2007; and Chapter 10). One way of doing this was to sell 
non- core assets to the black business groups, claiming credit for being engaged in 
empowerment transactions, while at the same time organizing finance for these 
groups at full commercial rates (Ponte et al., 2007; Mondliwa and Roberts, 2020).
Second, there were almost no black businesses that had access to significant 
capital to make investments. This meant that only a few black individuals and 
their companies emerged as leading black partners for various deals, including 
some that were clearly linked to the ruling party (Gqubule, 2006; Southall, 2007). 
Arguably, businesses also targeted partnerships with these connected 
businesspeople because it meant that they could leverage these links to lobby for 
favourable policies in particular economic sectors.
Third, there was no legal compulsion for white businesses to consider deals or 
other strategies for including black businesspeople, because there was no clear 
policy or mandatory compliance with BEE. This was in spite of the fact that 
legislation had been developed for the formalization of transformation in other 
areas, such as, employment equity, a land rights process, and black inclusion 
through preferential procurement (DTI, 2003).
A report released by the BEE Commission, which had been set up in 1998 
under the auspices of the Black Business Council, was submitted to President 
Mbeki in 2001. It highlighted in detail the range of concerns about the manner in 
which transformation had taken place since the democratic transition. These 
included disenchantment with the fact that there was no policy direction, no 
formal voice for black business, the fact that white businesses had led the BEE 
agenda on their own terms, and that transformation had been narrowly defined 
(BEECom, 2001).
In some sectors, established businesses tried to anticipate the changes that 
would come, and address the biggest concerns by agreeing to sector charters—
arguably to head off more aggressive policy interventions by government to drive 
transformation at the sectoral level. The first two sector charters were in the liquid 
fuels and petroleum value chains, and in mining (Bowman, 2019). Both included 
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voluntary commitments by firms to broaden the scope of empowerment initiatives 
from a focus on ownership transfers to black inclusion in management and com-
pany value chains and structures (Hirsch, 2005; Gqubule, 2006). Notably, these 
early charters were in regulated sectors where government had relatively strong 
leverage in terms of how it could use sector regulations to drive more radical 
reforms (Ponte et al., 2007; Bowman, 2019).
9.3.2 2003–19: Formal BEE Legislation and  
Successive Amendments
The Broad- Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) Act of 2003 
represented an important change. After 2003, most empowerment transactions or 
BEE deals became more broad- based, in line with the Act. This was a significant 
development from the early forms of black empowerment of the 1990s (Hirsch, 
2005; Gqubule, 2006).
In response to some of these core criticisms of the manner in which 
empowerment had evolved since 1994, particularly the view that BEE had only 
benefited a few, the notion of black empowerment in the BBBEE Act was 
expanded beyond what was effectively a focus on ownership in the 1990s, to 
include seven dimensions of empowerment (BEECom,  2001; DTI,  2003).2 The 
government strategy that was published by the Department of Trade, Industry, 
and Competition (DTIC) in 2003 emerged partly as a result of the BEE 
Commission’s findings, which were endorsed by the president, and set in motion 
a process of formalizing and codifying empowerment (DTI, 2003). There was also 
an attempt to consolidate BBBEE through the issuing of Codes of Good Practice 
to provide the basis for a generic scorecard against which firms’ empowerment 
credentials would be measured when they competed for government contracts 
(Gqubule, 2006; Southall, 2007; Tangri and Southall, 2008). Importantly, however, 
compliance with these new provisions was not compulsory and there were no 
legal penalties on firms for failing to comply.
Even after the first BEE legislation was enacted in 2003, there was arguably 
limited commitment from the private sector to implement it. Many companies, 
particularly those not reliant on government contracts or licences, have failed to 
meet BEE requirements for various reasons, including the lack of an economic 
incentive to do so (Tangri and Southall, 2008; Mondliwa and Roberts, 2020). This 
has been recognized in the subsequent reviews of progress with BEE by the 
BBBEE Commission and others (BBBEE Commission, 2017a). In addition, the 
2 The seven areas were human resource development, employment equity, enterprise development, 
preferential procurement, as well as investment, ownership and control of enterprises, and 
economic assets.
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model of equity acquisitions by black business and groups has failed because 
many of those acquisitions were based on loans that left real economic control 
and returns in the hands of the established corporations (Southall, 2007; Tangri 
and Southall, 2008; Mondliwa and Roberts, 2020).
Large proportions of the private sector were also being excluded from having 
to comply with BEE, in different ways. While this may be justifiable as a reason 
for not wanting to disadvantage smaller entities with disproportionate compliance 
obligations, it did mean that only some firms had to bear the costs and re spon si bil-
ities of putting in place transformation programmes. The practice from the early 
2000s was that companies with relatively small annual turnovers did not have to 
comply with any of the BEE requirements (Tangri and Southall,  2008; BBBEE 
Commission,  2017a); and medium- sized companies could initially choose four 
from the seven (previously five from seven) scorecard components to comply 
with (Tangri and Southall,  2008). Larger companies could pick up points for 
spending on corporate social investment schemes such as rural development and 
social upliftment initiatives, which may have been helpful to society in general 
terms (such as supporting youth education schemes) but were often unrelated to 
the core business of the enterprise. This implied less of a need on the part of 
white- owned businesses to focus on incorporating black businesses or in di vid-
uals into their value chains and management structures (Bracking, 2019).
The above concerns were some of the reasons for the 2013 BBBEE Amendment 
Act. The amendments focused on strengthening enforcement and the monitoring 
and evaluation of BEE across the board. This was in response to the very poor 
record of compliance by companies since 2003 (RSA, 2014). A new component 
was to make all measurement categories compulsory from 2016, with only some 
accommodations for qualifying small enterprises (Bracking, 2019). The BBBEE 
Amendment Act of 2013 also led to the establishment of a BBBEE Commission, 
and strengthened reporting obligations for South African companies and those 
listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) (Bracking,  2019). The 2014 
amendments to the BBBEE Codes of Good Practice changed the system from 
seven to five elements: ownership; management control, which combined the pre-
vious employment equity and management control elements; skills development; 
socioeconomic development; and enterprise and supplier development, which 
combined the previous enterprise development and preferential procurement 
elements. Importantly, the amendments included minimum targets of a 40 per 
cent score on ownership, skills development, and enterprise and supplier devel-
opment, which were identified as priority elements (RSA, 2013).
The changes also increased the credit for and weighting of black ownership 
from 20 to 25 points in public procurement considerations, introduced a formal 
definition of fronting and criminal sanctions for it, and increased the weighting 
of accreditation for efforts to encourage training and black representation in the 
supply chain in the area of enterprise and supplier development (Bracking, 2019). 
These changes reflected a greater emphasis on driving compliance and targeting 
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the inclusion of black businesses in value chains. This was undoubtedly a response 
to shifts in the political settlement and increased agitation within the ruling party 
under President Zuma for more ‘radical’ and extensive transformation of the 
economy—a key tenet of which was economic inclusion of black South Africans 
(Von Holdt, 2019).
The amendments also gave expression to the need to confront the problematic 
and cynical culture of compliance—or non- compliance—that had developed. 
Some white- owned firms blatantly entered into ‘fronting’ deals to skirt 
regulations. A common practice was for black business partners to be brought in 
as ‘nameplate’ partners to win contracts and create the perception of compliance, 
thus undermining the spirit of broad- based transformation. To counter this, the 
amended legislation included a new and specific definition and penalty for 
fronting. The amended legislation also sought to encourage compliance by 
introducing the ‘once- empowered, always- empowered’ provision, which meant 
that formerly white- owned companies were allowed to retain their empowerment 
credentials even after their black shareholders had sold their shares, including to 
white investors (BBBEE Commission,  2017b). While it made it easier for BEE 
groups to raise finance, it was a potentially problematic shift, however, because it 
meant that businesses in key economic sectors such as mining and finance—
which no doubt lobbied for the changes—would not have the incentive to seek 
out new BEE partnerships once previous BEE partners had exited. It meant prior 
gains made through previous BEE deals could be eroded (Gqubule, 2018).
While the amended legislation did lead to a wider participation of black busi-
nesses in the economy, its effects were not at the structural level. The challenge 
posed by the BEE policy agenda was that in its essence it was an attempt to engen-
der a fundamentally interventionist and redistributive social programme—in the 
form of black economic empowerment—in a wider economic policy context that 
was fundamentally neoliberal and market- oriented, and in which the control of 
capital was highly concentrated (Ponte et al.,  2007; Southall,  2007; Patel and 
Graham, 2012). As others have analysed in this volume and elsewhere, this was a 
very conflicted policy approach, one underpinned by orthodox macroeconomic 
policy and liberalized trade. There was no clear strategy for how to deal with the 
legacy of entrenched economic concentration, the power of large firms, high bar-
riers to entry, and the challenge of developing new black industrialists and firms 
(Chabane et al., 2006; Hamann et al., 2008; Bell et al., 2018).
9.3.3 Despite Changes to BEE Legislation and Policy,  
Fundamental Problems Persist
9.3.3.1 Persistently High Barriers to Entry and Other Constraints
While the changes to BBBEE policy were significant, a number of the key issues 
addressed in 2013 were very similar to the concerns raised in 2001 by the BEE 
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Commission initiated by the Black Business Council. This suggests that only 
limited progress had been made on the ground. A key problem that persists, up to 
2020, is that throughout the economy there is still insufficient focus on the need 
to address the barriers that inhibit entry in general, and that of black- owned firms 
in particular. Barriers faced by black businesses are especially high. This is because 
access to markets and capital for black businesses is made more difficult by 
exclusion from well- established business networks and value chains, there are 
reputation and trust issues vis- à- vis white- owned businesses, and there is a 
history of skewed ownership of productive resources, which means that many 
black businesspeople struggle to find collateral when applying for business loans 
(Bosiu et al., 2020; Vilakazi et al., 2020).
As an illustration of the lack of the necessary complementary measures, requir-
ing existing companies to procure from black- owned businesses assumes that these 
black suppliers both exist and that they have grown enough to be able to supply 
large firms. And, where they do exist, the BBBEE approach assumes that they are 
given a fair chance in bidding for contracts with existing firms, or that they are con-
nected to networks that enable them to integrate into value chains and that they are 
given the opportunity and support to overcome barriers and grow (das Nair et al., 
2018; das Nair and Landani, 2020). This is in fact not the case in many value chains 
analysed in recent research (Bosiu et al., 2020; Vilakazi et al., 2020).
This form of BBBEE also had the major—and probably unintended—conse-
quence that by including black capitalists in the ownership and management of 
existing large businesses the position of entrenched incumbents has only been 
reinforced. Aligning the economic incentives of the emerging black middle class 
with those of the existing capitalists has made it far less likely that black capitalists 
will agitate for more extensive reforms to address the entrenched racial skewing 
of capital ownership. Calling for a change to the structure of markets and the need 
to address concentration more directly would not serve the interests of the large 
firms from which black businesspeople, elites, and the emerging middle class 
have been benefiting. The black partners have shared the incentive to protect the 
established rents of the insiders (Vilakazi and Ponte, 2020).
The BBBEE policy has, therefore, not gone nearly far enough in addressing the 
complex ways in which outsiders are excluded from economic participation. The 
principal and mutually reinforcing barriers include lack of access to finance, 
difficulties integrating into existing value chains, lack of access to inputs, and 
limited access to key routes to market and large- scale patient finance to enable 
growth and the achievement of scale economies. These and other constraints are 
discussed below:
9.3.3.2 Problems with Access to Funding
Foremost among these barriers is the lack of a comprehensive system of industrial 
financing with provision of adequate ‘patient’ capital to allow for the time it takes 
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firms to build capabilities and make large- scale investments. While there is an 
established network of government development finance institutions (DFIs), 
their activities have largely been uncoordinated and are not aligned with a central 
objective of driving structural transformation. In the post- apartheid period in 
general, the reorientation of government’s industrial development initiatives have 
not successfully supported more diversified industrial activities (Goga et al., 2019).
Funding for the development of downstream linkages has remained relatively 
weak, despite stated government objectives of increasing beneficiation, strength-
ening local value chains, and supporting more labour- intensive (and downstream) 
activities (Maia et al., 2005; Bell et al., 2018). This has been perpetuated by a com-
mercial banking and private equity sector whose lending and investments have 
been directed at private consumption, household credit, and short- term portfolio 
interests, rather than at productive fixed investments in the real economy (Bosiu 
et al., 2017; and Chapter 10). Importantly, black- owned businesses in particular 
continue to report challenges with access to finance and a problem with DFI insti-
tutions that do not steer a proportional share of capital towards black businesses 
(IDC, 2003 and 2015; Goga et al., 2019; Bosiu et al., 2020; Vilakazi et al., 2020).
9.3.3.3 Poor Coordination of Economic Policy
A further problem is that industrial policy, and competition and empowerment 
policies have not worked effectively together to address other barriers to entry and 
racial transformation. For example, it appears that the issue of improving access to 
routes to market for challenger firms has not been addressed directly by the differ-
ent policies. This has been acknowledged by the ministry responsible for trade and 
industry (Bosiu et al.,  2020). In practice, these gaps in policy coordination and 
implementation have effectively meant that laws not specifically intended to effect 
transformation, such as competition law, have rightly or wrongly been viewed as 
primary tools for promoting transformation. Competition policy (as opposed to 
the narrower enforcement of competition law) is an important potential tool to 
remove strategic barriers preventing black business participation as competitors, 
as contemplated in the definition of BEE policy discussed earlier. With the 
2018 amendments to the Competition Act, greater participation by smaller 
enterprises and businesses owned by black people, in particular, is also now 
included in specific provisions relating to anticompetitive conduct.
9.3.3.4 Problems with Gaining Access to Value Chains in Crucial Sectors
There has also not been recognition in policies of the complexity of entering 
certain value chains in key, labour- absorptive sectors. For example, in order to 
survive and then compete with established, vertically integrated firms, successful 
entry into the agroprocessing sector requires finance, skills, and achieving scale 
economies in activities such as processing and distribution (Bagopi et al., 2016; 
Nkhonjera, 2020). While incumbent firms have been penalized for engaging in 
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anticompetitive practices in agroprocessing that further raised barriers to entry 
and limited participation (Mncube,  2014; Nkhonjera,  2020), this needs to be 
complemented by appropriate measures to support effective entry.
Emerging firms also face challenges in terms of accessing retail shelf space and 
routes to market, despite the expansion of retail supplier development programmes 
that have historically been token corporate social investment schemes (das Nair 
et al., 2018; Chisoro- Dube and das Nair, 2020; das Nair and Landani, 2020). This 
is a challenge that still confronts black industrialists, in particular, because of the 
lack of established networks and a proven track record with existing white- owned 
businesses (Bosiu et al., 2020).
The size of investments required to establish competitive challenger firms is 
significant, and entry has been difficult in many value chains, even for firms that 
do have established links with sizeable holding companies (Nkhonjera,  2020). 
Large- scale entrants have found it difficult to build market share in tightly held 
sectors (Chisoro- Dube and das Nair, 2020; Nhundu and Makhaya, 2020; Robb, 
2020). In many cases, there are difficulties with building a brand and overcoming 
network effects, first- mover advantages, and high switching costs. However, they 
also reflect the effective lobbying by insiders for regulations that protect their 
positions (Nhundu and Makhaya,  2020; Vilakazi and Ponte,  2020). This is in 
addition to the restrictions that incumbents can impose in relation to the access-
ing of routes to market and key infrastructure (Paelo et al., 2017; Chisoro- Dube 
and das Nair, 2020; Mondliwa, 2020; Robb, 2020).
All this shows that the structure of markets and the racial composition of 
ownership and control has not changed significantly over time, despite the many 
iterations and amendments to empowerment policies and legislation. Clearly a 
more focused intervention is needed.
9.4 Rethinking Empowerment towards Structural  
Transformation in South Africa: New Evidence from  
the Black Industrialists Scheme
The case study of the black industrialists scheme (BIS) offers key insights into 
how the failures of BEE policy can be addressed through a sector- oriented strat-
egy for inclusion, which also has a focus on the structural transformation of the 
economy.3
Diversifying the economy in terms of productive activities and control of 
resources by black South Africans clearly requires new thinking about policies for 
increasing black participation. The discussion in section  9.2 suggests that a 
3 The discussion in this section draws substantially from an underlying working paper (Bosiu et 
al., 2020). See also DTI (2015).
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comprehensive policy approach to achieving structural transformation needs to 
be closely linked with industrial and competition policies to address barriers that 
can undermine structural change. This is reinforced by the experience of BEE in 
practice reviewed in section 9.3, which has highlighted the lack of a policy focus 
in the early years, ineffective enforcement, low levels of compliance once 
legislation has been in place, and the lack of coordination with other critical 
policy areas.
The focus of the BIS, launched in 2016, has been on firms in the manufacturing 
sector with a high potential to contribute to structural change, including through 
investments in diversified and medium- technology production activities. 
Another of its features is its aim to address important barriers related to finance 
and access to markets, which, as has been argued, are key determinants of effective 
participation of black- owned businesses. In this section the BIS’s design and key 
outcomes are evaluated, followed by a discussion of the cross- cutting implications 
of key policy gaps for barriers to entry.
9.4.1 Key Features of the Black Industrialists Scheme
The rationale of the BIS is that the development of the manufacturing sector 
through the production of higher- value products, creating employment, and 
broadening black participation within it, is critical for establishing a new 
economic growth trajectory for South Africa (NCOP, 2016). Early discussions 
around the BIS began in the mid- 2000s, although the BIS policy was only 
launched publicly in February 2016. Importantly, at the core of the rationale for 
the programme is an evolution in the strategy for BEE (without displacing BBBEE 
laws), as reflected in the parliamentary summary of the inputs of the Director 
General of the Department of Trade, Industry, and Competition (DTIC, formerly 
DTI), Lionel October:
[T]he first step for the DTI had been to transform existing enterprises to assist 
the black majority in entering the market. This was the rationale behind the first 
phase of BEE policies, which stipulated that companies must be BEE compliant, 
having certain levels of black ownership, management, and procurement . . . [the 
BIS] targeted businesses that already had black ownership and management. In 
other words it was a secondary project, a second phase . . . to help black 
businesses expand their market penetration or enter new markets.
(NCOP, 2016)
This reference suggests a recognition by the government that, since its inception 
in 2003, the BBBEE policy had not sufficiently addressed certain aspects of 
barriers to entry. The BIS can thus be seen as a progression in policy—and with 
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the potential to catalyse structural transformation in targeted industries, tied into 
broader economic objectives. Indeed, the design of the BIS programme points to 
an important shift in the understanding of barriers and what it takes to build 
challenger firms beyond the scorecard parameters of BBBEE.
The two main tools used to achieve the objectives of the BIS programme are 
the provision of access to capital, and access to markets. Access to markets is to be 
facilitated through state- owned companies, and progressively through private- 
sector channels. In practice, the scheme aims to assist so- called ‘black 
industrialists’ (BIs) through providing concessional funding (grant plus debt) 
through a central office which sources funding from the Industrial Development 
Corporation (IDC), South Africa’s primary DFI, and provincial DFIs. The BIS 
targets enterprises operating in industries that fall within the DTIC’s priority 
manufacturing sectors noted in the Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP).
The IPAP is the primary industrial policy implementation strategy in South 
Africa (arising from the National Industrial Policy Framework of 2007), updated 
through various iterations with a particularly strong sectoral focus (DTI, 2015; 
NCOP, 2016). This is a critical aspect as it means that black industrialist support 
is directly linked to the strategy to grow South Africa’s manufacturing sector as 
part of long- term growth. A key difference with BBBEE is that the BBBEE policy 
necessarily applies a generic code system and criteria across all economic sectors 
and cannot be adapted to issues that may be specific to certain sectors or 
industries.
Qualifying BIs are defined as those entities in which the black owners hold 
more than 50 per cent of the shares in the firm that operates within a focus sector 
of the IPAP. The BIs need to demonstrate a medium- to long- term commitment 
to the firm, exercise operational control, bear personal risk in the venture as the 
primary entrepreneur, and be involved in driving the strategy and day- to- day 
running of the firm. The very specific characterization of the qualifying 
industrialists appears to respond to a key criticism of BBBEE, namely that many 
black shareholders (and managers), even in broad- based arrangements, were not 
exposed to key operational aspects of the existing businesses in which they 
became owners and so could not gain the skills and experience relevant for build-
ing new enterprises in the medium and long term.
The two broad qualifying criteria—the scale of the project and the potential 
contribution to the economy—suggest the prioritization of large- scale projects 
that have the potential to impact on competitive dynamics in markets and create 
substantial employment.4 In terms of substantial scale, the specific project for 
which funding is being sought must require a minimum investment of R30 
million (US$1.8 million, in 2020). The DTIC then provides a cost- sharing grant 
4 Smaller projects and companies are, in principle, catered for through other programmes of the 
DTIC and/or those of other government agencies.
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of between 30 per cent and 50 per cent of the required investment for the project, 
up to a cap of R50 million (US$3 million). The contribution to the economy is 
based on eight equally weighted criteria in terms of the expected contribution to: 
employment (securing, retaining, or increasing direct jobs); market share 
(securing new business or increasing existing operations); quality improvement 
(reducing relative prices and/or increasing the quality of products offered); green 
technology and resource- efficiency improvements; localization (increasing local 
production activities, diversification, and exports); improving the regional spread 
of production (in rural areas or regions with unemployment higher than 25 per 
cent); personal risk (demonstrating own financial and/or non- financial contribu-
tion to the business); and empowerment credentials (BBBEE scores) (DTI, 2015).
The criteria have therefore been designed to reward and incentivize certain 
behaviours that are aligned with a range of socioeconomic and manufacturing- 
specific objectives. The amount of the government contribution is based on the 
combined performance of the applicant in relation to black ownership (with more 
being desirable) and on the economic benefit criteria. However, it is a significant 
concern that these criteria have only applied at the pre- qualification stage, and 
firms are not required to report on their performance against them, once they are 
on the programme. This means that there are no repercussions if the firms do not 
achieve any of the objectives claimed in the application stage.
Overall, a total of 135 enterprises had been supported under the scheme since 
its commencement in 2016 to the time of the survey in May 2019, with a substantial 
combined value of approved project disbursements (DTIC and co- funder funds 
combined) of approximately R12 billion (US$700 million) (Bosiu et al., 2020).5 
The potential impact of the programme is therefore significant.
9.4.2 The Survey of the Black Industrialists Scheme
9.4.2.1 The Aim and Design of the Survey
The analysis of the outcomes of the BIS involved an online, anonymized survey 
administered in May 2019 (for full details refer to Bosiu et al., 2020). The survey 
gathered data on the businesses and their performance, including under the 
economic benefit criteria, and their experience with difference stages of 
application and disbursement processes at the DTIC as well as other DFIs or 
private funders as comparators. There were thirty- nine respondents, which 
included both applicants and beneficiary firms of the programme since its 
inception in 2016—out of 255 applicants or beneficiary firms (Bosiu et al., 2020). 
At the time of the survey, there were 135 beneficiaries, at different stages of the 
5 By comparison, South African public sector institutions spent approximately R250 billion on 
fixed assets in 2018. See Statistics South Africa website: http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=12,705.
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programme cycle between approval and claims and disbursement. The survey 
was accompanied by verification workshops and in- depth interviews with 
selected firms as well as with the DTIC as the responsible ministry, and various 
other state- and private- sector agencies responsible for the provision of financial 
and non- financial support to small and medium- sized firms in South Africa. This 
combination of engagements served to test and strengthen the robustness of the 
findings.
9.4.2.2 Key Findings of the Survey: Has the BIS Contributed to Inclusive 
Structural Transformation?
The focus here is on aspects relating to the programme’s potential to drive an 
inclusive form of structural transformation in the terms discussed in sections 9.2 
and 9.3 above. Further details can be found in Bosiu et al. (2020).
The majority of the investments made by the BIS beneficiaries have been 
expansionary capital investments in diversified manufacturing, which suggest 
that the programme has contributed to catalysing investments in new productive 
assets in the economy. These investments occurred at a time in South Africa when 
private and public gross fixed capital formation was stagnant (Bosiu et al., 2017; 
Bell et al., 2018). Given their particular emphasis on diversified manufacturing 
activities, this meant that they contributed incrementally to structural change. 
Although the businesses of BIs are relatively small compared with large South 
African businesses (such as those listed on the JSE), the survey found that these 
businesses have invested in relatively large projects, in line with the BIS objectives, 
ranging up to R390 million (US$23 million, 2020) in value.
The BIS cost- sharing grant offers support in three main categories of 
interventions: capital investment, investment support, and business development. 
Of total investment allocations for approved BIs that responded to the survey, 
matched against data from the DTIC database, 97 per cent (R2.9 billion, US$177 
million, 2020) of actual and projected disbursements by the DTIC and the co- 
funders were committed to capital investments. Indeed, 80 per cent of these funds 
were earmarked for investments in machinery and equipment, implying that 
firms were expected to invest in productive assets that would improve production 
capacity, scope, and capabilities. The majority of firms responding confirmed that 
their output had increased since approval to the BIS, in many cases due to the 
project for which they had applied to the BIS.
Generally, these are also large investments relative to those supported under 
other government programmes and some private- sector schemes. This targeting 
of the programme is especially significant because it implies a focus on firms that 
have already overcome the initial stages of testing and learning involved in the 
building of organization capabilities and have sufficient scale and scope to 
compete as effective rivals in the markets in which they operate. This includes 
shifting to more sophisticated activities and stimulating rivals to do the same as 
part of the competitive process.
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There is also significant diversity in the manufacturing activities in which the 
firms surveyed are involved, and many of them have operations in ‘rural’ 
locations, although this is not a strong feature in the data. Specifically, based on 
self- classification by the firms under the IPAP focus areas, fifteen of the thirty- 
nine respondents operated in chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and plastics, followed 
by agroprocessing, and clean technology and energy. Other activities included: 
manufacturing of wiring and electrical components; electrical and digital devices; 
food additives, preservatives, food processing; household consumables; and 
clothing and textiles products. These are generally activities which entail medium- 
technology manufacturing processes, and, importantly, are also labour- 
absorptive, which means ultimately shifting the employment of labour to higher 
value- added activities in the economy.
In response to questions on whether they had made improvements under each 
of the eight economic benefit criteria, many companies responded with detailed 
descriptions of specific technologies acquired and indications of the savings made 
in some cases (with 63 per cent of respondents reporting and describing some 
form of improvement). Firms also reported improved product quality, advancing 
product development, and achieving cost efficiencies which are important in 
terms of upgrading production processes and the potential to be competitive in 
international markets. In terms of employment, the respondents reported an 
increase of almost two thousand jobs when comparing their employment levels at 
the time of their first application to the BIS up to the time of the survey in 2019. 
Many of these were jobs in operational activities (rather than technical) involving 
large proportions of youth and women employees (Bosiu et al., 2020).
In addition to the competitiveness improvements noted above, nearly three- 
quarters of firms increased sourcing from local and/or black- owned firms, 
indicating local linkages. However, more than 80 per cent of the primary input 
materials are still imported from China and the USA, followed by Europe and 
India, which means there may be opportunities to increase local supply linkages 
over time.
The evaluation of the survey points to the importance of targeted industrial 
policy interventions which require effective levers and support, while also placing 
strong conditions on firms in terms of expected outcomes from funding grants. In 
this regard, the DTIC does not require firms in the BIS to report on the above 
outcomes at all, except if they are applying for additional funding. While this is 
potentially problematic, the risk of funds being squandered or used in un pro duct-
ive ways is partly mitigated by the fact that the BIS operates on a claims- based 
system, which requires firms to first make the investments they have committed to 
in their applications (using own or external funding), before they can claim for a 
refund under the scheme. The claims- based system also means that the BIS eff ect-
ive ly ‘rewards’ existing projects and entrepreneurs that have been able to commit 
some of their own or borrowed funding for the projects already. The challenge, of 
course, is that many black- owned businesses have reported significant difficulties 
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with sourcing funds, including for working capital requirements. In this regard, 
the DTIC has created a joint funding forum with private sector funders and DFIs 
to work closely with the DTIC on the BIS applications.
The insights gained from the programme at a relatively early stage in its life 
suggest that the BIS has a significant potential contribution to driving structural 
transformation, not least through investments in improved capabilities. Overall, 
it is clear that the provision of finance and the accompanying non- financial 
support is critical, and that this is best done through targeted programmes that 
build the capabilities of potential (medium- sized) challenger firms in the 
manufacturing sector, in particular.
9.5 Conclusion
The precarious and shifting balance in South Africa’s political settlement 
necessitates a rethinking about how to achieve structural transformation and 
economic inclusion. In this chapter it has been argued that these objectives must 
go together. As a political and social necessity, structural transformation of the 
economy must account for the politics and economics of the exclusion of black 
individuals and enterprises from participating in the mainstream economy.
Black economic empowerment and opening up the economy to entrants and 
more competition generally are essential for the process of structural trans form-
ation in South Africa. A crucial point to highlight is that inclusion and rivalry 
need to be substantive for there to be productivity- enhancing effects. This means 
that entrants and emerging firms need to be able to compete as effective rivals in 
the economy to stimulate dynamic efficiencies through the competitive process—
pointing in turn to the importance of addressing barriers to entry and expansion 
that are even higher for black- owned businesses. The competitive pressure that 
new rivals can bring contributes to dynamic gains to the economy in terms of 
investments, diversification, and upgrading to improve competitiveness. These are 
all critical factors in the process of structural transformation.
The BBBEE policies have been an important and necessary first step towards 
achieving economic inclusion, but they have not gone far enough or provided the 
right incentives for incumbent interests and black capitalists to drive structural 
change. They certainly have not addressed the structural and strategic barriers 
discussed in the chapter which prevent smaller and black- owned firms from 
expanding; nor have the different strategies focused in any way on competition 
and building effective rivals. Development finance has not provided the expected 
thrust for driving inclusion and structural transformation, and BEE deals have 
created a false sense of inclusion.
In this context, the BIS marks an important shift in the thinking about the role 
of industrial policy that is integrated with BEE in driving inclusion and 
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competition. The main insights are that the provision of finance and the 
accompanying non- financial support is critical, and that this is best done through 
targeted programmes that build the capabilities of potential (medium- sized) 
challenger firms in the manufacturing sector, in particular. The early- stage survey 
of the performance of firms under this programme shows that the scheme has 
had a catalytic effect in terms of stimulating relatively large investments by 
industrialists, as well as driving improvements in their production capabilities, 
cost efficiencies, and product development. The programme has, however, not 
been successful in improving access to markets and into established value chains. 
This is the function of a lack of a coherent and coordinated strategy within South 
Africa’s industrial, sector regulation, and competition policy space to systemically 
address barriers of this nature. The potential benefits of developing such a strategy 
for driving structural transformation of the economy are significant, requiring 
extensive further research to inform policymaking that must avoid the pitfalls of 
previous approaches.
The impact of the programme in driving inclusion and structural 
transformation is therefore likely to be more significant if there is more focus on 
opening up access to markets through procurement by government and private- 
sector entities. This is because there has not been a systemic approach to 
understanding and targeting specific barriers faced by black- owned firms, such as 
lack of access to markets.
The lack of focus on specific barriers such as finance in the BBBEE and indus-
trial policies has meant that other areas of policy, such as competition law, have 
become viewed as the primary tools for transformation, despite their limited legal 
remit. A more integrated and comprehensive approach, involving different agen-
cies and private- sector bodies is required. Such an integrated approach is also 
necessary for dealing with some of the administrative challenges raised by the 
firms surveyed, particularly with respect to delays in disbursements and the lack 
of coordination between agencies of government.
It is clear that while the BIS presents a number of challenges to address, it also 
offers a great deal to build on for it to become an effective tool to drive a process 
of inclusive structural transformation. Early indications are that the programme 
has promoted diversification, employment creation, entry and expansion, and 
investments in improved capabilities, which are all essential for structural change.
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Profitability without Investment
How Financialization Undermines Structural 
Transformation in South Africa
Antonio Andreoni, Nishal Robb, and Sophie van Huellen
10.1 Introduction
Sustained investment in productive capabilities and fixed- capital formation is a 
key driver of inclusive and sustainable structural transformation. Both historically 
and compared to other middle- income countries, South Africa has performed 
poorly in terms of sustaining domestic- productive investments. This failing has 
coexisted with the development of a stock market with the second- highest level of 
capitalization over gross domestic product (GDP) in the world (a record retained 
since 2013, and second only to Hong Kong), and high levels of profitability across 
several economic sectors. This means that, despite the deepening of financial 
markets and persistently high profits, investments have not materialized.
In this chapter, this apparent paradox is unpacked through the presentation of 
new evidence on the specific ways in which financialization of non- financial 
corporations (NFCs) in South Africa has resulted in low investment performances. 
Aggregate evidence of the coexistence of high profitability, deep financial markets, 
and sluggish productive investment is provided. This is borne out further by the 
focus on two large, publicly listed corporations operating across different 
economic sectors—Sasol in heavy manufacturing industry, and Shoprite in 
supermarket retail. Built on an analysis of company financial statements, the case 
studies identify a number of shifts in firm behaviour and corporate strategy 
between 2000 and 2019, particularly in regard to sources and uses of funds.
The analysis shows that firms have increasingly financed operations, capital 
expenditure, and distributions to shareholders with debt. The US dollar- 
denominated share of this debt has grown rapidly in the period studied, exposing 
firms to increased exchange and interest rate risk in a volatile global macroeco-
nomic environment. Distributions to shareholders, driven by dividends rather 
than share repurchases, have also risen markedly over the same period—with 
growing repayments to creditors further augmenting the flow of resources away 
from productive reinvestment and toward financial markets.
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These dynamics are attributed in part to South Africa’s subordinate position in 
a global economic hierarchy encompassing currencies, value chains, and financial 
markets, and which imposes profound limitations on the development strategies 
and policy space available to low and middle- income countries. An exploration of 
these dynamics helps to identify the scale and complexity of the challenges facing 
attempts to resist the influence of financialization, and to pursue growth paths 
premised on redressing a growing imbalance between financial and non- financial 
sectors through redirecting resources away from finance and towards productive 
investment.
For the rest of the chapter, section 10.2 introduces the literature on the role of 
finance in structural transformation and the ways in which financialization 
hampers sustained productive investments. Building on, and extending, a specific 
stream of research focusing on the tension between financialization and 
innovation within NFCs (Lazonick and O’Sullivan,  2000; Lazonick,  2014), a 
number of financialization factors and dynamics which are specific to companies 
in middle- income countries are identified. Section  10.3 focuses on the South 
African case, and presents new historical evidence on a selected number of 
financialization indicators for publicly listed NFCs. Section 10.4 presents the two 
case studies and an in- depth investigation into several factors driving the 
financialization of NFCs across companies in South Africa and, potentially, other 
middle- income countries. Section 10.5 concludes and reflects on the implications 
for industrial policy.
10.2 Structural Transformation, Finance, and Investments: 
Why Financialization Matters
The processes of countries’ structural transformation are complex, involving 
changes in multiple dimensions. By directing and sustaining strategic investments 
in productive capabilities, finance can play a critical role in driving structural 
transformation (Samargandi et al., 2015). The experience of early industrializers 
(and successful late industrializers) points to the fact that reinvestment of profits 
generated within business enterprises is a major source of finance, alongside 
financial institutions. By retaining profits and reinvesting them strategically in the 
development of productive capabilities, collective learning, and technologies, 
business enterprises can develop managerial and organizational capabilities that 
allow them to exploit economies of scale and diversification opportunities 
(Penrose, 1959; Lazonick, 1990).
Economies of scale, of scope, and innovation are not only key drivers of 
growth—they are also key generators of large profits. In order to be (and remain) 
innovative, business enterprises need to exercise strategic control over the 
financial resources they are able to generate as an organization (Lazonick and 
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O’Sullivan, 2000; Lazonick, 2010). They also need to make sure that long- term 
cycles of learning and innovation are properly funded over time, and against 
uncertainty. Commitment of financial resources under uncertainty is central for 
sustaining productive capabilities development and accumulation, and steering 
them towards innovation, from both company and country perspectives (Chang 
and Andreoni, 2020).
However, business enterprises can become financialized—that is, the nexus 
between finance, investment, and structural transformation can break. 
Financialization happens because, to quote Epstein’s (2005: 3) definition of 
financialization, with the ‘increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, 
financial actors, and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and 
international economies’, resources generated in the real economy are diverted 
from productive investments towards the expansion of the financial sector. 
Middle- income countries are fully exposed to global financial systems and 
financialization dynamics, while at the same time large segments of their 
economies are structurally and institutionally underdeveloped, and thus exposed 
to unproductive financial systems development. After each of these points is 
addressed, the discussion turns to how they play out in the specific context of 
middle- income countries like South Africa.
10.2.1 Theoretical Perspectives on Financialization
Financialization is a global phenomenon, although it impacts different countries in 
specific and interdependent ways (Chang and Andreoni, 2020). Across middle- 
income economies, financialization diverts finance from those productive 
investments needed to sustain industrialization efforts and infrastructure 
development. It also undermines technological catch- up and reduces returns to 
workers for their key contribution to value creation within business enterprises. 
Indeed, by undermining productive structural transformation, financialization also 
has a direct and indirect distributional impact on the demand and employment 
side, ultimately impacting the rise of domestic effective demand. Finally, given that 
financial markets are global and business enterprises are transnational, there are 
plenty of transmission mechanisms through which financialization in one country 
(or company) affects the other country (or company, especially those operating 
along the same sectoral value chain).
In the decade since the global financial crisis, much of the popular discourse 
on financialization has focused on financial ‘innovations’ such as credit default 
swaps (CDS) and derivatives, and their roles in precipitating the crisis. However, 
there was already extensive scholarship on financialization from a range of 
perspectives before the crisis. This body of literature has discussed financialization 
at multiple levels—from analysis of household assets and liabilities, and the 
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changing behaviour of NFCs, to its influence on financial systems at a national 
and international level; and from multiple angles, including social provision by 
states, shifts in the international division of labour, class formation, and 
international monetary architecture (see Krippner (2005) for a review of the pre- 
crisis literature).
Marxist political economists and post- Keynesian scholars, in particular, have 
developed theories of financialization from a macro perspective, mainly focusing 
on the ways in which financialization operates across sectors and across classes 
within a macroeconomic framework (see e.g. Fine,  2013; Lapavitsas,  2013). 
Lapavitsas (2013), for example, focuses on the different ‘set[s] of social 
mechanisms that systematically convert temporarily idle funds into money capital 
available for lending’ (2013: 118). From this perspective, financialization is 
embodied in changing relations between and within sectors in the last three 
decades or so of the twentieth century—with firms, banks, households, and the 
state in advanced economies representing the key sectors. As NFCs developed 
the financial intermediation capabilities required to trade in financial markets 
and pursue financial profits, their relations with and reliance on banks weakened 
over time. In turn, banks sought new streams of profit in direct lending to 
households and increased financial intermediation services. At the same time, states’ 
withdrawal from social provision—pensions, housing, education, and healthcare 
key among these—combined with changing patterns of bank lending to draw 
ordinary households more deeply into the financial system than ever before 
(Lapavitsas, 2013: 2–4). The core argument here is that financialization is, in the 
final analysis, antithetical to real accumulation. Financialization results in 
increasing appropriation of value by the financial system at the expense of the 
‘real’ or productive economy, and ultimately exposes households and whole 
economies to new forms of vulnerability.
A different stream of research has focused on the ways in which financialization 
of NFCs has historically emerged out of specific institutional changes in corporate 
governance regimes (Lazonick and O’Sullivan,  2000; Lazonick,  2014) and has 
shaped and spread along global value chains (GVCs) (Baud and Durand, 2011; 
Milberg and Winkler, 2013; Auvray and Rabinovich, 2019). Starting in the 1980s, 
with the increasing globalization of financial markets and fragmentation of 
production, the refocusing of multinational corporations (MNCs) on core 
businesses and the increasing power of global institutional investors, corporate 
strategies shifted from the old logic of ‘retaining and investing’ to one of 
‘downsizing and distribution’. The affirmation of what came to be called 
‘shareholder value maximization’ ideology—a new hegemonic principle of 
corporate governance—is considered to be the main mechanism underpinning 
corporate financialization.1
1 See also Froud et al. (2006) on the link between financialization and changes in corporate 
governance, with a focus on three iconic NFCs—i.e. GlaxoSmithKline, Ford, and General Electric.
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The shareholder value maximization (SVM) perspective was built on ‘residual 
claimant’ theories of the firm. These proposed that only a firm’s owners or 
shareholders truly take a risk in investing in it, as they are only guaranteed a 
return on their investment if the firm turns a profit (the ‘residual’ to which they 
have claim). The interests of other stakeholders—workers, managers, and 
creditors—are contractually enforceable, and are thus not always perfectly aligned 
with profit maximization. Shareholders are therefore seen as having the most 
powerful incentives to ensure the efficiency of the firm, maximizing profits and 
their own returns, which they are best placed to allocate to further reinvestment 
in the firm or to other private ends. SVM ideology maps this argument onto 
society as a whole: because shareholders’ incentives lead them to maximize profits 
at firm- level, shareholders’ returns ought to be maximized in general, allowing 
them to allocate those returns to further profit- maximizing activities, thus 
maximizing utility at an overall social level (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). This amounts to the simple idea that what is best for the 
owners of shares is best for society as a whole.
Lazonick (2014) has challenged this perspective, arguing that shareholders in 
the context of contemporary financial markets ought not to be considered 
‘investors’ in the traditional sense. This is because they tend not to make consistent 
investments of their resources in a given firm and they have the ability to sell off 
their shares in a way that means their ‘investments’ are rarely subject to major 
risk. In contrast, it is employees, taxpayers, and governments who make regular 
investments of time and resources in firms, and tend to be the ones to pay the 
price when risks transform into genuine crisis. According to Lazonick, SVM 
is the key justification and corporate governance principle behind the finan-
cialization of NFCs, and has contributed powerfully to the inability of the USA, 
for example, to achieve inclusive and innovative growth. For Lazonick, the 
combination of increasing distribution of ‘excess cash’ to shareholders and 
financial markets through dividends and share repurchases, and the growth of 
stock- based compensation for executives, has broken the finance–investment 
nexus that had driven growth in the US economy from the second world war 
until the 1970s.
10.2.2 Financialization of Non- financial Corporations in 
Middle- Income Countries: Towards a Micro- level Perspective
While most scholarship on financialization has focused on advanced economies, 
since the early 2000s, several contributions have explored the transmission 
mechanisms of financialization between advanced (‘core’) and developing 
(‘peripheral’) economies. In this context, Powell (2013) advances a theory of 
‘subordinate financialization’, according to which financialization across 
emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs) is driven by a combination 
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of power dynamics inherent in the global financial architecture. These result in 
macroeconomic and financial system vulnerabilities for EMDEs. Powell argues 
that EMDEs are experiencing financialization, ‘but in a distinctive form which 
has been shaped by imperial relations in the current world market conjuncture’ 
(2013: 144).
Powell proposes several hypotheses about the likely features of subordinate 
financialization in EMDEs in the context of this particular conjuncture. First, as a 
consequence of the subordinate position of EMDE states and their currencies in 
the international financial system, financial liberalization is likely to undermine 
investment, especially in productive activity. Second, international private capital 
flows, driven by monetary conditions in advanced economies and increasing in 
volume and volatility, expose EMDEs to financial crisis. This imposes costly risk- 
management strategies for policymakers in EMDEs, negatively affecting credit 
conditions and rates of fixed investment. Third, leading NFCs in EMDEs are 
likely to become increasingly reliant on market- based finance, generating 
volatility in national financial systems, especially where foreign currency- 
denominated debt is taken on by NFCs. Fourth, banks are likely to turn towards 
global capital markets, creating new vulnerabilities by opening the domestic 
banking sector to external factors with potentially negative macroeconomic 
consequences. Finally, households are likely to become financialized in terms of 
both assets and liabilities. Bonizzi et al. (2019: 10) argue that these vulnerabilities 
in developing economies ‘may serve to cement or even deepen their subordi-
nation in the global hierarchy of nations’; the subordinate financialization 
perspective is thus grounded in the exploration of fundamentally hierarchical 
and extractive relations between core and peripheral economies (see also 
Bonizzi, 2013).
The subordinate financialization literature introduces important insights into 
the specific financialization mechanisms operating at the macro and financial 
system levels across middle- income countries and other peripheral countries. 
A number of these specific mechanisms reflect micro- level financialization 
processes within NFCs, which will be different from those highlighted in NFCs 
based in advanced economies like the USA.2 To advance a micro- level perspec-
tive that shows the specific forms of tension between financialization and invest-
ments across NFCs in middle- income countries, three clusters of issues are 
discussed: heterogeneity between different sectors and different segments of the 
GVC with respect to the rentieristic nature of activities; pull factors, such as 
asymmetries along GVCs, foreign ownership, and dependence on international 
2 For instance, taking the cases of Apple Inc. and Foxconn International Holdings (FIH) as exam-
ples, Froud et al. (2014) find different—though still interdependent, because of their being in the same 
GVC—financialization processes within the companies and broader outcomes for their respective 
countries.
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finance; and inducement factors, such as cheap credit, and the need to meet 
shareholders’ expectation and mitigate the risk of hostile takeovers.
There are six major interlinked factors related to these issues. First, 
financialization is heterogenous across sectors. This is because profitability 
margins, industry organizations along value chains, and competition are different 
across sectors. Extractive sectors, for example, tend to offer high profitability 
margins, especially when beneficiation activities are limited. Once initial fixed 
investments are in place, the financial stream from these activities can be 
extremely high and relatively stable (depending on commodity cycles). Similarly, 
in the energy sector, prices are largely determined by financing costs more than 
production costs. Mineral and non- mineral rents can be easily extracted in the 
form of royalties and often in a situation of limited competition or monopoly (see 
Bowman (2018), on South African platinum mining). Competition is critical in 
determining the extent to which companies need (or not) to reinvest to retain 
their dominant position.
Second, even within the same sector, financialization can take different forms, 
depending on the business enterprises’ positioning along the value chain. The 
reason is that opportunities for rents are disproportionately distributed along 
sectoral value chains, especially when NFCs do not face major competitive 
pressures. Hence the value chain structure matters in shaping specific forms of 
financialization, especially across middle- income countries. In upstream sectors 
producing industrial materials such as chemicals or steel, the scale- efficiency of 
the investment is very high—also relative to the domestic demand. As a result, 
very few players can operate or control the sector—and in the case of a monopoly 
price regime, only one. In downstream industries such as retail and distribution, 
by controlling access to final markets, NFCs can also extract significant extra 
profits by simply applying large price mark- ups. This dominant position gives 
businesses the opportunity to extract rents along the entire value chain of buyers. 
The lack of competition does not provide any compulsion for reinvestment, and 
companies’ extra profits can be easily targeted by predatory value extractors in 
both the domestic and international markets.
Third, business enterprises in low and middle- income countries tend to be 
squeezed along their GVCs, given the ‘endogenous asymmetries’ characterizing 
modern GVC structures (Milberg and Winkler, 2013; Chang and Andreoni, 2020). 
The endogenous asymmetries allow for international companies to extract extra 
profits generated in the host economies and use them to respond to short- term 
financialization pressures from international shareholders. As a result of these 
asymmetries, profitability margins of new productive investments in low and 
middle- income countries can be limited. Companies’ strategic response—espe-
cially in manufacturing industries—could be to move away from long- term pro-
ductive capabilities development towards trade intermediation and service 
activities. In effect, this is functional downgrading. This is particularly the case in 
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the absence of effectively enforced industrial and trade policies, as business 
enterprises are squeezed along the value chain and in the international market by 
established business enterprises (Auvray and Rabinovich, 2019; Ponte et al., 2019; 
and Chapter 12).
Fourth, business enterprises’ ownership structures matter. Foreign ownership—
especially by institutional investors—might expose companies in low and middle- 
income countries to powerful extractive forces and pressures to extract financial 
resources and capture rents. Bonizzi (2017) points out that institutional investors, 
largely based in high- income economies, collectively owned the equivalent of 60 
per cent of global GDP in 2014. From a political economy point of view, the lack 
of a mature class of industrial capitalists with interests embedded in the domestic 
economy, impacts negatively on the financial commitment of business enterprises. 
In a number of middle- income countries like South Africa, the privatization of 
state- owned enterprises (SOE) has opened the door to a number of major 
international institutional investors, including pension funds, and an 
accompanying shift in corporate governance strategies. Their interest in a 
sustained flow of dividends can affect the long- term financial commitment of 
resources in productive investments.
Fifth, business enterprises in middle- income countries rely on international 
financial markets for access to cheap credit and foreign exchange needed for 
operational purposes, exposing them to high levels of exchange and interest rate 
risks. Subordination in the international financial system means NFCs in middle- 
income countries turn to high- income countries’ capital markets to source capital 
at competitive rates and to gain access to foreign exchange needed to settle import 
bills. US dollar- denominated debt positions expose middle- income country 
NFCs to two types of vulnerabilities: a currency mismatch between income 
generating activities and debt servicing costs, aggravated by exchange rate vola-
tility; and a policy risk as the sustainability of the US dollar- denominated debt 
position is at the mercy of a foreign central bank (primarily the US Federal 
Reserve), which sets policy rates with no regard for the fate of foreign companies. 
This double vulnerability requires middle- income country NFCs to engage in 
costly financial risk management activities or suffer from sudden and substantial 
losses if the risk is not managed effectively.
Sixth, business enterprises in middle- income countries rely to a large extent on 
foreign capital for liquidity of domestic capital and equity markets. In order to 
keep foreign investors happy, these enterprises have to offer high risk- adjusted 
returns to compensate for the higher risk associated with their subordinate 
position. At the same time, enterprises must fend off potential hostile takeovers 
by keeping their share price high through offering large shareholder pay- outs, 
either via dividends or share buy- backs.
Moreover, depending on a country’s particular sectoral composition and patterns 
of industrialization and deindustrialization (see Chapter 11), the combination of 
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these sector- specific factors will magnify the impact of financialization on the 
economy as financialization dynamics reinforce each other. For example, as 
highlighted in Fine and Rustomjee (1996), it can be expected that an economy 
like South Africa’s, which has traditionally developed around the ‘minerals energy 
complex’ (MEC), will be dominated by several of the sector- specific financialization 
dynamics highlighted above.
10.3 Signs of Financialization and the Broken Profit–
Investment Nexus
By the early 1990s, South Africa already had a relatively well- developed and 
influential financial sector, characterized by a strong banking system and 
sophisticated capital markets (Isaacs and Kaltenbrunner,  2018). By the early 
2000s, the country’s first democratic government had made a formal commitment 
to a conventional macroeconomic policy framework targeted at low inflation and 
debt. Integration into global financial markets on this basis was explicitly aimed 
at attracting capital inflows from abroad, and incentivizing domestic investment 
by exposing leading domestic firms to the discipline of international competition 
(Mondliwa and Roberts, 2019; Ndikumana et al., 2020). However, despite South 
Africa’s strict adherence to Washington Consensus policies, its growth strategy 
has largely failed—evident in the persistently high levels of poverty, inequality, 
and unemployment (Rodrik,  2006; Bosiu et al.,  2017). Chronically weak 
investment combined with relatively rapid trade and capital account liberaliza-
tion has driven a post- apartheid economic restructuring of which manufacturing 
industries have been a major casualty, eliciting diagnoses of ‘premature de- 
industrialization’ (Bosiu et al., 2017). An overwhelmingly non- selective, supply- 
side approach to industrial policy during liberalization has failed to support 
industries in need of more controlled exposure to international competition, and 
contributed to major manufacturing job losses and the shedding of entire indus-
tries (Roberts, 2007; Zalk, 2014; Andreoni and Tregenna, 2020).
Figure 10.1a shows how market capitalization of listed South African NFCs has 
increased steadily, while fixed capital formation has plateaued and been declining 
since 2008. Using the two- digit standard industrial classification (SIC) code, 
Figure 10.1b distinguishes between mining and energy sectors (ME), which have 
been studied extensively in the financialization literature on South Africa (Fine 
and Rustomjee, 1996; Karwowski, 2015; Isaacs, 2017; Ashman et al., 2012),3 and 
other sectors. Figure 10.1b shows a declining trend in fixed capital investment in 
3 ME sectors here are simply combining the mining and quarrying, and electricity, gas, and water 
supply sectors. This does not correspond to the MEC, originally confined around six conglomerate 
groups, which serves as an analytical unit, not an industry classification.
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the ME sectors since the global financial crisis, and a similar trend for other sectors, 
initially. A reversal of the trend is identified from 2014, driven by a construction 
boom paired with a rapid expansion of the financial services sector.
These trends develop alongside high profitability and increasing shareholder 
payouts with some sectoral differences. Figure 10.2 shows annual profitability as 
net- profits as a percentage of turnover, and total dividends paid to shareholders 
as a percentage of net- profits, for the ME sectors (Figure  10.2a), and for the 
remaining sectors (Figure 10.2b). The most noteworthy observations are that the 
profitability of the ME sectors varies with global commodity cycles (demonstrating 
sectoral specificities), that ME sectors’ dividend payments continue even in times 
of negative net- profits, and that dividend payments increase steadily for other 
sectors while profit margins remained relatively flat after the GFC. Interestingly, 
the spike in 2016 in Figure 10.2b is due to a steep increase in dividends paid by 
the financial services sector. The financial services sector is now the largest 
provider of dividends before manufacturing and exceeding the ME sectors (the 
largest providers in the early 2000s) by far, showing a remarkable expansion in 
both profits and size over the past two decades.
10.3.1 Factors Contributing to South Africa’s Failure to Achieve 
Structural Transformation
The post- apartheid state’s weakness vis- à- vis powerful factions of domestic 
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Figure 10.1 Fixed capital formation and stock market capitalization
Source: (a) Statistics South Africa, Annual Financial Statistics Survey (authors’ calculations). (b) South 
African Reserve Bank and World Federation of Exchanges database via The World Bank Data 
(authors’ calculations).
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to achieve structural transformation (Fine and Rustomjee,  1996). Rather than 
strategically utilizing the high profitability of dominant upstream firms to strengthen 
production, consumption, and technological linkages with manufacturing 
industries in particular, the nature of the political settlement has allowed these 
firms to entrench their access to rents and their influence on policy (Roberts and 
Rustomjee, 2009; Zalk, 2014 and 2017; and Chapter 14).
Changing sentiment in international financial markets was a key driver of the 
post- 1994 unbundling of the powerful, diversified conglomerate groups that 
constituted the MEC into separate entities focused on specific industries. Shares 
in diversified conglomerates had tended to trade at a discount in international 
markets due to the challenges posed by diversified holdings for market valuation 
methods and ‘transparency’ for shareholders (Bowman,  2018: 395), and 
unbundling proceeded rapidly (Mohamed,  2009).4 Largely unencumbered by 
strategic oversight, regulation, or industrial policy on the part of the government, 
this process had extremely destructive consequences for industrial capabilities in 
some cases (see Chapter 2).
4 It should be noted, however, that conglomerate unbundling has not resulted in more competitive 
markets—see Chabane et al. (2006). Industries considered to be highly concentrated include ICT, 
energy, financial services, food and agroprocessing, infrastructure and construction, intermediate 
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Figure 10.2 Profitability and dividend payments
Notes: Dividends as % of profits in (a) are interrupted for 2015 and 2016 as profits turned negative, 
while dividend payments were maintained throughout. Profitability is measured as net- profits as a % 
of turnover.
Source: Statistics South Africa, Annual Financial Statistics Survey (authors’ calculations).
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Following the post- apartheid government’s commitment to liberalization, 
exchange controls were gradually eliminated, a number of large corporates were 
allowed to list on foreign stock exchanges (notionally to raise capital for domestic 
investment), capital markets deepened substantially, and South African banks 
internationalized their operations and investments. Non- resident market 
capitalization as a percentage of total market capitalization has increased 
substantially since the early 2000s, both in equity, driven by robust liquidity and 
profitability, and debt, reflecting a sizeable carry trade attracted by high bond 
yields related to persistent current account deficits, and significant levels of 
offshore trading of rand- denominated assets (Isaacs and Kaltenbrunner,  2018). 
This trend has been accompanied by an increase in market- based credit relative 
to bank- based credit.5 These developments are in line with a general trend across 
low and middle- income countries, which has ignited growing concern about new 
vulnerabilities and the phenomenon of subordinate financialization in these 
economies.
These developments have resulted in key domestic prices—exchange rates, 
interest rates, and asset and property prices—becoming increasingly delinked 
from domestic conditions, and driven instead by financial conditions in high- 
income economies and the decisions of large institutional investors.6 Further, the 
changing demands of the global financial system on firms hoping to attract 
international investment have reinforced tendencies toward financialization in 
the domestic political economy. This is evident in increased payouts to 
shareholders in the post- apartheid period, driven by international investors’ 
demands for competitive rates of return to shareholders. The distribution of 
profits to financial markets depletes NFCs’ most efficient source of finance for 
expanded investment, entrenching an extractive and dependent relation between 
financial system and profitable enterprise.
South Africa’s integration into the global financial system has been accompa-
nied by shifts in the country’s corporate governance framework, and the role of 
corporate governance in relation to financialization. The processes of liberaliza-
tion, internationalization, and de- conglomeration came with a formal shift from 
a ‘management- controlled, “social club” approach’, dominated by family, cultural, 
and other informal networks, towards an Anglo- American7 corporate govern-
ance model centred around the principle of maximizing shareholder value (see 
Padayachee,  2013 and  2017). Aspects of the former ‘social club’ dispensation 
5 However, bank- based credit remains the dominating source of credit, covering almost 90 per cent 
of total credit to non- financial corporations in 2019 according to BIS Statistics.
6 These relations also act as a transmission channel for crisis in other parts of the world; exchange 
rate and bond yield movements in the context of the Covid- 19 crisis reflect this starkly.
7 In the sense of the countries, not the company.
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remain in place, however, and a remarkably consistent flow of corporate scandals 
and collapses has spanned across twenty- five years and four editions of the King 
codes, which set out corporate governance requirements with which all the com-
panies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), banks, financial institu-
tions, and SOEs must comply. Despite this, the World Bank and the Institute for 
International Finance ‘have rated South Africa among the top countries in terms 
of corporate best practice, and King 2 was seen as a benchmark worldwide’ 
(Padayachee, 2013: 268).
While the evidence on levels of actual compliance with corporate governance 
regulations and principles is mixed, the impact of the shareholder value 
maximization aspect of the post- apartheid shift is clear. This is reflected materially 
in rising shareholder payouts, but also in the institutional and regulatory 
environment that has facilitated increasing distribution of profits to financial 
markets. Provisions allowing companies (and, critically, their subsidiaries) to 
repurchase their own shares were introduced in 1999, followed by further rounds 
of deregulation, resulting in relatively lax requirements on authorization, 
announcements, and reporting.
Wesson (2015), whose research on repurchases in the South African context is 
unparalleled, notes that the South African regulatory environment is unique in its 
approach to repurchases. First, subsidiaries of a parent company can purchase 
parent company shares up to 10 per cent of the total. Repurchases in the 2000–9 
period were mainly driven by subsidiary repurchases since these were taxed at a 
lower rate than direct repurchases and dividends until 2012 (Wesson,  2015). 
Changes to the tax system introduced in 2012 reduced taxation on dividends in 
an effort to increase the country’s attractiveness to international investors (Nyere 
and Wesson, 2019). In addition, the stock exchange listing requirements state that 
a firm is only required to declare a repurchase once cumulative repurchases 
surpass 3 per cent of total shares. Due to ambiguity in these regulations, however, 
many firms interpret the rule to mean that they need only announce repurchases 
once these have surpassed 3 per cent in a single year, rather than 3 per cent 
cumulatively over multiple years (Wesson, 2015).
As a result, unlike in the USA, UK, France, Hong Kong, and most other 
countries with much stricter repurchase announcement requirements, in South 
Africa it is impossible to track the full extent of a company’s repurchasing activity 
in real time unless they are also listed on overseas exchanges (Wesson et al., 2015). 
Scrutiny of these regulatory lacunae has increased following a number of high- 
profile accounting scandals in leading South African firms, some of which have 
destroyed billions of Rands in value. However, decisive action on the part of the 
government or the JSE is lacking, and enforcement capacity remains weak 
(Crotty, 2019).
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10.4 Financialization of Non- financial Corporations: Sasol 
and Shoprite, a Comparative Case Study Analysis
It is worthwhile recapping the six major interlinked factors set out in 
 section 10.2: (1) sectoral heterogeneity (at firm, industry, and value chain levels); 
(2) value chain positioning and opportunities for rents; (3) financialization pres-
sures on firms due to endogenous asymmetries in GVCs; (4) ownership structure, 
especially in regard to foreign institutional investors; (5) risks associated with 
reliance on international financial markets for relatively cheap credit and foreign 
exchange needs; and (6) the impact on domestic enterprises of the need to pro-
vide foreign investors with high risk- adjusted returns due to middle- income 
countries’ subordinate position in global financial hierarchies.
This section examines how these factors play out in two JSE- listed South 
African firms located in different sectors and value chain positions: Sasol, an 
upstream producer of fuels, specialty chemicals and other primary inputs, and 
Shoprite, the country’s leading supermarket chain.
10.4.1 The Story of Sasol
Sasol was established in 1950 as the South African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation 
Ltd, a SOE. Privatized in the 1980s, Sasol is now a fullyfledged multinational 
company, employing over 30,000 people across thirty- two countries. Initially an 
energy producer specializing in coal- to- liquid (CTL) fuel production, Sasol later 
diversified into other synthetic fuels and industrial chemicals, a strategy the firm 
intensified in the post- 1994 democratic era in anticipation of lower profits from 
its energy- producing assets (Mondliwa and Roberts, 2019; and Chapter 4). This 
strategy proved successful, with Sasol coming to dominate the South African 
market across a range of specialized industrial chemicals, including polymers, 
explosives, waxes, and fertilizers, and forming part of a small group of highly 
vertically integrated firms that dominate the value chain from import, refinement, 
and production, to distribution and retail (Paelo et al., 2014).
Having secured its position in South Africa in the early years of the post- 1994 
dispensation, Sasol looked abroad in the 2000s. The firm listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange in 2003, and allocated significant capital expenditure to a series 
of overseas projects in Malaysia (2000), Mozambique (2000), Qatar (2003), China 
(2006/7), India (2008), Uzbekistan (2009), and a series of extremely large 
investments from 2011 onwards in North America (especially in Canada) (Sasol, 
2012; Mondliwa and Roberts, 2019; and Chapter 2).
The fuel and chemicals industries in which Sasol operates are highly strategic 
due to their economic impact on consumers and downstream industries (Paelo 
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et al., 2014). Mondliwa and Roberts (2019) among others have shown that Sasol 
has benefited from significant state support throughout the post- apartheid era via 
a number of channels. Direct support has included subsidies, large shareholdings 
by state development finance institutions, and other supportive industrial policy 
measures; indirect support has largely taken place through ineffective efforts to 
discipline and reallocate monopoly rents accruing to the set of dominant firms to 
which Sasol belongs (Davie,  2005; Zalk,  2014: 330; DTI,  2018). Efforts by the 
government to use regulation and competition policy to influence Sasol in ways 
that benefit downstream manufacturing and the economy more broadly have not 
only failed, but in some cases have been in direct conflict with other industrial 
policy measures and stated national strategies for growing the industrial base 
(Mondliwa and Roberts, 2019).
10.4.2 The Story of Shoprite
Like Sasol, Shoprite is a dominant player in an important strategic sector—food 
retail. Not only have Shoprite, its subsidiaries, and a small handful of major 
competitors maintained a firm grip on the South African market in spite of the 
entrance of new firms, they have extended their reach into a number of other 
countries on the continent. This expansion and search for new markets, aided by a 
strategy of differentiated brand offerings for different income groupings, has been 
identified as Shoprite’s key growth strategy (das Nair and Chisoro-Dube, 2017: 9).
Shoprite retains a market share of at least 30 per cent in South Africa. This has 
been due in part to a series of key acquisitions, including, famously, the acquisition 
of the OK Bazaars chain for R1—less than $5 at the time (Jones, 1997). Shoprite’s 
dominance is also due, in part, to large investments in an advanced retail and 
distribution infrastructure, including its own logistics fleet, and sophisticated 
information management systems (das Nair and Chisoro-Dube, 2015 and 2017). 
It is the only supermarket chain in the JSE’s top fifty firms, with the third- highest 
revenues and the third- highest number of employees (almost 150,000) on the 
exchange (Bosiu et al., 2017; Thomson- Reuters, 2019).
As a large employer and a dominant lead firm in an industry with a direct 
impact on households and a range of other non- financial sectors, Shoprite’s impact 
on the broader economy is significant. das Nair and Chisoro-Dube (2015) argue that 
more competition in the industry would be beneficial for households and suppliers, 
and describe a range of barriers to entry in the markets Shoprite operates in. 
These include prohibitive initial investment costs, and the time and ‘patient’ 
finance needed for the development of key capabilities, as well as a set of ‘strategic 
barriers’ essentially to do with anticompetitive practices by dominant firms (2015: 
17). das Nair and Chisoro-Dube (2017) also note that, as lead firms in their 
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supply chains, dominant supermarkets like Shoprite are able to exert huge pres-
sure on suppliers, primarily through demanding lower costs, larger quantities, 
and higher standards. Lastly, Shoprite has also benefited from substantial state 
support over the years, in the form of significant state ownership of equity, 
employment subsidies, and minimal penalties for anticompetitive behaviours 
(see Chapter 8).
10.4.3 The Symptoms of Financialization in Both Firms
Both Sasol and Shoprite show a number of symptoms of financialization. These 
reflect the spread of what Lazonick has referred to as ‘the American disease’—the 
extraction of profits or ‘excess cash’ out of firms and into financial markets via 
dividend payments, share repurchases, and payments to creditors. However, in 
these two cases the disease manifests differently than in Lazonick’s work in the US 
context, with growing shareholder distributions driven by dividends rather than 
share repurchases (see Figure 10.3).
Figure 10.3 compares shareholder distributions from 2000–9 with those from 
2010–19. Data for the earlier period are drawn from Wesson’s (2015) database for 
dividends and repurchases, while figures for the more recent period have been 
constructed from company financial statements and the Thomson- Reuters Eikon 
database.
It is clear that both firms have significantly increased their total distributions to 
shareholders (TDS), with Shoprite increasing TDS to a greater degree than Sasol. 
This shows that, in terms of the extent of their financialization, non- ME sectors 
may be in a process of ‘catching up’ with ME sectors. Perhaps most interestingly, 
dividends have driven the increase in total distributions, while growth in 
repurchases has been less significant in the latter period, even declining in Sasol’s 
case. This pattern resembles that observed by Andreoni et al. (2020) in the UK 
and broader European context, in contrast with the USA.
Clear shifts in strategy in relation to sources of funds are also observed in the 
latter period, with both firms financing capital expenditure, acquisitions, and 
shareholder distributions increasingly with debt (see Figure 10.4).
Two points can be made about Sasol’s sources of funds in the last twenty years 
or so. First, the funds Sasol raises from equity are extremely small in comparison 
with funds raised from sales revenues and from debt. The highest total raised 
from equity in a single year was equivalent to around US$750,000 in 2013, while 
in that same year around US$1.4bn was raised in debt alone. This evidence seems 
to confirm Lazonick’s (2008) proposition that the primary function of the modern 
stock market is not to provide resources to firms, but to extract from them.
The second point is that debt has increased rapidly from around 2012, in a 
context of first stagnating and then rapidly declining net income as oil prices 
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collapsed toward the end of 2014. These outcomes reflect a major strategic shift 
from 2011 onwards, led by the firm’s first ‘outsider’ CEO—a former FluorCorp 
executive, David Constable. A key outcome of this shift was that the company 
started to pivot away from major new investments in South Africa and other 
international operations in favour of new US- based ‘megaprojects’, the viability of 
which depended to a large extent on the maintenance of relatively high oil prices. 
Another related outcome was that it reorganized its corporate structure, 
organization, and culture in line with what Lazonick and others have described as 
a ‘downsize and distribute’ model of corporate governance. In the case of Sasol 





































































































Figure 10.3 Composition of distributions to shareholders, 2000–9 vs. 2010–19
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Figure 10.4 Sources and uses of funds in Sasol and Shoprite (2000–19)
Source: Company annual financial statements and Thomson- Reuters Eikon database.
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downstream operations, rapid increases in stock- based executive remuneration, 
and larger distributions to shareholders.
Related both to Sasol’s strategic pivot towards North America and loose 
monetary conditions in the USA, the currency composition and overall level of 
Sasol’s debt has changed drastically since 2011. Dollar- denominated debt surpassed 
rand- denominated debt in 2015 and has grown rapidly since, approaching the 
equivalent of R130bn in 2019, more than ten times its 2013 level. Sasol’s exposure 
to exchange rate risk, escalated by delays in the construction of key dollar- generating 
assets has clearly intensified sharply in recent years. Over the same period, a 
major decoupling has taken place between where Sasol generates its profits—
overwhelmingly and consistently in South Africa through the period studied 
here—and where it invests these profits, with capital expenditure in South Africa 
stagnating as investment in the USA took precedence from 2011 onwards.
Analysis of Shoprite’s sources of funds indicates a similar escalation in the 
proportion of debt to net income, with net debt increasingly volatile from 2008 
and growing rapidly from 2012 onwards. Shoprite has not experienced the same 
level of decline in net income as Sasol, but net incomes stagnated in 2017–18 and 
fell by a worrying 18 per cent from 2018 to 2019. Shoprite reported a large equity 
issue in 2017, to the value of R4.6bn. However, a close examination of its annual 
reports shows that this represented a large- scale conversion of debt securities into 
shares, and ought not to be considered as new funds raised from shareholders 
(Shoprite, 2012). These securities had been issued in 2012, to institutional 
investors only, as a means of funding acquisitions and to ‘shore up the balance 
sheet’ (News24, 2012).
While available data on the evolution and composition of Shoprite’s debt over 
the period studied are poor, its financial statements have reported growing dollar- 
denominated debt from 2015 onwards. These show that while rand- denominated 
debt increased from R110m to R134m between 2015 and 2018 (a 22 per cent 
increase), US dollar- denominated debt increased from R249m to R6.9bn—an 
increase of almost 2,700 per cent (Shoprite, 2016 and 2018). Such a rapid escalation 
in the firm’s foreign debt is concerning. Further, unlike Sasol (despite its present 
difficulties), Shoprite has acquired no assets that generate US dollars or any other 
‘hard currency’, and it appears to have no plans to develop any. It is also worth 
noting that large portions of Shoprite’s borrowings have come from branches of 
international banks based in tax havens including Mauritius and the Isle of Man.
Shoprite’s 2018 Integrated Annual Report acknowledges exchange rate 
volatility and shortages of hard currency as high- risk concerns that ‘continue to 
create major obstacles’ for the firm (p. 25). Shoprite’s key risk mitigation strategy 
is to increase investments in US treasury bills (short- term, low- yield debt 
obligations). This reflects one of the key concerns of the subordinate 
financialization perspective, as the strategy generates increased net flows of 
capital from EMDEs to advanced economies (see Lapavitsas, 2013; Powell, 2013). 
As Akyuz (2018) argues, these dynamics entrench EMDE current account deficits 
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as EMDE holdings of low- yielding foreign assets increase alongside relatively 
high- yielding foreign liabilities.
Another component of Shoprite’s risk mitigation strategy is that the firm 
instructs its subsidiaries to pay out its ‘excess’ cash to the parent company to pay 
back short- term debt (Shoprite Integrated Annual Report 2018: 25). This is made 
possible because Shoprite exercises control over a buyer- driven value chain. As a 
result of this power, resources that could be ploughed back into productive 
reinvestment, spread more equitably in less oligopolistic markets, or used to raise 
low wages and improve poor working conditions, are instead being paid out to 
Shoprite’s creditors and are lost to the continent entirely.
Building on Wesson’s (2015) finding that share repurchases in South Africa 
tend to be conducted via subsidiaries, it is argued here that these trends suggest 
increasing extraction of value out of productive assets and into financial markets.
10.4.4 Key Finding: Corporate Strategies Are Driven by 
the Availability of International Capital
The evidence presented above supports one of the key arguments of subordinate 
financialization scholars: that changes in NFCs’ corporate strategy—particularly 
regarding capital structure and investment patterns—have not been driven by 
operating characteristics, as theorized in orthodox economics, but by the 
availability of international capital to EMDE firms in an era of global financial 
liberalization (Powell, 2013).
The core findings illustrate an increase in financial activity relative to 
productive activity, indicated by an increasing reallocation of precious firm 
resources away from productive investment and toward financial interests, paying 
high returns to property in shareholdings and to creditors. It is also clear that 
while companies operating in different sectors and stages of the value chain are all 
affected by financialization, there is heterogeneity in the ways in which 
financialization operates across NFCs. So, to the extent that financialization can 
manifest differently, it also hampers structural transformation in different ways.
10.5 Conclusions
Over the last two decades, financialization in South Africa has been driven by the 
joint effect of the distribution of power in the domestic political economy and the 
nature of South Africa’s integration with global finance. These two factors have 
mutually reinforced each other and deprived the economy of the precious 
resources needed to spur investment- led structural transformation. Specifically, it 
has been shown how financialization has undermined the translation of profits 
into domestic investment, reducing its capacity to drive structural transformation.
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Post- apartheid liberalization and internationalization coincided with a global 
conjuncture in which private capital flows and underlying economic performance 
have become increasingly delinked. This has, in combination with increased 
international investment and trading in South African equity, debt, and currency 
markets, contributed to increased financial vulnerability and extraction of profits 
from South African firms.
The prevailing economic policy framework and the additional measures taken 
to buffer the economy from crisis have essentially socialized the costs of these 
developments, while the benefits accrue to international investors, domestic 
finance capital, speculative asset traders, and wealthy beneficiaries of asset price 
inflation. Safeguarding macroeconomic stability via inflation targeting and 
reserve accumulation has entrenched high interest rates and reliance on short- 
term inflows. As South Africa started to reconnect with international financial 
markets, NFCs were put under extreme pressure to conform with contemporary 
corporate strategies and to align with the international demand for shareholder 
value maximization. This realignment is at the expense of productive reinvestment 
of profits in general, and especially in South Africa where they are generated.
As shown in the two case studies in section 10.4, studies of financialization in 
middle- income countries can benefit a great deal from a firm- level analysis. This 
allows for the recognition of a range of heterogeneities at the firm, industry, and 
value chain level, an evaluation of how value chain positioning impacts the 
creation and extraction of rents, and the analysis of common financialization 
pressures faced by NFCs in spite of their differences. Sasol and Shoprite, lead 
firms operating in different sectors and value chain positions, clearly illustrate 
this. Both firms show symptoms of financialization, increasing their distributions 
to shareholders markedly in the period under study, with the composition of this 
increase driven by dividends rather than share repurchases. Despite their differing 
operating characteristics, the analysis of the firms’ sources and uses of funds 
shows that both have increasingly financed their investments, operations, and 
even shareholder distributions with debt, much of which has been denominated 
in US dollars. This has exposed both firms to significant risks given that the bulk 
of their profits are generated in Rands, and is an especially troubling development 
for Shoprite in light of its apparent lack of dollar- generating assets. The strategies 
employed to mitigate these risks reflect power dynamics underlying South Africa’s 
financialization on two levels: the acquisition of low- yielding, dollar- denominated 
‘safe haven’ assets to hedge against currency risk reflects the country’s subordinate 
position in the global hierarchy of currencies and financial markets; and the 
extraction of profits from subsidiaries to finance dramatically increased debt 
reflects the power of lead firms’ value chain position and market dominance.
These processes have further empowered domestic capital vis- à- vis the state, 
which has enacted forms of deregulation that further entrench financialization 
and appears to retain relatively little leverage to induce large domestic firms to 
invest in accordance with a strategic national growth path.
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While enabled by changes in corporate governance, financialization is 
entrenched within a broader political economy context in South Africa, and in 
South Africa’s relations with the rest of the world. Given the complex firm- level 
processes of financialization revealed by the case study analysis, a more detailed 
framework capable of unveiling heterogeneous processes of financialization is 
called for. Without such deep dives into specific company trajectories, corporate 
governance reforms alongside competition and industrial policy for structural 
transformation cannot be effective.
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The Middle- Income Trap and Premature 
Deindustrialization in South Africa
Antonio Andreoni and Fiona Tregenna
11.1 Introduction
The South African economy has been stagnant over an extended period of time, 
going back to the apartheid era. This is manifest in the lack of structural 
transformation and in weak economic growth. Even with the unique 
characteristics of the South African economy, it shares commonalities with some 
other middle- income countries and can be considered as an example of an 
economy stuck in the ‘middle income trap’. It has remained in middle- income 
status over a long period of time, without approaching a transition towards high- 
income status. Growth has been stagnant, with little improvement in average 
living standards. At a structural level, the economy has not undergone the kind of 
structural transformation that could form the basis for a shift towards a superior 
growth path.
Premature deindustrialization (Palma,  2005 and  2008; Tregenna 2009, 2015, 
2016a and 2016b; Rodrik, 2016) is among the key factors locking many middle- 
income countries in a trap of stagnant growth and thwarting their catching- up with 
advanced economies. When premature, deindustrialization is likely to have more 
severe consequences for growth than deindustrialization in advanced economies, 
as discussed further below. South Africa arguably started to deindustrialize in the 
early 1980s; by 2020 it was still at relatively low levels of income per capita and 
shares of manufacturing in gross domestic product (GDP) and total employment 
(see Chapter 2).
Beyond falling in the middle- income trap in general, with many of the features 
of premature deindustrialization, a further impediment to South Africa’s 
economic progress has been that the country can also be understood to have been 
stuck in a ‘middle income technology trap’. Andreoni and Tregenna (2020: 324) 
introduce this idea, conceptualized as ‘specific structural and institutional 
configurations that are not conducive to increasing domestic value addition and 
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to sustained industrial and technological upgrading’. This is reflected in the lack 
of crucial industrial and technological upgrading that could enable new 
development trajectories, with severe consequences for industrial development 
and economic growth. The middle- income technology trap is thus closely linked 
with the concept of premature deindustrialization.
The middle- income technology trap can contribute to premature deindustrializa-
tion, as the failure to upgrade manufacturing and move to more technology- 
intensive industries can exacerbate the poor performance of manufacturing. 
Premature deindustrialization, in turn, can contribute to countries being stuck in 
a middle- income trap. Linking the middle- income technology trap and premature 
deindustrialization presents the possibility of a vicious cycle of weak techno-
logical and broader industrial upgrading, deindustrialization, lack of structural 
 transformation, and poor economic growth.
This diagnosis brings to the fore the importance of industrial policies in 
supporting industrial development and structural transformation, in particular 
in promoting technological upgrading throughout manufacturing and a shift 
towards more technology- intensive manufacturing activities. The effectiveness of 
industrial policy in addressing premature deindustrialization in middle- income 
countries critically depends on the specific features of the industrial system. 
Indeed, countries that are traditionally classified in the group of middle- income 
countries are highly heterogeneous with respect to their premature 
deindustrialization experiences.
This chapter analyses structural change, the middle- income trap, and 
premature deindustrialization in South Africa, in the context of the specific 
industrialization challenges faced by middle- income countries today. It provides 
global and regional evidence for the different premature deindustrialization 
trajectories that countries have followed. Throughout the chapter, reference is 
made to three selected middle- income countries as comparator cases: Brazil, 
China, and Malaysia. Whereas South Africa previously (up until 1972) had the 
highest income per capita of these countries, by 2020 it had the lowest. The four 
countries have followed very different policies, with diverse outcomes in 
structural transformation and growth. While there are some commonalities 
among them, these marked differences draw attention to the profound deficiencies 
in South Africa’s policy choices and economic outcomes.
Section 11.2 discusses the issue of the ‘middle- income trap’ and the challenges 
that middle- income countries face in industrializing during the current period. 
Section 11.3 presents an empirical analysis of selected global evidence on the 
phenomenon of premature deindustrialization, situating South Africa in an 
international comparative perspective. Section 11.4 briefly discusses industrial 
policy implications for middle- income countries, and section 11.5 concludes.
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11.2 The Middle- Income Trap, the Middle- Income Technology 
Trap, and Industrialization Challenges
11.2.1 The Middle- Income Trap
As a stylized fact, many middle- income economies have experienced stagnant 
economic growth and have struggled to transition to high- income status. In some 
cases, this manifests as a slowdown in growth after an earlier period of more rapid 
growth that took them from low- to middle- income status. The notion of a 
‘middle- income trap’ has been used to refer broadly to the problem of a failure of 
middle- income countries catching up with advanced economies and transitioning 
to upper- income status.1 Many middle- income countries have experienced 
stagnant growth (in both absolute and relative terms) over a long period of time, 
and being ‘trapped’ in an apparent low- growth equilibrium.
It is worth noting that the middle- income trap is not a confinement from 
which countries have no hope of escape. Between 1994 (the year of South Africa’s 
democratization) and 2019, nine countries that had been classified as lower- 
middle- income transitioned to high- income status; seven of these nine countries 
were East European. In addition, over this period, a diverse group of twenty- two 
countries moved from upper- middle- income to high- income status, including 
Chile, Greece, Hungary, Uruguay, and Saudi Arabia. This indicates that there is a 
degree of mobility, and that some countries have moved ahead while South Africa 
has remained stuck in middle- income status. South Africa was one of nine 
countries classified as middle- income in both 1994 and 2019, with others 
including Brazil, Argentina, Malaysia, and Mexico. Of course, within these 
countries that remained in middle- income status during this period, some (such 
as Malaysia) followed a catching- up trajectory while others (including South 
Africa) fell further behind, as discussed further below. Eight low- income and 
thirty- five lower- middle income countries moved to upper- middle- income status 
between 1994 and 2019, a number of these overtaking South Africa in income 
per capita.
Of course, these income categories are based only on income levels (specifically, 
gross national income (GNI) per capita in US$), and do not reflect the deeper 
structural features that are associated with the concept of a middle- income 
trap. Nonetheless, these observations do point on the one hand to the stagnation 
of some countries (including South Africa) in middle- income status, while on 
1 For recent literature on the middle- income trap, see for instance Gill and Kharas, 2007; Arias and 
Wen (2015); Wade (2016); Felipe et al. (2017); Kang and Paus (2020); Klingler- Vidra and Wade (2020); 
Lebdioui et al. (2020); and Paus (2020).
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the other hand others have been able to attain sustained high growth rates 
and transition to high- income status, some of these overtaking South Africa in 
the process.2
Various explanations have been advanced for the apparent prevalence and 
persistence of the middle- income trap (see Wade,  2016). One focuses on 
productivity, and specifically the failure of middle- income countries to sustain 
rates of labour productivity growth above those of advanced economies (see, for 
example, Lin, 2017). Other authors such as Lee (2013) draws attention to middle- 
income countries being squeezed between, on the one hand, countries with lower 
wages and that have been successful as large- scale exporters, and on the other 
hand, more technologically advanced economies.
If the idea is embraced that manufacturing industries play a critical role in 
boosting productivity, value addition, and technological change, premature 
deindustrialization could be another factor responsible for the phenomenon of 
the middle- income trap. Countries can be considered to experience premature 
deindustrialization when the level of GDP per capita and/or the shares of 
manufacturing in total employment and GDP at which deindustrialization sets in 
are lower than is typically the case internationally.
11.2.2 South Africa: Stuck in the Middle
According to various indicators of industrial competitiveness, South Africa is 
stuck in the middle- income countries segment, and has shown signs of an 
ongoing process of premature deindustrialization. Over several decades, the 
annual growth rate of the manufacturing sector has slowed down dramatically, 
thereby affecting the absolute manufacturing value addition produced in the 
country. As a result of this premature deindustrialization process, if South Africa’s 
export performances are benchmarked against those of other middle- income 
countries, gross export value is shown to increase after 2000, but at a much slower 
pace than major comparator countries.3
Figure 11.1 compares the evolution of South Africa’s GDP per capita with that 
of the three comparator middle- income countries that are referenced throughout 
this chapter: Brazil, China, and Malaysia. Each of the four countries’ GDP per 
capita is shown relative to that of the USA over the period 1960–2019, showing 
the extent to which they are catching up or falling behind.
2 See Felipe et al. (2017) for a systematic analysis of countries’ historical transitions between 
income categories; they argue that the evidence suggests that there is no generalized phenomenon of a 
middle- income trap.
3 Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive overview of relevant empirical trends in the South African 
manufacturing sector, demonstrating the lack of structural transformation and deindustrialization.
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Until 1972, South Africa had the highest level of GDP per capita in the group, 
after which it was overtaken by Brazil. South Africa was then overtaken by 
Malaysia in 1993 and China in 2018, leaving it with the lowest income level 
among these four countries. South Africa’s income per capita remained at a little 
over a quarter of that of the USA until the mid- 1970s, but this ratio fell 
dramatically during the 1990s and 2000s. There was modest growth in South 
Africa during the 2000s, which saw some catching- up with the US benchmark. 
However, this ratio has fallen again from 2011 onwards. Thus, over an extended 
period of time, instead of catching up, South Africa fell further behind, with a 
GDP per capita just 13 per cent of that of the US in 2019.
Figure  11.1 also illustrates the contrasting fortunes of the three comparator 
countries, all of which are currently classified as middle- income economies. 
Brazil experienced rapid catching- up from 1966 to 1980, reaching almost 30 per 
cent of US income per capita; it then experienced a short period of catching- up 
during the Lula presidency and the early years of the Dilma presidency, before 
again falling behind the USA as well as being overtaken by Malaysia in 2016. 
Malaysia and China are pre- eminent examples of sustained catching- up. China’s 
GDP per capita rose from just 1 per cent of that of the USA to 15 per cent over the 
period shown. While these are both classified as middle- income countries at the 
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Figure 11.1 South Africa and comparator countries: % of US GDP per capita 1960–2019
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators (WB WDI).
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It is true that virtually all countries would show up poorly when benchmarked 
against China’s long- run growth miracle. Yet South Africa performed poorly 
when compared not just against the three comparator countries and the bench-
mark of the US as shown here, but against all relevant country groupings and 
aggregates.
This underscores the long- term structural deficiencies of South Africa’s 
economy and growth trajectory, and the extent to which it is has remained stuck 
in its middle- income position and in fact has fallen down the global rankings in 
GDP per capita. Even during the period of relatively rapid economic growth in 
the 2000s, there was a failure of structural transformation in the South African 
economy.
11.2.3 Structural Challenges: The Middle- Income Technology Trap
Andreoni and Tregenna (2020) identify three specific structural factors associated 
with the middle- income trap: breaking into globally concentrated industrial 
production; linking up with global value chains (GVCs) while also linking back 
with local production systems; and keeping pace with technological change. The 
combined impact of these three structural challenges is what they call the ‘middle- 
income technology trap’. Indeed, capturing this set of factors and observing how 
they unfold in different countries along different structural trajectories constitutes 
a key step in designing appropriate industrial policy for middle- income countries.
11.2.3.1 The Challenges of Breaking into Globally Concentrated 
Manufacturing Production
First, global industrial production generally remains highly concentrated, with 
world manufacturing value added shares being captured by a few mature and 
emerging economies. This is despite a small number of countries (especially in 
East Asia) having managed to meaningfully expand and upgrade their industrial 
production. In this context of the global industrial landscape, South Africa has 
faced a fundamental challenge in increasing its domestic value added (DVA) in 
manufacturing industries and exported products. Simply put, manufacturing 
DVA indicates the extent to which a country adds value in manufacturing, 
excluding the value of imported intermediate inputs. In South Africa, the net 
DVA declined among all major manufacturing subsectors between 1995 and 2008 
(Figure  11.2). Some recovery was registered after 2008, for example in the 
machinery and equipment industries (see Chapter 13).
11.2.3.2 The Challenge of Linking Up with GVCs While Linking Back with 
Local Production Systems
A second challenge identified by Andreoni and Tregenna (2020) is that of ‘linking 
up’ through productive integration in GVCs, while also ‘linking back’ with the 
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local production system. It is important that countries develop their industrial 
capabilities and maximize the potential benefits of forward integration into 
GVCs.4 Between 1990 and 2010, African countries experienced limited gains 
from GVC integration and declining forward integration (and DVA) in 
international trade. Much of Africa’s participation in GVCs has developed in 
upstream production (backward integration), with declining downstream 
integration. South Africa has seen an increase in backward integration, measured 
in this context as the share of foreign value added in exports, from 17 per cent in 
1995 to 30 per cent in 2011 (Figure 11.3).
Middle- income countries like South Africa typically struggle to move into the 
more complex, technologically sophisticated, and profitable segments of GVCs, 
which can contribute to their often remaining stuck in a middle- income 
technology trap, and a middle- income trap more broadly. Where middle- income 
countries’ engagement with RVCs or GVCs is predominantly in low value- added 
production, this brings the risk of disarticulation with the domestic manufacturing 
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Figure 11.2 Domestic value- added content of South African exports by major 
manufacturing sub- sectors
Source: Authors, based on TIVA.
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sector and a hollowing out of domestic industrial capabilities. This points to the 
importance of ‘linking back’ with domestic production systems, in a way that fos-
ters structural transformation. GVC upgrading involves transitioning to more 
profitable and/or technologically advanced economic niches within GVCs. To do 
so, firms require multiple sets of capabilities that are relevant to various stages of 
value chains (Figure 11.3).
Intersectoral upgrading is becoming increasingly important, given that 
modern, high- value manufacturing activities require cross- cutting capabilities 
and technology systems. Technology systems such as biotechnologies, advanced 
materials, microelectronics, and automation are required in a range of 
manufacturing activities (Chapter 12). These complementary sets of capabilities 
are thus important for innovation and technological upgrading—both intra- and 
inter- sectoral upgrading—and hence to enable new development trajectories.
11.2.3.3 The Challenge of Keeping Pace with Technological Change
A third challenge is that of ‘keeping pace’ with technological change and 
innovation (Andreoni and Tregenna,  2020). Technological change at the 
innovation frontier—the so- called fourth industrial revolution—has increasingly 
been recognized by lower- and middle- income countries as a critical competitive 
factor for GVC upgrading and a leapfrogging opportunity.
‘Key technology systems’ are particularly important in keeping pace with 
technological change, especially in the current global industrial landscape. The 
European Commission (2009), for example, identified the following list of 
technology systems as key enablers of innovation and structural change in the 











Sectoral Value Chain Y
Sectoral Value Chain z










Figure 11.3 Capturing high- value niches and the need for multiple sets of 
complementary capabilities
Source: Andreoni (2019).
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industrial biotechnology, advanced materials, and advanced manufacturing 
 systems. These key enabling technologies (KETs) are transversal, in that they are 
utilized across multiple sectors and supply chains. They are also embedded, 
playing an important function in integrated technology systems. Key technology 
systems have the potential to be quality- enhancing, productivity- enhancing, and 
strategic. All of these characteristics render key technology systems important in 
technological upgrading and for avoiding a middle- income technology trap.
Regarding the challenge of keeping pace with these technologies, Table  11.1 
compares South Africa with Brazil, China, and Malaysia for some key research 
and development (R&D) and technology indicators. The comparisons show 
South Africa ranked as the worst in all seven of these measures. For instance, 
South Africa had approximately one- third of the R&D personnel per million 
inhabitants as did both China and Malaysia, and also spent far less on R&D (both 
as a percentage of GDP and per capita) than the three comparator countries. As 
an indication of technological intensity, South Africa had by far the lowest share 
of high- technology exports in total manufactured exports. South Africa is clearly 
a laggard in both the ‘inputs’ to technological upgrading and the ‘outcomes’ in 
technological intensity and, as seen earlier, economic growth. Insofar as ‘keeping 
pace’ is important in avoiding a middle- income trap, these comparisons do not 
bode well for South Africa’s prospects of catching up.
Furthermore, recognizing the role of ‘key technology systems’ draws attention 
to the fact that there are important functions and activities relating to these 
technological capabilities which are not necessarily located in individual manu-
facturing firms. For instance, these activities could be in separate engineering, 
design, and research institutions and businesses, which may be classified within 
Table 11.1 South Africa and comparator countries: R&D and technology indicators
 Brazil China Malaysia South 
Africa
Total R&D personnel per million inhabitants 2,917 3,824 3,835 1,327
Total R&D personnel per thousand total 
employment
6.3 7.0 8.3 4.6
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D as a 
percentage of GDP
1.3 2.1 1.4 0.8
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D per 
capita (current PPP$)
194 320 405 108
Scientific and technical journal articles 60,148 528,263 23,661 13,009
Patent applications, residents 4,980 1,393,815 1,116 657
High- technology exports (% of manufactured 
exports)
13.0 31.4 52.8 5.3
Note: Each variable is shown for the most recent year for which data are available for all four  
countries; years and data sources as follows: both R&D personnel measures are for 2014 and from 
UNESCO; both R&D expenditure measures are for 2014 and from UNESCO; all other measures are 
for 2018 and from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WB WDI).
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the services sector. While sector categories remain relevant, the blurring between 
sectoral divisions and the growing integration between sectors needs to be 
recognized (Andreoni and Chang, 2017; Cramer and Tregenna, 2020). This also 
affects apparent trends in manufacturing employment and output shares. While 
manufacturing employment share may have remained steady or even fallen in 
countries that have successfully developed these capabilities, the manufacturing 
share is nevertheless higher than predicted, as in the cases of China and Malaysia 
for instance.
Apparent deindustrialization, based on aggregate trends in manufacturing 
output or employment, can obscure different dynamics in the composition of 
manufacturing, in productivity (Tregenna,  2009 and  2013), the extent of 
outsourcing to the services sector (Tregenna, 2010), and, of particular relevance 
here, the role of ‘key technology systems’. Structural transformation involves not 
just change in the overall sectoral composition of the economy, but also a shift 
towards activities with the scope for higher cumulative productivity increases. 
Key technology systems have important roles to play in this, irrespective of the 
sectors within which these activities may be formally classified.
Middle- income countries such as South Africa run the risk of undermining 
the ‘technological preconditions’ that have to be met in order to capture value 
opportunities from technological change. For example, to make investments in 
ICT and digital solutions valuable, investments in the production capacity and 
hardware and organizational capabilities must be in place. In particular, the 
integration of digital technologies and networks with robotics and autonomous 
systems requires investments in key technology sub- systems and components, 
including automation and m2m (machine- to- machine) technologies, embedded 
software, sensors and human interfaces, and augmented reality. These emerging 
technologies are expected to reshape the industrial plant of the future, making 
processes faster and more responsive, while reshaping the nature of jobs and skills 
(see Chapter 12).
11.3 Premature Deindustrialization: South Africa from 
an International Comparative Perspective
This triple set of structural challenges faced by middle- income countries, as 
synthesized in the idea of a ‘middle- income technology trap’, highlights the 
existence of potential reinforcing mechanisms and cumulative vicious cycles 
undermining structural transformation.5 Specifically, breaking into the global 
5 The literature on circular and cumulative causation initiated by Allyin Young and later developed 
by several structuralist and development scholars, including Gunnar Myrdal and Nicholas Kaldor, has 
emphasized the risks of cumulativeness and circularity in structural dynamics. While these properties 
can be responsible for virtuous expansionary cycles of increasing returns, they can also turn into 
negative cycles and a low- level equilibrium trap. For a review, see Toner, 1999.
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economy, linking up while linking back, and keeping pace with technological 
change are in themselves interlinked challenges. But they are also intertwined and 
reinforced by the cumulative structural dynamics of industrialization or 
deindustrialization. If a country falls behind in its industrialization pathway, and 
it shows signs of premature deindustrialization, the triple set of structural 
challenges discussed above becomes progressively more constraining. With a 
reduction in a country’s industrial base, its opportunities for DVA shrinks, and its 
companies will find it increasingly difficult to ‘link back’. Furthermore, 
investments in technological upgrading and innovation will be limited by reduced 
expansionary dynamics and scale across manufacturing industries. These 
domestic dynamics of manufacturing and technological contraction will also be 
reflected in a reduced international competitiveness and potential growth in import 
penetration. It is then unsurprising that many countries that are stuck in a middle- 
income technology trap have also undergone a process of deindustrialization, in 
particular premature deindustrialization.
Having explored the structural challenges facing middle- income countries, the 
discussion turns to a closer exploration of deindustrialization. Deindustrialization 
trends across countries are empirically analysed, the patterns and dynamics of 
deindustrialization internationally—in particular premature deindustrialization—
are explored, and South Africa is located in the context of these trends.
The first step is an estimation of the relationship between countries’ GDP per 
capita and their shares of manufacturing in total employment. This simple 
regression analysis enables the identification of the level of GDP per capita and 
share of manufacturing in total employment associated with the ‘turning point’ at 
which the share of manufacturing levels off and begins to decline. Second, is the 
characterization of country experiences based on countries’ changes in share of 
manufacturing in total employment, and on whether their actual share of 
manufacturing in total employment is higher or lower than the regression analysis 
would predict. Countries are categorized based on these two dimensions. Finally, 
combining this with data on countries’ 2015 level of GDP per capita and 
manufacturing employment share makes it possible to identify potential 
premature deindustrializers among middle- income economies. Throughout, 
particular attention is drawn to the case of South Africa, while also making 
reference to the three comparator countries.
11.3.1 The ‘Inverted- U’ Pattern of Industrialization 
and Deindustrialization
This part of the study begins with an analysis of the relationship between GDP 
per capita and the share of manufacturing in total employment. This step of the 
method follows Rowthorn (1994), Palma (2005 and 2008), Tregenna (2015), and 
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Tregenna and Andreoni (2020). Rowthorn (1994) identifies an inverted- U 
relationship between countries. That is, at higher levels of GDP per capita, the 
share of manufacturing in total employment typically rises, up to a turning point 
associated with a particular level of GDP per capita and share of manufacturing 
employment, after which manufacturing accounts for a declining share of total 
employment. Naturally, this is a stylized pattern based on data for many countries, 
and countries will inevitably have either a higher or lower actual employment 
share than would be predicted, based on the regression analysis.
The share of manufacturing employment in total employment is estimated as a 
function of GDP per capita and GDP per capita squared (all in natural logs). The 
inclusion of the squared term takes account of the expected non- linear 
relationship between the explanatory and independent variables.6 The final 
sample comprises 148 countries, with excellent coverage across regions and 
across levels of development.7
The results confirm the expected inverted- U relationship between GDP per 
capita and manufacturing share of employment. This simple regression yields an 
estimated turning point for 2015 of approximately $17 000 (2015 current US$). 
This level of GDP per capita corresponds (in this regression) to a 12 per cent 
share of manufacturing in total employment. The curve is shown in Figure 11.4, 
which also shows the turning point of the regression—the level of GDP per capita 
and associated share of manufacturing in total employment at which the latter 
levels off and subsequently begins to decline.
11.3.2 Characterizing Country Patterns
Next, countries are categorized based on two dimensions. First, whether their 
actual share of manufacturing in total employment in 2015 was higher or lower 
than would be ‘predicted’ based on their level of GDP per capita in 2015 and the 
estimated coefficients from the regression (that is, the sign of the residual term 
for each country). This dimension gives a sense of which countries may be ‘under- 
industrialized’ given their level of GDP per capita. Where this is positive, a 
country falls above the curve in Figure 11.4, and conversely where this is negative. 
Second, whether they experienced an increase or decrease in the share of 
6 Data on GDP per capita and population are from the United Nations (UN) Main National 
Accounts database (UNMNA), available at https://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/Introduction.asp 
(UNMNA). GDP data are in current US$. Data on manufacturing share of employment are taken 
from the International Labour Organisation (ILO) ILOSTAT database, available at http://www.ilo.org/
ilostat/faces/ilostat- home/home?_adf.ctrl- state=97dmq1had_4%26_afrLoop=410,550,119,330,777#.
7 The initial sample includes 181 countries for which data are available on all variables for both 
2005 and 2015. All countries with a population below one million people are excluded from the sam-
ple. This excludes from the analysis small island nations and other small countries, which may follow 
atypical development paths that can distort the analysis. A further three countries identified as outli-
ers are also excluded.
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manufacturing in their total employment between 2005 and 2015. This second 
dimension indicates which countries can be considered (simply on the basis of 
sectoral employment shares) to have deindustrialized during this period. Taken 
together, these two dimensions allow for the tentative classification of countries 
into four broad categories, depicted schematically in the four quadrants of 
Figure 11.5.
It must be emphasized that this analysis is exploratory and indicative, rather 
than definitive.8 It is thus only suggestive of which countries might be considered 
as deindustrializers, and especially as premature deindustrializers.
Quadrant I includes countries in which the share of manufacturing employ-
ment is higher than expected in 2015, and in which this share grew between 2005 
and 2015. Based on this analysis, these countries do not raise a concern in terms 
of deindustrialization. Countries in Quadrant 4 are also growing their share 
of manufacturing in total employment, which in 2015 remained below their 
‘expected’ values. Thus, even though these countries might be regarded as 
8 Reasons for circumspection include: that this is just one approach to conceptualizing and meas-
uring premature deindustrialization; the inclusion of estimated values in the ILOSTAT database; limi-
tations of the econometric methodology and specification (including the non- inclusion of explanatory 
variables other than GDP per capita and its squared term); the narrow range of the predicted values of 
manufacturing share of total employment; measurement of deindustrialization only in terms of 
employment shares and not also shares in GDP; and sensitivity to the specific years used in the analy-
sis. Furthermore, to reach more definitive conclusions, individual country- level analysis would be 
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Figure 11.4 Estimated relationship between GDP per capita and manufacturing 
share of employment, 2015
Note: Dashed lines indicate the turning point of the relationship.
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‘under- industrialized’, they show evidence of industrializing during this 
 decade (2005–15).
Countries falling in Quadrants II and III can be characterized as possible 
deindustrializers, in that their share of manufacturing in total employment fell 
between 2005 and 2015. Yet, in the case of Quadrant II countries, their 
manufacturing employment share in 2015 still remained above their 
‘expected’ level.
From the standpoint of structural change and concerns around the impact of 
deindustrialization on growth, it is the countries falling in Quadrant III that 
potentially raise more significant concerns. In these countries, the share of 
manufacturing in employment fell over the period 2005–15 as well as being lower 
than expected (based on cross- country regressions) in 2015. Rather than catching 
up to their ‘expected’ level of industrialization, this group of countries fell further 
behind. Furthermore, some of these countries had a higher than expected level of 
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x-axis: change in share of manufacturing in country’s employment, 2005–2015
QUADRANT III
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Figure 11.5 Characterization of international trends in deindustrialization
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South Africa falls in Quadrant III—the category of greatest potential concern in 
terms of deindustrialization. Between 2005 and 2015, the share of manufacturing 
in South Africa’s total employment fell from 13.9 per cent to 11.2 per cent (based on 
the ILOSTAT data). Worth noting is that this is in fact only slightly below the 
expected value for 2015 based on South Africa’s GDP per capita and international 
patterns of widespread deindustrialization; that is, South Africa’s share is actually 
close to its predicted value.
In contrast with South Africa, the three comparator countries—Brazil, China, 
and Malaysia—all fall in Quadrant II. Like South Africa, their share of 
manufacturing in total employment declined between 2005 and 2015. Yet, unlike 
the case of South Africa, their share of manufacturing in total employment 
remained higher than predicted in 2015. A key factor in this difference is that 
these three comparator countries began the period of analysis at relatively higher 
shares of manufacturing in total employment, for their levels of income per 
capita, than in the case of South Africa.
Key statistics for South Africa, Brazil, China, and Malaysia are shown in 
Table  11.2. South Africa had the lowest share of manufacturing in total 
employment in both 2005 and 2015. Moreover, as discussed, it is the only one 
among this cohort of countries to have a lower than predicted share of 
manufacturing in total employment in 2015 (albeit only very slightly lower than 
predicted). Brazil’s actual share is only slightly higher than its predicted share, 
while in China and Malaysia the actual shares were well above predicted shares, 
indicating the high levels of industrialization in the latter two countries.
11.3.3 Identifying Possible Premature Deindustrializers
Next, Quadrant III countries are further divided into those that might be regarded 
as possible premature deindustrializers. Possible premature deindustrializers for 
2015 are identified as those countries in which: (1) the share of manufacturing in 
Table 11.2 South Africa and comparator countries
 Actual share of 
manuf. in total 
employment 2005 (%)
Actual share of 
manuf. in total 
employment 2015 (%)
Difference btw actual & 
predicted share of manuf. in 




Brazil 14.2 12.5 0.7
China 23.6 17.6 5.9
Malaysia 19.8 16.5 4.6
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total employment fell between 2005 and 2015; (2) the share of manufacturing in 
total employment in 2015 was less than would be expected based on their GDP 
per capita (i.e. they fell below the curve shown in Figure 11.4; and (3) their GDP 
per capita in 2015 was below the level of GDP per capita associated with the 
turning point in the relationship based on the pattern found across countries (i.e. 
they fell to the left of the turning point shown in Figure 11.4). As such, this set of 
countries excludes those in Quadrant III with levels of GDP per capita above the 
income turning point (i.e. advanced economies that are deindustrializing). This 
part of the analysis thus introduces a third dimension (to the left or right of the 
income turning point), to identify the (potential) premature aspect of the 
deindustrialization experiences internationally.
From this, middle- income countries that emerge as possible premature 
deindustrializers are listed in Table  11.3. This excludes low- income (e.g. 
Zimbabwe) and high- income (e.g. Chile) countries that also fit the criteria of 
possible premature deindustrializers.
11.4 The Role of Industrial Policy in Avoiding 
the Middle- Income Trap
This section is a brief reflection on some industrial policy implications (industrial 
policy for structural transformation is more fully discussed in Chapter  15). 
Industrial policy is crucial for avoiding a middle- income technology trap in 
general and a middle- income technology trap in particular, for avoiding or 
reversing premature deindustrialization, and of course more broadly for 
structural transformation. Table  11.4 provides a list of industrial policy 
instruments, organized around five key policy areas, namely: building production, 
technological, and organizational capabilities; innovation and technological 
change; linking up while linking back into GVC and industrial restructuring; 
demand and trade; and industrial finance.
These areas have been selected as they match the critical challenges that 
countries in the middle- income status present, which might also relate to their 
premature deindustrialization. A number of policy instruments are effective tools 
in addressing more than one policy area. The table also shows the extent to which 
the selected comparator countries—Brazil, China, and Malaysia—have adopted 
these instruments (for a discussion of the historical trajectories in industrial 
policymaking across these countries, see Andreoni and Tregenna,  2018; and 
Andreoni and Tregenna, 2020).
As discussed in Andreoni (2016), the identification of a mix of policy 
instruments is only the first step. Indeed, these instruments must be aligned, 
coordinated, and synchronized over time. Andreoni (2016) conceptualizes an 
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industry policy matrix with three main axes. First, the ‘industrial policy 
governance model’, referring to the level at which policies are implemented 
(regional/state, national/federal, or in some cases supranational). Second, 
‘industrial policy targets and areas’, in terms of the cluster of objectives addressed 
by each industrial policy instrument (for example, instruments aimed at the 
‘innovation and technology infrastructure’ policy area). Third, ‘industrial policy 
levels of intervention’, in respect of how selective each industrial policy instrument 
is. While some policy instruments are sector- specific or even firm- specific, others 
are applicable to manufacturing as a whole and others are macroeconomic in 
nature (although even these economy- wide measures will typically have uneven 
effects across sectors).
Combinations of industrial policy measures can be directed at a common 
objective, or they can be used to manage trade- offs between competing objectives. 
The success of any individual industrial policy measure will be conditional on 
how it is coordinated with other measures affecting the same firm, sector, or value 
chain. This underscores the importance of coordination between industrial policy 
Table 11.3 Possible middle- income premature deindustrializers, 2005–15
Country Income group Region
Albania Upper- middle Europe and Central Asia
Angola Upper- middle Sub- Saharan Africa
Armenia Lower- middle Europe and Central Asia
Botswana Upper- middle Sub- Saharan Africa
Cameroon Lower- middle Sub- Saharan Africa
Costa Rica Upper- middle Latin America and the Caribbean
Cuba Upper- middle Latin America and the Caribbean
Dominican Republic Upper- middle Latin America and the Caribbean
Ecuador Upper- middle Latin America and the Caribbean
Georgia Upper- middle Europe and Central Asia
Ghana Lower- middle Sub- Saharan Africa
Iraq Upper- middle Middle East and North Africa
Jamaica Upper- middle Latin America and the Caribbean
Kazakhstan Upper- middle Europe and Central Asia
Kyrgyzstan Lower- middle Europe and Central Asia
Mauritania Lower- middle Sub- Saharan Africa
Namibia Upper- middle Sub- Saharan Africa
Panama Upper- middle Latin America and the Caribbean
Peru Upper- middle Latin America and the Caribbean
Philippines Lower- middle East Asia and Pacific
South Africa Upper- middle Sub- Saharan Africa
Tajikistan Lower- middle Europe and Central Asia
Note: Countries listed in alphabetical order. Income and regional group classifications based on World 
Bank classification; income groups use 2015 classification (see https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/

























Table 11.4 An industrial policy toolbox for middle- income countries
Areas Critical challenges for middle- income countries  Policy instruments Brazil China Malaysia South 
Africa
1 Building capabilities 1.1 Skills policy X XXX XX X
1.2 Technology and extension services via 
intermediate institutions
XXX XXX XX X
1.3 & 
2.1
Matching grants and targeted subsidies for 
investment
XX XXX XX XXX
2 Innovation and technological change 2.2 Public- private partnerships and consortia 
with universities
XX XXX XX XXX
2.3 Joint ventures with multinational 
corporations
XX XXX XX XX
3 Linking up while linking back into GVCs and 
industrial restructuring
3.1 Strategic mergers and acquisitions, and 
recession cartels
X XXX X X
3.2 Competition policy X XX X XX
3.3 FDI incentives X XXX XX X
3.4 Local content policy XXX XXX XX XX
3.5 SMEs targeted investments X XX X X
3.6 Cluster policy X XX X X
3.7 Special economic zones X XXX XX X
4 Demand and trade 4.1 Export promotion zones X XXX XXX X
4.2 Export cartels X XXX X X
4.3 Selective trade policy XX XXX XX X
























5 Industrial finance 5.1 Export finance services X XXX X X
  5.2 Development banks XXX XXX XX X
  5.3 Sector- specific development banks X XXX X X
  5.4 Hybrid finance solutions combining grants, 
loans, subsidies
XX XXX XX X
  5.5 Direct investment policy and SOEs XXX XXX XX XX
Source: Authors, based on Andreoni, 2016; Andreoni and Tregenna, 2018; Andreoni and Tregenna, 2020; UNIDO, 2020.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 15/07/21, SPi
256 The Middle-Income Trap and Premature deindustrialization
and other domains—such as macroeconomic policy, innovation and technology 
policy, labour market policies, trade policy, infrastructure policy, and so on—in 
setting countries on a path of avoiding or escaping a middle- income trap and 
avoiding or reversing premature deindustrialization.
Andreoni and Tregenna (2020) point to three important policy issues with 
regard to a middle- income technology trap and a middle- income trap in general. 
First, while there are substantial opportunities for upgrading in value chains, this 
requires significant industrial policy support, including in key technological and 
product services. Second, it is important that firms and countries deepen their 
productive and technological capabilities to support innovation and upgrading. 
Third, countries need to both ‘link up’ and ‘link back’ through the development 
and integration of their local production systems, including through technological 
upgrading.
While industrial policies must inevitably have a particular focus on the 
manufacturing sector, they also need to apply to other sectors and to the ways in 
which sectors are interconnected. As shown here, South Africa lags behind 
comparator countries in R&D and technological intensity, which are especially 
important for avoiding a middle- income technology trap and for structural 
transformation more broadly. This points to the critical importance of policies 
specifically designed to support R&D, innovation, and technological upgrading 
as integral aspects of industrial development.
There is a great deal of heterogeneity among middle- income economies, 
including between South Africa and the three comparator countries referenced 
here—Brazil, China, and Malaysia. This includes differences in their industrial 
policies and in their innovation and technology performance. While all four 
countries show evidence of having deindustrialized, the analysis presented here 
draws attention to the difference between the trajectories in South Africa and the 
other three countries. South Africa presents as a failure of structural 
transformation, while Malaysia and China represent exemplars of structural 
transformation in middle- income countries. Unsurprisingly, these four middle- 
income countries had dramatically differing fortunes in economic growth.
11.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter assesses the development and industrialization challenges facing 
South Africa as a middle- income country—and moreover, as a country that is 
arguably caught in a middle- income trap. South Africa can also be understood as 
being in a middle- income technology trap, failing in the technological upgrading 
necessary for structural transformation and catching- up. ‘Stuck in the middle’, 
South Africa—alongside a number of middle- income countries—has been unable 
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to break out of its middle- income status. On the contrary, South Africa has been 
falling behind frontier economies and falling down global GDP rankings over a 
long period of time. Far from catching up with advanced economies, other 
countries are catching up with and overtaking South Africa, including some 
countries that were previously in the low- income group.
South Africa’s poor growth performance has been concomitant with its failure 
to take forward its industrialization and to upgrade the structure of its economy. 
It has not successfully come to terms with the challenges of breaking into the 
global concentration of industrial production, linking up and back, and keeping 
pace with technological change. Unsurprisingly, the long- term deindustrialization 
trend has not been halted or reversed. This analysis of the global evidence on 
premature deindustrialization benchmarks South Africa’s structural position and 
trajectory in the global context. The share of manufacturing in total employment 
in South Africa in 2015 is shown to have fallen over the preceding decade as well 
as being (slightly) below the share that would be predicted based on international 
patterns.
Adding to the concern about the quantitative share is the composition of South 
Africa’s manufacturing sector and exports. With some exceptions, the profile of 
South African manufacturing production and exports does not show the desirable 
patterns of structural transformation, which would include growth in domestic 
value added, movement up the value chain, and increasing focus on products that 
show potential for cumulative productivity increases and are demand- dynamic. 
South Africa is also lagging in terms of innovation and in the development and 
application of KETs that would enable the country to become competitive in the 
manufacture of complex products and to gain from the opportunities associated 
with the fourth industrial revolution.
Reversing premature deindustrialization in South Africa will depend on the 
coordination of a feasible set of integrated interventions that reinforce each other. 
In particular, strategic forward integration and upgrading in GVCs is a complex 
process, as it entails both linking domestic players to foreign companies and 
markets, while at the same time building local supply chains of producers.
As discussed above, a variety of industrial policy tools are available. Different 
combinations of tools are relevant to particular country contexts. The 
heterogeneity among the four comparator countries and among middle- income 
countries overall also highlights the need for dynamic and flexible industrial 
policies that are well suited to individual countries’ particular political economies 
and other relevant characteristics. At the same time, clear lessons are apparent 
from the diversity of industrialization and growth experiences and outcomes over 
a period of time.
Industrialization remains important for technological change, structural 
transformation, and avoiding or escaping a middle- income trap. These goals also 
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require upgrading and compositional changes within manufacturing. Furthermore, 
there are significant opportunities for value addition within other sectors and at 
the interfaces between manufacturing and other sectors, and at the intersection of 
different technology systems. Certain services activities are closely linked with 
manufacturing and are critical to the competitiveness of manufacturing, 
 technological upgrading within manufacturing, (re)industrialization, and structural 
transformation. In addition to their importance to manufacturing, some services 
activities (as well as some activities in other non- manufacturing sectors) provide 
opportunities for cumulative productivity increases and growth- pulling, and thus 
require industrial policy- type support. Bold industrial policy, and coordination 
between industrial policy and other policy areas, are crucial for shaping a new 
industrial ecosystem in South Africa and in helping the country escape the 
middle- income trap.
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Digitalization, Industrialization,  
and Skills Development
Opportunities and Challenges  
for Middle- Income Countries
Antonio Andreoni, Justin Barnes, Anthony Black, and Timothy Sturgeon
12.1 Introduction
The world economy is undergoing a period of structural and technological 
 trans form ation, driven by the increasing digitalization of economic activity. 
Digitalization is influencing innovation, production, trade, consumption, and a 
host of business processes, though to what degree is an empirical question that 
will yield different answers across industries and geographies. Part of this transi-
tion, sometimes described as the ‘fourth industrial revolution’ (variously referred 
to as Industry 4.0 and 4IR) relates to the digitalization of production. The key 
technologies are at different stages of maturity; they include advanced robotics 
and factory automation, data from mobile, and ubiquitous internet connectivity 
(variously referred to as the internet of things, IoT, and industrial internet of 
things, IIoT), cloud computing, big data analytics, machine learning, and artificial 
intelligence (AI). Associated with this technological transition is the development 
of new ‘platform’ business models and modes of value creation (Schwab, 2016; 
World Bank, 2016; UNCTAD, 2018; UNIDO, 2019; Andreoni and Roberts, 2020; 
Sturgeon, 2021).
The technologies and business models emerging in this ‘digital economy’ have 
already disrupted traditional industries and created entirely new ones, such as 
social media. Aside from these dramatic developments, ongoing digitalization is 
raising concerns about the dislocation and job losses that might result from tech-
nolo gies such as robotics and artificial intelligence. Since many of the relevant 
technologies are skill- biased, the ability of developing countries to compete in 
traditionally labour- intensive industries that have supported their industrializa-
tion may be undermined (Ford,  2015; Hallward- Driemeier and Nayyar,  2018; 
Rodrik, 2018; Clifton et al., 2020).
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Digitalization is being experienced differentially across the globe, reflecting the 
range of opportunities it offers as well as the challenges specific countries face in 
investing in and successfully adopting advanced technologies. In South Africa, 
digitalization is occurring in an economy that has prematurely deindustrialized 
and where the digital capability gap in terms of infrastructure and skills is wide. 
Like many resource- dependent economies, the country has failed to fully diver-
sify and move to higher productivity and more complex activities (Bell et al., 2018; 
Andreoni and Tregenna,  2020; and Chapter  11). Unemployment remains at 
extremely high levels, while societal inequality continues unabated.
Despite this, South Africa has islands of excellence in which firms are em bra-
cing the opportunities provided by digitalization to achieve greater efficiency, 
process innovation, and supply- chain integration. These examples point to what 
is possible, while at the same time revealing gaps and shortcomings. Both the 
potential and shortcomings are evident across firms (in terms of investment rates) 
and public institutions (in terms of services and policies). The development of 
digital skills in cross- cutting fields such as data science and software engineering, 
and complementary services, will clearly be of heightened importance.
This chapter examines the opportunities and challenges of digital industrializa-
tion in middle- income countries, mainly through the lens of South Africa. In doing 
so, the chapter advances a framework for understanding digitalization and how it 
can be harnessed as part of a broader structural transformation. This framework 
includes the identification of key transversal enablers, including digital skills, data 
connectivity, supplier and quality assurance management, investment in productive 
capabilities for digitalization, and the development of appropriate public policies 
and regulations. The emphasis is on locating the digit al iza tion challenge at both the 
firm and broader societal levels. In this way a digital industrial policy for South 
Africa can act as a catalyst for more inclusive and sustainable industrial growth.
The rest of the chapter is comprised of four sections. Section 12.2 introduces 
the key transversal technologies and business models driving structural trans-
form ation in the digitalization context. Against this backdrop, section 12.3 dis-
cusses the South African digitalization experience and highlights challenges faced 
by middle- income countries as they seek to benefit from digitalization, especially 
in the areas of digital skills. Section 12.4 provides a set of digitalization policy 
principles and identifies key industrial policy and associated institutional pri or-
ities to support the successful transition of the South African economy as it 
embraces digitalization. Section 12.5 concludes.
12.2 The New Digital Economy: Transversal Technologies  
and Business Models
Digitalization brings together a range of new and established technologies, 
including robotics, sensors, machine learning, and IoT, all of which are transversal 
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in that they have applications across and along sectoral value chains. Table 12.1 
provides a summary of the main transversal technologies underpinning the new 
digital economy.
These technologies are enabling major economic changes, albeit unevenly. 
Changes can be incremental (e.g. improving output quality or maintenance pre-
dictability in a single machine) or disruptive (e.g. fundamentally changing the way 
products and services are created and delivered). The combined impact of these 
changes has the potential to yield manufacturing systems that respond in real time 
to conditions in the factory, supply- chain disruptions, and changes in demand.
Though digitalization is most often discussed in the context of manufacturing 
(the ‘smart factory’), changes are also occurring in agriculture (such as ‘precision 
farming’), and in mining or construction (such as autonomous vehicles and 
machinery). Precision farming, for example, combines high- resolution satellite or 
drone imagery to tailor the application of irrigation or fertilizer and monitor crop 
health metre by metre across the field (Chapter 6). Similarly, real- time 3- D mod-
elling of construction sites and mines using photogrammetry collected from 
drones or small aircraft can allow earth- moving equipment to function without 
human operators.
Table 12.1 Transversal technologies in the digital economy, with key features
Transversal technologies Key features
1. Advanced manufacturing: learning 
machinery; networked and 
autonomous factory automation 
systems
 • Digital simulation, augmentation, and 
virtual reality
 • Rising functionality in entry- level 
machinery and software (e.g. low cost 
3- D printers, drones, robots)
 • Ubiquitous monitoring and measure-
ment of processes (sensors), connected 
factories and supply chains
2. New mobile and internet- connected 
data sources
 • Industry (IIoT) and consumer (IoT) 
connected products and services, sen-
sors, clickstreams, location data, etc.
3. Cloud computing  • Storage, SaaS, mobile access and con-
stant updating of software and systems
4. Big data analysis  • Huge data storage, with sample sizes 
that can lead to robust results, new 
insights, and high fault tolerance
5. Artificial intelligence (AI)  • Machine learning, prediction, self- 
maintenance, regulation, and replica-
tion, autonomous visual recognition
Source: Authors.
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12.2.1 The Main Features and Technologies of the Digital Economy
The collection of vast volumes of data is a key feature of digitalization. For 
ex ample, data can be collected through sensors during production, when a prod-
uct or service is in use, and from online search and purchasing activities by con-
sumers. When aggregated, this ‘big data’ can be analysed and fed into to 
machine- learning algorithms, making it possible for firms to gain novel insights 
into production processes, supply chains, and consumer behaviour. This is often 
referred to as the internet of things (IoT), and in industrial settings as an indus-
trial IoT (or IIoT). IoT- enabled digital systems make use of cloud storage, big 
data analytics, and, increasingly, artificial intelligence, each running on a nested 
set of platforms, as depicted in Figure 12.1. Digitalization enables a dynamic cycle 
of continuously improved efficiency that is increasingly being driven by the rapid 
advance of machine learning (a form of artificial intelligence).
The more members or users in a production system or platform, the more data 
are collated and the greater its value in respect of data aggregation and analysis—
i.e. ‘network effect’. However, network effects can give rise to high levels of con-
centration and potential abuse of market power, such as barriers to entry for 
smaller and independent competitors attempting to enter the market, in the 




innovation driven by AI?)
















Figure 12.1 Data flow across key transversal technologies in the digital economy
Source: Sturgeon, 2021.
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an asset and the ownership and control of data of dominant platforms an im port-
ant determinant of power relations in value chains and markets (Andreoni and 
Roberts, 2020). This is more likely to be the case in the digital systems underlying 
consumer services (e.g. ride hailing and e- commerce) because consumer needs 
tend to be similar. In these cases, the influx of digital services can be very rapid 
and disruptive. In industrial and producer services industries user needs tend to 
be more complex and variable, and this appears to be dampening network effects 
in these sectors.
12.2.2 Digitalization of Production Technologies in Manufacturing
In industry, digitalization can improve a range of business processes through the 
convergence of existing technologies such as ICT and enterprise- level manufac-
turing software and systems (Box 12.1) with newer technology such as sensors 
and then connecting this IoT to ‘the cloud’ where it can be analysed and acted 
upon, as shown in Figure 12.1. Thus, through retrofitting existing equipment as a 
transition towards fully blown advanced digital manufacturing, incremental 
improvements are possible.
Advanced digital technologies can enable greater coordination efficiencies, 
condition monitoring, and process optimization, both within firms and along 
supply chains. Indeed, when firms can exchange information across various busi-
ness functions, monitor processes in real time, and track operational performance 
at the level of individual products, data are produced that can allow machines and 
Box 12.1 Enterprise- level manufacturing software and systems
Enterprise resource planning (ERP) refers to an integrated suite of compatible 
and interlinked software applications that cover a range of core business pro-
cesses, such as finance, human resources (HR), distribution, manufacturing, 
purchasing, services, and supply- chain management.
Manufacturing execution systems (MES) are computerized systems used in 
manufacturing to track and document the transformation of raw materials to 
finished goods. They provide visibility into the performance of individual lines 
and workstations, often delivering analysis to management in easy to read 
‘dashboards’ in real time.
Product lifecycle management (PLM) is a product- level information man-
agement system that can track and collect data about a product throughout its 
entire lifecycle, from ideation, design, and manufacture through service and 
disposal.
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other resources to be allocated more efficiently, problems and bottlenecks to be 
identified more quickly, processes optimized, and defects reduced. Manufacturing 
execution systems (MES) for example, can deliver a kind of radical transparency 
that can disrupt long- standing routines for the better (Box 12.1). If mismanaged, 
however, they can create a climate of fear and resentment, both at the level of 
operators and line managers.
Digital technologies can manifest in demand changes (such as the emergence 
of autonomous vehicles), entirely new processes of design and production 
(3- D printing), increasing automation of production technologies, entirely new 
sales and marketing models (channel access, pricing, and packaging), and the 
emergence of alternative business models (for example, the rise of the sharing 
economy). Still, in manufacturing, the variability of requirements and the 
importance of physical manipulation limits the easy scalability of digital systems, 
resulting in more incremental adoption, and creating opportunities for the 
implementation of industrial policies aimed at fostering spillovers.
In product design, the combination of automated design software, additive 
manufacturing, and breakthroughs in material science have significantly reduced 
the time it takes to develop prototypes and produce tooling (Ferraz et al., 2019; 
Andreoni et al., 2021). Additive manufacturing, in particular, presents an op por-
tun ity to ‘leapfrog’ in the area of tooling. Though additive manufacturing is mostly 
used for pre- production activities, for example, producing design prototypes, it is 
increasingly being used for production and post- production activities. Because 
parts are produced in high- mix, low- volume production environments, additive 
manufacturing can be well suited for aircraft, shipbuilding, and after- market 
(replacement) vehicle parts. The benefits of 3- D printing have been well proven in 
terms of process and product upgrading, including product development through 
rapid prototyping, and reduction in tooling costs, material waste, supply- chain 
costs, and lead times to market. Still, a few firms are experimenting with connect-
ing 3- D printers in ‘swarms’ to produce at higher volumes, which has the potential 
to disrupt the organization of value chains (Rehnberg and Ponte, 2018).
If additive manufacturing has opened up new possibilities for design, proto-
typing, and customization, large- scale manufacturing production has been 
undergoing a different set of changes with high potential for an increasing degree 
of automation. Automated systems are increasingly multi- purpose and multi- 
tasking (reprogrammable on the fly), and are networked, to aggregate data from 
production. However, the high costs of such systems are beyond the reach of the 
medium- and small- volume producers that might benefit the most from their 
flexibility. Indeed, the adoption of industrial robots internationally has been 
mainly concentrated in a few industries, especially automotive (accounting for 40 
per cent of the total), computers and electronic equipment, electrical equipment, 
appliances and components, rubber, plastics and chemicals, and industrial 
machinery (Andreoni and Anzolin, 2019).
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12.2.3 The Digital Economy and Innovative Business Models
The digital economy is not only about machinery and software—it operates 
according to a particular set of distinct business models. The following are the 
three most important ones.
Open innovation refers to the pre- competitive pooling of R&D activities and 
design criteria, either through consortia, or though the voluntary ‘crowdsourcing’ 
efforts of engineers and technologists interested in creating free resources for 
their technical communities. For example, nearly all the world’s major computer 
programming languages, such as Python, are open sourced and free. Like modu-
larity, open innovation helps firms ‘vertically specialize’, that is, develop a strategic 
focus on a specific bundle of competencies, while still providing customers with a 
rich set of fully functional products and solutions. Open innovations are by defi n-
ition widely available, including to firms and researchers in South Africa.
Modularity describes a business model based on interchangeability, where sub- 
components can be added or subtracted without redesigning entire systems. On 
the factory floor, different subassemblies with shared interfaces can be substituted 
in the assembly of larger products. In product design off- the- shelf or lightly cus-
tomized modular components can be designed- in as elements of larger systems. 
By defining and publishing the application programming interface (API) for third 
parties to create platform- compatible applications, platform owners can provide 
access to, and collect fees from, thousands of compatible applications, deepening 
network effects. This is evident at both the consumer (e.g. software for PCs and 
mobile handsets) and industrial levels (cloud computing applications). Indeed, 
the digital economy can be seen as a set of nested platforms, each with multiple 
sub- systems and applications operating on the principle of modularity, which, 
viewed in aggregate can be characterized by ‘deep modularity’ (Sturgeon, 2021).
Platforms provide services for networks of users. There are typically different 
groups of users such as those using the platform to sell (for example, hotel book-
ings) and those looking to find and purchase goods and services, who typically 
use it for free. The platform owners can charge fees from both parties across this 
‘two- sided’ market, generate revenue from third parties (such as advertisers), 
channel consumers to the platform’s preferred services, and benefit from aggre-
gating user data, both for analysis that improves services (see Figure 12.1) and for 
sale to others. Once established, network effects make it very difficult for later 
entrants. This is one reason that regulating, and even breaking up, dominant plat-
forms has become a policy priority in many jurisdictions (UNIDO, 2019).
These three business models are integrated in advanced manufacturing sys-
tems. These systems are mainly comprised of modular components and machin-
ery, and benefit from, or are even based on, inputs from open innovation. They 
can act as platforms upon which third- party complementors can offer specific 
fixtures and tools. Cloud computing services are then used to integrate 
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production and design data, with the cloud itself operating as a platform upon 
which additional modules, such as data analytics and AI services, can be devel-
oped and distributed.
12.2.4 Digital Technologies and Global Value Chains
The recent wave of technological change and the emergence of new business 
models has been taking place in the context of globalization and the fragmenta-
tion of production systems in global value chains (GVCs). In goods production, 
this is reflected in the rising share of international trade in complex intermediate 
goods. Because of the technical specificity of inputs, this type of trade requires 
‘explicit coordination,’ typically carried out by large and internationalized cor por-
ations (Gereffi et al.,  2005). While participation in GVCs can provide firms in 
developing economies with opportunities, incentives, and tools to upgrade cap-
abil ities, create employment, and support more inclusive growth, the emerging 
evidence is that GVCs have tended to benefit narrow segments of the industrial 
base (often the foreign- invested part), deepening polarization of income and 
wealth distribution (UNCTAD,  2018). There is indeed increasing evidence of 
‘thin industrialization’, characterized in part by specialization in low- value- added 
segments of the value chain (Whittaker et al., 2020; and Chapter 13).
As digital GVCs become more important, the effects of global- scale technology 
platforms and the business models that underpin them also need to be con-
sidered. One possibility is that less- developed economies might experience rising 
technological dependency and further isolation and exclusion from high- value 
segments of these fast- moving and sometimes oligopolistic platform- based digi-
tal value chains. Another is that multinational firms operating in these countries 
are adding another layer to the digital divide by deploying state- of- the art tech-
nolo gies ahead of local enterprises. On the other hand, advanced digital tech-
nolo gies hold great promise for increasing productivity; creating opportunities 
for local firms to learn by customizing, adapting, and integrating global tech nolo-
gies; and may be providing powerful new tools for accelerating innovation as well 
(Andreoni and Roberts, 2020; Sturgeon, 2021).
12.3 Digitalizing South Africa: Opportunities and Challenges  
for a Middle- Income Country
Overall, the deployment of digital production technologies in South Africa has 
been mixed. Islands of successful digitalization have emerged and firms have cap-
tured some of the digital dividends associated with improved design, customiza-
tion, and reduction in costs and entry barriers. Specifically, some lead firms have 
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begun to leverage customer data to improve products and services. For example, 
firms in the construction, agriculture, and mining vehicles industry have been 
monitoring the conditions of vehicles on a real- time basis for an extended 
period,1 while the mineral processing industry is using digitalization together 
with machine learning for condition monitoring and predictive maintenance.2 As 
a result of these technological changes, a lead mineral processing machinery 
manufacturer interviewed for this study reduced its product development times 
from six to eight weeks to two to three days.3 This is important for industries 
demanding a high degree of customization and where speed to market is crucial 
for competitiveness. Some firms have already made substantial investments in 
additive manufacturing, but there has been slow uptake of robotics, although it 
varies greatly by industry.4 For example, in addition to automotive, the large lead 
firms in the food processing industry have adopted robotics in their packaging 
lines, which has allowed for more precision and flexibility.5 Here, robots are sub-
stituting low- skilled labour.
While advanced digital technologies offer a wide range of opportunities for 
re- industrialization and inclusive growth in middle- income countries like South 
Africa, their limited diffusion points to challenges for both firms, public institu-
tions, and government. The research and industry dialogues undertaken as part 
of this study provide a rich tapestry of digital transformation evidence across key 
South African value chains. They highlight a tension between firms grappling 
with potentially existential technology- induced value chain shifts (e.g. the emer-
gence of autonomous vehicles, and ride- hailing applications)6 to the efficiency- 
seeking digital disruptions that are likely to significantly shift the position of firms 
within value chains (e.g. the adoption of digital technologies that enhance ser-
vices, products, and processes). Somewhere in the middle of this spectrum are 
new technology developments, particularly those adopted by multinational cor-
por ations (MNCs) and leading local firms, which will require suppliers and ser-
vice providers across the value chain to invest in digitalization capabilities to 
maintain their position within value chains. In all cases, firms wanting to digital-
ize clearly need to operate in a digitally enabled environment that is equipped 
with appropriate digital skills and infrastructures. This is essential for South 
Africa to benefit from applications such as AI- based machine learning, virtual 
reality digital twinning, and additive manufacturing that are rapidly transforming 
businesses in developed economies.
1 Automotive industry dialogue, 25 October 2018.
2 DIPF policy brief 1 and Machinery dialogue, 11 October 2018. 3 DIPF policy brief 1.
4 Of the four hundred firms that responded to ‘The Mobile Corporation in South Africa’ survey, 
only 6 per cent indicated they were using robotics while 13.4 per cent indicated using big data and 
machine learning, 13.6 per cent virtual reality, and 33.9 per cent IoT.
5 DIPF policy brief 4. 6 See for example Arbib and Seba (2017).
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12.3.1 The Inherent Tensions and Challenges  
in the Adoption of Digitalization
While South African industrialists have been aware of the potential for digital 
disruption in the value chains within which they operate, uncertainty about the 
extent of the emerging disruptions (its speed, scale, and scope) has often resulted 
in a reluctance to make new investments. The risks and rewards associated with 
embracing new digital technologies have not seemed to be sufficiently under-
stood to support more aggressive investment in these technologies, which partly 
explains the continued dominance of traditional industrial processes, products, 
and service models. Some firms have been experimenting with new technologies 
in narrow areas, and some have been achieving good results, which could inspire 
more wide- scale use and adoption.
Key cross- cutting themes and challenges fall into four main categories:
 1. the extent to which digital disruptions are likely to be efficiency- enabling as 
opposed to only value- chain disrupting;
 2. the extent to which digital disruption will impact economic activity in the 
purely digital space as opposed to the cyber- physical space;
 3. the extent to which entirely new value- chain models develop; and
 4. the extent to which digital disruption will shift the structure of GVCs, and 
the role of lead multinational firms in organizing their global activities.
It is also important to understand how these cross- cutting issues dynamically 
interact with industry- and sector- specific digitalization drivers and constraints.
Efficiency- Enabling versus Value- Chain Disrupting
The transition to digitally enabled firm- level business models is likely to in corp-
or ate both major and minor adjustments, and it is critical that these are both 
understood. If not, South Africa is likely to end up with a divide between univer-
sities and government operating and promoting digitally disruptive technologies 
on the one hand, and firms operating in the realm of more subtle incorporation 
of digitalization technologies to enhance competitiveness.
An example of dramatic digital disruption within value chains is the advent of 
autonomous electric vehicles. This would inevitably cause upheaval not just in 
automotive manufacturing and vehicle consumption, but across the entire auto-
motive ecosystem. This includes at the level of energy supply and the broader 
transport sector, and the South African automotive industry would undoubtedly 
be affected. South Africa’s leading articulated dump truck manufacturer, Bell 
Equipment, has started to explore the development of fully autonomous vehicles.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, many of the positive examples of digital 
progression in South Africa are less dramatic, encompassing efficiency- enabling 
interventions. These include improving the effectiveness of cold chain management 
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within the agriculture- food processing value chain using IoT (see Chapter  6), 
improving machine reliability through the application of machine learning, or sup-
plying fashion retail markets with more desirable products on the basis of IoT- 
enabled data analytics and supply- chain coordination. For example, Atlantis 
Foundries, which manufactures commercial vehicle engine blocks for several major 
international engine brands, is an excellent case of the application of AI to predict 
sub- surface defects. Its use here has reduced internal scrap and rework rates by up 
to 90 per cent.
Digital Disruption across the Cyber- Physical Space
The extent of digital disruption is linked to how digitalization transverses the 
purely cyber versus the cyber- physical and mainly physical value chains. For 
example, digital books or games that can be downloaded are primarily digital 
transactions (although recognizing that a physical product is ultimately required 
to read or play). Cyber- physical products are items such as household appliances, 
electronic goods, or vehicles, where an increasing amount of digital technology is 
embodied within these products. Finally, there are also primarily physical prod-
ucts or services which may be significantly augmented by digitalization in future 
but that will remain primarily physical activities.
Seen through this lens, certain value chains are likely to be more disrupted 
than others. Firms have recognized the extent to which these disruptions would 
be appropriate for their business. For example, having tested several innovations 
across the business, one of South Africa’s leading clothing retailers has taken a 
relatively cautious view on ‘digital disruption’. Its advances into e- commerce have 
not yielded the anticipated results, although the group is seen as a leader in this 
space in South Africa. The focus of its digitalization effort has, therefore, increas-
ingly been on big data analytics to enhance marketing and supply- chain strategies 
in response to rapidly changing consumer preferences and the need to improve 
on customer experiences.
In mineral- processing machinery, digitalization enables machinery manufac-
turers in partnership with engineers to provide mines with a total cost of the pro-
cessing service. Systems and processes are customized to specific mines, the wear 
of parts is tracked, enabling optimal replacement, and performance is monitored 
across plants. While the firms are moving to selling this as a service, competitive 
capabilities still involve embodying knowledge in the physical products being 
manufactured. The lead firms have been increasingly employing additive manu-
facturing and simulation in design and product development to optimize the 
mineral processing solutions being supplied (Chapter 3).
The Potential for New Value Chain Models
A critical consideration that emerges in respect of all the industries studied is the 
extent to which new value- chain models will evolve because of digitalization. The 
role of machines will likely increase (displacing the centrality of human- to- human 
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interaction), platforms will take a greater share of economic activity from prod-
ucts (pay- for- use displacing merchandise transactions), trade will become more 
embodied by data rather than goods, and market intelligence will shift from 
tightly controlled company cores to the ‘digital crowd’ (McAfee and 
Brynjolfsson, 2017). These changes can fundamentally alter how GVCs function 
and are organized. And there is great risk that power is concentrated among plat-
form leaders and the places in the world from where dominant platforms are 
emanating.
The primary challenge that South African industrialists face is not only the 
need to understand individual digital technologies and the individual business- 
model shifts they enable, but rather how the technologies and associated business- 
model shifts combine in the value chains within which their firms operate. For 
example, rapidly advancing automotive telemetry, which effectively plugs vehicles 
into the IoT, while also allowing vehicles to ‘see’ their immediate environment 
through advanced sensor technology, could provide the basis for the develop-
ment of autonomous vehicles. This might change the components and materials 
cars are made of. Even more fundamentally, the technical dimensions of the 
autonomous vehicles may become superfluous to the passenger, such that vehicle 
ownership no longer remains important.
Global Value Chains, SMMEs, and Policy Challenges
A final set of critical cross- cutting considerations relates to the position of South 
African firms within complex GVCs. Many larger South African- based manufac-
turers are subsidiaries of MNCs, operate under licence to MNCs, or are inde-
pendent but supply MNCs. These firms often have limited agency regarding the 
technologies they use and the products or services they offer, as these are pre-
scribed by lead firms and parent organizations. For many South African firms, 
the only scope for embracing new digital technologies is in process improvements 
that fall into their ambit of control. For the balance of opportunities, the South 
African firms are ultimately dependent on how the lead firm in their GVC 
embraces the new digital technologies and then ‘trickles these down’ through 
their global networks. In these arrangements it would be very difficult for South 
African technology providers to gain entry.
On other hand, digitalization can also facilitate GVC fragmentation. For 
ex ample, in the automotive industry, a key issue is the diffusion of new tech nolo-
gies beyond the better- positioned first- tier suppliers to the second and third tier. 
Increasing the share of local content in domestically assembled vehicles is a key 
objective of the recently developed South African Automotive Masterplan 
(Chapter 5; see also Barnes et al., 2017). This in turn, can facilitate the expansion 
of opportunities for independent SMMEs.
The use of new technologies is opening up space for innovation. In clothing, 
textiles, and footwear, for example, advances in digital fit software combined with 
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rapidly advancing additive manufacturing technologies, such as vat polymeriza-
tion, will have a significant impact not only on product development but all the 
functional areas of the value chain, from design to prototyping, and ultimately 
volume production. With this technology, it is possible to go directly from 
computer- aided design of a shoe, to the sharing of that design to anywhere in the 
world, to the printing of the shoe last on an additive printer; and for the upper 
part to then be prototyped, with the sole being also printed on an additive printer.
These inherent tensions place the South African industrial ecosystem at some-
thing of a crossroads. Will digitalization result in further consolidation of GVCs 
and the continued growth and dominance of MNCs as lead firms, or will it facili-
tate GVC fragmentation, and the expansion of opportunities for independent 
SMMEs? The central point of this analysis is that there is ample space for policy 
intervention in the digital economy. The challenge is intervening in a way that 
allows South African industry to move down the technology adoption curve, 
innovate, and avoid being trapped in low value- added segments of digital GVCs. 
This has proven difficult in goods- producing GVCs. Whether the road will be 
easier or harder in digital GVCs remains to be seen.
The Interplay between Cross- Sectoral and Industry- Specific Factors
The dynamic interplay between cross- cutting and value chain- specific digit al iza-
tion issues is one of the most striking aspects of this analysis. This suggests that 
forms of cross- cutting support, such as skills development, need to be combined 
with industry- specific responses to digitalization as embedded in sector strategies.
In food value chains it appears that changing market and regulatory condi-
tions, particularly concerns around food safety, are the key drivers of digit al iza-
tion. In fresh fruit, while there is huge potential to grow exports and employment 
with the application of digitalization, export market access and related standards 
are a major obstacle. Blockchain technology and radio frequency identification 
(RFID) tags are causing some disruption in the food industry by addressing the 
core challenges around transparency and traceability along the value chain. For 
example, a local grower and producer of citrus fruits, Katlego Sitrus, is exporting 
fruit with stickers which have a quick- response barcode that consumers can scan 
to know the provenance of the product (Chapter 6).
The ability to absorb new digital technologies depends in part on the factor- 
cost profiles that dominate activities within specific value- chain linkages. For 
example, where labour costs represent a small proportion of total production 
costs, and are comparatively cheap internationally, the incentive to invest in new 
digital technologies is greatly reduced. While the introduction of AI- enabled 
robotics is growing rapidly in automotive assembly plants located within high 
labour- cost, developed economies, the most advanced automotive plant in South 
Africa still has no co- bots, despite its sister plant operating with dozens of them. 
Similarly, the South African clothing and footwear industries, which have low 
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comparative labour costs, only have automation in key capital- intensive nodal 
points, like materials cutting and plant performance monitoring. All assembly 
activity is still being undertaken manually.
In mining machinery, the growing regional market in Southern Africa pro-
vides an important base from which locally based firms have been able to build 
capabilities. The advantages of proximity and location- specific knowledge require 
partnerships with the engineering procurement and construction management 
firms which lead mine design. The firms must simultaneously learn from global 
developments and provide regional solutions in, for example, predictive main ten-
ance which requires reliable data transfer (Chapter 3).
In those value chains where data are the main source of value, especially in 
consumer applications, concentration in digital platforms and control of data 
have played a key role. Data often provide platform owners with their power and 
associated commercial value in areas such as search, ride hailing, performance 
monitoring and management, e- commerce, and social media (McAfee and 
Brynjolfsson,  2017; Polson and Scott,  2018; Singh,  2018; UNCTAD,  2018; 
Andreoni and Roberts,  2020). There are also important implications for inter-
nation al trade. The USA has pushed for multilateral commitments (the so- called 
‘Digital 2 Dozen’) which would prevent measures that support local businesses in 
competing with currently dominant platform owners, such as a prohibition on 
customs duties for digital products.
12.4 Basic and Intermediate Capabilities, Digital Skills, 
and Infrastructure
In South Africa and other middle- income countries, a number of structural issues 
can hinder the adoption of advanced digital technologies by firms that are not 
MNCs or internationally competitive. The lack of basic and intermediate digital 
capabilities—digital skills in particular—and enabling infrastructural capabilities 
undermines domestic firms’ technology efforts, specifically their absorption of 
digital technologies, their integration into existing production systems, and their 
retrofitting (Ferraz et al., 2019; UNIDO, 2019).
As discussed in section 12.1, the fact that 4IR technologies build on and co- exist 
with 3IR technologies means that firms will have to equip themselves with a broad 
array of capabilities and skills from both 3IR and 4IR. Indeed, to the extent that it 
is possible, for a company it would not make any sense to try to develop advanced 
capabilities in data analytics, for example, if the same company is still struggling to 
effectively deploy basic ICT; similarly, data cannot be harvested if the firms’ pro-
duction technologies have no sensors and, thus, connectivity. Similarly, IoT would 
not be feasible without the development of coding skills and standardization cap-
abil ities, as well as access to reliable connectivity infrastructure. As a further 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 15/07/21, SPi
Antonio Andreoni et al. 275
example, the introduction of robot cells and the effective use of robots for the exe-
cution of various tasks such as handling, welding, etc. implies that firms have 
eff ect ive ly arranged the production flow and supply logistics and that robots can 
be fed with intermediate components (e.g. from forming presses) in time in a fully 
controlled environment and without any disruption. These production conditions 
are very difficult (and costly) to meet in firms operating in countries with limited 
access to high- quality electricity supply and connectivity. Moreover, the lack of 
well- trained operation management and engineering skills tend also to pre- empt 
the introduction of such digital production technologies and processes, as does the 
higher level of complexity involved in installing and running them effectively. As 
several respondents in the study indicated, it makes no sense to automate a sub- 
standard process (Andreoni and Anzolin, 2019).
These examples suggest that basic and intermediate capabilities are in fact pre- 
conditions for meaningful and effective engagement with more advanced digital 
capabilities. These capabilities are critical for creating the micro- efficiency and 
reliability conditions required to deploy new digital production technologies 
effectively. They also support the learning journey of technology absorption and 
adaptation, which should result in the retrofitting of the legacy production sys-
tems. These pre- conditions essentially set a threshold for the viability of more 
advanced digital capability, which many firms in middle- income countries find 
difficult to get past (Andreoni and Anzolin, 2019).
Firms in advanced countries are better positioned to capture 4IR op por tun-
ities, exactly because they have spent decades absorbing, deploying, and improv-
ing 3IR technologies. Some are also platform owners. Generally, firms in mature 
industrial economies have more easily overcome the digital capability threshold 
and can focus more directly on developing and putting to use the more advanced 
capabilities and skills of digital production technologies. Not only are these firms 
better positioned to incrementally integrate 4IR technologies and rethink their 
organizational models, they also operate in industrial ecosystems in which 
firms—while equipped with different capabilities—have been integrated in sup-
ply chains for a long time. As an example, it is easier for an original equipment 
manufacturer (OEM) in a developed country to introduce a new digital produc-
tion technology, as its local suppliers operate with similar software and hardware 
systems, and are aligned in terms of their production standards and enabled by 
the same connectivity infrastructure.
These conditions are often not in place in developing countries, nor in periph-
eral regions in advanced countries. Given the dualistic structure of the industrial 
system in developing countries, a few major large firms and international OEMs 
operate as production islands in a sea of often disorganized, semi- formal, and 
small- scale business operations. This is a major ‘structural’ obstacle to the diffusion 
of 4IR technologies, especially those that are intrinsically based on networked 
systems and data.
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12.4.1 The Institutional Challenge of Developing Digital Skills
Digitalization exacerbates the already- significant skills development challenges in 
several ways. Emerging technologies call for a new set of digital skills profiles—
for example programming skills, web and application development skills, digital 
design, data management, visualization, and analytics—which build on advanced 
literacy, numeracy, and ICT skills. And given that digital technologies draw on 
and integrate different science and technology fields in new ways, traditional 
training often does not prepare for the use of integrated technologies. The need 
for training in the deployment of mechatronics, or design of digital platform 
interfaces integrating hardware, software, and connectivity solutions raises the 
digital capability threshold significantly (Andreoni et al., 2021).
Another important skills- related challenge faced by South Africa and other 
middle- income countries is institutional in nature. Specifically, the challenge for 
training institutions, technical colleges, and universities to develop and embed 
appropriate skills in the new and existing workforce is a big one. While there are 
some cases of excellent training provision in South Africa, overall the insufficient 
funding in the education infrastructure, in particular the necessary laboratories, 
tools, and machinery to develop industry- and productive task- specific skills has 
been a major constraint. This underfunding has also limited the much- needed 
curriculum development and upgrading of teachers’ competencies in fast- 
evolving technology fields. This has often resulted in training institutions dishing 
out certificates rather than developing appropriate skills, and working in isola-
tion, removed from the productive sector they are supposed to be working with.
Even when curricula have been updated and efforts have been put in place to 
provide high- quality formal training, lack of on- the- job training and work- 
integrated learning means that graduates are not sufficiently prepared to work in 
an industrial environment. Often the lack of these programmes is due to the 
limit ed number of qualified firms which can employ and train the workforce, and 
again provide funding to support costly training programmes. The challenges of 
skills provision are thus intertwined with the structural features of the productive 
economy, replicating its dualistic structure and reflecting the lack of a diffused 
ecosystem of competitive firms—in this case firms that are able to train youths 
effectively and to provide technology- rich employment prospects.
Skills challenges are not only technological, but equally operational and organ-
izational. Given that new digital technologies are largely not plug and play, many 
require production system retrofitting and operational integration. Consequently, 
business enterprises require experienced mid- level technicians and directors of 
operations able to choose appropriate digital solutions, redesign and monitor 
processes, and address cyber- security and data infrastructure issues, alongside 
assuring overall organizational performance. These digital skills can be difficult to 
find as they comprise several tacit knowledge elements and experience- based 
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competencies. A lack of domestic firms that actively promote the development of 
this experience means that a limited number of experienced people are available 
in general.
12.4.2 The Need for a Coherent Digital Industrial Policy in South 
Africa and Other Middle- Income Countries
The South African economy is at an important juncture. To benefit from the 
techno logic al advances of digitalization, South African- based businesses need to 
address the tensions highlighted above and fill the digital capability gap related to 
skills and infrastructure. Most advanced digital technology will not be invented 
in South Africa, but its implementation—especially in a manufacturing environ-
ment—typically requires a non- trivial level of adaptation and integration, and 
provides a strong foundation for the development of local capabilities 
(Sturgeon, 2021). The challenge is to engage with global technology ecosystems, 
and to leverage them. There should be a fostering of spillovers from technology 
investments that can support a virtuous cycle of technology and capability devel-
opment in the broader economy. At the same time, for local industrial and tech-
nology ecosystems to emerge, a broader social support system is needed, as well 
as policies to ensure the socially inclusive structural transformation of the South 
African economy.
Maximizing the benefits of the digital economy requires new approaches and 
analytical frameworks that are robust enough to accommodate technological 
dynamism and uncertainty. These frameworks should capture the changing real-
ity of production systems and products, and their underlying technology plat-
forms and organizational models—i.e. the industrial ecosystem (Andreoni, 2018 
and 2020). New industrial policy principles should also reflect the need for more 
strategic coordination among (and within) public and private sectors; better tar-
geting and policy alignment; and the introduction of both cross- sectoral inter-
ventions and industry- specific digital industrial policy.
The cross- sectoral interventions should focus on those opportunities and chal-
lenges faced by different firms across industries, especially those related to 
broader foundational capabilities, such as basic and transversal digital skills, and 
digital and manufacturing extension services; those related to technology infra-
structure, such as digital software licensing, connectivity, and data quality and 
affordability; and those related to broader financing, investment, and regulatory 
conditions in the country.
The measures covering sectoral value- chains should address industry struc-
ture, including position and links to GVCs. There also needs to be a focus on the 
different needs and conditions of firms, in particular, the specific types of digital 
skills, digital technology infrastructures and services, challenges and barriers to 
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linkages development, competition conditions and value capture, and sectoral 
regulatory frameworks and incentives, including procurement and market 
regulations.
Not all industries, nor the value chains in which they are located, will be 
affected in the same way, so there needs to be careful prioritization. The following 
list of seven priorities has been identified as appropriate to the South African 
business experience.
Priority 1: Improved Cost, Speed, and Reliability of ICT 
Infrastructure (Bandwidth)
South Africa has an expensive, comparatively slow, and unreliable ICT infrastruc-
ture and industrialists deem this to be a major limitation to the adoption of more 
advanced digital technologies. Potential value- chain efficiencies that are likely to 
be gained from digitalization, enabling data analysis, and tracking of performance 
across plants and markets, are undermined by poor connectivity. AI- enabled 
machine learning systems, which are particularly data intensive, appear com-
prom ised due to this limitation, especially for SMMEs that do not have the 
resources to invest in bespoke infrastructure, such as microwave links. The key 
requirement is to release spectrum for improved connectivity and exploit ‘edge 
computing’ to bypass poor connectivity.
Priority 2: Digital Skills Policy
Embracing new digital technologies in South Africa is comparatively expensive 
for firms because of the substantial skills gap. This requires both scaled- up skills 
development programmes and the attraction of skilled immigrants in key areas. 
These include:
 • Increasing incentives for cross- cutting skills development in software en gin-
eer ing, programming, data science, and related ICT skills, both in respect of 
on- the- job training and higher education.
 • The establishment of a priority skills list for essential industrial activities in 
digitalization, machine learning and Artificial Intelligence, CAD/CAM 
technologies, and the management of MES/ERP/PLM systems. The list 
needs to direct public digital skills expenditure and should be updated 
annually in recognition of the rapidly moving digital skills frontier.
 • The development of sector- specific digital skills in partnership with private 
sector industry associations and Sector Education and Training Authorities 
(SETAs).
 • The reform of incentives and organizational structures within technical and 
vocational education and training (TVET) institutions to incentivize 
firm- driven training beyond narrow certification- driven training. More pri-
vate sector involvement is essential to create a closer alignment between 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 15/07/21, SPi
Antonio Andreoni et al. 279
rapidly changing sector requirements and TVET skills programmes.7 
Incentivizing internships is a major opportunity in this regard.
 • The linking of digital skills policy to broader technology policy to provide 
less resourced firms with complementary public support in training, tech-
nology absorption and associated organizational development.
Priority 3: Digital Technology Policy
The systematic restructuring of technology policy and institutions is required in 
four areas: digital technology absorption, standards development and dis sem in-
ation, system integration, and scaling. One such opportunity is the development 
(or conversion) of technology centres, science councils (e.g. the Council of 
Scientific & Industrial Research (CSIR)), incubators, and university units into a 
coordinated network of ‘technology intermediary institutions’ organized around 
the main digital technology platforms and supporting technology absorption, 
integration, and deployment. Public- private initiatives such as the Mandela 
Mining Precinct offer considerable potential (Chapter 3).
The key elements of each are:
 • Technology absorption: This requires the provision of manufacturing and 
digital extension services (including organizational and operational sys-
tems), demonstration projects, beta factories, access to data and infra- 
technology (metrology, standards), and access to additive manufacturing.
 • Standards development and dissemination: This would be enabled through 
the provision of standardization services and data, infra- technologies, test-
ing, and certification facilities.
 • System integration: This includes retrofitting services and legacy system inte-
gration into digital platforms, rapid prototyping facilities, and virtual design.
 • Technology scaling: This necessitates codification and dissemination of suc-
cessful technology solutions and the provision of scaling- up facilities such 
as accelerators for digital start- ups and SMMEs.
Incentivizing firms to incorporate digital technologies in their business models is 
also a key requirement, and yet the evidence from the industry case studies sug-
gests that South Africa’s R&D tax- based incentives define the opportunity so nar-
rowly that most firms do not qualify for support. This is an important legacy 
consideration that is likely to exist in many middle- income economies. For 
ex ample, the South African government’s tax- based incentive defines what con-
stitutes R&D, but then notes numerous exclusions. These include market research, 
7 An example is the Mercedes- Benz Learning Academy in East London.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 15/07/21, SPi
280 Digitalization, Industrialization, and Skills Development
market testing, or sales promotion; administration, financing, compliance, and 
similar overheads; and routine testing, analysis, information collection, and qual-
ity control in the normal course of business. This definition precludes data- 
intensive technologies. It is important that R&D incentives support both 
efficiency- seeking and business- model innovation in the emerging digital space.
Priority 4: Financing and Investment
Digitalization requires investment in upgraded capital equipment and human 
capital. In addition, there are working capital consequences when firms shift to 
providing end- to- end service solutions for customers as opposed to selling prod-
ucts. For example, South African mining machinery manufacturers are contract-
ing with mines to deliver processed tonnes of ore rather than the supply of 
machinery. This has balance sheet consequences for firms, with concomitant 
changes to financing requirements. Development finance institutions, such as the 
Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), have a lead role to play in offering 
the appropriate financing required. Without a comprehensive understanding of 
disruptive new digital business models by the industrial financing institutions 
themselves, such support is unlikely.
Priority 5: Linkages to Development Policy
As a country with generally weak industrial supply chains, particularly with 
regard to the role of SMMEs, digitalization offers a major opportunity to promote 
the adoption of supply- chain tools (such as ERP and MES) for better supply- 
chain integration. Supporting second- and third- tier firms in accessing affordable 
digital technology licences or creating alternative models to reduce the licencing 
burden is crucial. The creation of a ‘Catalogue of Digital SMME Suppliers’ via an 
open and competitive digital market platform to match specific technology and 
production services demand and supply along and across industry value chains 
could be enormously valuable to SMMEs. De- risking SMME investments in new 
technologies and products using combined technology services and hybrid 
financing models (such as matching grants and pre- commercial procurement) 
could also support the inclusion of these firms within South Africa’s industrial 
value chains.
Priority 6: Economic Regulation, Competition Policy, and Data
Digitalization sometimes entails the convergence of platforms and networks 
across the telecommunications, finance, retail, and logistics spheres. In such 
instances there are substantial scale and first- mover advantages. Where there are 
local demand specificities, domestic platforms can rival multinational platforms, 
as is evident in South African e- commerce. In the industrial sector, the specifici-
ties of products, process, and business models mean that digital products and 
platforms tend to remain more fragmented, a characteristic that provides 
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op por tun ities for the involvement of local technology vendors and system inte-
grators. Evidence suggests that smart and flexible regulatory frameworks need to 
ensure that dominant platforms cannot abuse their position to undermine 
local rivals.
South Africa’s regulatory bodies, as for most other middle- income countries, 
are still organized as if digitalization is not under way. There need to be appropri-
ate regulatory and competition rules for digital platforms, including addressing 
data privacy and ownership, which draw on international experience, such as the 
measures taken recently by the EU and India to ensure a level playing field for 
local businesses in e- commerce and online search activities. In this regard, the 
2018 amendments to the South African Competition Act have introduced provi-
sions relating to buyer power and they do strengthen rules relating to price dis-
crimination. However, guidelines regarding their application still need to be set.
Priority 7: Trade and Tax Policies
Middle- income countries like South Africa should be working with other coun-
tries at the WTO to resist the push by the global technology giants for digital 
transactions to be exempt from tariffs. The advance of digital technologies poten-
tially weakens the position of industrializing countries as international firms can 
bypass import duties, local taxes, and other domestic regulations. For example, 
additive manufacturing may simply require the transfer of code from a data cloud 
to a locally based 3- D printing machine and the transfer of the code is free of 
import tariffs (and other taxes such as VAT and ad valorem excise taxes) or adher-
ence to regulations relating to the safety or health properties of the end product.8
A key question, then, is how the South African government plans to tax 
imported digital products and services to enable and protect local productive 
activity? In principle, digital technologies do not necessarily represent a threat; 
they can be used to better protect the domestic market and consumers. For 
ex ample, clothing, textile, and footwear products entering South Africa could be 
required to have radio frequency identification (RFID) tags that prove their prov-
enance, such as where they were manufactured, and at what price they were 
exported from the country in which they were produced.
12.4.3 Silos Need to Give Way to an All- Encompassing Policy  
and Governance Framework
The effectiveness of sectoral and cross- sectoral interventions across key policy 
priority areas will depend on the extent to which the government is able to align 
8 See also the work on base erosion and profit shifting by the OECD, and the tax challenges arising 
from digitalization (http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/).
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interventions and develop a governance framework that cuts through policy silos 
(Andreoni,  2016). This is a challenge facing all countries, but in resource- 
constrained middle- income economies such as South Africa it is more acute. This 
is because breaking out of policy silos is both a matter of what and how policy 
interventions are designed as well as what and how resources are allocated and 
governed. Figure  12.2 presents a potential digital industrial policy matrix for 
South Africa. It attempts to integrate the different key policy priorities that have 
been highlighted and to locate these within the specific South African context.
12.5 Concluding Remarks
The development of digital industrial policy in middle- income economies such as 
South Africa is an emerging field. The evidence presented in this chapter suggests 
that policy should aim at shaping a new industrial ecosystem in which the op por-
tun ities and challenges of new digital industrial technologies are fully seized. This 
means identifying and targeting areas within and across sectors in which the 
deployment of digital technologies allows firms to: improve products and their 
digital content, adapt product and system functionalities to accommodate digital 
transformation; move towards higher value product segments; diversify products 
and activities by deploying digital industrial technologies transversally across 
industry value chains; increase productivity via process upgrading along the value 
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chain and the local production system; link up with other domestic and international 
firms; diversify market access; and develop industrial competitiveness in new global 
industries by leveraging domestically available resources.
While policy design and the governance framework are critical, the effective 
implementation and enforcement of any digital industrial policy will depend on 
enhanced government capacity and more effective cooperation with the private 
sector. Overall, digital industrialization will raise potential trade- offs and new 
conflicts in the economy, for example with respect to employment and new skills 
requirements. Given the challenges faced by SMMEs, there is a concern that digi-
tal technologies will exacerbate the existing divide between large and small firms 
to the detriment of the much- needed re- industrialization. Digital industrial pol-
icy must therefore actively govern these processes to ensure the digital industrial 
dividend is distributed across different types of firms, their employees, and 
broader society. This challenge is certainly not unique to South Africa. Other 
middle- income economies are facing the same difficulties in respect of their own 
industrial policy frameworks, and will need to similarly define how to incorporate 
digital disruption within their existing suite of policy instruments.
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Global Value Chains, ‘In- Out- In’ 
Industrialization, and the Global Patterns 
of Sectoral Value Addition
Antonio Andreoni, Keun Lee, and Sofia Torreggiani
13.1 Introduction
Since the diffusion of the putting- out system among early European industrializers 
and, more recently, the emergence of regional and global value chains (RVCs and 
GVCs) among late industrializers, production- chain development has always 
played a key role in shaping countries’ structural transformation. Although GVCs 
already existed in the 1960s when countries like South Korea and Taiwan were 
starting to industrialize, since the 1990s there has been a palpable leap in the scale 
and scope of the internationalization of production. This is reflected in the large 
volume of flows in intermediate goods, which in 2018 represented almost half of 
world goods traded (about US$8.3 trillion) (UNCTAD,  2019), and in the 
substantial increase in the geographical breadth, length, and depth of production 
chains. Several global changes have also made the expansion of RVCs and GVCs 
possible: falling transport costs and advances in technology enabling more 
interconnectedness via ICTs; cost- reduction opportunities associated with 
offshoring labour- intensive manufacturing processes; and the increasing trade 
and investment liberalizations (Nolan,  2001; Milberg and Winkler,  2013; 
Gereffi, 2014; Neilson et al., 2014; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2015).
While GVCs have remained a regional phenomenon to a certain extent, or 
limited to ‘Factory North America’, ‘Factory Europe’, or ‘Factory Asia’ (Baldwin 
and Lopez- Gonzalez, 2015), since the mid- 1990s Latin American and, to a lesser 
extent, African countries have also started to show increasing inter- as well intra- 
regional integration. GVC integration, however, has followed very different 
pathways and led to very different industrial upgrading outcomes. In this chapter, 
the factors and dynamics that have determined this variety of GVC integration 
pathways and the related industrialization outcomes are analysed. This is done 
through the presentation of new evidence on the patterns of sectoral value chain 
addition that have been recorded across middle- income countries in the years 
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1995–2011, with a particular focus on South Africa. Capturing the ways in which 
different sectors have contributed to domestic value addition (DVA) makes it 
possible to identify several stylized facts around ‘late- late industrialization’. 
Building on this historical analysis, the discussion ends with a reflection on 
possible future scenarios arising from the Covid- 19 crisis.
Section 13.2 starts with a review of emerging theoretical perspectives and 
hypotheses around factors and dynamics leading to different GVC integration 
pathways and related industrialization outcomes. While joining GVCs might 
represent a learning opportunity and open up a development pathway, there is a 
risk for firms—and countries as a whole—of being stuck in low value- added 
activities with little scope for progressing to higher tiers in the value chains. More 
accessible parts of the value chain are associated with limited linkages and little 
possibility for knowledge spillovers in the wider economy, which might result in 
‘thin industrialization’ (Gereffi,  2014) and ‘enclave effects’ (Gallagher and 
Zarsky, 2007; Plank and Staritz, 2013). The existence of some of these factors and 
dynamics points to the importance of pursuing a strategic integration with GVCs. 
This means an integration which evolves both sequentially and in parallel with 
the development of local value chains and ecosystems. Industrial policy is key in 
integrating these two processes.
Building on these theoretical perspectives, section 13.3 involves a review of 
the empirical evidence on the variety of GVC integration pathways across 
 different countries, and provides new country- and sector- level evidence of 
the  so called ‘in- out- in’ industrialization hypothesis formulated by Lee et al. 
(2018) and the detour strategies suggested in Lee (2019). The analysis advances 
to a focus on two success stories of GVC integration—South Korea and 
China—and a study of the ways in which different economic sectors have 
 contributed to a sustained increase in DVA at the country level. The 
 chapter empirically documents how successful catching up has been associated 
with an ‘in- out- in’ industrialization process of GVC integration, where 
 countries first ‘couple’ by entering GVCs in low value- added segments, then 
‘decouple’ by building domestic supply chains and upgrading existing local 
capabilities, and finally ‘recouple’ by performing high value- addition activities 
in GVCs.
In section 13.4, this country and sectoral analysis is developed to identify 
emerging patterns across middle- income countries, with a particular focus on the 
South African case. The ‘in- out- in’ industrialization hypothesis is tested and 
several stylized facts are noted and discussed, as South Africa’s sectoral GVC 
participation dynamics are benchmarked against those of Central and Latin 
American and South East Asian economies. The key finding is that, in relation to 
increasing DVA, today’s middle- income countries have experienced different for-
tunes at the sectoral and country level.
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Section 13.5 concludes, reflecting on possible future scenarios arising in the 
post- Covid- 19 international context and the emergence of potential new 
industrialization models. For developing and emerging economies, reduced 
opportunities for export- led industrialization suggest the importance of 
diversifying their production base by leveraging existing domestic markets and 
creating new ones through procurement policies, and backward and forward 
integration. The development opportunities offered to emerging countries like 
South Africa through their endowments in natural resources are revisited as 
potential sources of innovation and diversification.
13.2 Global Value- Chain Integration and the Development  
of Local Ecosystems: Theoretical Perspectives
From a structural transformation standpoint, integration in GVCs offers both 
new opportunities and challenges for low- and middle- income countries (LMICs) 
like South Africa. GVCs might represent an attainable first step towards 
integration into regional and global markets and industrialization, while 
diversifying and upgrading in specific tasks and new products. Rather than 
having to develop an entire product, countries can specialize in specific tasks or 
components of a multitude of value chains, starting at the relatively accessible 
bottom. Through the exposure to learning processes, technology transfer, and 
informational flows, these countries might then benefit from knowledge spillovers 
and start upgrading within GVCs. The notion of upgrading represents a central 
concept in the GVC framework, originally defined by Gereffi (1999) as ‘the 
process of improving the ability of a firm or an economy to move to more 
profitable and/or technologically sophisticated capital and skill- intensive 
economic niches’. This notion has been extended to the now widely accepted 
four- fold categorization of upgrading typologies as product, process, functional, 
and intersectoral upgrading (Kaplinsky and Morris,  2001; Humphrey and 
Schmitz, 2002). This taxonomy conceives of the movement towards higher value 
creation in terms of the successful adoption of new processes, the development of 
new products, the functional reconfiguration of who does what along the entire 
chain, and the entry into completely new industries.
With respect to functional upgrading in particular, the three stages of OEM- 
ODM- OBM have often been the key framework of understanding (Hobday, 2003). 
Original equipment manufacturing (OEM) is the first step in catching up among 
East Asian manufacturers; own design manufacturing (ODM) is the second step, 
where manufacturers can depart from simple jobs, such as assembling, and begin 
involvement in production design; and own brand manufacturing (OBM) is the 
last step, whereby these manufacturers perform all functions of production, 
design, marketing, channel management, and research and development (R&D) 
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independently. According to Hobday (2003), firms in East Asian countries 
followed a transitional path from OEM to ODM, and then to OBM. This 
transition is not simply limited to companies, as it also involves the development 
of different sets of backward and forward linkages in the domestic ecosystem 
(Andreoni, 2019; Andreoni and Tregenna, 2020).1 However, the transition from 
one mode to the next is not easy, especially in the transition to OBM, because this 
step involves several risks, including counterattacks from flagship firms in 
existing GVCs or incumbents. This is noted in Lee et al. (2015) in the case of the 
South Korean SMEs trying OBM, and in Navas- Aleman (2011) in the case of the 
footwear and furniture sectors in Brazil. Both cases show that this stage can be 
prolonged by a slowdown, which may even lead to a decline in sales or market 
share, and even to a possible crisis for firms attempting this functional upgrading.
13.2.1 Global Value- Chain Integration: Challenges for Upgrading
When evaluating the potential opportunities as well as challenges associated with 
GVC integration, six main factors and dynamics should be considered (see Lee 
and Mathews, 2012; Andreoni, 2019; Andreoni and Tregenna, 2020).
First, transnational corporations (TNCs) leading regional and global value 
chains are extremely powerful organizations. Their power relies on the creation of 
entry barriers in the forms of patents, quality standards, and copyrights and 
trademarks, as well as their control over technologies, including data and digital 
platforms (see Chapter 12). TNCs also orchestrate global chains of suppliers and, 
through their localization and related buying and pricing strategies, have the 
power to include companies (or not). In the South African mining equipment 
industry, for example, sourcing decisions are controlled by a limited number of 
TNCs (Andreoni and Torreggiani,  2020; and Chapter  3). Other practices have 
been documented across several countries. For instance, in the case of consumer 
goods, former vendor companies (brand owners) often stop giving OEM orders 
to destroy the company that has begun to sell their competing brands (Lee et al., 
2015). In the case of capital goods, incumbent companies suddenly charge 
predatory prices in the market once they realize that latecomer firms have become 
successful in developing their products, which poses the threat of competition 
against products of the incumbent. In certain cases, the incumbent reacts by 
filing lawsuits against the latecomers, and claiming that the latter has copied its 
1 In structural economics, backward linkages refer to the relationship involving a firm buying 
intermediate inputs from another firm in an upstream industry. Forward linkages refer to the 
relationship between a firm selling intermediate inputs to another firm in a downstream industry. 
Hence, each firm establishes linkages with upstream and downstream firms along several sectoral 
value chains (in some cases also with consumers of final goods). These linkages constitute the input- 
output production matrix of an economy.
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products. In other cases, small supplier firms have had trouble with the client 
firm over selling prices and delivery time, among others, which has sometimes 
led to a sudden halt in purchasing orders from the client firm.
Second, the sectoral value chains that firms in developing and emerging 
economies tend to be integrated with (or the GVC stages they perform) are not 
those with high- value opportunities or margins for manufacturing development. 
Within the African context, for example, GVC integration has mainly involved 
upstream resource- based sectors. While there are some encouraging cases of 
successful integration in sectoral value chains—such as the flower and leather 
industry in Ethiopia (Cramer et al., 2020), and the fruit industry in South Africa 
(Chapter  6)—without developing a number of key manufacturing industries 
delivering production technologies for the other sectoral value chains, these will 
not be able to transform these economies and trigger cumulative processes of 
intersectoral learning (Andreoni, 2018; and Chapter 1).
Third, from a learning perspective, there are risks in committing scarce 
resources in specific assets to perform relatively unsophisticated activities such as 
basic processing or assembling. This can lead to a situation of ‘production lock- in’ 
when firms remain stuck in a certain low- value activity, followed by potential 
‘value- chain de- linking’ once more price- competitive firms or new quality 
standards emerge (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2015). As a result of these processes, 
industrial systems in developing economies in the early stages of economic 
transformation are generally characterized by foreign- owned companies that 
establish few backward and forward linkages with local suppliers, and processors 
generally lacking the capabilities to perform activities other than basic assembling. 
Existing small enterprises lack the scale and skills to provide reliable intermediate 
products, as well as the resources to invest in technological upgrading. Particularly 
problematic therefore is the lack of medium- sized manufacturing firms that can 
do those things—the so- called ‘missing middle’ phenomenon.
Fourth, care is needed when interpreting upgrading trajectories with respect to 
the well- known ‘smile curve’, originally developed by Acer’s CEO Stan Shih to 
describe the position of Taiwan in the electronics value chain (Shih, 1996). This is 
partly because of the risks of ‘production lock- in’ or ‘value- chain de- linking’ 
discussed above. The smile curve, indeed, illustrates the decomposition of value 
of a given product into the underlying stages (tasks) of production. According to 
the traditional, partly simplistic, interpretation of the smile curve theory, in order 
to upgrade their position, firms and countries should seek to move to tasks at the 
extreme ends of the curve, typically those that extract a higher share of the overall 
value. However, this view ignores the fact that multidimensional upgrading—for 
example, functional, process, product, and intersectoral upgrading—goes beyond 
existing firms specializing only in a limited and isolated sets of tasks. In order to 
capture ‘high value niche’ opportunities along the value chain through task 
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specialization, companies often have to develop multiple sets of complementary 
production capabilities that cut across many stages of the value chain.2
Fifth, discussions on GVC integration tend to focus narrowly on ‘vertical 
linkages’ along the value chain, while missing the important role of cross- sectoral 
‘horizontal linkages’ among different firms at each node of the value chain. As 
shown by the South Korean firms’ experience, leveraging a bigger piece of the pie 
from global profit critically requires building and upgrading local chains for value 
and knowledge creation (Lee et al.,  2018). More in general, export- led 
industrialization and successful GVC integration in several East Asian countries 
has advanced hand in hand with the development of horizontal cross- sectoral 
linkages in the domestic economy, and the resulting incremental DVA in trade 
(Chang, 2010).
Finally, when considering opportunities and risks associated with GVC 
integration, it is crucial to address context- specific political economy dynamics 
and issues related to ownership. Firms across developing countries tend to be 
adversely affected by the existing distribution of organizational power in both the 
public and private sectors—namely, the countries’ ‘political settlement’ 
(Khan, 2010; Whitfield et al., 2015; Behuria et al., 2017; Andreoni, 2019). Given a 
certain political economy context, participation in GVCs might lead to 
entrenching power even more upstream and consolidate an incentive structure 
that is biased towards importers more than producers.
The fight for independence from leading firms in the GVC is a key political 
economy process.3 Latecomer firms from the South certainly have the option of 
not fighting and remaining dependent on a single TNC or a few. This strategy 
may lead to stable growth for a while. However, in the longer term the outcomes 
are often uncertain as new late entrant firms emerge from the next- tier countries 
offering lower wages and costs (Lee and Mathews, 2012). The limitations of these 
dependent catch- up strategies are shown in the case of other countries reported 
in previous studies (Rasiah, 2006; Van Dijk and Bell, 2007). In the case of South 
Africa, for example, the emergence of competitive suppliers in China and other 
East Asian countries has resulted in increasing import penetration over the last 
two decades. Import penetration, especially from China, has also increasingly 
shifted from low- to medium- tech products. This has crowded out several South 
2 In today’s advanced economies’ industrial ecosystems (Andreoni and Lazonick, 2020) such as the 
Emilia Romagna region in Italy (Andreoni, 2018), these complementary capabilities have been devel-
oped along different cycles of industrial transformation and renewal of vertically integrated firms, 
supported by a dense network of local specialized suppliers and contractors.
3 This recognition is to some degree in contrast with several studies in GVC literature that have 
tended to concentrate on collaborations between the flagship firms in the West and firms in the South 
(Ernst and Kim, 2002).
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African companies, especially those that were not investing in developing their 
capabilities (Torreggiani and Andreoni, 2019).
In terms of ownership of value created in the GVC, upgrading from OEM to 
ODM and finally to OBM is a key process for creating more value locally and 
obtaining a certain degree of independence from the flagship firms in the existing 
GVC. Another important factor is for firms to eventually aim to have some form 
of local ownership, as building independently would be difficult (Amsden and 
Chu, 2003). Although Taiwan has been more dependent on foreign MNCs than 
South Korea, it did eventually create locally owned big businesses, thus raising its 
status to a high- income economy. Lee et al. (2013) confirm that having or not 
having a certain number of big businesses is an important benchmark for a 
middle- income country’s ability to get out of the middle- income trap 
(Chapter  11), and that both South Korea and Taiwan have created a critical 
number of global big businesses relative to the size of their economy.4
13.2.2 ‘In- Out- In’ Industrialization and Local- Production 
System Development
On the basis of the discussion on the challenges of upgrading, the following 
hypothesis is formulated: while at the initial stage of structural transformation 
more integration into the GVC is desirable for learning from foreign sources of 
knowledge, functional and sectoral upgrading requires a second stage in which 
domestic companies seek a form of separation and independence from the 
existing foreign- dominated GVCs. Then, in a third stage, after building their own 
local value chains, latecomer firms and economies might have to seek more 
opening and integration. This dynamic sequence or detour of ‘in- out- in again’ 
would generate a non- linear curve in terms of the degree of participation in the 
GVC, as measured by share of foreign value added (FVA) in gross exports of an 
economy.
Lee (2013) shows that the first phase of participating in the GVC is to obtain 
operational knowledge or skills in the mode of ‘learning by doing’ participating 
in the arrangement of OEM or foreign direct investments (FDI). The intermediate 
stage of separation, which would require building capabilities in designing, R&D, 
and marketing, will be illustrated in the following section (13.3). Here, drawing 
on Lee et al. (2015) learning at different stages is discussed in detail. The last 
phase of re- increasing GVC participation tends to emerge when the firms would 
often become internationalized in production, facing rising domestic wages, and 
4 By the early 2010s, Taiwan had eight companies included in Global Fortune 500 class companies 
and South Korea had thirteen such companies, whereas South Africa has zero number of such big 
businesses (Lee, 2019: table 2.2).
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relocating their factories to lower- wage sites. This is exemplified in the next 
section by stories of South Korean firms, which included SMEs and big businesses. 
The ‘catch- up cycle’ theory (Lee and Malerba,  2017) thus acknowledges the 
possibility and reality that latecomer firms and industries which learn from the 
GVC led by firms from advanced industrial nations may take the leadership of 
sectors by creating their own value chains.
Thus, as is done in Lee et al. (2018), it is hypothesized here that the trend of the 
FVA would increase initially (during the low- and lower- middle- income stages), 
then decline at the upper- middle income stage as firms try to create more local 
value added, relying less on the GVC, and finally increase again at the high- 
income stage, with enhanced innovation capabilities and internationalization. 
This non- linear perspective considers that while more integration into the GVC is 
desirable at the initial stage, upgrading at the later stage requires that the 
latecomer firms and industries try to effect a temporary separation from the 
existing foreign dominated GVC, although these firms might have to look for 
more openings to integrate once more in the GVC after upgrading.
Throughout this ‘in- out- in’ industrialization process, successful catch- up also 
results in the development of a local production ecosystem. Indeed, several 
authors have recently started to recognize the urgent need for increasingly 
integrated frameworks that analyse how GVCs and local clusters are connected 
through a variety of globalization processes (Gereffi and Lee, 2016; De Marchi et 
al., 2018). Building on Hirschmann (1977), Andreoni (2019) highlights the need 
to understand production transformation from a multi- linkages perspective, with 
a focus on both the regional and global value chains, as well as—and more 
critically—the system of interdependencies in the domestic economy, referred to 
as the ‘local production system’ (LPS). This is defined as the structural 
configuration of multiple types of linkages in a given economy—meaning 
production, technological, consumption, and fiscal linkages.
Production linkages are further classified into backward (or upstream) linkages 
and forward (or downstream) linkages. Backward linkages correspond to the 
growth stimuli to sectors that provide the inputs required by a particular 
production activity. For instance, setting up a steel plant would stimulate the 
demand for steel scrap, coal, and other similar goods. Forward linkages represent 
the inducement to start new activities employing the output supplied by a 
particular production activity. An example here is the expansion of the steel 
industry, which would encourage the emergence of sectors employing steel as 
their basic input, such as machine tools.
Related to the development of production linkages, technological linkages rep-
resent potential factors that encourage or discourage both productive opportunities 
and technology adoption. More specifically, input- output tables—matrices of inter- 
industrial flows of goods and services produced domestically—provide a faithful 
representation of the backward and forward linkages connecting different sectors. 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 15/07/21, SPi
294 Global Value Chains
Technological linkages on the other hand capture the underlying direct and 
indirect transfer of technological capabilities within and across sectoral value 
chains. These technological relations are extremely important as they provide the 
main channels through which intersectoral learning may occur.
With specific reference to the case of countries dependent on resource 
extraction and primary industries, ‘consumption linkage’ and ‘fiscal linkage’ are 
two further concepts of linkages to be considered. Consumption linkages reflect 
the process by which the new incomes of the primary resource producers, in a 
first stage, lead to the importing of consumer goods and, later, to their replacement 
by domestic production in the agricultural, industrial, and service sectors. Fiscal 
linkages emerge when resource rents are deployed to fund public investments and 
to develop production in unrelated sectors.
Linkages and their context- specific structural configuration are responsible for 
a number of both incentive and constraining mechanisms, and are critical for 
understanding production transformation and, eventually, how to achieve quality 
of growth. Production, consumption, and, especially, technological linkages can 
induce learning and diversification dynamics, improvements in process efficiency, 
and scaling- up, as well as enhancing product quality, standards, and 
functionalities. The lack of these linkages might undermine the possibility of 
implementing scale- efficient investment, as well as result in production- related 
interlocking bottlenecks within and across value chains. Indeed, investment 
bottlenecks upstream might make it unprofitable to invest downstream in the 
sectoral value chain, while the lack of technological linkages might frustrate 
technological upgrading in sectors relying on manufacturing production 
technologies (such as agriculture and mining).
13.3 A Variety of Global Value Chain Integration and the 
‘In- Out- In’ Industrialization Pathways in South Korea and China: 
Some Stylized Facts
Integration into GVCs has followed a variety of pathways across regions and 
countries. Among Asian late industrializers, Lee and Mathews (2012) and Lee 
(2013) find cases in South Korea and Taiwan of successful upgrading, with South 
Korea moving into high- end segments in the same industry and Taiwan moving 
into new higher value- added sectors (so called ‘double upgrading’). These 
countries managed to escape the middle- income trap precisely because they were 
able to achieve a double upgrading, that is, increase their DVA in manufacturing, 
while matching a rise in domestic wages. Rising wages played a key role in shifting 
from low value- added activities towards higher value- added activities within and 
across industries. In contrast, Giuliani et al. (2005) observe that GVC integration 
has very rarely resulted in functional and intersectoral upgrading in Latin America.
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Drawing on the OECD- TiVA database,5 Figure  13.1 reports trends in back-
ward participation in GVCs in total manufacturing, proxied by the FVA content 
of gross exports, by macro- regions. The main stylized fact is that all macro- 
regions have experienced an increase in their backward participation in manufac-
turing GVCs. The lowest rates of participation are reported by Central and South 
American economies and by countries belonging to the Rest of the World group, 
which also include the sub- Saharan African countries (excluding South Africa).
Disaggregated data for sub- Saharan African countries are not available in the 
OECD- TiVA database (with the only exception of South Africa). However, 
employing alternative sources, the literature has shown a set of stylized facts. As 
reported by Foster- McGregor et al. (2015) using data from the UNCTAD- EORA 
database, while the value of world imports has more than doubled during the 
2000s, with intermediate goods making up 65 per cent of world imports in 2011, 
5 For the purpose of this historical analysis, the 2016 edition of the OECD- TiVA dataset (covering 
sixty- four economies and thirty- four industries over seventeen years, from 1995 to 2011) was selected. 
It was chosen over the more recent 2018 edition (covering sixty- four economies and thirty- six indus-
tries over eleven years, from 2005 to 2015). Unfortunately, the two databases cannot be combined as 
they are based on different versions of System of National Accounts (SNA). The 2020 version of the 
OECD- TiVA dataset, covering the period 1995 to 2018, will contribute significantly to improve 
understanding of the long- term dynamics of countries’ GVC participation across different industries. 
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Figure 13.1 Backward participation in manufacturing GVCs by macro- regions, 
1995–2011
Note: Mfg is the abbreviation for ‘manufacturing’.
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the OECD- TiVA dataset (2016 version).
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much of Africa’s participation in GVCs has developed in upstream production. 
This upstream GVC specialization has been coupled with a declining downstream 
integration since 1995. Moreover, in all African countries the increase in value 
addition across manufacturing sectors has remained limited, while industries 
such as mining and quarrying, and financial intermediation are those that have 
experienced the largest increases in domestic value added alongside transport, 
wholesale trade, and utilities (Andreoni, 2019; Amendolagine et al., 2020).
Moving to a country- level analysis, Figure  13.2 shows trends in backward 
participation in GVCs in total manufacturing for the most important emerging 
and transition economies for which OECD- TiVA data are available. South Africa 
is benchmarked against the other countries in the respective regional groups—
Latin America, South East Asia, and Eastern European transition economies. 
These figures point to a third stylized fact: that middle- income countries and 
transition economies face the difficulty of moving into more technologically 
sophisticated segments of GVCs. Focusing on the production of low value- added 
parts and components might exacerbate the risk of ‘de- linking domestically’ and 
the hollowing out of the domestic manufacturing sector. Under these conditions 
a combination of weak productivity growth and rising labour costs, or the 
emergence of alternative lower- cost locations, might lead to declining profitability, 
disengagement by the lead firm, and a further weakening of domestic productive 
capacity. In some cases, these dynamics might result in premature de- 
industrialization (see chapter 11).
For countries such as Mexico, the globalization of production has not resulted 
in greater long- term domestic investments, capital accumulation, DVA, and 
international value capture (see Giuliani et al.,  2005; Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 
2011 for a broader discussion on GVC integration and upgrading in Latin America). 
An example is the 1990s FDI- led expansion of the high- technology sector in the 
Mexican state of Jalisco, analysed by Gallagher and Zarsky (2007). They find that 
the benefits of the investment flows were largely limited to the Jaliscan ‘enclave’, 
and that foreign investments ‘crowded out’ domestic ones, resulting in minimal 
net gains. Large IT TNCs from the USA with operations in Jalisco also imported 
98 per cent of inputs, with the result that the domestic manufacturers that 
supplied Mexico’s high- tech firms before the foreign penetration declined by 
80 per cent. The causes of these disappointing performances lie in the barriers to 
entry for domestic firms, combined with policies favouring foreign over domestic 
investment, and inadequate R&D spending by both the government and firms.
A study by Plank and Staritz (2013) similarly reveals that the potential positive 
effects from TNCs’ investment in the electronics sector in Hungary and Romania, 
as reflected in the relevance of local linkages and knowledge spillovers, have 
remained extremely low. Figure 13.2 shows that these countries correspond to the 
already high level of the GVC participation, higher than that of Mexico. Despite 














































































































Figure 13.2 Backward participation in manufacturing GVCs, South Africa, and 
selected emerging and transition economies, 1995–2011
Note: Mfg is the abbreviation for ‘manufacturing’.
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the OECD- TiVA dataset (2016 version).
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this, the authors argue that on the one side, the strategic interest of TNCs may 
have not allowed for an involvement of local suppliers that went beyond the 
provision of non- core products and services, and, on the other side, that the 
geographical isolation of foreign- owned plants has constrained the potential 
demonstration effects. Furthermore, the scarcity of local business actors in some 
industries in Central Eastern European countries, heavily dominated by foreign- 
owned companies, has prevented the absorption and the spread of potential 
spillovers.
Admittedly, for a limited number of fast catching- up economies, particularly 
from Asia, the internationalization of production has resulted in concrete 
opportunities for entering in technology- based markets and capturing value from 
advanced manufacturing technology. South Korea and China are perhaps the two 
most striking examples.
13.3.1 The ‘In- Out- In’ Industrialization Pathways in South Korea
Research on latecomer SMEs in South Korea has identified several cases of risky 
but successful transition from dependent or subcontracting original equipment 
manufacturing firms into independent or original brand manufacturing firms. 
Whereas several SMEs from South Korea have successfully increased their 
respective market shares against the incumbent leading brands in the global 
market, the challenges faced by them include a number of diverse factors: the 
marketing capability to sell products independently; interferences by the 
incumbent leading firms, including a sudden cancelling of the OEM orders; legal 
cases of dispute over intellectual property rights (IPRs); and price wars or 
dumping (Lee et al.,  2018). For them, firm- specific, often tacit, knowledge 
(obtained mostly by trial and error) is recognized as an important source of 
distinctive competences and an ex post entry barrier (Lee et al., 2015).
South Korean success in achieving growth beyond the middle- income trap has 
been made possible mainly by big businesses’ functional upgrading. A remarkable 
example is Hyundai Motors, established in 1968 as an assembler for Ford. With 
the aim of becoming an independent brand manufacturer, the company decided 
to end its business relationship with Ford, and in 1975 started to produce its own 
branded cars, Pony, with licensed production of the Mitsubishi engine. Later, 
after the 20 per cent equity- holding Mitsubishi refused to transfer to Hyundai the 
know- how to design and produce engines, the South Korean company decided to 
pursue the option of developing its own technology independently. This eventu-
ally resulted in upgrading within GVCs, as shown by the decreasing trend in FVA 
(or, alternatively, by the increasing of domestic value- added) in the 1980s and by 
the mid- 1990s (Lee et al., 2018: 432, fig. 1). And then after upgrading domestic 
capabilities, the South Korean industries have actively been re- coupled with the 
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GVC. This is shown by the increasing trend of the backward GVC participation 
in a number of medium- high- tech sectors since the late 1990s, in Figure 13.3.
13.3.2 The ‘In- Out- In’ Industrialization Pathways in China
With a time lag of almost two decades, there is evidence that China followed a 
similar integration pattern to South Korea. In fact, as shown in Lee et al. (2018: 
434, fig. 3) the backward integration of China in GVCs in total economy has been 
declining since the early 2000s, reflecting increasing DVA in manufacturing 
exports. However, total manufacturing trends hide very important sub- trends. 
Relevant structural change has in fact occurred over the last two decades, with 
China transitioning from being predominantly an exporter of textiles to an 
exporter of high- tech products, such as non- electrical machinery and equipment, 
ICT, and electronics. Across nearly all manufacturing sub- sectors this structural 
transformation has been paralleled, starting from the early 2000s, by a significant 
increase in the DVA content of China’s exports. This possibly reflects an increased 
specialization in higher value- added activities, greater participation in domestic 
value chains by upstream intermediate suppliers, or a mix of the two. In 1995, 
for example, around three- quarters of the total value of ICT exports represented 
foreign content, but by 2011 this had dropped to just over half; similar large 




































Figure 13.3 The ‘in- again’ phase in South Korea: backward integration in medium- 
high- tech sectoral value chains
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the OECD- TiVA dataset (2016 version).
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transport equipment (see Figure 13.4). As an example of this transition, in 2002 
China became the largest producer of machine tools and in 2012, consumed four 
times the number of machine tools of the USA, whose share of global production 
of machine tools declined from 20.4 per cent per cent in 1980 to 5.3 per cent in 
2012 (Andreoni and Gregory, 2013).
13.3.3 Factors Contributing to the Successes in South Korea 
and China
These kinds of success stories are built on a variety of factors. Overall, in East Asia 
these involved strategic state intervention through the use of targeted credit and 
export subsides, strict conditions on inward FDI, and import protection to 
expand output, productivity, and export competitiveness, exports, and economic 
growth (Amsden, 1989; Milberg and Winkler, 2013; Andreoni and Chang, 2019; 
Chang and Andreoni,  2020). In China specifically, the key success factors 
were the domestic market dimension, the strategic use of industrial policies 
placing limits on FDI flows, and the targeted use of Special Economic Zones for 
the development of domestic industry. In all these cases, the main stylized fact is 
that increasing DVA resulted from a transient decoupling from foreign- 






































Figure 13.4 The ‘out’ phase in China: backward integration in medium- high- tech 
sectoral value chains
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the OECD- TiVA dataset (2016 version).
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13.4 Global Patterns of Sectoral Value Addition: A Focus on 
Middle- Income Countries and South Africa
The industrialization experience in South Korea and China described above 
supports the argument that these countries’ engagement with GVCs followed an 
‘in- out- in industrialization’ pathway. This strategic and dynamic engagement 
with GVCs has resulted from two parallel structural dynamics whose rate of 
expansion has been different in the three stages of ‘in’, ‘out’, and ‘in again’ 
industrialization, as shown in Table 13.1 for China.6
In the ‘in’ phase, the rate of growth of FVA has been higher than that of 
DVA. This suggests that in this phase, countries tend to prioritize the engagement 
with GVC and the access to global market demand. In the ‘out’ phase, however, 
the rate of growth of DVA has been increasing more strongly than the rate of 
growth of FVA. This means that in the ‘out’ phase, countries focus their efforts on 
substituting some imported intermediate goods with domestic produce (Kee and 
Tang, 2016) and in increasing the value content of existing intermediate and final 
goods produced domestically. Both processes are made possible by an expansion 
of domestic supply- chain linkages. The last phase—‘in again’—is one in which the 
rate of growth of FVA and DVA seems to balance out. In this phase countries 
benefit from cumulative dynamics of trade capacity and domestic production 
expansion.
The three sets of dynamics described for each phase of ‘in- out- in again’ indus-
trialization are not sector neutral. Indeed, Figures  13.3 and  13.4 have already 
shown how in South Korea and China different sectors followed different path-
ways, suggesting that within the overall ‘in- out- in again’ industrialization path-
way there are structurally heterogenous dynamics. This can be due to 
sub- sector- specific conditions, like the product characteristics (the value content 
of the product, for example), and also technology, the degree of modularity, and 
6 From a methodological point of view, differently from Lee et al. (2018), here the focus is on the 
‘expansionary structural dynamics’, hence the ratio of foreign value added (FVA) in gross exports over 
gross exports. There is also a comparison of the rates of growth in domestic value added (DVA) in 
gross exports and FVA in gross exports to capture the distinctive dynamics of participation in GVCs.
Table 13.1 Drivers of ‘in- out- in’ industrialization, China
Phases in out in- again
1995–2003 2004–8 2008–11
Average growth rate FVA 0.196 0.274 0.157
Average growth rate DVA 0.157 0.397 0.143
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the OECD- TiVA dataset (2016 version).
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business and organizational models of production. Analysis of sectoral patterns 
becomes necessary because the overall or aggregate pattern of backward GVC 
participation (or the level of FVA) is affected by the degree of international 
integration and the industrial structure. So, a country with a high weight of the 
primary sectors would have a low level of FVA (Lee et al., 2018). Global market 
development and global political economy factors such as trade policy play 
important roles as well, as they determine the scope for value- chain development 
both globally and regionally. These sectoral dynamics are also interdependent as 
all these sectors are linked by production linkages—the expansionary dynamics 
of one sector can pull investments and value- added expansionary dynamics into 
other sectors.
The evidence presented in Figure 13.2 has already shown how middle- income 
countries and transition economies have not yet managed to complete—or even 
start in some cases—their ‘in’ phase, and have overall struggled to shift from an 
acceleration in the FVA expansionary dynamics to a more than proportional 
acceleration in the DVA expansionary dynamic. While their manufacturing 
industry as a whole is struggling to build its domestic production ecosystem, 
these challenges manifest differently in specific manufacturing sub- sectors. 
Figure 13.5 presents sub- sectoral evidence (with a focus on selected medium- and 
high- tech sectors only) for two regional groups (Central and Latin American 
countries, and South East Asian countries) and benchmarks South Africa’s 
sectoral value- addition performances against them.
If South Africa is benchmarked against middle- income countries across Latin 
America and South East Asia (excluding China), a very different picture of the 
sectoral value chain patterns of integration emerges. On average, the backward 
participation of middle- income Latin American countries across all the selected 
medium- and high- tech sectors does not go above 40 per cent. In two sectors, at 
least, South Africa is consistently more integrated than Latin American countries 
(i.e. chemical products, and machinery and equipment; see Chapters 3 and 4 for a 
discussion of these sectoral value chains). However, if South Africa is compared 
with South East Asian countries, the picture changes dramatically. It is clear that 
South Africa is less integrated than South East Asian countries across all sectors, 
and that the levels of FVA are significantly lower. Overall backward integration in 
manufacturing is above 40 per cent for all South East Asian countries, with coun-
try peaks in the chemicals, machinery, and motor vehicle sectors above 60 per 
cent of FVA.
The sectoral value- addition patterns for South Africa shown in Figure  13.5 
suggest a somewhat unusual situation. Contrary to other middle- income 
countries, which find it particularly difficult to move from an ‘in’ to an ‘out’ phase, 
South Africa has even struggled with engaging in the ‘in’ phase of increasing 
backward integration into GVCs. In particular, the level of backward integration 
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Figure 13.5 Backward participation in manufacturing GVCs: South Africa and other 
middle- income countries
Notes: Y- axis: FVA contribution to gross exports (%); the LATAM group includes Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Peru; the South East Asia group includes Cambodia, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the OECD- TiVA dataset (2016 version).
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in the country has remained significantly lower than in SEA economies in the 
1990s and 2000s. This means that while the middle- income countries in the SEA 
group have already started integrating into GVCs, South Africa has been slow in 
linking up into GVCs, similarly to a number of countries in Latin America. In 
addition, the ‘out’ phase has not materialized either, as the country’s dependence 
on international trade increased after the end of apartheid in 1994, with China 
becoming its main trade partner in 2008 (Torreggiani and Andreoni, 2019). On 
the one hand, the country has relied increasingly on imports of final goods to 
satisfy its domestic demand; on the other hand, it has served as a gateway and 
export platform for foreign investors and traders to access the rest of the African 
continent. This has limited the scope for the localization of high value- added 
activities and thus for increasing DVA.
In the manufacturing sector, as well as in a number of medium- and high- tech 
sectors like chemicals, non- electrical machinery, and equipment and automotive, 
the higher relative levels of DVA in South Africa with respect to South East Asian 
countries is due to the country’s rich endowment in mineral resources and the 
historical dominance of the mineral- energy complex within its economy. In the 
case of non- electrical machinery and equipment, this trend is mainly driven by 
the existence of very strong domestic capabilities in certain specific advanced 
sectors providing critical inputs to the mining industry (i.e. backward integration 
from manufacturing to natural resources). For example, domestic mining 
equipment producers have strong and particularly advanced capacities in offering 
products and services in certain fields, such as deep- level mining and related 
areas (Kaplan, 2012; Andreoni and Tregenna, 2020; and Chapter 3). In the case of 
the automotive sector, the relative higher levels of DVA along such value chains 
are mainly driven by the country’s use of its natural resources endowment and by 
the specific intermediate products it has been able to produce based on that (i.e. 
forward integration from natural resources to manufacturing—see Chapter  5). 
These intermediates include, for example, catalytic converters, which make 
extensive use of platinum- group metals of which South Africa is the world’s 
largest producer. Notwithstanding these exceptions, the overall failure of South 
Africa to diversify its economy and integrate the ‘in’ phase in the 1990s and 2000s 
has dramatically delayed its progress along the ‘in- out- in’ industrialization 
pathway.
13.5 Post- Covid- 19: What Next? Rethinking Global Value  
Chains and Industrialization Models
The recent global pandemic has accelerated a contraction in international trade, 
already fuelled by rising geopolitical tensions between major regional blocks—
the USA, China, and the EU. This has led to a sharp drop in global FDI, with 
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particular reference to inflows into developing countries. As reported by 
UNCTAD (2020a), total world trade fell by 5 per cent in the first quarter of 2020. 
The organization’s estimates also point to a 27 per cent drop for the second 
quarter of the year and to an overall annual decline of 20 per cent. The most 
affected sectors in terms of trade contraction in the first quarter of the year have 
been textiles and apparel, office machinery, automotive, energy, chemicals, non- 
electrical machinery and equipment, and precision instruments. To date, the 
agri- food sector has been the least volatile. With specific reference to developing 
countries, preliminary data for April 2020 suggest that South Asian and Middle 
Eastern countries have experienced the sharpest trade downturns, registering 
declines up to 40 per cent. As far as FDI is concerned, estimates from UNCTAD 
(2020b) expect global FDI flows to contract between 30 per cent and 40 per cent 
in 2020/1. Among the most affected sectors will be the consumer cyclical 
industries, such as airlines, hotels, restaurants, and leisure, as well as the 
manufacturing and energy sectors. According to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) (2020), from the beginning of the Covid- 19 crisis until late March 
2020, developing countries also experienced the largest capital outflow ever 
recorded, with investors removing US$83 billion from emerging economies.
Disruptive changes in the length, location, and governance structure of GVCs 
following the Covid- 19 crisis have given rise to additional structural 
transformation challenges. But the crisis has also presented new opportunities for 
pursuing more inclusive and sustainable pathways of development and industrial 
catch- up (UNCTAD, 2020c). In particular, reduced opportunities for export- and 
FDI- led industrialization due to the reshoring of production and new trade 
regimes suggest the importance of imagining alternative industrialization models. 
These could provide frameworks for countries to diversify their production base 
by leveraging existing domestic markets and creating new ones through forward 
and backward integration.
Within this context, developing countries might consider with renewed 
interest the development possibilities offered by their natural resource 
endowments. This is in line with a relatively new strand of the innovation 
literature that departs from the ‘natural resource curse’ hypothesis. It shows how 
natural resource industries might provide emerging economies with a platform 
for progressively increasing downstream value addition (see Lebdioui et al. (2020) 
for Chile and Malaysia; Andreoni and Tregenna (2020) for Brazil; Andreoni and 
Torreggiani (2020) for South Africa; and see Chapter 3 on mining and Chapter 6 
on fruit). It also suggests opportunities for these industries to engage and upgrade 
in backward and forward knowledge- intensive and higher value- added activities. 
Such sectoral cases also show how industrial policy has been particularly 
important in achieving greater degrees of linkage development, competitiveness, 
and technological sophistication in these natural resource industries, and in 
related upstream and downstream sectors.
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In light of the current and expected trade disruption, South Africa’s rich 
mineral deposits as well as the country’s proximity to other equally resource- rich 
economies in sub- Saharan Africa might open up important opportunities for 
both upstream and downstream integration, as well as value addition through 
industrial and technological innovation. Two scenarios are elaborated: one related 
to backward- linked (upstream) industries, focusing on the case of mining 
equipment; the other in relation to forward- linked (downstream) industries, 
focusing on the automotive sector.
The impact of the Covid- 19 crisis across different geographies has put new 
pressure on traditional mining global supply- chain structures, which are 
concentrated around a few equipment vendors from the USA, Europe, Japan, and 
China. According to a recent exploratory analysis conducted by international 
professional services organizations (Ernst & Young, 2020), mining companies are 
actively exploring alternative and broader sources of supply to reduce reliance on 
a small number of overseas vendors. On the one hand, this will open up 
opportunities for local or regional companies with the right level of technology 
and production capabilities to enter into such value chains. On the other hand, 
foreign multinationals supplying mining equipment and other critical inputs to 
mining houses might decide to progressively relocate part of their production 
activities closer to their clients’ operations, through subsidiaries or collaborative 
partnerships with local companies. The South African mining equipment sector 
is well positioned to seize both these opportunities in the domestic and regional 
mining markets. Obviously, strategic industrial policy actions will be needed to 
put conditions in place to attract and retain productive investments, and to help 
domestic mining equipment producers in their attempt to enter supply chains led 
by major mining companies. In this respect, an institutional effort is urgently 
needed to reform local content and procurement policies in the South African 
mining sector, and to establish an efficient and affordable support system for 
export development of domestic equipment suppliers (see Andreoni and 
Torreggiani, 2020; and Chapter 3).
The pandemic hit the automotive sector at a time of dramatic technological 
change and industry organization restructuring globally. Climate change has 
made decoupling growth from fossil fuels and, thus, the use of cleaner energy 
sources of mobility a key priority for sustainable structural transformation. 
Technological solutions so far have mainly relied on alternative energy sources, in 
particular electric and hydrogen- based technologies. These technologies have 
created new global demand for natural resources such as lithium for the 
production of batteries, and platinum- group metal resources for the global fuel 
cell market. While countries endowed with lithium like Chile can look at that 
natural resource as a driver to attract investment in domestic production of 
batteries for automotive, a country like South Africa could leverage its large 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 15/07/21, SPi
Antonio Andreoni, Keun Lee, and Sofia Torreggiani 307
platinum- group metal resources to develop forward linkages in a number of 
emerging and innovative sectors, and become an exporter of value- added 
technologies based on its natural resources (platinum being the main catalyst in 
fuel cells). Fuel cells can be deployed in portable power generation, stationary power 
generation, and power for transportation (DMR, 2013). These technologies find 
applications across various domestic, regional, and global value chains and could 
be used as a way of anchoring new transformative investments in South Africa.
The two scenarios sketched above for the mining equipment and automotive 
industries show how sectoral value chains constantly change in their geographical 
breadth, length, and depth, especially as a result of major crises. And that these 
changes brought about by the unprecedented pandemic crisis will have a long- 
lasting structural impact on the sector- specific processes of value creation, 
capture, and distribution across countries and companies.
This chapter has shown how structural transformation has been dramatically 
affected by these global value- chain dynamics, especially since the 1990s. Building 
on several data and country cases, a number of theoretical arguments and stylized 
facts across a variety of middle- income country experiences have been reviewed 
and systematized. In spite of this variety, it has been noted how a specific type of 
strategic and sequential engagement with GVCs—‘in- out- in- again’—is a major 
success factor in catching up processes underpinning structural transformation. 
Specifically, the analysis of the ‘in- out- in- again’ model of strategic integration 
into GVCs has been developed by extending the analyses to include South Korea 
and China—and in each case going below the broader sector level to show 
heterogeneous patterns of sub- sectoral value addition. The experiences in these 
countries and the wider macro- regions have then been used as benchmarks for 
assessing the South African case.
The new evidence shows how South Africa has been particularly slow in the 
‘in’ phase of GVC integration, and that the ‘out’ phase has been limited even in 
those sectoral value chains with the highest potential. Moreover, domestic value 
addition has been mainly driven by high- value natural resource exports, more 
than high- value manufactured products. Several chapters in this volume have 
analysed the mix of production, technological, institutional, and political 
economy contextual factors which have hampered structural transformation in 
South Africa. All these factors are intrinsically related to the GVC integration 
pathway followed by this country, and are likely to remain so even in the post- 
pandemic scenario. In this sense, the South African experience is a paradigmatic 
example of the challenges posed by a GVC- shaped industrial landscape. The 
extent to which South Africa might become an example of strategic restructuring 
of production chains in the post- pandemic phase will dramatically depend on its 
industrial policy approach to local production system development and domestic 
value addition.
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The Political Economy of Structural 
Transformation
Political Settlements and Industrial Policy in South Africa
Pamela Mondliwa and Simon Roberts
14.1 Introduction
Despite multiple policy interventions, South Africa has not made significant 
progress in achieving growth- enhancing structural transformation over the period 
1994 to 2019. In terms of sectoral transitioning, the economy has prematurely 
de in dus trial ized, with manufacturing’s contribution to gross domestic product 
(GDP) declining from 21 per cent in 1994 to 12 per cent in 2019 in favour of 
services (Chapter 11). The increase in the contribution of services to GDP over 
the period 1994 to 2019 has been accompanied by the increasing importance of 
lower- value, lower- productivity services overall (Chapter  1). At the same time, 
the growth of financial services has not been accompanied by significant growth 
in employment in the sector, nor by higher levels of savings and investment in the 
real economy.
Within manufacturing, growth in value added has continued to be biased 
towards mineral- and resource- based industries that were at the industrial core of 
the economy in 1994, reflecting limited sectoral deepening (Chapter 2). The slow 
progress of transformation of the industrial structure is reflected in South Africa’s 
undiversified exports. Mineral and resource- based industries continue to 
dominate the export basket—accounting for approximately 60 per cent of 
merchandise exports in 2019—and South Africa is thus missing out on the gains 
from international integration in improved competitiveness and ‘learning 
through exporting’ in diversified manufacturing industries (Bell et al., 2018).
The failure to achieve growth- enhancing structural transformation has also had 
implications for socioeconomic outcomes, including increasing unemployment, 
worsening inequality (Chapter 8), and limited success in increasing participation 
by the previously disadvantaged black population (Chapter 9).
So why has South Africa had such a poor record, particularly as the economic- 
policy objectives of successive African National Congress (ANC) governments 
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under democracy have been to change the structure of the economy to more 
diversified and labour- absorbing industries? To answer this question, it is necessary 
to understand the power of different interests and how they have influenced 
policy choices, design, and implementation (Khan and Jomo,  2000; Khan and 
Blankenburg, 2009; Gray, 2018).
As a salient case study on structural transformation and economic develop-
ment, the South African experience offers key lessons for middle- income countries 
more generally. The analysis draws on the contributions in this book, reflecting 
on the differences and similarities observed in the detailed industry studies, 
including the coalitions of interests that underpin the outcomes. This is comple-
mented by engagement with the contestation of interests at the macro level and 
how these conflicts influence both industrial and broader economic policies.
Section 14.2 starts with a discussion of the political settlements framework and 
how it assists in understanding different trajectories of industrial development. 
Section 14.3 then presents the observed patterns of structural change in selected 
industries, drawing on the in- depth industry chapters, and considers how the 
liberalization of the economy and the configuration of economic power 
influenced these patterns. Section 14.4 reflects on the shifting coalitions of 
interests that have underpinned the policy agendas under former presidents 
Mandela, Mbeki, Motlanthe and Zuma. Section 14.5 concludes the analysis by 
drawing out the main observations regarding South Africa’s evolving political 
settlement, its influence on industrial development, and the wider lessons for 
other middle- income countries.
14.2 Political Settlements and Industrial Development
The success or failure of structural transformation, in terms of processes of 
production upgrading, necessarily depends on changes in the distribution and 
configuration of power among different organizations, that is, in the ‘political 
settlement’ (Khan,  2018). A given settlement depends on the distribution of 
power within countries and, for industrial development, whether the ruling 
coalition supports the design and implementation of policies with incentives for, 
and conditions on, firms to ensure high levels of investment and effort in learning 
and technological upgrading (Khan, 2018).
As such, successful industrial production relies on the ability of the state to 
create and manage rents, which are important for technological learning, which is 
necessary for driving structural change. The political settlements framework is a 
useful lens through which to examine how states’ capabilities to manage these 
rents, including monitoring and disciplining rent recipients to ensure productive 
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investment for growth, are influenced by the distribution of power within a soci-
ety (Gray, 2018).
The political settlements framework emerged as a critique of New Institutional 
Economics (NIE), which focused on the adoption of institutions that enforce the 
rule of law, a democratic political election system, low levels of corruption, 
transparency of the state, and limited restrictions on the private sector, which 
ultimately became the ‘good governance agenda’ (Gray, 2019). However, the NIE 
struggled to explain huge differences in the development trajectories of countries 
despite them adopting this good governance agenda (Khan, 2018). The political 
settlements framework assesses how regimes work in practice and explains that 
the economic outcomes of an institutional dispensation is heavily reliant on the 
distribution of power in the environment in which they operate (Khan  2018, 
Gray 2019).
For example, let us consider the relationship between competition and 
economic development. NIE emphasizes competition with liberalized markets 
and independent institutions as the primary requirement for economic 
development and moving countries to what North et al. (2009) term ‘open access 
orders’. However, this supposes that competition simply arises in the absence of 
obstacles, and fails to recognize the need to address entrenched inequality and 
economic power (Makhaya and Roberts, 2013). And, it does not properly explain 
the underlying power arrangements and configuration of interests that shapes 
markets and influence a given institutional configuration and framing of laws 
(Khan, 2010).
The new institutionalism also does not engage with the ‘path- dependent’ 
nature of development—meaning that firms which have developed productive 
strengths are able to re- invest, further develop capabilities, and grow their 
businesses. Thus, inclusion requires productive rents to induce investments in 
capabilities outside the initial industrial core to support structural change. NIE is 
primarily focused on static efficiency rather than the dynamic efficiency that is 
necessary for long term growth.
By comparison, in the political settlements framework, rents are pivotal in 
shaping the structural change required for economic development and power is 
held in both formal and informal institutions (Khan,  2018; Gray,  2018). The 
implication is that political settlements analysis entails a broader mapping of 
groups that hold power in society, including the elite and non- elite (Behuria et al., 
2017). It is necessary to consider how powerful elites organize through formal 
and informal institutions, especially during development transitions, to sustain 
economic benefits for groups that would otherwise have lost out (Khan, 2010). 
The organizations which are formed are thus the mechanism through which 
social and political stability is maintained, helping to generate distributions of 
economic benefits in line with distributions of power.
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The approach to political settlements adopted in this chapter draws on the 
contributions of Khan (2010 and 2018), together with developments by Behuria 
et al. (2017), and Gray (2013, 2018, and 2019). These contributions all note the 
importance of ‘holding power’, which refers to the capacity to engage and survive 
conflicts—in other words, the ability to inflict costs and absorb costs inflicted by 
opposing groups (Behuria et al.  2017). The sources of holding power include 
economic structure, violence rights, rents and ideology (Behuria et al.,  2017; 
Gray, 2018).
The following section looks at some of the industry experiences in the context 
of the political economy and political settlement dynamics described above.
14.3 Structural Transformation in South Africa: A Review 
of Industry Experiences
The political settlements underlying South Africa’s structural change dynamics 
can be observed by reflecting on the conflicts over value capture in the industrial 
groupings that form the core of the economy, which have been analysed from 
different perspectives in the book. These include metals and machinery, chemicals 
and plastic products, food and beverages,1 fruit, and automotive industries (Bell 
et al., 2018; and Chapter 1).
The ongoing better performance of upstream resource- based industries 
compared with the more diversified downstream sub- sectors, into which these 
resource- based basic products are inputs, is reflected in the studies of metals and 
machinery, and chemicals and plastic products (Chapters 3 and 4). The two 
industry groupings show common features and interesting contrasts. Importantly, 
both show the failure to diversify and build stronger capabilities. Indeed, there 
has been a hollowing out of capabilities as the downstream more diversified parts 
of the value chains have performed far more poorly than the upstream resource- 
based basic metals, refineries, and chemicals parts of the chain.
Within each industry, however, there are pointers to the potential for growth. 
For example, there are segments within the machinery and equipment sub- sector 
linked to meeting the specialist requirements of different types of mining 
operations, in which South Africa has developed world- leading capabilities. 
While there have been such niches of advanced capabilities, the country failed to 
build on these capabilities through supporting broader local clusters. In the 
plastic products industry, for the period from 1994 to 2002 during which tariffs 
1 As there is no separate chapter on food and beverages, see Bell et al. (2018) for background 
research on this sub- sector.
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were liberalized, the local firms competed effectively with imports and grew 
output and employment. Crucially, during this period the monopoly input 
supplier, Sasol, was constrained in its pricing to local customers. This changed as 
the regulatory regime altered, and Sasol’s2 strategy towards the local value chain 
moved to maximize prices (Mondliwa and Roberts, 2019).
Various forms of continued support for the upstream basic metals and 
chemicals sub- sectors have contributed to the outcomes. This is a puzzling 
question from the political economy perspective: why have capital- intensive 
resource- based industries continued to receive so much attention and different 
forms of support, while downstream, labour- absorbing, industries have in most 
cases not been supported by effective strategies for building capabilities? Part of 
the answer lies in what has been the dominant paradigm of economic policy in 
general, part lies in the challenges of competitiveness in these sub- sectors within 
the global context, and part lies in the ongoing influence of the large upstream 
firms, which are well entrenched and effective at lobbying.
Different factors have driven the performance of the automotive and the food 
industries. These are both large industries in South Africa, accounting for 7.2 per 
cent and 14.8 per cent of manufacturing value added respectively in 2019.3 The 
automotive sector has been assisted by a targeted industrial policy, which has 
evolved through a series of phases (Chapter 5). Outside of resource- based sectors, 
it has recorded by far the best growth in manufacturing, yet the capabilities 
remain shallow and focused at the assembly level. The automotive industry has 
continued to run a significant trade deficit, while the record in growing local 
content has been relatively poor. South Africa has not developed the capabilities 
of more sophisticated automotive hubs in countries such as Thailand and Mexico. 
The automotive industry reflects a skewed arrangement that favours the original 
equipment manufacturers (OEMs). The successful lobbying of the large OEMs 
for ongoing support is one factor explaining the outcomes observed in South 
Africa. This is perhaps unsurprising as the threat of the loss of high- profile jobs in 
unionized factories has had a greater influence than the potential employment 
that could be generated by better policy support.
The food and beverage industries consist of a range of value chains extending 
from agriculture and agroprocessing to retail. The industries include some success 
stories, notably the rapid growth of fresh fruit production based on export 
markets (Chapter  6), and wine exports (Chapter  7). During apartheid, in the 
agriculture to food value chains there had been extensive regulation and support 
for cooperatives in processing, such as milling and dairy. The widespread 
2 Sasol is the upstream supplier of chemical inputs including polymers used to produce plastic 
products.
3 This only counts the narrowly defined sub- sectors and not the related areas, such as automotive 
components classified under other sub- sectors, and agricultural production and packaging in the 
case of food.
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liberalization of markets in the 1990s brought far- reaching restructuring with 
large employment losses in many segments. In this changing context, the 
cooperatives became privately owned with many acquired by multinational con-
glomerate groupings.
The fresh- fruit industry has emerged as a strong export generator and has built 
considerable capabilities to export fruit into international markets. A key factor 
in its success is coordination along the value chain to deliver higher- value 
products to meet the preferences of export markets. This has combined the 
farming of new varieties requiring advanced capabilities with the appropriate 
logistics and marketing operations to place the products on supermarket shelves. 
The successes have resulted from effective producer strategies, in the absence of a 
targeted government strategy, though there have been some attempts to rectify 
this.4 South Africa has realized the ‘industrialization of freshness’ in important 
fruit groupings, while in other groupings the industry has not achieved the 
coordination and long- term investments required (Chapter 6).
14.3.1 South Africa Has an Open Economy but There Have Been 
Signs of Structural Regression
With the liberalization of the economy starting in the 1990s, South Africa has 
become extremely open and internationalized in terms of trade, capital flows, and 
ownership. While these changes brought far- reaching restructuring in industry, 
the changes have not resulted in diversification or sustained higher levels of 
investment (see also Black and Roberts,  2009). The experience points to the 
challenges of managing international integration to ensure that the linkages are 
built into local production systems (Chapter 13).
In terms of international trade, the liberalization in the 1990s heralded much 
higher levels of exports and imports (Chapter 1; and Figure 14.1). Over the period 
1994–2002 the real exchange rate had weakened, as was appropriate under 
reduced protection. While import penetration increased so did the ratio of 
merchandise exports to GDP, from 18 per cent in 1994 to 25 per cent in 2000, 
opening up a trade surplus. This included increased exports in diversified 
manufacturing industries including machinery and equipment and motor 
vehicles (see Chapters 3 and 5). In these and other manufacturing sub- sectors, 
imports also grew substantially.
From 2002, however, the strengthening exchange rate underpinned by the 
focus on inflation targeting meant imports increased strongly, to reach 27 per cent 
of gross domestic expenditure (GDE) in 2008 (Figure 14.1). As reflected in the 
4 This seemed to be changing, when in 2019 a process began for developing a master plan to 
support fruit alongside other selected agricultural products.
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industry studies, these increased imports were largely of diversified manufactured 
products and undermined local producers who could not compete with cheap 
imports. The increase in imports in fact exceeded the higher earnings from minerals 
exports and the country went into a trade deficit during the international 
resources boom to 2008. The end of the boom saw much poorer export earnings, 
while the hollowing- out of diversified productive capabilities meant a widening 
trade deficit once again from 2011.
Instead of the hoped- for export- led growth, the far- reaching liberalization and 
international integration led South Africa to prematurely deindustrialize, with 
the contribution of manufacturing to GDP declining from 21 per cent in 1994 to 
12 per cent in 2019.5 Moreover, within manufacturing, the structural change has 
in fact been regressive in nature, as growth in value added has continued to be 
biased towards mineral and resource- based sub- sectors (Chapters 1 and 2). The 
share of diversified manufacturing (including metal products, plastic products, 
and food and beverages) in total manufacturing value added in fact declined 
between 1994 and 2019 (Chapter 1). There has been a decrease in manufacturing 
employment across the board, but the largest losses have been borne by exactly 
those diversified manufacturing industries where strong growth would create 
jobs, both directly and in related industries. As noted above and in Chapters 1 to 6, 
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Figure 14.1 Trade and the real effective exchange rate
Note: the real effective exchange rate is indexed at 2015 = 100.
Source: South African Reserve Bank data.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 15/07/21, SPi
Pamela Mondliwa and Simon Roberts 319
there have been ‘islands’ of strong export capabilities in manufacturing, such as 
in mining machinery, but these have not been built upon to be replicated in other 
parts of the economy.
Its openness to the global economy has further meant that South Africa has 
been exposed to global commodity price volatility. This is evident in the huge 
swings in steel prices (Chapter  3). The effects of downturns have been for the 
local producer to lobby for support, while in years of high prices the profits have 
been taken out of the business.
South Africa’s liberalization of capital flows has seen large volumes of portfolio 
and foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows and outflows (Figure 14.2). As South 
African companies such as SABMiller and Naspers have become part of huge 
transnational corporations (TNCs), the capitalization of the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE) has increased to an equivalent of more than 300 per cent of the 
country’s gross domestic product (GDP). This has not meant higher levels of fixed 
investment in South Africa, however. Capital account liberalization has also 
allowed South African corporations to move capital abroad on a grand scale, both 
legally and illegally (see Ashman et al., 2011).
The rise in portfolio and FDI inflows has been matched by an increase in for-
eign ownership of the JSE. Measured in terms of control of companies listed on 
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Figure 14.2 Portfolio and FDI inflows, outflows, and JSE capitalization
Source: Authors’ calculations using South African Reserve Bank data.
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the late 1990s to 25 per cent in 2018.6 The significance of TNCs in South Africa’s 
economy is in line with global trends, which show individual corporations 
controlling resources (at least in monetary terms) and having security, 
intelligence, and public relations operations larger than many states, as well as 
significant lobbying capabilities, such as through donations to political campaigns 
(Zingales, 2017; UNCTAD, 2018).7
The international ownership of key businesses in South Africa has in some 
industries been part of a deliberate government strategy. In the case of basic steel, 
the government strategy was for Iscor to have an international steel equity partner 
to enable access to technology and investment (Chapter  4).8 Ultimately, the 
company became absorbed into ArcelorMittal, the largest steel transnational 
corporation in the world. The local business became peripheral to the parent, 
given the relatively small domestic demand and low levels of growth, and the 
parent company did not invest in the R&D in the South African business required 
for learning higher- tier capabilities. The weakening of historical cost advantages 
meant it was vulnerable to commodity price swings, while subject to transfer 
pricing and profit shifting by the parent company, and weakening local linkages 
and technology collaboration (see also Lee, 2015).
14.3.2 Key Insights from the Industry Experiences
Political settlements are stable when the distribution of rents is in line with the 
distribution of power in the economy. This suggests that powerful groups can be 
identified by studying the patterns of rents or benefits of economic policy. The 
key insight to be drawn from the discussion of industry experiences is the strong 
continuity of better performance by upstream industries and poor progress in 
diversifying the economy. There have also been sustained high profit levels in 
some sub- sectors of services (OECD, 2013; World Bank, 2018; and Chapter 2). 
These outcomes point to the weight of path dependency that needs to be 
addressed for a change in direction, in which industrial policy and broader 
economic policy should play a key role. However, the degree of success or failure 
6 The largest South African conglomerates, led by Anglo American and Richemont/Rembrandt 
(now Remgro) had always been internationalized, even while being identified as South African, in 
part because of their origins and in part because of their response to economic sanctions during 
apartheid. However, these were still family- controlled conglomerate groups with a very substantial 
part of their business based in South Africa (Chabane et al.,  2006). Remgro has remained family- 
controlled and Anglo American has unbundled; the huge growth in foreign ownership was boosted by 
AB Inbev’s acquisition of SABMiller (the biggest listed company in recent years in terms of its market 
capitalization).
7 The significance of large global corporations is not new of course (Zingales, 2017).
8 Iscor was the state- owned and vertically integrated steel producer with interests in iron ore and 
steel production. When it was privatized, it was split into Kumba Iron Ore and Arcelor Mittal South 
Africa (“AMSA”).
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in effecting this change is dependent on the extent to which the powerful interests 
or groups support this diversification. Three important observations from the 
industry experience can be made. These are discussed briefly below and are 
developed further in the discussion on the evolving political settlement 
underpinning South Africa’s industrial development, in section 14.4.
First, the patterns of performance were reinforced by the adoption of the 
liberalization policy paradigm, which mainly benefited the established large and 
competitive firms in the economy. The analysis of the evolving political settlement 
must engage with the extent to which different organizations influenced the 
policy decisions taken, as well as the underlying ideological conflicts in the 
policies that were adopted. The ideology and dominant policy paradigms have 
implications for policy choices and influence the relative holding power of 
different groups (Gray,  2018). In this regard, free market economic orthodoxy, 
together with the liberalization agenda, have privileged the interests of existing 
capitalists at the expense of a model to support the entry and growth of challenger 
firms that would bring greater economic dynamism.
Second, the industry experiences point to the continued government support 
of the large incumbents, despite the industrial policies apparently being aimed at 
improving productive capabilities and investing in the diversification of certain 
industries. Our [?] analysis examines the economic power of large firms and the 
extent to which these firms have influenced the evolution of the political settle-
ment. This is based on the assumptions that industrial support creates rents and 
the distribution of these rents has largely followed the existing economic struc-
ture; and the prevailing economic structure reflects a country’s economic history, 
including the construction of markets and the main participants, as well as the 
large incumbent businesses.
Third, the lack of industrial diversification also reflects the problems with 
coordination across policy areas that include energy, minerals, and infrastructure. 
Understanding the underlying factors in the poor policy coordination is 
important, particularly if this failing is a result of conflicts of interests—as appears 
to have been the case.
It is important to understand the makeup of the main groups or interests that 
have been engaged in conflicts over policies, rents, and policy coordination. These 
are essentially established businesses, previously excluded black capitalists and 
black entrepreneurs, industry associations, trade unions, and the government and 
its constituencies. Many of the established businesses have also had interests in 
extractive industries with favourable dispensations governing inputs, energy, and 
infrastructure provision, and in which profits did not necessarily depend on 
investment in upgrading capabilities. The previously excluded black capitalists have 
been fragmented into two main groups, the black elites that often had ties with the 
ruling political party, and independent black entrepreneurs. Industry associations 
have provided important platforms for engaging on policy and have generally been 
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made up of different combinations of entrenched firms, black capitalists, black 
entrepreneurs, and entrepreneurs more generally. The trade unions representing 
workers have focused on the interests of the existing workforce, meaning that 
these have been largely aligned with the existing economic structure, and chiefly 
focused on worker issues within this context. The unemployed and market 
entrants have not been sufficiently organized to counteract the influence of 
entrenched firms on economic policy, and government has been the arena where 
conflicts of interests play out rather than a strong voice for the former groups. 
What is evident is that the interplay between these groups has been dynamic and 
fluid: in certain periods, some have managed to organize their power better and 
control rents, while in other periods different groups have been more successful.
14.4 The Evolution of the Political Settlement and Economic  
Policy for Industrial Development
South Africa’s democratic economic policy can be assessed in three phases that 
roughly coincide with the presidential tenure of Presidents Nelson Mandela (May 
1994 to June 1999), Thabo Mbeki (June 1999 to September 2008), and Jacob 
Zuma (May 2009 to February 2018). The period under President Cyril Ramaphosa 
(from February 2018 and continuing at the time of writing) is too short to 
properly assess, while President Kgalema Motlanthe (September 2008 to May 
2009) was an interim president for less than a year. As the chapter is concerned 
with structural change, the analysis considers the distribution of rents or flow of 
income between the initial industrial core (as at 1994) and more diversified and 
labour- absorbing industries. This section also considers broader economic policy 
beyond industrial policy, as the rent management systems of a country are 
strongly influenced by ideological commitments and dominant policy paradigms 
(Gray, 2018).
14.4.1 The 1994 Compromises: A Political Settlement 
to End Apartheid
The compromises reached in 1994 meant that the economic structure was left 
intact, in effect continuing to protect white ownership of wealth and privileged 
employment positions of the existing workforce for at least five years in exchange 
for improvements in labour rights. The compromises were premised on the 
growth that was expected on the part of established businesses. The major changes 
adopted were the liberalization of trade and capital flows, the deregulation of 
agricultural markets, and moves towards privatization. These choices effectively 
de- prioritized redistribution and inclusion.
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The compromises reflected the relative power of big business interests. Business 
had invested heavily in influencing the economic policy- thinking for the 
democratic era. This included engaging with all the stakeholders leading up to 
and during the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) 
negotiations in 1991, providing technical support and data for scenario- planning 
exercises, punting a market- friendly environment that informed both the ANC 
and the National Party in the coalition ‘Government of National Unity’ 
(Padayachee and Van Niekerk, 2019). The holding power that was leveraged was a 
combination of ideology and economic structure. Big business was at the helm of 
the country’s industrial core and this placed it in a privileged position, as it was 
understood that without businesses’ support, the economy would underperform. 
Big business’s position was further buttressed by the appointment of former 
banker Chris Liebenberg as the Finance Minister of democratic South Africa, 
following the resignation of Derek Keys, who was also a businessman. Chris Stals, 
who had close ties with the existing business establishment, was retained as 
governor of the Reserve Bank. Big business, recognizing the potential power of 
black entrepreneurs, initiated the principles and practice of black economic 
empowerment (BEE), with its emphasis on ownership transfers to influential 
individuals (linked to the ANC), to secure buy- in for orthodox reforms, 
particularly capital account liberalization (Zalk, 2016). These BEE deals started 
long before the actual legislation came into effect, and as such, served to 
significantly shape it.
Big business sought to mould institutions and set the rules of the game, to 
protect their interests over time. This continuity that has been observed over the 
democratic period confirms that the structure of power in the 1990s has effectively 
shaped the institutions in its favour.
In the period from 1994 to 1999, there was no overarching industrial policy. 
The Industrial Strategy Project (ISP), which guided microeconomic policy in the 
period mischaracterized South Africa’s economic challenge as having a high 
degree of industrial diversification from import substitution along with 
inefficiencies associated with protection from imports (Joffe et al., 1995: 45). As a 
result, the policy recommendations focused on facilitating specialization with 
three elements: fostering the role of market incentives, strengthening underlying 
capabilities in human resources and technology, and providing an appropriate 
institutional environment to facilitate industrial restructuring (Joffe et al., 1995: 45). 
This was very much aligned with the orthodox economic ideology that prevailed 
at the time, where emphasis was placed on fixing the fundamentals and allowing 
market forces to do the rest, rather than adopting targeted industrial policy to 
shape the development path.
The high levels of concentration and lack of competition in many sub- sectors 
were acknowledged as a challenge for a growing economy (Joffe et al.,  1995). 
However, the Competition Act of 1998, which was negotiated by government, 
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labour, and business, emphasized market efficiency and did not directly tackle the 
extreme concentration of control by dominant firms in many markets. The issues 
of inclusion specified in the preamble of the Act were only really given effect in 
mergers and acquisitions in the form of a public interest provision. As such, it was 
a reflection of the balance of power between the key constituencies and the 
strength of big business in particular (see Roberts,  2000: 124–42 for a detailed 
description of the negotiations). Many of the firms in the big business grouping 
were already dominant in the markets in which they operated and thus were more 
concerned about the implications of abuse of dominance provisions rather than 
merger regulation. The choices made mattered for structural transformation, as 
the strategic conduct of incumbents can raise entry barriers, exclude smaller 
businesses, and undermine capability development and diversification (Mondliwa 
et al., 2020; Mondliwa et al., 2021).
The ‘holding power’ of big business in the negotiations reflected the fact that gov-
ernment at the time of the legislation was very concerned about investment levels in 
the economy, which, given the economic structure, depended in large part on the 
decisions of big businesses. Indeed, the implicit threat of not investing if the com-
mercial environment was not ‘friendly’ or conducive to ‘business certainty’ played a 
part in determining the outcomes of the negotiations. This was reflected in the 
significant changes made between the government’s initial draft and the final pro-
visions (Roberts, 2000: 138). As a result, even though the Competition Act acknowl-
edges the objective of wealth redistribution, the orthodox provisions meant to 
deal with abuse of a dominant position have proven to be limited (Roberts, 2020).9
At the same time, macroeconomic policy emphasized ‘stability’ and cutting the 
fiscal deficit, with monetary policy attempting to target the money supply to con-
trol inflation. This was despite alternatives that were on the table, including the 
‘framework for macroeconomic policy in South Africa’ put forward by the ANC’s 
Macroeconomic Research Group (MERG). The MERG framework emphasized an 
initial public investment- led approach for the 1990s and sustained growth in 2000s 
underpinned by supply- side industrial policy interventions to alter the develop-
ment trajectory (MERG, 1993). The rejection of the MERG proposals by President 
Mandela and Deputy President Mbeki followed the critique by the white business 
community which labelled them as ‘macroeconomic populism’ (Gumede, 2007). 
The final negotiated economic policy focused on reassurances to local and interna-
tional business, and the developmental state ideas were abandoned. Subsequent 
assessments of economic performance found strong path dependency effects, with 
the benefits of trade liberalization being realized by those firms that were already 
internationally competitive in 1994 (Aghion et al., 2013; Bell et al., 2018; Mondliwa 
et al., 2021). Industrial financing, including by development finance institutions, 
continued to flow towards the upstream industries (Black and Roberts, 2009).
9 The Competition Act was amended in 2018 and the amendments seek to address questions of 
increased participation.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 15/07/21, SPi
Pamela Mondliwa and Simon Roberts 325
14.4.2 The More Things Change the More They  
Stay the Same: 2000–8
In the 2000s, under President Mbeki, there were strong elements of continuity 
from the compromises of the Government of National Unity. In effect, the 
political settlement reached in 1994 remained largely intact in terms of the 
balance of power and the institutional arrangements, albeit with some important 
additions. The benefits of liberalization, open markets, and macroeconomic 
stability continued to be proclaimed, reflecting the ascendance of free markets as 
the dominant policy paradigm. This was supplemented by expanded ‘market 
friendly’ incentives to encourage ‘knowledge- intensive’ activities and advanced 
manufacturing technologies (Machaka and Roberts,  2003). Higher levels of 
investment were expected from business in response. However, there was no 
understanding of the relationship between the economic structure and investment 
in capabilities and, instead, deindustrialization continued as downstream and 
diversified manufacturing performed poorly. In addition, the incentive 
programmes, in practice, tended to support the capital- intensive upstream 
industries (see Black et al., 2016; Mondliwa and Roberts, 2019). By the mid- 2000s 
there was still no overall policy that aligned all the different interventions and 
there was no one agency coordinating government interventions to ensure wider 
benefits (Rustomjee, 2013).
Though there was a range of incentives to promote investment, exports, and 
technological improvements, and to support small firms, these were largely soft- 
touch measures targeted at the same industries that received support from the 
apartheid government, doing very little to change the structure of the economy. 
The three manufacturing and tradable sub- sectors that were specifically sup-
ported by government between 1994 and 2007 were automotive, resource- 
processing industries (steel, chemicals, and aluminium), and clothing and textiles. 
Examples of these incentives include the accelerated depreciation allowance (37E 
incentive), and the Strategic Industrial Projects (SIP) programme. Both incen-
tives were made available to large capital- intensive projects, mostly in resource- 
related sub- sectors such as steel, ferro- alloys, aluminium, and basic chemicals 
(see Black and Roberts, 2009). The rationale for continuing to support upstream 
industries was based on op por tun ities for development through linkages to the 
downstream industries. However, there were no conditions placed on these 
incentives and there have been limited benefits for linked industries (Bell et al., 
2018; and Chapters 3 and 4).
With the commodities boom driven by Chinese demand, coupled with domes-
tic consumer credit extension and investment for the World Cup in 2010, the 
economy grew even while cheap imports on the back of the strong currency were 
hollowing out local manufacturing. At the same time, the need to bridge the gap 
between South Africa’s ‘two economies’ meant social grants were increased along 
with greater spending by government and parastatals on extending basic services.
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The approach to BEE reflected this attempt to straddle divergent realities as 
business committed to voluntary charters with weak monitoring and an absence 
of enforcement (Ponte et al., 2007; Mondliwa and Roberts, 2020). BEE effectively 
reinforced the existing economic structure and left black shareholders in debt to 
their white business partners and needing to ensure the flow of profits was 
maintained (Chapter  9). Large businesses successfully lobbied the government 
not to implement structural changes that would create opportunities for entrants, 
including black entrepreneurs, in exchange for firms creating BEE initiatives that 
effectively reinforced their position as gate keepers in the economy (Mondliwa 
and Roberts, 2020). This was despite the BEE Commission10 having developed a 
detailed programme for BEE that aimed to bring empowerment and structural 
transformation, together with an emphasis on increased productive investment 
(BEE Commission, 2001; Mondliwa and Roberts, 2020). Again, big business was 
able to use economic resources to accommodate a small black elite.
Many of the BEE Commissioners later became beneficiaries of the ownership 
transfers and have become multimillionaires. This weakened the holding power 
of the remaining black entrepreneurs as there was now a policy in place with the 
objective of addressing their concerns, even if the instruments were weak. By 2015, 
the distribution of the value of BEE deals was largely in line with the economic 
structure in 1994. Mining attracted the highest share (32 per cent of the total value), 
followed by industrials representing 18 per cent of the total value (Theobald et al., 
2015). The implication is that in relation to economic structure, the incentives of 
the new black elites connected to BEE were aligned with the status quo. The 
strategies of the emerging black elite were also to establish BEE holding companies 
that took minority shares in multiple existing companies to spread risk rather 
than deepening ownership and control and making new net investments. There 
are very few examples of BEE beneficiaries that have moved into diversified 
manufacturing activities; and those that have diversified their portfolios have 
tended to move into financial services.
The poor design of BEE also undermined the use of public procurement to 
drive diversification and productive inclusion. The application in practice meant 
that empowered importers could be prioritized over domestic producers. This 
came at the cost of domestic production and jobs.
The international listing of South African firms was taking place at the same 
time as the rise of the shareholder value movement, which saw the growing 
influence of institutional investors demanding intensive corporate restructuring 
to unlock larger and more rapid flows of cash to shareholders (Chapter 10). This 
underpinned the wide- scale corporate and industrial restructuring, which was in 
fact associated with a hollowing out of capabilities (Zalk, 2016). The impact of the 
10 The BEE Commission was established in 1998.
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commodities boom and strong currency meant that imported goods became 
cheaper and that salaries were higher in international currency terms, further 
fuelling consumption but undermining companies’ competitiveness.
On the labour front, much semi- skilled and unskilled labour, and many of the 
informally employed and unemployed, were progressively excluded. While 
popular protests grew, these were suppressed by policing, and social grants were 
substantially expanded to mitigate the short- term effects of deindustrialization 
(Runciman, 2017).
Overall, the development of industries in South Africa in the 1990s and early 
2000s reflects path dependency, compromises, and continuities in the absence of 
a concerted and coordinated industrial strategy across the government to change 
the trajectory. Individual ministries did develop strategies that aimed to support 
advanced manufacturing and create employment, such as the Integrated 
Manufacturing Strategy (Department of Trade, Industry, and Competition, 2002) 
and the Advanced Manufacturing and Technology Strategy (Department of 
Science and Technology, 2003). However, there was little coordination between 
these policies to ensure wider benefits.
Towards the end of this period it became apparent that structural change 
towards more diversified industries was necessary to drive growth and to address 
the high levels of unemployment and curb increasing levels of inequality. As part 
of the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa (ASGI- SA), 
which replaced the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) policy as 
the country’s macroeconomic policy, the National Industrial Policy Framework 
(NIPF) was introduced in 2007. The NIPF identified the need to coordinate 
interventions and target sub- sectors for industrial development. The focus of the 
strategy was on diversifying the economy towards downstream labour- absorbing 
industries. However, the industrial policy did not reflect the prevailing 
distribution of power within the economy. As such, it has not been successful and 
is considered a project of the Department of Trade, Industry, and Competition 
(DTIC) rather than part of a government- wide coordinated strategy.
14.4.3 Shifts in the Political Settlement: Populism  
and State Capture, 2008–18
Growing popular sentiment against the Mbeki government was made evident 
when President Jacob Zuma won the leadership of the ANC in 2007 and 
effectively removed President Mbeki in 2008 (with President Motlanthe holding 
office for a short period). This was with the support of the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU) and other groupings on the left inside the 
ANC. However, instead of a progressive economic policy agenda to engage with 
the country’s development challenges, under President Zuma an increasingly 
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clientelistic political settlement emerged. This included vertical fragmentation of 
control within the ANC as extractive rents were competed over from local to 
national levels of government and in state- owned corporations (Makhaya and 
Roberts, 2013; Public Protector, 2016; Bhorat et al., 2017). The message was that 
the market economy was rigged against the majority and that the only way to 
accumulate was through leveraging state influence.
For a time, public sector trade unions were kept onside by higher public wage 
settlements for government employees, while industrial unions fractured and 
ultimately left COSATU. The public wage premium increased during this period, 
and this, together with the expansion of public sector employment, increased the 
public wage bill, diverting funds away from other expenditure items such as 
investment in public infrastructure (Bhorat et al., 2016). This was the case even 
while the delivery of services by the state deteriorated and protests increased 
across the country (Runciman, 2017).
The impact of the political settlement of this period on industrial policy was 
profound, as conflictual stances were taken across government on a host of policy 
areas of central importance for industrialization, such as energy, mining, and 
procurement policies. Levers such as local procurement were employed for short- 
term rent capture across government. As a result, there were missed opportunities 
for building local capabilities in a number of areas, including machinery 
component manufacturing from the Transnet procurement process (Crompton 
and Kaziboni, 2020).11
The main strategy that President Zuma had used to gain leadership within the 
ANC was to divide the party and the Tripartite Alliance to alienate President 
Mbeki and his supporters.12 Once he was in power, it became important to bring 
in wider interests, reflected in a larger and more fragmented Cabinet, with the 
number of ministries growing from twenty- six to thirty- six. This proliferation of 
government departments made coordination of policy almost impossible.
President Zuma and his alliances often made public announcements about 
the need to displace ‘white monopoly capital’, which was allegedly growing at the 
expense of the accumulation of black wealth. This narrative was used to remove 
ministers that were labelled ‘puppets of white monopoly capital’ and replace them 
with others, many of whom were to emerge later as having connections to the 
Gupta family associates linked to state capture.13 The clientelism gained legiti-
macy even with the continued exclusion of the majority, and this narrative 
11 Transnet is the state- owned monopoly in rail, ports, and pipelines. In 2012, Transnet embarked 
on its largest- ever single order of 1,064 locomotives with local content requirements. However, the 
project was later found to be corrupt and the local- content requirements were bypassed in a number 
of instances.
12 This is an alliance between the ANC (ruling political party), the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU), and the South African Communist Party (SACP).
13 The Gupta family is alleged to be at the centre of the large- scale corruption that characterized 
Zuma’s presidency. See Bhorat et al. (2017).
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became a source of holding power. It also weakened the stance of big business, 
which was seen as representing ‘white monopoly capital’. Despite the rhetoric on 
‘radical economic transformation’ and fighting South Africa’s triple challenges of 
high unemployment, inequality, and poverty, there were very few interventions to 
trigger structural change or address real impacts of monopoly power on the 
economy. The most significant was the black industrialist programme, involving 
financing by the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and the DTIC, as 
well as public procurement, to address the challenges of access to markets, which 
has also had many challenges (Chapter 9).
The remaining industrial policy rents continued to flow towards established 
businesses. The incentive programme for the automotive industry was also 
updated in this period, but it continued to disproportionately benefit the 
multinational OEMs and there was limited upgrading through linkages to the 
automotive industry (Chapter  5). Import tariffs were introduced to support 
the struggling upstream steel industry at a significant cost to downstream 
industries (Rustomjee et al., 2018; and Chapter 8). Though the tariff support to 
AMSA came with conditionalities this time around, the design of the condition-
alities undermined their effectiveness (Chapter 8). Incentives to support recovery 
from the 2008 financial crisis and the ensuing recession, such as the Manufacturing 
Competitiveness Enhancement Programme, also flowed to established firms, 
often financing investments that would have taken place without it (Beare et al., 
2014). The programme’s design, whereby firms had to finance the investment and 
claim back from government later, privileged firms that already had access to 
funding. Programmes that were targeted at the upgrading of collective capabilities 
for diversified industries were not prioritized for funding. In 2014, a cluster 
programme was developed to assist firms to overcome challenges with 
competitiveness. The programme, which involved financing and policy support 
for groups of firms seeking to collectively resolve challenges, was later shelved 
due to lack of funding (Beare et al., 2014).
While firms broadly maintained profit levels in this period (Driver,  2019), 
there was limited investment in expanded productive capacity in South Africa 
(Bosiu et al., 2017). When challenged on this, business argued that the low levels 
of investment were a result of political uncertainty associated with Zuma’s 
presidency. However, the comparison of investment levels among comparable 
middle- income countries indicates the relatively lower investment levels in South 
Africa throughout the whole post- apartheid period (Chapter 1).
Zuma’s presidency has often been framed as the ‘nine wasted years’14 or ‘the 
corrupt years’. The implication of this position is that the removal of the ‘bad 
apples’, coupled with a return to the ‘good governance’ agenda that characterized 
14 In 2019, in a speech given at the World Economic Forum, President Ramaphosa referred to 
President Zuma’s time in office as the ‘nine wasted years’. See Haffajee, 2019.
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the Mbeki presidency, would resolve South Africa’s problems. It is argued strongly 
here that this is not the case. A point often missed in debates about this period is 
that South Africa’s failure generally to mobilize higher levels of investment in 
productive industries of the economy materially contributed to the conditions 
that enabled the brazen clientelism, patronage, and corruption that characterized 
the Zuma presidency (Zalk, 2016; Mondliwa and Roberts, 2018).
14.5 The Political Economy of Structural Transformation in 
Middle- Income Countries: Lessons from the South African Case
The success or failure of countries to drive structural change can be understood 
in terms of whether the political economy dynamics, and the governing coalition 
of interests, support the growth of diversified manufacturing sub- sectors with 
higher levels of productivity (Khan and Blankenburg,  2009; Gray,  2018). This 
chapter has assessed the contestation of interests and the power balance that 
underpin South Africa’s structural change dynamics. It contributes to the growing 
evidence of political economy analyses of structural change in middle income 
countries by engaging both with the conflicts at the micro level (in specific indus-
tries) and interaction with the meso and macro dynamics. So, what does the 
South African experience tell us about the political economy of structural change?
South Africa’s political settlement has evolved but not in ways that have led to 
significant changes to the productive structure of the economy. Instead of the 
upgrading coalitions critical for successful industrialization, the coalitions have 
effectively been of incumbent firms with limited sharing with a small group of the 
black elite. This deal has meant the firms have retained their economic position 
and been able to internationalize. In South Africa’s case, the large and lead firms 
are concentrated in commodities (linked to minerals), and regulated industries 
including telecommunications, healthcare, construction, and the financial sector. 
In commodities, the primary focus has been on extraction and export of minerals. 
This does not require substantial investments in capabilities within the economy. 
The rationalization of the activities of mining houses in the 1980s and 1990s meant 
that the non- core assets, including in mining machinery and equipment, which 
requires investment in technological capabilities to be competitive, were sold off 
to less funded domestic capitalists and international firms, implying an exit of 
capabilities and/or lower investments.
The regulated industries are mostly natural oligopolies, where high barriers to 
entry limit the levels of rivalry that would lead firms to invest in capabilities in 
order to increase market shares. The incumbent firms can also raise strategic 
barriers to entry to ensure the exclusion of other firms. The relative importance of 
both the commodities and the  regulated industries in the economy also means 
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that they have power to influence pol icies—what Zingales (2017) has termed 
the ‘Medici vicious circle’. The economic power that comes with establishing 
dominant positions in markets readily translates into the capture of political 
power that reinforces those positions. This exemplifies economic structure as a 
source of holding power.
The implication is that there is no influential constituency backing structural 
change. The commodity sub- sectors have also been producing intermediate 
inputs for more diversified downstream firms. These upstream firms at times have 
charged exploitative prices that have undermined the competitiveness of 
downstream firms (Chapters 3 and 4). The vertical distribution of power within 
the South African value chains has typically been skewed towards the upstream 
input suppliers. The holding power of these upstream firms has not only been 
derived from dyadic relationships between the upstream and downstream firms, 
but also from the orientation of institutions towards the upstream sub- sectors—
what Dallas et al. (2019) refer to as institutional power.
The levers which could have been used by the South African government, 
including energy and minerals policies, have been undermined by the 
fragmentation of the state. The division of responsibilities into many different 
departments under different ministers, particularly during the Zuma 
administration, meant that corporate interests could lobby them separately and 
make a coordinated approach unlikely. The separation from trade and industrial 
policy of initially technology policy in the 1990s followed by development finance 
and competition (from 2009) put further strain on the coordination requirements 
across government. Through the political settlements lens, however, what initially 
presented as an incoherent policy approach actually reflects an arrangement 
emerging from the need to keep the ruling coalition together.
In the agenda and actions of the state, the interests of workers and businesses 
in diversified industries have not been given importance, while the lobbying of 
the industries which prospered under apartheid have meant they have been able 
to continue to hold sway. Contests have largely been over the division of existing 
rents rather than how to create new rents. This has been true of the framing of 
BEE in terms of ownership in existing businesses. The issues of ‘state capture’ have 
also focused on existing rents.
Without crafting a new political settlement in which the interests of longer- 
term investment in capabilities have a prime position, it is difficult to see a differ-
ent path being taken. Breaking down barriers to entry and growth is one side of 
such a settlement; new investment is the other.
South Africa’s post- apartheid experience is an extreme version of factors facing 
upper middle- income countries struggling to enter high- incomes status in the 
context of liberalization, globalization, and high levels of inequality. Four key 
observations provide rich material for wider political economy debates.
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First, the state is not monolithic but rather an arena where conflicts between 
powerful groups take place. The industry case studies in the book and the dis-
cussion above have shown how different interests are able to shape economic 
policymaking and regulation in their favour. In addition, the state’s ability to 
monitor and enforce conditionalities on state- provided incentives is dependent 
on the balance of power.
Second, the constitutive power of international norms that are not necessarily 
associated with particular institutions can shape development outcomes (Dallas 
et al.,  2019). The rationalizing of South African conglomerates, combined with 
the internationalization of businesses and a narrower focus on protecting profits 
and paying out dividends, undermined longer- term productive investments in 
South Africa.
Third, inequality makes politics prone to populism, understood in economic 
terms as personalized leadership that addresses broad but unorganized discontent. 
The rise of former President Zuma was in response to the growing discontent 
with outcomes for the majority of South Africans. The liberalization reforms have 
largely ensured the continuation of the economic status quo including inequality. 
As such, the variable relationship between political stability and economic 
transformation during the period of analysis has underpinned the accommodation 
of particular interests.
And fourth, institutional analysis alone does not explain the paths of economic 
transformation. Post- apartheid South Africa has developed world- class institu-
tions, which on paper should have ensured that the transformation of the econ-
omy would be more inclusive. However, the way institutions work in practice 
depends on the responses of the organizations operating under these institutions 
(Gray, 2018). The state capture years have been indicative of how power lies out-
side formal institutions, with the Gupta family alleged to have used a web of 
informal networks that operate within and outside formal institutions to facilitate 
clientelism.
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Towards a New Industrial Policy for 
Structural Transformation
Antonio Andreoni, Pamela Mondliwa, Simon Roberts,  
and Fiona Tregenna
15.1 Introduction
The case of South Africa demonstrates why structural transformation is so 
important and yet so difficult to achieve. Moving to higher value- adding and 
more sophisticated, diversified economic activities is at the heart of a resilient and 
healthy economy which enables its citizens to realize their full potential. It 
involves investment in a wide range of productive capabilities for these economic 
activities to develop. The economic and social implications of the Covid- 19 
pandemic, which are still unfolding at the time of writing, make the building of a 
stronger, more diversified economic base even more imperative. It should also be 
self- evident that the structure and nature of production need to be environmentally 
sustainable and not exacerbate climate change.
Structural change (or the lack of it) is determined by the presence (or absence) 
of complex and interdependent processes of learning and investment in industrial 
ecosystems, specifically the development and accumulation of productive cap abil-
ities across sectors, organizations, and institutions. These processes require making 
the appropriate linkages among productive activities to effectively engage with 
technological change, notably digitalization, in order to integrate into global value 
chains (GVCs) in ways that support local capabilities development. In turn, the 
healthy development of the industrial ecosystems requires appropriate institutions 
and sound industrial policies as part of the country’s political settlement. The 
political settlement is understood as the compromises reached between powerful 
groups in society which set the context for institutional arrangements and other 
policies, as well as their effectiveness and enforceability.
South Africa is an important case study of the challenges faced by middle- 
income countries in pursuing structural transformation. By the 1990s, it had 
developed strong productive capabilities in some industries, largely as a result of 
the support for industries deemed strategic under apartheid. The economy was 
rapidly opened up in the 1990s, with deep trade liberalization (Roberts,  2000; 
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Erten et al., 2019). However, despite industrial policies that have sought to pro-
mote manufacturing, the deindustrialization process that began in the early 1980s 
has not been reversed, but has actually continued, as discussed in Chapter  11. 
And, within industry there has been a persistent bias towards heavy industry and 
an overall failure to diversify (Chapter 2).
The contributions to this book explore the changes over three decades in key 
industry groupings, locating the South African industry experience in an inter-
nation al context. Collectively, the chapters analyse the linkages and interdependen-
cies across activities, and point to the need to transcend the traditional 
‘manufacturing’ and ‘services’ divide to understand the development of pro duct-
ive capabilities in industrial ecosystems. Issues of technological change, pro duct-
ive capabilities, and the digitalization of production are considered in 
cross- cutting chapters, along with the record on black economic empowerment, 
inclusion, inequality, and sustainability.
South Africa has largely missed out on the gains from international integration 
in the form of ‘learning through exporting’ in diversified manufacturing 
industries. Instead, there are ‘islands’ of export capabilities, such as in mining 
machinery, which have not been built upon as catalysts of wider structural 
transformation. For instance, while the auto sub- sector—which has been highly 
incentivized under successive industrial policies—stands out in terms of the value 
of exports, these have been limited to fully assembled vehicles and a narrow range 
of components (Chapter  5). Minerals, along with basic metals and basic 
chemicals, remained almost as important in the country’s goods exports in 2019 
as they did twenty- five years earlier. There are, however, a few counter- examples, 
led by high- value fruit exports and niches within machinery and equipment, 
which demonstrate a possible alternative path (see Chapters 3 and 6).
In services too, there has not been a sustained trend towards upgrading and 
towards stronger integration with other sectors. There has been growth in lower- 
value, lower- productivity services overall, including those statistically classified as 
‘other business services’ (which include activities such as security and cleaning 
services, see Tregenna (2010)) and retail. While financial services and 
communication services have also grown in value added, they have only recorded 
modest increases in employment, and have not played a sufficiently developmental 
role in supporting the growth of productive industries (Chapters 1, 2, and 10).
South Africa’s poor performance must be understood in the context of the 
evolving political settlement. The compromises reached in 1994 reflected, in part, 
the strength of established business groups. While policies such as tariff 
liberalization (leading to increased market competition from imports) and 
competition law enforcement might have constrained market power to an extent, 
there has been a subsequent failure to enforce industrial policy levers to ensure 
that rents have been productively reinvested in expansion and upgrading.
As with many other middle- income countries, in South Africa macroeconomic 
policy has emphasized ‘stability’ as part of the conditions for business confidence, 
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which was supposed to underpin investment in the model promoted by the 
‘Washington Consensus’ International Financial Institutions (Padayachee and 
Van Niekerk, 2019; Michie, 2020). Achieving this stability meant cutting the fiscal 
deficit and reducing inflation through higher interest rates under inflation 
targeting. In the first decade of the 2000s, high real interest rates coupled with 
natural resource earnings led to a strong, overvalued currency and hence a 
growing trade deficit exacerbated by burgeoning credit- fuelled consumer 
spending. The unsustainability of this path became glaringly obvious with the 
2008 global financial crisis and the end of the commodities boom shortly 
thereafter.
As could be expected, the lack of fundamental distributional change—and the 
limited nature of trickle- down benefits—meant growing pressure to accumulate 
wealth by leveraging state influence. The vertical fragmentation of control within 
the ruling coalition of interests resulted in competition for extractive rents from 
local to national levels of government and in state- owned corporations (Makhaya 
and Roberts, 2013; Bhorat et al., 2017). In addition, a horizontal fracturing also 
occurred within both the labour and business constituencies. The fragmentation 
of government has made the development of a coherent strategy to reverse the 
trend, including an effective industrial policy, very difficult (see Chapter 2, and 
Bhorat et al., 2014 on policy coordination in South Africa).
This concluding chapter looks at the issues that have emerged in the book that 
can inform a necessary change in direction for middle- income countries such as 
South Africa. The chapter starts with a discussion of the foundations for structural 
transformation illuminated by the industrial ecosystems framework and the in- 
depth industry analyses. The key ‘gaps and traps’ which need to be confronted are 
then identified. This is followed by a focus on the key considerations for industrial 
policy for South Africa and other middle- income countries facing similar 
challenges. The chapter concludes with a call for the need to confront the 
implications of climate change and Covid- 19 as an essential part of achieving 
sustainable transformation.
15.2 Key Foundations for Structural Transformation to Build 
Industrial Capabilities: Understanding Industrial Ecosystems 
and Value Chains
15.2.1 An Industrial Ecosystems Approach
An industrial strategy that seeks to influence value creation and capture dynamics 
to achieve structural transformation must locate firms and their performance in 
terms of industrial ecosystems to allow for the consideration of all the relevant 
factors. The industrial ecosystems perspective allows for building an inductive 
and context- specific understanding of the structure of ‘the product space’ 
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emerging from the intersection of key sectoral value chains and different cap abil-
ities (Andreoni, 2018).
An approach to shape industrial ecosystems starts from the main units of 
analysis being the production capabilities, key enabling technologies, and the 
value chains, while taking into account the distribution of power. Within each 
industrial ecosystem, there are a number of value chains around which the 
productive activities (including manufacturing and services) are structured. Each 
of these value chains involves several productive organizations whose activities 
are made possible by their capabilities across different technology platforms.
The technology platforms integrate different types of technologies and 
technology systems. The increasing digitalization of the economy has dramatically 
reshaped these technology domains and the capabilities required by productive 
organizations to be competitive in the market. This means that some of these 
technology platforms underpin production processes of closely related industrial 
sub- sectors as well as different product- value segments within the same industrial 
sub- sector. Technologies are thus linked by a set of dynamic interlocking 
relationships spanning across sub- sectors and value- product segments.
Learning and capabilities development is the result of purposeful processes of 
trial and error, with investments in knowledge acquisition, reverse engineering, 
technology absorption and adaptation, and the scaling- up of production. 
Opportunities are not simply discovered but need to be created through 
interdependent relationships between firms and with public institutions in a 
dynamic ecosystem (see Chapter 1). The core underpinnings for these processes 
of learning and capabilities development require a coalition of interests which 
value the necessary longer- term investment in shared facilities, rather than short- 
term rent seeking (Khan and Blankenburg, 2009; Chang and Andreoni, 2020; and 
Chapters 1, 14).
15.2.2 Insights from Manufacturing Industries in South Africa
The studies of key industry groupings presented in the book reveal the importance 
of understanding capabilities and interdependencies on the ground, as well as 
how these interact with the dominant interests. They reflect an interesting mix of 
continuities and change.
The metals, machinery, and plastics industries exemplify the lack of structural 
transformation at the heart of the South African economy, as well as pointing to 
areas of potential. Over three decades, there have been major changes within 
industries. These have seen the internationalization of the industries in terms of 
ownership, technologies, and trade. However, the capital- intensive upstream 
basic industries were even slightly more—rather than less—important in 
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manufacturing value added in 2019 than in 1994.1 This reflects the weak per-
form ance of diversified manufacturing industries and contrasts with the more 
successful middle- income countries where manufacturing has continued to lead 
in building industrial capabilities, such that countries have escaped the ‘middle- 
income technology trap’ (Andreoni and Tregenna, 2020; and Chapter 11).
The dominant basic steel company in South Africa, now part of the largest 
global steel producer ArcelorMittal, has continued to receive support, including 
in the form of tariff protection. The upstream basic steel sub- sector, in which it is 
the leading producer, has continued to record a large trade surplus. By compari-
son, the downstream fabricated metal products and machinery manufacturers 
have recorded growing trade deficits and only islands of competitive capabilities, 
in a similar continuity (Chapter 3). The main basic chemicals company, Sasol, has 
performed well in South Africa while continuing to benefit from a favourable 
regulatory dispensation in liquid fuels and natural gas, and has used the profits to 
invest in less successful offshore ventures (Mondliwa and Roberts,  2019; and 
Chapter 4). The downstream and diversified plastic products sub- sector has per-
formed very poorly, with growing trade deficits (Chapter 4). Growth in down-
stream activities creates employment and has strong linkages to advanced 
capabilities such as in design and engineering services. Yet, there have not been 
effective industrial policies to leverage off the existing strong capabilities in seg-
ments of machinery production, led by that for the mining industry. This con-
trasts with a number of other countries where initiatives have successfully built 
industrial clusters in machinery and equipment (Chapter 3).
Along with machinery, plastic products are a critical industry for adopting and 
adapting to digitalization. The sub- sector brings together advances in materials 
science, design, additive manufacturing (3D printing), and integration across 
firms and along value chains to manufacture diverse components and final 
products. The plastic products sub- sector in South Africa has performed poorly, 
similar to the average for all diversified light manufacturing in the country 
(Chapter 4). In other words, there has been a regression, rather than progression, 
in terms of structural transformation. The reasons for this are a combination of a 
failure to focus on the clusters of capabilities and domestic linkages which 
the industry requires to meet the challenges of international competitiveness, 
coupled with a need to address issues of direct cost competitiveness. In other 
middle-income countries with dynamic industries, strong linkages with multi-
national corporations have been leveraged to support capabilities development 
(Chapter 4).
1 The share of basic metals industries (ferrous and non- ferrous) in manufacturing value added 
increased from 7.0 per cent in 1994 to 7.4 per cent in 2019 and the combined share of refineries and 
basic chemicals sub- sectors increased from 7.9 per cent to 13.9 per cent.
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In terms of structure, the auto sub- sector in South Africa presents a contrast 
with the metals and plastics sub- sectors: there is a well- established downstream 
assembly of motor vehicles but very weak backward linkages into components 
production, where diversified industrial capabilities are developed (Chapter  5). 
Sharp reductions in protection to induce the original equipment manufacturers 
to focus on fewer models and increase scale did bring restructuring. A targeted 
strategy, the Motor Industry Development Programme (MIDP), incentivized the 
scaling- up and export of components. This had a measure of success in a few 
components, notably exports of catalytic convertors. However, the overall picture 
after twenty- five years of industrial policies (including the Automotive Production 
and Development Programme (APDP)) has revealed a relatively large assembly 
industry with weak linkages into components (Chapter 5). The policies remained 
oriented in favour of the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and did not 
meet the challenges South Africa faces of being a small market in a global 
industry. This compares unfavourably with some middle- income countries such 
as Thailand. There, the balance has been in the other direction, with much strong 
clusters of components manufacturers and fewer models being assembled, but in 
much larger volumes than in South Africa (Barnes et al., 2017).
The South African fruit industry offers an interesting and important 
comparison (Chapter  6). In the absence of government targeting, key industry 
actors have coordinated effectively along the value chain to build the industrial 
capabilities required to deliver high- value fruit to export markets. This is 
particularly evident in citrus fruits, where industry bodies are relatively well 
organized and have brought in more participants, including smaller producers, 
while adopting improved technologies for higher- value niche products. When 
the apartheid- era agricultural boards were abolished in 1997, citrus growers 
formed the South African Citrus Growers Association (CGA) to continue to 
promote market access, research and technical development, and knowledge 
transfer. This included what became known as the Citrus Academy, which focused 
on developing a quality learning system for the industry and on improving access 
to skills development for all participants. The CGA was funded by voluntary 
levies paid by the growers, which later became a statutory levy to fund research 
and market access (Chapter 6). On the back of these investments, South Africa 
became the second- largest exporter of citrus in the world. In contrast, in other 
fruits such as avocados and berries, South Africa has not performed as well 
as  there has been less success in broader industry accumulation of cross- 
cutting capabilities, such as in research and technical development to meet 
phytosanitary requirements for export market access. A range of other countries 
demonstrate the potential for stronger growth that can be achieved through 
realizing the ‘industrialization of freshness’ (Cramer and Sender, 2019; Cramer 
and Tregenna, 2020).
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Overall, there has been limited collaboration for ‘learning’ and building 
capabilities in South Africa, due in part to the entrenched power of existing industry 
interests, and the consumption orientation of urban middle- and upper- income 
earners. As a result, there has not been the investment and effort required for 
processes of adopting and adapting technology for capability- building across 
related activities in industrial ecosystems. While successful industrializers have 
managed processes of international integration to build domestic linkages in local 
clusters of deepening capabilities (Lee, 2019), this has not been the case in South 
Africa. Notwithstanding small islands of excellence, overall, South Africa has 
been stuck in a middle- income technology trap with premature deindustrialization 
(Andreoni and Tregenna, 2020; and Chapter 11). Far- reaching liberalization has 
meant the economy is highly internationalized in terms of trade, ownership of 
businesses, and portfolio capital flows. This has translated not into substantial 
sustained growth in foreign direct investment and exports, but rather a volatile 
currency with periods of overvaluation in resource booms. Power has remained 
concentrated in core businesses which are now internationalized. The country 
has not been able to drive an agenda for structural transformation supported by a 
broad coalition of interests.
The vicious circles at work in South Africa point to the possible ‘traps and gaps’ 
facing middle- income countries, which must be confronted for sustainable 
structural transformation.
15.3 Obstacles to Acquiring Advanced Industrial Capabilities: 
Traps and Gaps
The challenges facing the ongoing acquisition of advanced industrial capabilities 
have changed with the internationalization of business, growth of GVCs, and 
increased trade in intermediate goods. Intermediate goods accounted for almost 
half of total world merchandise trade in 2018 (UNCTAD, 2020: 12). There is a 
number of vicious circles in which middle- income countries can get trapped. 
There are also gaps in the support required for businesses which need to be filled 
by targeted policies and institutions for industrial development (such as 
supporting skills and technology).
15.3.1 The Complexities of Building Local Capabilities and Linking 
into GVCs for Healthy Industrial Ecosystems
Building the linkages required to keep pace with technological change has 
become harder for middle- income countries in the context of increased global 
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concentration and changing patterns of the internationalization of business. 
When domestic industries do not move beyond producing at the relatively less 
technologically sophisticated levels of GVCs with low, and declining, shares of the 
overall value added, the economies get stuck in what Andreoni and Tregenna 
have called the ‘middle- income technology trap’ (Andreoni and Tregenna, 2020; 
and Chapter 11).
Countering this dynamic requires coordinated measures to shape the nature 
of articulation into the global economy—to deliberately build local linkages 
and thus achieve a measure of independence from the lead firms through 
stronger local ecosystems. This is at the heart of the challenges of structural 
transformation (Chapter  1). Participation in GVCs does not lead to upgrading 
and inclusive development outcomes ‘unless increasing shares of value added are 
created and captured domestically and are fairly distributed among different 
social groups’ (Ponte et al., 2019: 2). The initial integration into GVCs (the initial 
‘in’ phase in Lee et al., 2018) has enabled international markets to be accessed by 
local producers, as the large firms governing the GVCs have relocated production 
to lower- cost sites around the world. While this has held the potential for 
learning- by- doing and upgrading of capabilities through GVC participation, the 
upgrading has largely not been realized in middle- income countries. There has 
also been ongoing dependence on the international lead firms. Instead, it has 
become evident that a partial de- coupling from the GVCs (an ‘out’ phase) is 
necessary if domestic production networks are to be built up; this enables the 
possibility of a subsequent re- integration into the GVCs, on different terms 
(Lee, 2019; and Chapter 13).
Examples of South Korea, Taiwan, and China demonstrate the value of the ‘out’ 
phase of local linkages for the outcomes of international integration in the 1990s 
and 2000s. Producers in these East Asian economies developed their own design 
and own brands—requiring local design, R&D, and marketing capabilities. Sadly, 
in these periods, South Africa, along with many countries in Latin America, 
failed to diversify and build capabilities. What happened instead was further 
international integration in the 2000s leading to a hollowing- out of industrial 
capabilities. This is reflected in the higher foreign value added in gross exports in 
South Africa and Latin American countries, compared with these East Asian 
countries (Chapter 13).
The exceptions in specific industries in South Africa and other middle- income 
countries reinforce these overall insights. For example, in mining machinery and 
equipment, countries such as Australia and Chile have built local production 
systems (Chapter 3). In agriculture, South African fresh fruit producers illustrate 
what can be achieved (Chapter 6). In the automotive industry, Thailand provides 
an example of strong backward linkages to components producers being built 
(Chapter 5). These are examples in which linking back from GVCs has seen the 
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substitution of some imports of sophisticated intermediate goods with local 
production, thus reducing the foreign value added in gross exports.
15.3.2 Technology Traps, Digitalization, and Skills
A set of alternative measures and institutions is required to avoid a trap in which 
industrial capabilities are persistently undermined. And, the coalitions of interest 
to support them need to be built and sustained. Sophisticated and diversified 
industrial ecosystems involve strong horizontal technology linkages fostered by 
robust support for institutions for R&D, design, testing, and prototyping. Skills 
development alongside organizational capabilities are also priorities, which have 
become even more important given the technological changes under way with 
wide- scale digitalization (Chapter 12).
There has been a lack of coherence between technology and industrial policies 
in South Africa, as in many other middle- income and developing countries. In 
South Africa there is also a gap in effective institutions of industrial policy and 
skills development. The opportunities and challenges of digitalization and other 
dimensions of the fourth industrial revolution make bridging this gap and the 
capability shortfalls even more essential. Otherwise, instead of achieving the 
necessary catching- up, South Africa and other middle- income countries risk 
being left even further behind.
Digitalization involves both incremental and disruptive changes with 
transversal technological developments which cut across industries. There are 
three particular aspects of this that have already impacted on structural 
transformation in middle- income countries such as South Africa. The first aspect 
is the deployment of digital technologies to integrate production within and 
across firms along supply chains, involving a stepwise change in coordination 
efficiency. Together with the extensive adoption of sensors, this allows for real- 
time monitoring of product flow and quality. Second, the combination of design 
software, additive manufacturing, and material science dramatically reduces the 
time to develop new designs and to customize these to requirements. Third, 
advanced manufacturing, automation, and robotics are changing production and 
patterns of comparative advantage.
These links to root capabilities in engineering, electronics, design, and data 
analysis mean that investment in the appropriate skills and organizational 
capabilities is essential for countries and firms to benefit from the digital dividend. 
The cross- cutting nature of these technologies means that it is imperative to have 
functional institutions that support domestic horizontal linkages. These 
institutions can intermediate and fill gaps along the entire innovation and 
production value chains.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 15/07/21, SPi
346 Towards a New Industrial Policy
Some of this potential has been realized in South Africa, evident in a few 
islands of success (Chapters 3 and 12). However, the overall lack of coherence, 
particularly between skills development policy and industrial policy, means that 
firms have often ‘privatized’ the necessary training, which implies a bias against 
smaller firms as well as a reduced portability of skills between firms. There needs 
to be a national system for adult education and training. The industry studies and 
firm- level evidence point to a major gap here, notably regarding the performance 
of the Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs). Similarly, rather than 
contributing to shared facilities and a local ecosystem for product development 
and testing, successful firms have established their own in- house capabilities or 
drawn on the remote facilities of foreign parents. Overall, the government’s 
technology and industrial policies have been fragmented and ineffective in 
ensuring a collective approach to structural transformation. The counter- 
examples, such as citrus (Chapter 6), reinforce the general picture.
Extensive company and industry- level evidence shows that achieving 
competitiveness is about understanding value chains and building clusters to 
address collective challenges in productive capabilities at different levels of the 
chain. In South Africa there have been very few cluster initiatives in the areas 
where structural transformation is strongly required. For instance, strategies to 
build downstream capabilities in the metals, machinery, and equipment 
industries, where South Africa already has a significant industrial base, have not 
been effective (Chapter 3). This is because of industrial policies being undermined 
by the influence of upstream firms (Chapters 8 and 14), the lack of coordination 
of policy levers across departments, and the inconsistency with macroeconomic 
policy. Furthermore, coordination with other areas, notably public procurement, 
has been lacking in design and especially in implementation.
The traps and gaps that have been identified here compound each other, and 
have transversal effects across firms. Individual decisions taken by a single actor—
whether a firm or an institution of the state—can have implications for the 
competitiveness of entire production systems. As such, it is important that firms 
are not viewed in isolation, but rather as part of an industrial ecosystem of 
interdependent activities involving multiple heterogeneous actors which 
cooperate, compete, and co- evolve to create a web of complementary capabilities 
that supports innovation and continuous industrial renewal (Moore,  1993; 
Andreoni 2018).
15.3.3 The Political Economy of Structural Transformation
The ways in which industrial policy interfaces with powerful incumbents and, in 
turn, the way in which powerful organizations lobby different parts of the state 
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can result in an insidious vicious circle (Amsden,  1989; Andreoni and 
Chang, 2019). In South Africa, the extreme levels of concentration have been a 
key challenge for the enforcement of industrial policy as weak reciprocal 
conditionalities and the lack of policy alignment have resulted in the undermining 
of policy tools. The consolidation of unproductive rents and powerful positions 
have then further undermined industrial policy effectiveness (Chapter 14). This 
includes changes in procurement policies in South Africa in the late 1990s that 
prioritized narrowly defined value for money, essentially ruling out developmental 
impacts (Hirsch,  2005). The corporatization of network industries further 
encouraged under- investment in electricity transmission and the rail network for 
diversified exports as these all reduced short- term profit margins even while 
being critical for medium- term structural transformation (Das Nair and 
Roberts, 2017). At the same time, preferential terms for heavy industry users of 
energy, rail, and ports had been locked in, reinforcing the existing industrial 
structure.
Another compounding factor in South Africa has been the process of the 
fragmentation of the state, notably under the President Zuma administrations in 
2009–18, where a proliferation of different departments and agencies following a 
raft of different policies resulted in overall policy incoherence. This made ‘state 
capture’ for rent- seeking easier and undermined the National Industrial Policy 
Framework (Bhorat et al.,  2017; Zalk,  2017). Reversing this fragmentation and 
breaking the vicious circle to enable a coordinated industrial strategy is one of the 
key challenges which has faced President Ramaphosa since 2018. It means 
confronting the power of incumbents as well as rebuilding the state.
The structural transformation required to build diversified capabilities will 
self- evidently only be promoted and sustained if it is backed by a sufficiently 
strong group of constituencies. As, by its nature, this transformation will broaden 
the returns over time, this raises the question about the mobilization of support 
for the medium- term investments to support such transformation. This support 
is critical given the concentrations of incumbent power which may see their 
positions as being under threat.
Transformations are intrinsically related to inequality and power. Countries 
where strong local linkages have been built and the capabilities challenges have 
been overcome to support more diverse and sophisticated industrial activities 
also tend to have relatively more equal income distributions (Palma,  2019a). 
Conversely, those experiencing premature deindustrialization have had increasing 
levels of inequality (Baymul and Sen, 2019; Palma, 2019b). However, the extreme 
inequality of outcomes are themselves unsustainable, as seen in South Africa with 
the pursuit of rent capture through the state. This grew dramatically as high levels 
of inequality persisted in the 2000s, along with mass unemployment, even while 
aggregate levels of growth increased. The economy experienced deindustrialization 
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and a hollowing- out of capabilities with employment growth in low productivity 
services (Chapters 2 and 11).
The entrenched interests which are inimical to processes of structural 
transformation can be due to firms occupying quasi- monopoly positions where 
they are able to continue to extract profits from an inherited market structure 
with persisting barriers to the entry and growth of smaller rivals (Chapter  8). 
South Africa is an extreme case—with its high levels of concentration, the role of 
apartheid in supporting strategic firms and industries, and the legacy of this 
support (Buthelezi et al., 2019; Vilakazi et al., 2020; and Chapters 3, 4, 8, and 14). 
These businesses will naturally lobby vigorously to protect their narrow positions, 
even while some of the costs of a faltering development path will also fall on 
them. It has become evident that, in the early 1990s, some of the companies at the 
commanding heights of the South African economy had expected to make far- 
reaching concessions to support economic transformation. For example, the 
diversified mining conglomerate Anglo American was independently working 
out mechanisms for a redistributive tax, while Sasol was implementing a pricing 
structure designed to support downstream industries (Mondliwa and Roberts, 
2019; Michie,  2020). These were not pursued when it became evident that 
companies would not be held to such measures.
Competition can discipline incumbents, with rivalry between firms further 
promoting productivity improvements as firms invest in upgrading and improving 
production capabilities in order to win market share. Competitive rivalry also 
relates to how easily new market participants can bring products and services to 
market including, in the South African context, the extent of meaningful partici-
pation by challenger black entrepreneurs. Conversely, the exertion of market 
power can contribute to inequality by facilitating a transfer from the poor to the 
wealthy in the form of management compensation, profits, and shareholder divi-
dends emanating from anticompetitive conduct (Ennis et al.,  2019). The South 
African experience demonstrates the problems of concentration and barriers to 
the entry and growth of smaller rivals and the over- reliance on competition law 
enforcement for making markets work and engaging with entrenched corporate 
power (Chapters 8, 9, 10, and 14). It should in fact be just one component that is 
integrated with other policy domains. Competition law enforcement cannot cre-
ate competition in the face of barriers to entry and, working through legal 
mechanisms, it tends to be very slow (Roberts, 2020).
Industrial capability- building within and across firms requires a medium- to 
long- term financial commitment to investments. This is undermined where 
shareholders are focused on short- term returns and predatory value extraction 
practices (see Lazonick and Shin, 2020; and Chapter 10). The dramatic growth of 
financial services in South Africa has not been accompanied by higher levels 
of productive investment and instead reflects a balance of influence in favour of 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 15/07/21, SPi
Antonio Andreoni et al. 349
short- term returns (Chapter  10). This is particularly evident in the reliance on 
foreign portfolio and direct investment flows in the 2000s, which in turn pushed 
macroeconomic policy in the direction of high interest rates to continue attracting 
these footloose inflows. The policy stance was linked to a focus on macroeconomic 
‘stability’ (narrowly understood as low inflation), as the central criterion for 
securing putative business confidence. The stance amplified the effect of the com-
modities boom in the 2000s as inflows strengthened the currency, making 
imports cheap, and fuelling consumption. Following the 2008 global financial 
crisis, the narrow inflation focus of monetary policy, with higher interest rates as 
a key tool—and even while the drivers of higher prices were decisions over 
administered prices—simply led to prolonged austerity and entrenched deindus-
trialization. A different settlement requires policies that are oriented to invest-
ment by, and in, smaller producers, entrepreneurs, and workers. It also needs to 
promote a variety of corporate forms of ownership, including employee- owned 
businesses, and mutuals (Michie, 2017).
Although not yet fully evident at the time of writing, the impact of the Covid- 19 
pandemic has further pointed to the need for a long- term perspective on building 
local capabilities; this is discussed further at the end of the chapter.
15.4 Towards a New Industrial Strategy
Five important lessons have been identified in the book from the South African 
experience. While there are aspects that are specific to South Africa, these have 
broader relevance for middle- income countries.
First, premature deindustrialization needs to be arrested and reversed, 
including the growth and upgrading of the manufacturing sector.
Second, the technological changes under way with the digitalization of 
economic activities mean that developing an industrial ecosystem of firms with 
effective links to public institutions is critical for increasing domestic value 
addition and strategic integration in international value chains.
Third, inclusive industrialization depends on achieving structural change, 
dismantling barriers to entry to allow a new system of accumulation to emerge. 
This is particularly important in South Africa, with its extraordinarily high levels 
of inequality, but also for middle- income countries more generally.
Fourth, structural transformation depends on a country’s political settlement, 
specifically whether coalitions of interests that support the organization of 
industries for long- term investment in capabilities hold sway.
Fifth, purposive and coordinated industrial policies, as well as coordination 
between industrial policy and other relevant policy domains, are central to 
achieving these goals.
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Along with other middle- income countries, South Africa needs an economy 
that is more dynamic, competitive, and sustainable, where innovation and 
productivity lead to better jobs with high wages, and where entry is supported 
as part of ensuring wider participation. For this to happen, there needs to be a 
new vision for reindustrialization under a political settlement that prioritizes 
long- term investment in productive capacity and rewards effort and creativity 
rather than incumbency. Rather than settling for piecemeal initiatives, placing 
re- industrialization and industrial policies at the centre of the country’s development 
strategy requires a broad rethink.
Key considerations for an industrial strategy approach that is in support of 
inclusive (re)industrialization and structural transformation are set out below.
15.4.1 Inclusive Industrialization and Confronting Concentration
Manufacturing- driven structural transformation decreases inequality through 
learning, the creation of higher- earning jobs, and sharing in productivity 
improvements and linkages across the economy (Baymul and Sen, 2019). Along 
with high- productivity services in areas such as design and engineering, this is an 
important component of healthy industrial ecosystems. These should be 
accompanied by stronger worker protections, a system of lifelong learning and 
adult education, and equitable earnings in terms of race and gender, reflecting 
skills and employment opportunities. Such a trajectory is consistent with a diverse 
range of enterprises, with profits being earned from effort and creativity, and 
lower levels of concentration of ownership and control.
The negative implications of economic concentration, of which South Africa is 
an extreme case, are now well recognized (Buthelezi et al.,  2019). While 
competition law enforcement can address the conduct of existing large firms and 
evaluate mergers between them, it does not create more competition and wider 
participation in the face of barriers to entry (Vilakazi et al.,  2020). A broader 
competition policy that forms part of industrial policy is required (Mondliwa 
et al., 2021). In South Africa, the reductions in barriers to the entry and expansion of 
challenger businesses, especially black entrepreneurs, is a critical consideration. 
Industrial policy interventions can address vertical integration and be coupled 
with development finance to enable the investment in capabilities and learning 
necessary to grow efficient businesses (Chapter 9). Effective regulation for wider 
participation is an important aspect, especially in sectors where there are strong 
network effects, such as telecommunications. The analysis of barriers to entry has 
further highlighted the importance of access to markets for rivals. One example is 
a possible ‘supermarkets code’, where retailers commit to open up shelf space to 
smaller businesses, and engage in supplier development initiatives (Chisoro- 
Dube and Das Nair, 2020).
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Black economic empowerment (BEE) is another important factor in inclusive 
industrialization in South Africa. BEE was adopted through a combination of 
policies, regulations, codes, and charters to aim for wide- scale economic inclusion 
of the historically disadvantaged population in ownership, management, and 
through skills development initiatives (Hirsch  2005; Bhorat et al.,  2014; and 
Chapter 9). The model did not, however, fundamentally transform the concentra-
tion of ownership and control at the core of the economy (Ponte et  al.,  2007; 
Mondliwa and Roberts, 2020). Instead, through incentivizing large incumbents to 
bring influential black shareholders on board it has reinforced the political influ-
ence of the large companies and the financial sector (Chapters 9 and 14). While it 
has brought some racial diversification of the middle class and of management 
and ownership, and some growth of black- owned supplier firms, it has not funda-
mentally opened up the economy to wider participation, more effective competition, 
and investment by a more diverse set of businesses.
A focus on empowering participation will combine breaking down barriers to 
entry and opening up routes to market, together with more effective land reform, 
access to finance for wealth creation, and skills development (Vilakazi et al., 2020; 
and Chapter  9). This would also enable enterprises with diverse ownership 
models, such as mutuals and employee partnerships, to compete effectively and 
generate returns for a wider group of stakeholders (Michie,  2017; Michie and 
Padayachee,  2020). Only by bringing the core components of value creation 
together to reward effort, investment, and innovation can the economy be opened 
up, leading to higher levels of overall growth and development, and greater 
inclusion.
15.4.2 Building a Broad Coalition for Reindustrialization
South Africa’s course for reindustrialization and inclusive growth needs to be 
based on a broad coalition which has an interest in, and which focuses on, 
productive investment and widening economic participation. The narrow 
coalition of elites which has largely determined the economic policy agenda has 
undermined investment and reinforced, rather than changed, the existing 
structure of economic power. Reindustrialization requires, among other meas-
ures, large- scale public investment to provide effective public transport and edu-
cation for economic activity, alongside long- term private investment and 
entrepreneurship.
Current levels of poverty and inequality are unsustainable, and the youth are 
bearing the brunt of the alarmingly high unemployment rates. The creation 
of jobs and livelihoods is a priority for avoiding further unravelling of the 
social fabric and needs to be placed at the centre of a new social compact 
(Chapters 8 and 14). Though the current political settlement in South Africa has 
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accommodated the small black middle class to an extent, the burden of what has 
been referred to colloquially as the ‘black tax’ (in which black professionals pro-
vide significant financial support to extended family) is just one reminder that 
things need to change more broadly. Higher earnings for a small minority of the 
black population is not a sustainable solution.
So what is the new political settlement that can inform the new deal to ensure 
that it delivers real economic transformation? A new political settlement for 
industrialization must speak to and mobilize previously excluded key 
constituencies (Chapter 14). In South Africa these include the industrial working 
class (represented in industrial trade unions) through effective skills upgrading 
and investment, productive black entrepreneurs through opening up economic 
opportunity (Chapter 9), and producers of high- value agricultural crops, as the 
experience with citrus shows is possible (Chapter 6).
Naturally, no such coalition is fixed over time and the managing of conflicting 
claims is a central dimension of industrial policy. There would also be points of 
contestation within such a coalition, such as conflict between industrial workers 
and capitalists over wages and other issues. Nonetheless, a coalescence of interests 
and, crucially, interventions, is needed to drive an agenda of reindustrialization and 
structural change. The settlement must speak to the aspirations of key constituen-
cies, especially in urban areas, where the majority now live and where industrial 
agglomerations are built.
15.4.3 Incentivizing and Investing in Capabilities Development
The fourth industrial revolution is bringing the role of technology in moving 
countries forward into sharp focus. The unprecedented pace of the development 
and adoption of new technologies, and the systemic impact of these technologies, 
poses both challenges and opportunities for middle- income countries (Andreoni 
and Roberts,  2020; Andreoni and Tregenna,  2020; Sturgeon,  2021; and 
Chapters 11 and 12).
Digital technologies, in particular, tend to have a transformative impact on the 
existing technology platforms. Digitalization can widen the technology gap, or it 
can provide a bridge for countries to catch up. It means that industrial policy, 
combined with effective economic regulation, is more important than ever. 
Industrial economies have historically targeted and shaped the development of 
new industrial ecosystems by prioritizing certain technologies, as well as emerging 
sectors and related markets, in an entrepreneurial role for the state (Mazzucato, 
2013; and Chapter 12).
While the apartheid government heavily supported innovation and industrial 
development in organizations related to its own objectives (such as military 
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technologies), post- apartheid governments have had more broad- based 
innovation strategies. Technology is, however, embodied in investment, and the 
low level of investment in the economy means poor progress in technological 
upgrading. A strategy for building capabilities must bring together technology 
policy, investment, and industry incentives to present a coherent path for firms. It 
also requires rethinking the skills and training system to provide for lifelong skills 
development that is appropriate to the challenges of digitalization.
Incentives, technological change, skills development, and development finance 
therefore all need to work together, along with cluster initiatives at the local level. 
Cluster initiatives have a key role to play in linking skills development and shared 
facilities for technological capabilities such as design, testing, and prototyping. 
They can also support firms to pool resources, creating economies of scale and 
developing supply markets. Understanding how collective action can be supported 
for private investment in capabilities by groups of firms is central to building 
dynamic industrial clusters, together with effective institutions of industrial policy. 
In the few cases where clusters have been successful, local and provincial govern-
ments have played a leading role, given the geographical embeddedness of cluster 
initiatives—and they can continue to do so.
In order for government incentives and other support measures to have a 
wider impact on the economy, it is necessary that incentive packages are designed 
with robust and enforceable conditionalities so that deeper local capabilities are 
developed. The conditionalities need to ensure that the industrial policies do 
induce decisions that are consistent with the productive changes required for real 
transformation and are not another form of extractive rents (Chapter 14). On the 
contrary, conditionalities should ensure that rents are ploughed back into 
productive investment in support of expanded production and upgrading.
15.4.4 Understanding and Pursuing Regional Opportunities
The industrial ecosystems perspective proposes that geographical boundaries of 
ecosystems be defined by the value creation process and the structure and 
evolution of interdependencies, rather than national borders (Andreoni, 2018). 
The real boundaries of an ecosystem can therefore be identified by tracking the 
network of value- creation linkages involving organizations around and beyond 
national borders. In South Africa’s case, this means that some of the ecosystems 
may span a number of countries in the Southern Africa Development Community 
(SADC). Industrial strategies of SADC countries would thus be more effective if 
they considered the interdependencies of organizations operating across borders. 
For example, regional value chains have been an integral component of Asia’s 
rapid industrialization (Scholvin et al., 2019).
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The SADC region has been less successful in developing regional value chains 
even while an industrialization strategy does exist. Partly this reflects the lack of 
commitment to a shared regional vision for industrial development across 
Southern Africa, even with the wider Southern African region being the most 
important market for many of South Africa’s diversified products and services 
(Arndt and Roberts, 2018; Nkhonjera and Roberts, 2020). However, companies 
are integrating across the region, such as in the case of supermarkets, 
agroprocessing, and mining equipment supplies (Das Nair et al., 2018; Fessehaie 
and Rustomjee,  2018; Bosiu and Vilkazi,  2020). Yet, the regulatory and policy 
framework remains uncoordinated in practice. Moreover, regional value chains 
are crucial for resilience and building capabilities, especially in the context of 
climate change (Ncube, 2018; Paremoer, 2018; Bell et al., 2020).
15.4.5 The Climate Crisis and Environmentally 
Sustainable Industrialization
The climate crisis has urgent implications for what is manufactured as well as how 
it is produced. Whereas advanced economies were able to industrialize with 
little regard to the effects of industrialization on climate change (and should now 
bear the burden of responsibility), this is now an urgent problem facing all coun-
tries and economies. Developing countries need to demonstrate leadership in 
charting a path for structural transformation and industrialization that is consist-
ent with a green new deal (Pollin, 2020). Given the climate change imperative, 
structural transformation is even more important for ensuring shifts to more 
sophisticated activities with scope for cumulative productivity increases at lower 
levels of CO2 emissions. The alternative is competition in industries such as basic 
metals and basic chemicals on the basis of cheap energy and old dirty technolo-
gies. South Africa’s dependence on these has led to it being one of the highest 
emitters of CO2 per capita among middle- income and developing countries, 
although still behind oil producers and many industrialized nations.2 More 
technologically advanced production can increase value added in middle- income 
countries, at lower levels of emissions (Avenyo and Tregenna, 2021).
South Africa has developed policies on labour standards and environmental 
sustainability. These have been in line with international moves to incorporate 
sustainability and labour protections into the various international trade rules 
and codes adopted by lead firms in GVCs. However, the changes driven by 
international lead firms have typically related to placing greater requirements on 
suppliers to meet standards. They have in fact reinforced the governance of value 
2 See https://www.wri.org/blog/2020/02/greenhouse- gas- emissions- by- country- sector, accessed 23 
October 2020.
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chains by lead firms in industrialized markets, placing even greater cost burdens 
on suppliers in developing countries like South Africa (Ponte,  2019; and 
Chapter 7). The centrality of industrial policy in the ‘green transition’ needs to 
tackle the power dynamic in GVCs, as advocated in this book.
South Africa and other middle- income countries therefore need to urgently 
shift to an industrialization path that is aligned with a green transition (Altenburg 
and Rodrik, 2017; Ashman et al., 2020; Montmasson- Claire, 2020; Pollin, 2020). 
This requires the identification of emerging opportunities, and the building or 
adapting of firm- level capabilities to take up those opportunities. A just green 
transition implies taking account of the emissions in consumption, whether 
locally produced or imported. Including the climate impacts into assessment of 
production means that re- industrializing countries can more effectively target 
being competitive exporters of those products where demand will increase, given 
the urgent changes required around the globe.
15.5 Conclusion: Policy Coordination for Reindustrialization  
in a Post- Covid World
At the time of writing, South Africa and the rest of the world are in the throes of 
the Covid- 19 pandemic. Even after the medical emergency has passed, the 
economic consequences of the pandemic and of associated control measures are 
likely to endure for a long time. Like other countries, South Africa has seen 
widespread closures or downscaling of firms, and layoffs. The greater underlying 
economic fragility and the pre- existing crisis of unemployment in the country 
mean that the economic effects are likely to be especially dire. Part of the 
temporary rise in unemployment is likely to translate into an upward shift in 
South Africa’s structural unemployment. The recovery initiative would need to 
address all the structural issues identified, to transform the economy.
The economic impacts of the Covid- 19 pandemic have brought widespread 
recognition once more of the short- termism of markets and a growing consensus 
on the need for state leadership in the medium- to long- term vision for a more 
resilient economy and society. Countries with stronger and more diversified local 
production capacity and technological capabilities have been better placed to 
confront the challenges posed by Covid- 19. Effective government leadership 
which can respond and mobilize the private sector has also clearly mattered, 
along with the importance of international collaboration and multilateralism 
(Jenny, 2020).
National leadership must now mobilize for structural transformation while 
international cooperation is essential in tackling the implications of climate 
change. As such, ‘building back better’ in the wake of Covid- 19 will include a shift 
to a ‘green new deal’, and realize a more inclusive and equitable development path. 
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Post- Covid global economic restructuring also has potential opportunities for 
manufacturers in South Africa and other middle- income and developing 
countries. The shortening, and reconfiguration, of GVCs provides possible 
openings for import substitution, as well as the potential for repositioning 
countries and their businesses in GVCs with a focus on strengthening linkages in 
regional value chains.
The overarching analysis in this book demonstrates the importance of a holistic 
approach to structural transformation. It is one that embraces the challenges of 
building productive capabilities in the time of digitalization and that recognizes 
value- chain linkages and power relations in industrial ecosystems. In this 
framework, industrialization is integrated into overall economic planning and is 
based on an understanding of sectoral dynamics and opportunities, while taking 
the essential resources of land, water, and energy into account. It must reach and 
sustain a shared and binding commitment which, through shared growth and 
investment, will lead to a reversal of the growing inequality in wealth. Experience 
from other countries shows that successful industrial policy needs to be led 
politically from the apex of government and that lessons learnt along the way 
need to be incorporated in an iterative process of continuous improvement of 
policy design and implementation.
One aspect of this is the need for a planning function, driven from the top of 
the state, that can marshal institutions and policies in support of priority goals. In 
South Africa, this sort of planning would go well beyond the role of existing 
institutions such as the National Planning Commission (NPC) or the Department 
of Planning, Monitoring, and Evaluation (DPME). In particular, coordination 
between macroeconomic policy and industrial policy is critical for structural 
transformation. This includes managing the exchange rate to ensure exports are 
competitive, as has been a key pillar of the industrial policy of industrializing 
countries. It means a fiscal policy oriented to funding infrastructure investment 
and skills.
The vision of an integrated policy agenda towards structural transformation 
implies a re- shaping of policy functions, and the experimentation of new 
institutional forms. This may include repurposing government departments, 
agencies, and other public institutions, as well as development finance, regulatory, 
and competition institutions. Better coordination and integration of roles is 
needed around policies that relate to innovation, technology, industry, trade, 
development finance, and regulating markets—providing for clear leadership and 
coordination in areas such as skills development and in key sectors such as 
energy, minerals, and agriculture. This needs to be accompanied by improved 
institutional capacity and accountability of public institutions. Changes in policies 
and institutions must drive and be supported by the emergence of a new social con-
tract that places sustainable and inclusive structural transformation at its very core.
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